


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*Missionary, Educationist, Oriental Scholar,
Born 17 August, 1761,
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Died 9 June, 1834.*

THE KATHA UPANIṢAD
Carey Centenary Volume



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THE
KATHA UPANISAD

*An Introductory Study
in the Hindu Doctrine of God
and of Human Destiny*

BY

JOSEPH NADIN RAWSON,

*Jesus College, Oxford,
Professor of the History and Philosophy
of Religion in Serampore College,
Fellow of Calcutta University.*

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श्रीगुरुभ्यो नमः

TO THE

MEMORY OF MY TEACHERS

ARTHUR ANTHONY MACDONELL

AND

JOHN NICOL FARQUHAR,

ALSO TO

SURENDRANATH DASGUPTA

as representing my Indian friends, in the University of Calcutta and elsewhere, who, in gracious hospitality of spirit, have admitted one who was once a stranger to share the riches of the Mother-land, enabling him in some degree to apprehend, what never can be learned from books alone, the living meaning of the past.

श्रद्धाञ्जलिः ॥

K. L. W. ... 187/21

PREFACE

1. **Purpose.** The *Kaṭha Upaniṣad*, though not the oldest or perhaps the profoundest, is certainly from its comparative brevity, clearness and connectedness, and also from its artistic form and dramatic interest, deservedly the most popular of the Upaniṣads. As such it has probably seen more editions than any other. Then why add a new one ?

(1) In the first place, though there have been issued in recent years many editions and translations of the chief Upaniṣads, there has been a strange lack of commentaries, which, while setting forth the traditional interpretations, also make an attempt to arrive at an independent judgment as to the meaning in the light of modern knowledge. I have attempted to deal with the *Kaṭha Upaniṣad* as I would with a Biblical text, and my friend Principal S. N. Dasgupta, of the Calcutta Sanskrit College, than whom none should know better, assures me that he knows of no similar work. Though deeply conscious of my temerity I am still more conscious of the need of this type of study. I plead a reverent desire to appreciate and understand and I shall be justified if I have shown the way to those better qualified.

(2) Some ten years ago my friend and teacher, Dr. J. N. Farquhar, suggested that I should write for one of his series a book on *The Hindu Doctrine of God*. The attempt to do so convinced me that certain preliminary studies were first necessary. I began with a study of what is perhaps the most central document for Hindu theology,—the *Vedānta Sūtras*, making a translation of the commentary of Nimbārka, which in its conciseness and absence of sectarian polemic seemed to me unique, and comparing also the interpretations of Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja, Madhva, etc., with a view to discover, if possible, the original meaning of the *Sūtras* and to evaluate the whole movement of thought. But it soon became clear that to do this a preliminary study of the Upaniṣad texts cited was first necessary, and, for one Upaniṣad at least, an attempt at an independent valuation. I chose the *Kaṭha* as most central to the development of Hindu theism. I have therefore entitled this book, 'A preliminary study in the Hindu Doctrine of God'.

(3) I have hopes that this study may be of interest to students of the History and Philosophy of Religion generally. It has also a more specific purpose. The Senate of Serampore College, which directs the studies of all the Theological Colleges in India of University grade, has prescribed the *Kaṭha Upaniṣad* as one of the texts to be studied by students of the Philosophy of Religion ; it is also prescribed for special study by those who take Sanskrit. This book has in mind the needs of both these classes of students. The portion in large type is more

especially intended for students of the Philosophy of Religion who may be ignorant of, or possess a slight knowledge of, Sanskrit. Linguistic and critical notes intended for those who are making a study of the Sanskrit text, as well as details not needed by those making a general study, are put in small type. The Serampore Senate believes that it is essential that Indian students of Christian theology should be trained to appreciate India's great heritage of thought and culture,—that Indian Christian thought must be organically and not merely geographically Indian, and must consciously seek to relate the new to the old. A *deracinée* theology, like any other rootless plant, can hardly be vital or vigorous. A truly original Indian development of Christian theology must of course have its roots in the Christian scriptures and in Christian experience, but it must also spring from knowledge of and reverence for all that is true in the religious thought and experience of India's past. Hence the prescription of such books as the *Kaṭha Upaniṣad* and the *Gītā* in a course of studies in Christian theology.

It is my earnest hope that Hindu students also will find this study of value. They have their own problem of relating new and old, and the lesson of the *Kaṭha Upaniṣad* is still needed in India to-day.

(4) Not only Indian students but also British and American students of theology may find this book of value. For those of them who contemplate missionary work in India something of the kind is essential, and even for those who do not contemplate work in India the study of certain non-Christian sacred books is necessary for a just appreciation of religious values and should find a place in every theological curriculum. The time has surely passed when the mere study of manuals of comparative religion could be regarded as sufficient.

2. **Scope.** This volume consists of (a) an Introduction, (b) the Sanskrit text of the *Kaṭha Upaniṣad* printed in Devanagari, (c) a transliterated text, (d) an original translation, and (e) a commentary.

(a) The Introduction is made as brief as possible. Students may, if they wish, omit it at first reading, since the attempt is made in the commentary to deal as fully as necessary with all important points as they arise in the text.

(b) The text does not pretend to be critical. I have compared the chief printed editions: A—the Ānandāśrama edition, B—the Bombay text of Tukārāma Jāvaji, and C—the Calcutta Bibliotheca Indica text, and have noted where they differ. I have also endeavoured in such cases to take into account the *MSS.* evidence cited in A, but this is not of much value. Fortunately the variations are very slight, and in only one case are they important.

(c) It may seem redundant to print a transliterated text also, but this has been done for the benefit of students who know little or no Sanskrit. South Indian students in particular are not usually familiar with Devanagari, but their knowledge of Sanskrit terms in their vernacular enables them to follow the argument with the aid of a transliterated text. For

Western students also who are not Sanskritists the transliteration should be of help, and may, I hope, lure some of them on to the study of Sanskrit by making a difficult path somewhat easier.

(d) In the translation I have been tempted by the success of my revered teacher, Professor A. A. Macdonell, in his *Hymns from the Rigveda*, to attempt to indicate the poetry of the Upaniṣad by rendering it in a free verse, corresponding as nearly as possible to the original metres. This, I am afraid, in many cases only means that an *anuṣṭubh* verse is rendered by four octosyllabic and a *triṣṭubh* by four eleven-syllabled lines, but as a correct translation has been my first consideration even this measure of adherence to the metre has not always been possible.

(e) In the commentary I have endeavoured to approach the text without assumptions, seeking to apprehend the *samanvaya*, or the connected meaning of the whole, and guided chiefly by this in the interpretation of the parts. Right through I have of course been indebted to the great commentary of Śāṅkara (A.D. 788-850) from which, wherever helpful, I have freely quoted. Most later commentators have, however, been far too dominated by Śāṅkara, and this is true not only of Indians but also of Europeans like Gough and Deussen. I too started out under the guidance of Śāṅkara and Deussen, regarding the Upaniṣad as a monistic Vedānta work with certain dualist (Sāṃkhya) and theistic accommodations, but have been forced to a different conclusion. The first *adhyāya* is a unity in its thought, and the second, though probably somewhat later, occupies substantially the same standpoint. This standpoint I now view as definitely theistic, sometimes emphasizing the unity of all in a way that approaches positive or realistic pantheism but never recognizing the doctrine of illusion, and never therefore teaching the negative idealistic pantheism or acosmism of Śāṅkara.

Unfortunately Rāmānuja (c. 1050-1137) did not comment directly on the *Kaṭha*, but he quotes from it extensively in his great commentary on the *Vedānta-sūtras*,—the *Sribhāṣya*, and discusses what is its *samanvaya* or connected meaning. I have quoted some of the relevant passages. On the whole I believe his interpretations are correct, though he is sometimes too scholastic. I have also consulted and occasionally quoted the Vedānta-sūtra commentaries of Nimbārka (? 1100-1162) and Madhva (1190-1278). Madhva's *Kaṭha-bhāṣya* is definitely sectarian and is of little help for the interpretation of the Upaniṣad. Belonging to the school of Rāmānuja is the *Kaṭha-bhāṣya* of Raṅgarāmānuja, but this is very late and I have made no use of it.

In conclusion I must acknowledge my debt of gratitude to teachers and friends who have helped me to gain whatever knowledge I have of Indian thought, many of whom have read through the present work at various stages and offered valuable suggestions. My first debt is to two successive occupants of the Boden Sanskrit chair at Oxford. It was my privilege to read Sanskrit for two years with Professor A. A. Macdonell, most

genial and encouraging of teachers, and I have ventured to dedicate this book first of all to him as a tribute of gratitude from an unworthy pupil. Professor F. W. Thomas, who has succeeded him, has kindly read through the manuscript of the Introduction and the proofs of the text and commentary and given me most generous help. To two other old Oxford teachers I am also greatly indebted,—to Dr. J. N. Farquhar, late Professor of Comparative Religion at Manchester University, who made such notable contribution to the study of Indian Religion both by his own writings and by the encouragement he gave to others, and to Dr. Clement C. J. Webb, sometime Oriel Professor of the Philosophy of the Christian Religion, for the inspiration of his teaching and friendship. In the land of my adoption I owe most to Principal S. N. Dasgupta of the Calcutta Sanskrit College, whose erudition I vainly admire from far but whose friendship has been an unfailing stimulation. Another friend whose scholarly judgment and knowledge of philology have been of help is Dr. R. L. Turner, Professor of Sanskrit in London University. It is impossible to acknowledge all the help received from published works but I owe a special debt, which will be evident to readers of the Introduction, to a fellow-pupil of Professor Macdonell (though even then far exalted),—Professor A. Berriedale Keith of Edinburgh. To Dr. H. N. Randle of the India Office Library, Dr. Van Manen of the Asiatic Society of Bengal and Dr. Adityanath Mukherji, Registrar of Calcutta University, I am grateful for help with literature, and to Dr. Satkari Mookerjee of Calcutta University and my colleague Professor H. P. Sengupta of Serampore College, for help in correction of proofs. The mistakes that remain are my own. If I waited to correct them all this work would never be published. I send it forth in the hope that through the co-operation of friendly critics something more worthy may eventuate.

10th January, 1934.

J. N. R.

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ABBREVIATIONS

AND BIBLIOGRAPHY OF WORKS FREQUENTLY CITED.

I. EDITIONS OF THE SANSKRIT TEXT OF THE KĀṬHA.

- A. Ānandāśrama Text .. *Kāṭhakopaniṣat, sa-ṅkā-dvaya-śāṅkara-bhāṣyopetā*, (Ānandāśrama Sanskrit Series), Bombay, 1914.
- B. Bombay (Nirṇayasāgara) Text. *Iśādyasottaraśatopaniṣadaḥ*, Tukārāma Jāvaji, Nirṇayasāgara Press, Bombay, 1917.
- C. Calcutta (Bibliotheca Indica) Text. *Six Upaniṣads, viz., Iśā, Kena, Kaṭha, Praśna*, Muṇḍ. and Māṇḍ., edited with the Commentary of Śāṅkara Āchārya and the Gloss of Ānanda Giri, by E. Röer, (B.I. Series), Calcutta, 1850.

II. TRANSLATIONS, ETC., OF THE KĀṬHA UPANIṢAD.

- Arabinda Ghose *The Kaṭha Upanishad*, text and trans., Poona, 1919.
- Böhtlingk *Drei kritisch gesichtete und übersetzte Upanishad mit erklärenden Anmerkungen*, text, trans., critical notes on *Kaṭha, Ait., Praśna*, Leipzig, 1891.
- Charpentier Jarl Charpentier: *Kāṭhaka Upaniṣad*, Introduction, trans., and notes. (*Indian Antiquary*, Vol. 57, (1928), pp. 201-7, 221-8; 58, (1929), pp. 1-5.
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- Hillebrandt, A.B.U. .. Alfred Hillebrandt: *Aus Brahmanas und Upanisaden*, Diederichs, Jena, 1923. (*Kaṭha*, I-III, 116-124.)
- Hillebrandt, T.K. *Text-kritische Bemerkungen zur Kāṭhaka und Praśna-Upaniṣad*, Z.D.M.G., Vol. 68, 1914, (pp. 579-582).

Hume (or H.)	Robert E. Hume: <i>The Thirteen Principal Upanishads</i> , 2nd edition, Oxford, 1931, (pp. 341-361).
M.M: Max Müller	F. Max Müller: <i>The Upanishads</i> , 2 vols., 1879, 1884. (S.B.E., Vols. 1 and 15.)
Mead	G. R. S. Mead and J. C. Chattopādhya: <i>The Upanishads</i> , 2 vols. (<i>Kaṭha</i> , Vol. 1), London, 1896.
Pelly	R. L. Pelly: <i>Kaṭha Upaniṣad</i> , Calcutta, 1924.
Ram Mohan Ray	Raja Ram Mohun Roy: <i>The Kuṭh-Opanishud of the Ujoor-Ved</i> , Calcutta, 1819.
Röer	E. Röer: <i>Nine Upanishads translated</i> , B.I., Calcutta, 1853.
Regnaud	Paul Regnaud: <i>Études védiques et post-védiques</i> , (Annales de l'Université de Lyon), Paris-Lyon, 1898. (<i>Kaṭha</i> , pp. 57-167.)
Śaṅkara	(Unless otherwise stated) <i>Kaṭhupanīṣad-bhāṣya</i> , see A.
Śarmā	D. S. Sarma: <i>The Kathopaniṣad and the Gita</i> , Madras, 1932. (Appeared when this book was in the press.)
Sarvānanda	Swami Sarvananda: <i>Kaṭha Upaniṣad</i> , Madras.
Sītārāma Śāstri	<i>The Kaṭha and Prasna Upaniṣads</i> , Madras, 1923.
Tattvabhūṣaṇa	Sītānātha Tattvabhūṣaṇa: <i>The Upaniṣads</i> , Vol. 1, Calcutta, 1900.
Tattvabhūṣaṇa, (Bengali)	<i>Upaniṣadaḥ, prathamaḥ khaṇḍaḥ, Iśā-Kena-Kaṭha-Prasna-Muṇḍaka-Māṇḍukyeti ṣaṭ</i> , Calcutta, 1922.
Whitney (or W.)	W. D. Whitney: <i>Translation of the Kaṭha Upaniṣad</i> , (Transactions of the American Philological Association, Vol. 21, pp. 88-112), Boston, 1890.

III. OTHER ABBREVIATIONS, (A. LITERARY).

Ā.	Āraṇyaka.
A.Ā.	<i>Aitareya Āraṇyaka</i> .
A.B.	<i>Aitareya Brāhmaṇa</i> .
Ait.	<i>Aitareya Upaniṣad</i> .
B.	Brāhmaṇa.
Br., B.A.U.	<i>Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad</i> .

B.I.	<i>Bibliotheca Indica</i> series, (published by the Asiatic Society of Bengal).
B.R.	Böhtlingk and Roth's <i>St. Petersburg Lexicon, Sanskrit and German</i> , 7 vols., 1852-75.
Barnett	L. D. Barnett: <i>Bhagavad-gita</i> , London, 1905.
Belvalkar, H.I.P.	Belvalkar and Ranade: <i>History of Indian Philosophy</i> , Vol. 2, The Creative Period, Poona, 1927.
Bhandarkar, V.S.	Sir R. G. Bhandarkar: <i>Vaiṣṇavism and Śaivism</i> , (Grundriss), Strassburg, 1913.
Bloomfield, H.A.V.	Maurice Bloomfield: <i>Hymns of the Atharva Veda</i> , (S.B.E. 42), 1897.
<i>Ch., Chānd</i>	<i>Chāndogya Upaniṣad</i> .
C.Sk.	Classical Sanskrit.
Dasgupta, H.I.P.	Surenranath Dasgupta: <i>History of Indian Philosophy</i> , Cambridge University Press, Vol. 1, 1922, Vol. 2, 1932. (References, unless otherwise stated are to Vol. 1.)
Deussen, A.G.P.	<i>Allgemeine Geschichte der Philosophie</i> , Vol. 1, part 2, <i>Die Philosophie der Upaniṣad's</i> , Leipzig, 2nd edition, 1907.
Deussen, P.U.	<i>The Philosophy of the Upanishads</i> , (tr. A. S. Geden), Edinburgh, 1919.
E.R.E.	<i>Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics</i> , Hastings, Edinburgh.
Edgerton, M.Y.S.	Franklin Edgerton: <i>The Meaning of Sāṃkhya and Yoga</i> , (American Journal of Philology, Vol. 45), 1924.
Farquhar, O.R.L.I.	J. N. Farquhar: <i>Outline of the Religious Literature of India</i> , Oxford, 1920.
Geldner, R.V.	K. F. Geldner: <i>Der Rigveda</i> , (Quellen der Religions Geschichte), Göttingen, 1923. (Up to iv. 58. Promised complete in H.O.S.)
Gough	A. E. Gough: <i>The Philosophy of the Upanishads</i> , London, 1882.
<i>Gītā</i>	<i>Bhagavad-gītā</i> .
Grundriss	<i>Grundriss der Indo-Arischen Philologie und Altertumskunde</i> , (Encyclopædia of Indo-Aryan Research), Strassburg.
H.O.S.	Harvard Oriental Series.
Hill	W. D. P. Hill: <i>The Bhagavadgītā</i> , Oxford, 1928.

<i>Iśā</i>	<i>Iśā Upaniṣad.</i>
Jacob. C.	G. A. Jacob: <i>A Concordance of the principal Upanishads and Bhagavad-Gīta</i> , Bombay, 1891.
K.B.	<i>Kauṣītaki Brāhmaṇa.</i>
<i>Kaus.</i>	<i>Kauṣītaki Upaniṣad.</i>
<i>Kaṭha</i>	<i>Kaṭha Upaniṣad.</i>
K.S.	<i>Kāṭhaka Samhitā.</i>
Kaegi, R.V.	<i>The Rigveda</i> , (tr. Arrowsmith), Boston, 1898.
Keith, A.Ā.	A. Berriedale Keith: <i>The Aitareya Āraṇyaka</i> , Oxford, 1909.
Keith, R.P.V.	<i>The Religion and Philosophy of the Veda and Upanishads</i> , H.O.S., 31, 32, 1925.
Keith, R.V.B.	<i>Rig-Veda Brāhmaṇas</i> , H.O.S. 25, 1920.
Keith, S.S.	<i>The Sāṃkhya System</i> , Oxford, 1918.
Keith, V.B.Y.S.	<i>The Veda of the Black Yajus School</i> , H.O.S. 18, 19; 1914.
M. or Macdonell, S.G.	A. A. Macdonell: <i>Sanskrit Grammar</i> , London, 1911.
Macdonell, H.R.V.	<i>Hymns from the Rigveda</i> , (Heritage of India Series), Calcutta and Oxford.
Macdonell, S.D.	<i>Sanskrit Dictionary</i> , reprinted, Oxford, 1924.
Macdonell, S.L.	<i>History of Sanskrit Literature</i> , London, 1909.
Macdonell, V.G.S.	<i>Vedic Grammar for Students</i> , Oxford, 1916.
Macdonell, V.R.S.	<i>Vedic Reader for Students</i> , Oxford, 1917.
Macdonell, V.M.	<i>Vedic Mythology</i> , Grundriss, Strassburg, 1897.
Macdonell, V.I.	Macdonell and Keith, <i>Vedic Index of Names and Subjects</i> , London, 1912.
Madhva	Madhvācārya: <i>Pārṇaprajña-darśanam</i> , (<i>Vedānta-sūtra-bhāṣya</i>), Calcutta, 1882. Tr. S. Subha Rau, Madras, 1904.
<i>Mahān.</i>	<i>Mahānārāyaṇa Upaniṣad.</i>
<i>Mait.</i>	<i>Maitri or Maitrāyaṇīya Upaniṣad.</i>
M.S.	<i>Maitrāyaṇī Samhitā.</i>
<i>Māṇḍ</i>	<i>Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad.</i>
<i>Muṇḍ</i>	<i>Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad.</i>
Max Müller, A.S.L.	<i>Ancient Sanskrit Literature</i> , 2nd edn. London, 1860.
Nimbārka	<i>Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabhaṇ nāma brahma-mimāṃsā-bhāṣyam</i> , Chowkhamba Sanskrit series, 152, Benares, 1907.

- Nimbārka *Srī-brahma-sūtram, bhāṣya-trayopetam*, (Nimbārka, Śrīnivāsa, Keśava Kāśmīri), Brindaban.
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Tr. G. Thibaut, S.B.E. 48, Oxford, 1904; also, (First Pada only) Rangacharya and Varadaraja, Madras, 1899.
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- Śaṅkara, Śb. *Vedānta-sūtra-bhāṣya*, (*Brahma-sūtraṃ nāma vedānta-darśanam*), B.I. Calcutta, 1863. [1890.
Tr. G. Thibaut, S.B.E. 34, 38, Oxford,
- S.B.E. Sacred Books of the East, ed. F. Max Müller.
- Ś.B. *Satapatha Brāhmaṇa*, (tr. Eggeling, S.B.E. 12, 26, 41, 43, 44).
- Svet.* *Svetāśvatara Upaniṣad*.
- Sāyaṇa See *Rg-Veda Saṃhitā*.
- Tait.* *Taittirīya Upaniṣad*.
- Tait.Ā.* *Taittirīya Āraṇyaka*.
- Tait.B.* *Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa*.
- T.S. *Taittirīya Saṃhitā*, of the Black Yajur-Veda.
- Thibaut George Thibaut: *The Vedānta-sūtras*, with the commentary by Śaṅkarācārya, S.B.E. 34, 38; with the commentary of Rāmānuja, S.B.E. 48.

Tr.	Translated by.
U.	Upaniṣad.
V.S.	<i>Vājasaneyi Saṃhitā</i> , of the White Yajur-Veda.
V.Sk.	Vedic Sanskrit.
Warren	H. C. Warren : <i>Buddhism in Translations</i> , H.O.S. 3; 1896.
Winternitz, G.I.L.	<i>Geschichte der indischen Litteratur</i> , Leipzig, Vol. i, 1908, ii, 1913. Tr. Mrs. S. Ketkar, <i>A history of Indian Literature</i> , Vol. i, Calcutta, 1927.
Woods	J. H. Woods: <i>The Yoga-System of Patañjali</i> , (Tr. of Patañjali's <i>Yoga-sūtras</i> , with the <i>Yoga-bhāṣya</i> of Vyāsa and the gloss of Vācaspati Mīra). H.O.S. 17, 1927.

B. MOSTLY GRAMMATICAL.

A.	Ātmanepada.	ft.	future.	n.	noun or neuter.
ab.	ablative.	g.	genitive.	P.	Parasmaipada.
ac.	accusative.	Gk.	Greek.	pf.	perfect.
adj.	adjective.	Heb.	Hebrew.	pl.	plural.
adv.	adverb.	<i>ibid.</i>	in the same place.	pp.	perfect passive participle.
aor.	aorist.	imperf.	imperfect.	pr.	present.
c.	<i>circa</i> , about.	impv.	imperative.	<i>q.v.</i>	<i>quod vide</i> , which see.
<i>cf.</i>	<i>confer</i> , compare.	in.	instrumental.	s.	singular.
cp.	comparative.	ind.	indicative.	<i>s.v.</i>	<i>sub voce</i> , under the word.
d.	dative, died.	L.	Latin.	<i>v.l.</i>	<i>varia lectio</i> , variant reading.
f.	feminine.	lc.	locative.	<i>vr.</i>	with variations.
ff.	and the following.	m.	masculine.		

ᾄπ. λεγ. ἀπαξ λεγόμενον, word occurring only once.
 ∪ indicates that a sandhi has been disjoined.

INTRODUCTION

TO THE GENERAL READER.

No one can doubt the importance of the *Kaṭha Upaniṣad* in the history of the development of Indian thought,—and this study stresses its significance and maintains its central position in that development. But has this ancient scripture any living meaning for to-day ?

Writing in the *Observer*, concerning the opening days of the World Economic Conference, Mr. J. L. Garvin remarks, “The overwhelming feeling was against that peculiar post-war disease—the doctrines of ego-centric nationalism and self-sufficiency. Signor Jung, the leader of the Italian delegates, coined the epigram of the week, ‘Economic isolation means self-mutilation’.”¹

But why the qualifying adjectives ? It is not only *economic* isolation that means self-mutilation. Nor are ego-centrism and self-sufficiency merely post-war diseases. The Babylonian account of the Fall says, “Themselves they exalted”, and the Buddha depicts the whole world as in the grip of the demon *Ahaṃkāra* (Egoism). It is not new moreover that the demon should masquerade as divine patriotism, for naked selfishness can never long deceive. So it cloaks itself with herd-feeling and takes a fine name. Nineteen centuries ago Jesus Christ was crucified for sin,—but the particular sin which directly caused his death was (Jewish) ego-centric nationalism. What is new, however, to-day, is the world-wide extent of the destruction wrought by the demon, and the world-wide extent of the glamour which nevertheless moves men to worship him. So it needs a World Conference to discover that “Isolation is self-mutilation”, and even then men and nations do not act as if they believed it. Consequently our modern world, both east and west, answers very well to the picture of hell drawn in the *Īśa Upaniṣad* :

“Sunless, in truth, are those worlds called,
And with blind darkness covered o’er,

To which on passing forth they go—
Whatever folk are slayers of the soul.”

There is, then, no message that the modern world needs more than the great Upaniṣad doctrine of Unity (*advaita*). “He who sees things (men, communities, nations), as *separate*, runs to waste after them.” “He obtains death after death, who sees things as if separate here.”

The disease is patent, what of the remedy? (Certainly not in Conferences which in endless *tarka* (argumentation) seem only to discover the lowest common measure of our humanity.)

Our first need, so the Upaniṣads teach, is Vision,—*Ātma-darśana*,—“to see the greatness of the Self”. If we have seen the impotence and futility of our isolated, distracted, ego-centric selves, then, in our despair, we need to realise that the One Power behind the universe is yet the inmost reality of our own souls and capable there of His fullest manifestation. Vision of God, the Highest Self, is the first and most essential step toward liberation from the obsession of ego-centrism.

Secondly—(and this is the special teaching of the *Kaṭha Upaniṣad*),—Vision must lead to *Yoga*,—to the yoked life. The *Kaṭha Upaniṣad* teaches mysticism, but it is a very practical mysticism. *Yoga* is in the first place (in St. Paul’s language) *athletis*,—“the athletic life”, an ordered, disciplined training of all our powers much more radical than any merely physical athleticism.² Men are continually being led astray by uncurbed instinct or desire for pleasure, and only when all our powers are yoked and rightly directed can there be harmonious and victorious living. Now this first type of *Yoga* is widely recognised as necessary, but the problem that has confronted ethics in all ages is to find power for discipline. The distinctive answer of the *Kaṭha*, its message for India and the world to-day, is that this power can only spring from a higher *Yoga*,—the *yoga* of communion, the yoking of our individual powers with the higher, essential Self, which is their basis as it is the ground of reality of the whole universe.

¹ *Observer*, June 18th, 1933.

² St. Paul does not actually use *ἀθλησις* but he uses the verb *ἀθλέω* and other words expressing the same idea. See 2 *Timothy* ii, 3-5; *Phil.* iii, 13, 14; 1 *Cor.* ix, 25.

This answer has been widely misunderstood. In India its effect has been largely nullified, partly through the growth of a totally different conception of Yoga,—a yoga of suppression and trance, and partly because the Upaniṣadic doctrine of unity has been too often interpreted as a pure metaphysical monism. But Śāṅkara's overstress on oneness, which made him treat all diversity, including human personality, as illusion, brought its nemesis in a doctrine of two orders of knowledge which made it possible to acquiesce for practical life in a degree of diversity in religious and social life (e.g. in polytheism and caste-division) unparalleled throughout the whole world.

In the West a very different development of thought has led to very similar practical results. The characteristic teachings of the *Kaṭha Upaniṣad* are just as essential in Christianity, and nowhere have they been so powerfully set forth as by Jesus himself followed by St. John and St. Paul. Christian theology also gave in more developed form the answer of the *Kaṭha* regarding the relation between man and God, though with an even more radical recognition of the essential sin of ego-centrism and an attempt, in the doctrine of atonement, to set forth the historic operation of Divine Grace to overcome it. But European thought, in large measure, has treated all this as impractical mysticism.

So ultra-monism and ultra-individualism alike have led to an agnosticism which treats religion as a matter of the imagination. Human life, therefore, has ceased to be divinely based, and, with the weakening everywhere of the ties of custom, chaos has resulted. I know of no escape save by the rediscovery of God, not merely as the philosophic Absolute or the transcendent, numinous Other, but as the Spirit,—the very basis of human personality and its ever-renewing, vitalising power.

(N.B.—The general reader may omit the rest of the Introduction except the Argument. The student of Indian religious philosophy may also perhaps, with advantage, read the Introduction *after* the Commentary).

INTRODUCTION

GENERAL INTRODUCTION TO THE UPANIṢADS.

The Upaniṣads, their nature and classification.

It is now fairly well agreed that the word *Upaniṣad* is derived from *upa* (near) + *ni* (down) + *sad* (to sit), i.e. "sitting down near", and denotes primarily the sitting down of a little group of pupils at the feet of their teacher. The name would thus naturally be transferred to denote the teaching itself thus privately given. We thus obtain the meaning, "secret word", "secret or mystic meaning or doctrine". This is the most usual meaning in the Upaniṣads themselves, as for example when Yājñavalkya in *Br.* ii. 1. 20 says of the Soul (*ātman*) from which all powers and all beings come forth like sparks from fire, "Its *upaniṣad* is *satyasya satyam*",—"Its mystic meaning is 'Reality of reality'." Thirdly the word is used to denote the books in which such secret or mystic teaching, handed down in different schools, was afterward reduced to writing.

The Upaniṣads are philosophical and mystical-religious treatises which form what is called the *jñāna-kāṇḍa* or "knowledge-section of the Veda. The earlier or *karma-kāṇḍa* ("works-section") comprises (1) the *Samhitās* (Hymn-books) or collections of *mantras* (mostly hymns in praise of the gods), and, especially in the *Yajur-veda*, sacrificial formulæ, and (2) the *Brāhmaṇas* (Ritual-books) consisting of directions for the performance of the sacrificial ritual and explanations of its meaning. There are thus three divisions of the Veda, (1) *Samhitās* or *Mantras*, (2) *Brāhmaṇas*, (3) *Upaniṣads*, which "may be roughly characterised as the utterances of poet, priest, and philosopher". Another way of stating it is that the *Brāhmaṇas* are ritual appendices to the *Samhitās* and the *Upaniṣads* are usually philosophical appendices to the *Brāhmaṇas* of which they form a part. Later a fourth division of the Veda,—the *Sūtras* or systematised synopses of ritual, ethics, and doctrine, was added.

The Veda is also fourfold in another way, consisting of the *Rg*, *Sāma*, *Yajur*, and *Atharva Vedas*, and each of these Vedas, in its fourfold division of *Samhitā*, *Brāhmaṇa*, *Upaniṣad*, and *Sūtra*, is preserved in different recensions by various Vedic schools (*sākhās* or *caranās*). In the case of the *Samhitās* these recensions do not in most cases differ very greatly. In the case of the *Upaniṣads*, however, a number of quite different books were composed, redacted and handed down in the various schools.

It is quite uncertain how many books there were which bore the title "Upaniṣad". Probably more than 300. Nārāyaṇa's collection (c. 1400 A.D.), which formed the basis of Colebrooke's, contained 52. Prince Dārā Shukōh's collection translated into Persian (1656-7), and then translated into Latin by Anquetil Duperron (1801) under the title "*Oupnekhat*", contained about 50.¹ The late *Muktikā Upaniṣad* gives a list of 108 *Upaniṣads*, and this is regarded as authoritative in South and West India. (These 108 have been printed by Tukārāma Jāvaji, Nirṇayasāgara Press, Bombay, in what is probably the most handy edition of the Sanskrit text. Of European translations Deussen's, *Sechzig Upanishad's des Veda* is the most compendious.)

Though the number of *Upaniṣads* is thus very large most of them are comparatively late, as is seen by the fact that they are sectarian in character. Śaṅkara (c. 800 A.D.) is said to have written commentaries on eleven *Upaniṣads*, 1. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*; 2. *Chāndogya*; 3. *Aitareya*; 4. *Taittirīya*; 5. *Kena*; 6. *Kaṭha*; 7. *Īśā*; 8. *Śvetāśvatara*; 9. *Muṇḍaka*; 10. *Praśna*; 11. *Māṇḍūkya*. Śaṅkara did not apparently write a separate commentary on (12) the *Kauṣītaki* (commentary by Śaṅkarānanda, c. 1350) or (13) the *Mahānārāyaṇa*, but he made use of them in his great commentary on the *Vedānta-sūtras*. The addition of (14) the *Maitrāyaṇīya* or *Maitri* completes the list of what are often called the classical *Upaniṣads*,² i.e. those generally accepted as ancient and authoritative in the time of the great commentators.³ In addition, even in their time there were a number of later works (loosely attached to the *Atharva-veda*) which were regarded as

having a claim to rank as Upaniṣads, and this number has since been very considerably added to.

Six of the fourteen classical Upaniṣads are (mainly) written in archaic prose, similar to that of the Brāhmaṇas; five are written in somewhat archaic (pre-epic) metre; and three are in later, more classical prose. Deussen interpreted this distinction as chronologically determinative, and in this he has been very widely followed. Taking his division⁴ we may classify as follows:—

I. ANCIENT PROSE UPANIṢADS.

Veda.	School.	Upaniṣads.
A. <i>R̥g</i>	Aitareyin	<i>Aitareya</i>
	Kauṣītakin	<i>Kauṣītaki</i>
B. <i>Sāma</i>	Tāṇḍin or Kauthuma	<i>Chāndogya</i>
	Talavakāra	<i>Kena</i>
C. <i>Black Yajur</i>	Taittirīya	<i>Taittirīya</i>
<i>White Yajur</i>	Vājasaneyin	<i>Bṛhadāranyaka</i>

II. EARLY METRICAL UPANIṢADS.

C. <i>Black Yajur</i>	Kāṭhaka	<i>Kaṭha</i>
	Śvetāśvatara	<i>Śvetāśvatara</i>
	Taittirīya	<i>Mahānārāyaṇa</i>
<i>White Yajur</i>	Vājasaneyin	<i>Īśā</i>
D. <i>Atharva</i>	? Śaunaka	<i>Muṇḍaka</i>

III. LATER PROSE UPANIṢADS.

C. <i>Black Yajur</i>	Maitrāyaṇī	<i>Maitri</i>
D. <i>Atharva</i>	? Paippalāda	<i>Praśna</i>
	? Śaunaka	<i>Māṇḍūkya</i>

¹ For lists of Upaniṣads in the various collections, see Deussen, S.U.V. 535; Farquhar, O.R.L.I. 364.

² These 14, with the omission of *Mahānārāyaṇa*, are translated in Dr. R. E. Hume's "The Thirteen Principal Upanishads" (Oxford University Press), which is invaluable for English-speaking students.

³ We may note that Rāmānuja makes use of all 14, Śāṅkara of all except the *Maitri*. Śāṅkara also uses subsidiarily the later *Ātharvaṇa* Upaniṣads, *Jābāla* and *Paṅḍgi*; and Rāmānuja the *Subāla*, *Cūlikā*, *Jābāla*, and *Mahā*.

⁴ See P.U. 23-26.

Relative date and order of development of the Upaniṣads.

The six old prose Upaniṣads are almost unanimously, by most European and modern Indian authorities,¹ regarded as the oldest. As to the order of composition among these six, Deussen² followed by Macdonell³ and Winternitz⁴ ranks as follows, 1. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, 2. *Chāndogya*, 3. *Aitareya*, 4. *Taittirīya*, 5. *Kauṣītaki*, 6. *Kena*. The *Kaṭha* followed by the *Īśā* is regarded as the earliest of the next group. Oldenberg⁵ takes the *Aitareya* along with the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* and *Chāndogya* as the oldest, and follows Indian tradition in suggesting that the *Īśā* should be included in the earliest group. Keith says, "The first place must probably be accorded to the *Aitareya Āraṇyaka* in its philosophical portion, that is the first three sections of the second book, and probably the *Aitareya Upaniṣad*, which fills the remaining three sections of the second book, is not to be dated later than any of the other Upaniṣads. After these must certainly come the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* in its main portion, books i-iv, and the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*", which is secondary in its versions of matter which it shares with the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*. Much later and in the following order come the *Kauṣītaki*, *Taittirīya*, and *Kena*.⁶

Belvalkar, however, dissents from these conclusions, urging that "the merely external difference between prose and verse, unless used in conjunction with other more vital differences, does not deserve that exaggerated importance which Deussen assigns to it".⁷ He points out⁸ that while earlier authorities (including Deussen) have admitted that many of the Upaniṣads are composite, they have made very little attempt to separate the older from the later sections, and this failure very largely vitiates their attempt to arrange them in chronological order. He himself, applying stylometric tests and considering mutual quotation and ideological development, arranges in four groups very different from Deussen's. I. Brāhmaṇic, II. Brāhmaṇo-Upaniṣadic, III. Upaniṣadic, IV. Neo-Upaniṣadic.⁹

¹ *E.g.* Dasgupta, Ranade, Radhakrishnan.

² P.U. 23.

³ S.L. 226.

⁴ G.I.L. i. 205.

⁵ L.U. 341.

⁶ R.P.V. 498.

⁷ H.I.P. 90.

⁸ *Ibid.* xxiv.

⁹ *Ibid.* 135.

Omitting Belvalkar's sub-groups, except in group III where we are most concerned, we may condense as follows:—

GROUP I.	GROUP II.	GROUP III(a).	GROUP III(b).	GROUP IV.
<i>Ait. Ār.</i> ii. 1-3	<i>Isā</i>	<i>Kaṭha</i> I. i, ii.	<i>Kaṭha</i> II.	<i>Ch.</i> vii.
<i>Bṛ.</i> i. 1-3.	<i>Bāṣkala</i> . ¹	<i>Ch.</i> v. 3-10.	<i>Tait.</i> ii. 6-8.	„ viii, 13-15.
<i>Ch.</i> i, ii.	<i>Ait.</i>	<i>Bṛ.</i> vi. 2.	„ iii. 7-10.	<i>Bṛ.</i> v, vi. 4.
<i>Ait. Ār.</i> iii.	<i>Bṛ.</i> i. 4-6.	<i>Kauṣ.</i> i.	<i>Ch.</i> viii. 1-12.	<i>Svet.</i> ii, iii, iv.
<i>Tait.</i> i.	„ vi. 1-3.	<i>Kaṭha.</i> I. iii.	<i>Bṛ.</i> ii. 2, 3, 5.	<i>Māṇḍ.</i>
<i>Kena</i> , iii, iv.	<i>Ch.</i> iii.	<i>Muṇḍ.</i>	„ iv. 3-5.	<i>Mait.</i> iii-vii.
	„ iv. 16-17.	<i>Svet.</i> i.	<i>Kauṣ.</i> ii, iii, iv.	
	„ v. 1-2.	<i>Praśna</i> (?).	<i>Svet.</i> v, vi.	
	<i>Tait.</i> ii. 1-5, 9.	<i>Ch.</i> iv, v, 11-24.	<i>Mait.</i> i, ii.	
	„ iii, 1-6.	„ vi.		
	<i>Kena</i> i, ii.	<i>Bṛ.</i> ii. 1, 4, iii.		
	<i>Chāgaleya</i> . ¹	„ iv. 1-2.		
		<i>Ārṣeya</i> . ¹		

A systematic chronological grouping like this obviously requires detailed discussion such as we cannot possibly give in this brief introduction,—more detailed indeed than that which Belvalkar himself gives. We shall later deal with some of the points raised when we discuss the date of the *Kaṭha*. For the present, we would concentrate attention on what we take to be the most important point,—the very different position assigned to the Yājñavalkya section of the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* (ii. 4, iii, and iv.) as compared with the generally accepted chronologies given above. Deussen of course holds that the idealistic monism of Yājñavalkya (which is the foundation of that of Śaṅkara) “is the main doctrine of the Upaniṣads in the sense that it was (first) definitely formulated and laid down, and that other doctrines (pantheism, cosmogonism, theism), are really deviations from it, caused by the inability of man to remain on the high level of thought postulated in the distinction (between empirical reality and the thing in itself), and by the constant effort to apply empirical categories

¹ The *Bāṣkala*, *Chāgaleya*, and *Ārṣeya Upaniṣads*, previously only known from their occurrence in the *Upnekhāt*, have been discovered and edited by Prof. F. O. Schrader, who would date them somewhere between the old prose and the early metrical Upaniṣads. Dr. S. P. Belvalkar, who has translated them, seems to rank the *Bāṣkala* still higher. This, as well as the position he gives to the *Isā*, may well be doubted. (See *Four Unpublished Upaniṣadic Texts*, Proceedings of the Third Indian Philosophical Congress, Madras, 1925.)

to the thing in itself. From the tendency to regard the universe, however, as actually real and an absolute thing, there grew up the view that the Ātman is the universe which we know, that is a system of pantheism. . . . But this standpoint was also liable to difficulties : the identity was difficult to hold fast and gave way to the simpler empirical conception of causality : the Ātman produces the Universe, and he enters into it with his self. This doctrine is found, he thinks, nowhere in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, but in the *Chāndogya*, the *Taittirīya*, the *Aitareya*, and later. The pantheism thus passes into cosmogonism. The next stage of thought produces theism : the relation of the Ātman to the soul in man is conceived as no longer one of identity, but as one of some degree of contrast and independence : the Ātman of the individual is set over against the Ātman in its highest aspect, tentatively even in some old passages, then definitely and openly in the *Kaṭha Upaniṣad* and still more markedly in the *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad*. The road was now open for the disappearance of the deity (i.e. in the Sāṃkhya) since the individual souls were now independent entities.”¹ Or, if we may sum up in Deussen’s own words, the doctrine of the Upaniṣads “begins with a bold and blunt Idealism, and from thence (by accommodation to popular thought) through the phases of Pantheism, Cosmogonism, and Theism, it finally leads to the Atheism of the later Sāṃkhya and eventually to the Apsychism of early Buddhism.”²

Keith characterizes Deussen’s view of Upaniṣad development as “a brilliant and attractive theory”, but “one impossible to accept”. “The obvious history of the Upaniṣads,” he says, “would suggest that the cosmogonic is the oldest form of the doctrine of the Brahman or Ātman. . . . The view of Yājñavalkya cannot, save by paradox, be deemed the earliest view or the dominating view expressed in the Upaniṣads : . . . independent and older are the cosmogonic and pantheistic views which appear in the *Aitareya Āraṇyaka* and in the *Brāhmaṇas*, and the dominating influence of the view of Yājñavalkya ascribed to it by Deussen cannot be established.”³

¹ Keith, R.P.V. 509.

² Deussen, A.G.P., quoted Belvalkar, H.I.P. 89. See also P.U. viii.

³ R.P.V. 510, 512.

Even so late an Upaniṣad as the *Śvetāśvatara*, Keith says " shows no trace of the presupposition of the doctrine of Yājñavalkya : it is adequately explained as the mere development of primitive pantheism or cosmogonism ".¹ When in addition he repeatedly (in effect) remarks, " The prominence of Yājñavalkya can hardly be historical ",² one might suppose that he is arguing for the comparatively late date of this " the most characteristically individual of the doctrines of the Upaniṣads ".

Belvalkar, using very much the same arguments as Keith reaches the conclusion, " Upaniṣadic idealism may thus have come toward the end of the process, and not initiated it ".³ He tries to show that there is a definite and natural evolution of thought. In groups one and two the interest is centred on cosmology. In group three there is a double movement, in one direction toward a more positive theism, in the other toward idealism. In group four this leads toward negativism and *māyā-vāda*. Keith on the other hand says, " An advanced and profound doctrine may be early in appearance, as Yājñavalkya's view in B.A.U. ; for philosophy does not present any orderly advance of ideas, and Yājñavalkya was evidently too subtle for his age, which however was strongly influenced by views which it could not wholly adopt ".⁴ Of these two positions we confess that we feel more inclined to Belvalkar's with its late dating of the Yājñavalkya *kāṇḍa*, but do not feel competent to decide. But whether he is right in his contention that " chronology and logic have thus joined hands ",⁵ or whether Keith is justified in his opposite contention, both are agreed on the main point which we wish to make, namely, that the theistic (or panentheistic) cosmogonism of the *Kaṭha Upaniṣad* is not a late declension from a pure monistic idealism (which is to be regarded as the main teaching of the Upaniṣads), but is rather on the central and direct line of Upaniṣad development, which derives from the Vedic cosmogonism and leads to the *Gītā* and the *Sūtras* of Bādarāyaṇa. Conversely, the idealism of Yājñavalkya, which issued in the absolute monism

¹ R.P.V. 524. Keith does not like Deussen distinguish between pantheism and cosmogonism, but regards them as two aspects of one phase of thought.

² *Ibid.* 495.

³ H.I.P. 359.

⁴ R.P.V. 498 n.

⁵ H.I.P. xxv.

of Śaṅkara, is an aberrant development from the main teaching of the Upaniṣads.

It is impossible to give any absolute dates for the Upaniṣads but the six early prose Upaniṣads, in their main portions, the *Īśā* and the first *adhyāya* at least of the *Kaṭha*, are almost certainly pre-Buddhistic and may be roughly assigned to the seventh and sixth centuries B.C. (See the discussion of the date of the *Kaṭha Upaniṣad*.)

The beginnings of Indian Philosophy in the Ṛg Veda.

The common root of religion and philosophy is seen very clearly in the *Ṛg Veda*. Religion is born of the awe and wonder created in the mind of man both by the splendour and mystery of the outer world and by the mysterious events and powers of his own life and being. Philosophy, as Plato said, is also born of wonder. It is the search for meaning and unity amid the seemingly endless variety of the world of our experience. So the *Ṛg Veda* is the record of how the Vedic Indians both wondered and adored, and wondered and sought to understand.

At first all the nature powers which provoked wonder and awe were regarded as separately existing, and the Vedic Indians worshipped numerous *devas* or 'shining ones'. Naturally, however, the spirits associated with the greater nature powers were singled out for special worship. The heaven gods (Dyaus, Varuṇa), and the sun gods (Sūrya, Savitṛ, Mitra, Viṣṇu), the gods of the Wind (Vāyu) and the thunderstorm (Indra, Rudra), and the god of fire (Agni), thus became the great objects of Vedic worship. While the Vedic Indians never attained to a monotheism like that of the Hebrews, or of the Persians under Zoroaster, nevertheless at a certain time Varuṇa almost attained such a position. For the most part, however, Vedic Hinduism may be described as polytheism, qualified by what Max Müller called *henotheism* (better *kathenotheism*), or the worship of various gods treating the one who is immediately being praised as relatively supreme.

Various causes tended to the evolution of a quasi-monotheism or pantheism from this primitive polytheism. It was natural that the various *devas* presiding over groups of natural phenomena should tend to be identified. So the various Sun gods

tended to be looked upon as one ; and Fire became regarded as one deity in three forms and was thus identified with the sun, or celestial fire, the lightning or atmospheric fire, as well as being the earthly Fire-god, manifest on the altar and in the homes of men. Thus the triune Agni was identified with Sūrya, Savitr, and all the sun gods, and with Indra, Rudra and Vāyu, and all the atmospheric gods. The sun and the fire thus became the great later Vedic symbols for one supreme numinous or adorable reality. This process was also aided by the fact that many of the names of the gods were descriptive, e.g. Savitr—inspirer or vivifier ; Prajāpati—lord of the people ; Viśvakarma—world-maker. The name of one god is therefore often applied to another and the two tend to become identified.

Philosophical speculation began very early,—how early we cannot say, and in time it led to philosophical discussions. We have records of these in the *brahmodya*, or theological riddles, with which some of the Brahmins entertained one another and their hearers when they were assembled for the great sacrifices.

The Riddle-hymn of Dirghatamas. One example of a *brahmodya* which is preserved in the *R̥g Veda* (I. 164.) is the riddle-hymn ascribed to the ṛṣi Dirghatamas. It begins thus :

1. Of this love-worthy priest, ancient of days,
Whose middle brother is the hungry-eater,
There is a butter-backed third brother :
Here I beheld the Lord of men with seven sons.¹*

One might not guess at first (for the riddle is distinctly ambiguous), that the Priest and Lord referred to is the Sun (Sūrya) with his seven solar rays (the Ādityas), his brothers being Lightning and the sacrificial Fire. The three are brothers since all are forms of fire,—heavenly, atmospheric, and earthly,—the triune Agni.

¹ Both the terms used and the construction are more than ambiguous, and this is reflected in the extraordinary variety of the translations. Cf. Griffith, *Hymns of the R̥g Veda*; M. N. Dutt, *R̥gveda Saṃhitā*; Geldner, *Der R̥gveda*; Regnaud, *L'Enigme du R̥g-Veda*; and also Sāyana's Commentary. It has also been translated by Ludwig and Grassmann, and as an *Atharva Veda* hymn, (ix. 9 and 10) by Henry and Whitney, H.O.S., vol. viii, 552-561. For notes marked * see Appendix V (page 229), where I have attempted to justify my translation and have also given alternatives.

The next riddle is easier, plainly referring to the chariot of the sun with its seven horses. It is the first chariot-parable in Indian literature and has a long progeny, through the chariot-parable of the *Katha* to the present car of Jagannāth.¹

2. They yoke the seven to the one-wheeled car,
 One horse, with seven names, draws it along ;
 The three-naved wheel is ageless, never loosened,
 Whereon depend all these created beings.^{2*}

The seven horses are the seven solar rays, sevenfold yet one effulgent radiance (or the seven Ādityas who are yet one). The one wheel is time, with three naves or axles,—past, present, and future (or else, according to Yāska, the year with three seasons). Again, in verse 11, the sun itself as identified with the year is typified by the wheel, which is then said to have twelve spokes (the months), and on this wheel as it revolves round the heaven stand in pairs seven hundred and twenty children (the nights and days). The hymn is long and the themes discussed various, often in riddles too obscure for any certainty as to the meaning, but the recurring theme which gives a certain unity to the whole is that of the Sun as the symbol of the manifold yet one, the ever-changing yet eternal reality, the source of all life and order.

Almost in the fashion of an Upaniṣad sage Dīrghatamas questions about the *ātman* :

4. Who has beheld the First one, being born,
 Which being boneless sustains what has bones ?
 From earth are breath and blood : where is the soul (*ātman*) ?
 Who may approach a man who knows to ask this ?^{3*}

Various interpretations are possible, but we venture to suggest that the verse refers to the invisible soul, which though unsubstantial sustains the body, and equates it with the Primæval one which, coming into manifest being, produces and sustains the world. So he continues :

6. As ignorant I ask of those who know, the sages,—
 Not knowing, for the sake of gaining knowledge,—
 What is that One, in form of the unborn,
 Who has established firm these six world-regions.^{4*}

[One should not perhaps stress the point here, but the "unborn" (*aja*) almost becomes a technical name for the *ātman* (both the individual soul and the supreme Lord) in later literature.]²

¹ See next page.

² See *Katha* ii. 18, *Svet.* iv. 5, *Gītā* ii. 20, 21.

The sun is again introduced in v. 7, under the figure of a bird, as the visible form of the "unborn". This (after various other figures, including again the sun-wheel, 11-14), leads on to the parable of the birds on the tree, 20-22, which begins,

20. Two birds, close yoked companions,
Clasp close the self-same tree;
Of these one eats the sweet fruit,
Uneating the other looks on.^{5*}

This is interpreted by Sāyana as referring to the two forms of the *ātman*, the individual soul and the *paramātman*, and is quoted in this sense by *Muṇḍ.* iii. 1. 1 and *Śvet.* iv. 6, and apparently referred to in *Kaṭha* iii. 1.

The seer also recognises his kinship with the whole universe^{6*}:

33. Heaven is my father and begetter : here's the navel;
My kin and mother is the spacious earth.

Then comes the verse so often quoted as the real beginning of Indian philosophy :

46. *Indraṃ Mitraṃ Varuṇam Agnim āhur,*
atho divyaḥ sasuparṇo Garutmān :
Ekaṃ sad viprā bahudhā vadaṃti,
Agniṃ Yamaṃ Mātariśvānam āhuḥ.

They call it Indra, Mitra, Varuṇa, and Agni,
And also heavenly, beauteous-winged Garutmān :
The Real is One, though sages name it variously,—
They call it Agni, Yama, Mātariśvān.

The Cosmogonic Hymns of the Tenth Book.

It is in the tenth book of the *Ṛg Veda* that its philosophic ideas are most clearly defined in a number of very striking cosmogonic hymns. We will concentrate mainly on three of these which lay the foundation for much of the thought of the *Kaṭha Upaniṣad*. These are (1) The Creation hymn (X. 129); (2) The Hiranyagarbha hymn (X. 121); and (3) The Puruṣa hymn (X. 90).

¹ Twenty miles north of Puri is the great Temple of the Sun at Konarak, built in the form of a stone chariot drawn by seven horses. The Jagannath car is a development of the same idea. Sūrya worship was very prevalent in Orissa, though it is difficult to say how far it dates back. It is interesting to note that legend connects the ṛṣi Dīrghatamas with Orissa, making him the real father of Kakṣivāt, reputed son of King Kaliṅga. (See Max Müller, A.S.L. 57.)

The Creation hymn (*Nāsadīya-sūkta*) is in many ways the most remarkable hymn in the *Rg Veda*.

1. Non-being then existed not nor being,
There was no air, nor sky which is beyond it ;
What was concealed ? Wherein ? In whose protection ?
And was there deep unfathomable water ?
2. Death then existed not, nor life immortal ;
Of neither night nor day was any token ;
By its inherent force the One breathed breathless ;
No other thing than that beyond existed.
3. Darkness there was at first, by darkness hidden ;
Without distinctive mark this all was water ;
That which, becoming, by the void was covered,
That one, by force of heat (*tapas*) came into being.
4. Desire (*kāma*) entered that one in the beginning,—
Desire that was the earliest seed of mind.
The sages seeking in their hearts with wisdom,
Found out the bond of being in non-being.
5. Their ray extended light across the darkness ;
But was the one above or was it under ?
Creative force was there and fertile power,
Below was energy, above was impulse.
6. Who knows for certain ? Who shall here declare it ?
Whence was it born and whence came this creation ?
The gods were born after this world's creation ;
Then who can know from whence it has arisen ?
7. Wherefrom then this creation has arisen,
And whether He has or has not produced it,—
He who surveys it in the highest heaven,
He only knows, or even He may know not. ¹

Macdonell says : “ Apart from its high literary merit this poem is noteworthy for the daring speculations which found utterance in so remote an age. But even here may be traced some of the main defects of Indian philosophy,—lack of clearness and consistency and tending to make reasoning depend on mere words.” Nevertheless its truly philosophical candour cannot but command our admiration. Summing up the main ideas, the hymn says that before the beginning of determinate, empirical existence the One existed. It was apparently conceived as Spirit, hence the words, “ The One breathed

¹ Translation from Macdonell, H.R.V., slightly modified by suggestions from his V.R.S.

breathless". Verse 2 says that nothing else existed, but verse 3 speaks also of primæval matter, pictured as a dark void or abyss of waters (note the similarity to Genesis I. 2). By the power of his own *tapas* (heat or creative fervour) the One evolved into determinate being. Desire also (possibly another name for *tapas*) is said to produce thought, and this thought or wisdom manifested in the hearts of sages, enables them in some degree to understand whence they and the whole creation have arisen. Yet the writer of the hymn also confesses that all this is only surmise, for how is it possible to be sure of things which lie so far beyond determinate knowledge.

The Hymn of the Golden Germ (*Hiranyagarbha-sūkta*). This hymn is far more definitely theistic than the preceding. In it the first existent being is called Prajāpati. We have here also the picture of a chaos of waters, apparently created by the one Lord, but later we are told that He became manifest on them in the form of a golden germ or egg, from which the whole universe developed. He is called the one Life or Soul of the gods (*devānām asur ekaḥ*¹), the true and faithful (*satya-dharmā*), who created the world and ever sustains it, the only God supreme over the gods (*deveṣv adhi deva ekaḥ*), the Lord of creatures (*Prajāpati*), giver of life and strength, who rules over all.

1. Hiranyagarbha came in the beginning,
Of every creature born the one sole Lord ;
The earth he has supported and the heaven ;
What God shall we adore with our oblation ?
2. Who gave the breath of life and vital power,
To whose commands the gods all render homage,
Whose shade is death, and also life immortal,—
What god shall we adore with our oblation ?
3. Who by his might alone became the monarch,
Of all that breathes, of all that wakes or slumbers,
Of all, both man and beast, the Lord eternal,—
What god shall we adore with our oblation ?
4. Whose might and majesty these snowy mountains,
The oceans and the distant streams exhibit,
Whose arms extended are these spreading regions,—
What god shall we adore with our oblation ?

¹ Cf. the *Ruah Elohim* (Spirit of God) which, in Genesis i. 2, is said to move upon the face of the waters.

5. Who made the heavens bright, the earth enduring,
Who fixed the firmament, the heaven of heavens,
Who measured out the air's extended spaces,—
What god shall we adore with our oblation ?
7. When the great waters swept the universe,
Bringing the Germ, also producing fire,
Then He arose, the One Life of the gods,—
What god shall we adore with our oblation ?
8. Who overlooked the waters in his might,
As they brought power and bore the sacrifice,
The only God supreme above the gods,
What god shall we adore with our oblation ?
9. May He not injure us, the earth-begetter,
He who begat the sky,—the true and faithful,
He who begat the great and shining waters,—
What god shall we adore with our oblation ?
10. Prajāpati, thou rulest over all,
And there is none in all the world beside thee ;
Give unto us that pray our heart's desire,
May we become the lords of all good things.¹

The Puruṣa Hymn (*Puruṣa-sūkta*). The third of the creation hymns, the *Puruṣa-sūkta* differs considerably in outlook from the other two. It repeats in rather more concrete form the idea of the Hiraṇyagarbha hymn of a primæval being, existing before any determinate existence, and then evolving himself or coming to birth in the empirical universe. This being is called the Puruṣa, i.e. Man or Person, and seems to be conceived as a giant with a thousand heads, eyes, and feet, who filled the whole universe but extended far beyond it,—the universe being said to be constituted from one-fourth of his body. Here both the immanence and the transcendence of the Supreme Being are expressed. The first stage in creation was apparently the evolution of another being called *Virāj* ("the resplendent"), which may represent primæval matter,—the "waters" of the Hiraṇyagarbha hymn, but corresponds better to the *Kātha Avyakta*, (see 132-141),—and again Puruṣa is said to be evolved from *Virāj*, just as Hiraṇyagarbha as the life or soul of the gods and other beings, was born in the matter of his own creation. The second half of the hymn seems to express a different view of creation, representing it as a sacrifice, in which the gods, who strangely appear from nowhere, offer up the Puruṣa. The various parts

¹ With acknowledgments to Kaegi, R.V. and Peterson, H.R.V.

of the sacrificial victim produced the parts of the universe. His head produced the sky, from his feet came the earth, from his eyes the sun, and from his mind the moon. In this hymn also we first have mention of the four castes, for we are told that the Brāhmaṇa was created from his mouth, the Rājanya or Kṣatriya from his arms, the Vaiśya or agriculturist from his thighs, and the Śūdra or lowest caste from his feet.

1. The Person (*Puruṣa*) had a thousand heads,
A thousand eyes, a thousand feet;
He filled the earth on every side,
Yet stood ten fingers length beyond.
2. The Person truly is this all
What has been and what is to be;
The Lord of immortality,
He was all that which grows by food.
3. Such is his greatness, and yet more,
Than all this is the *Puruṣa*;
All beings are one-fourth of him,—
Three-fourths immortal in the heaven.
4. For with three-fourths he went on high,
One-fourth of him remained below,
Thence spread abroad on every side,
Over the lifeless and living.
5. From it was *Virāj* first evolved,
Again from *Virāj*, *Puruṣa* :
When born he thence stretched far beyond,
Behind the earth, also before.
6. With *Puruṣa* as offering,
The gods performed a sacrifice,
Its melted butter was the spring,
Summer its fuel, autumn its oblation.
9. From that oblation fully made,
Were born the Ṛg and Sāma chants,
From it were born the sacred hymns,
From it was born the *Yajur* Ved.
12. His mouth became the *Brāhmaṇa*,
His two arms formed the kingly class,
His thighs became the husbandman,
From his feet was the Śūdra born.
13. From his mouth was born the moon,
From his eyes the sun was born,
Indra and *Agni* from his mouth,
While from his breath was *Vāyu* born.

14. From his navel was the mid-world (*antarikṣa*)
 From his head there rolled the sky,
 From feet the earth, from ear came space (*dīśah*):
 Thus fashioned they the worlds.

Are the Upaniṣads a direct development of Ṛg-Vedic philosophy?

It is the opinion of some scholars that the Upaniṣad doctrines "were not directly developed from the monotheistic tendencies of the later Ṛg-Vedic speculations".¹ Some regard them as an entirely new development, produced by reaction against, rather than growth from, what had preceded. The theological interest of the Vedic hymns gave place, it is said, to the ritualist interest of the *Brāhmaṇas*, in which the sacrifice became more powerful than the gods, and the thought of the Upaniṣads (particularly the doctrine of the *ātman*) developed as a revolt, originally particularly in Kṣatriya circles, against a ritual which had become arid and profitless. Dasgupta agrees with Deussen and Garbe² in the former view but dissents from them in the latter, pointing out that many of the Upaniṣads show signs of development in Brahmin circles, not as an entire revolt from sacrificial ritual to something quite different but rather by a natural development from the ritual by allegorisation and meditation upon its inner meaning.

We doubt whether there is such lack of connection as Dasgupta suggests between the cosmogonic hymns of the Ṛg Veda and the early Upaniṣads. It is true that Prajāpati-Hiranyagarbha is not referred to by name in the early Upaniṣads, but the ideas of the myths are clearly referred to in *Ś.B.* vi. 1. 1., *Br.* i. 2, i. 4., *Ch.* iii. 19, *Ait.* i; and, as we have said, underlie the whole thought of the *Kaṭha*. This is obvious in such passages as iv. 6, 7, but it is also true of iii. 11, and vi. 7, 8.

(There, in the series *Puruṣa-Avyakta-Mahān ātman*, we have reference to the One supreme who evolves the other, the many, which is yet non-different from himself, being an expression of his own nature, and then entering into it becomes life or soul. The Sāṃkhya philosophy was probably derived from the ideas of the *Puruṣa-Hiranyagarbha* myth by looking on the waters

¹ Dasgupta, H.I.P. 52.

² Deussen, P.U. 17ff., 396ff. Garbe, *Beitr. zur ind. Kulturgeschichte*, 1ff.

or primitive matter as independently existing, and the Puruṣa as first coming to determinate consciousness in the intelligence (*māhat* or *buddhi*) which is a product of matter (*avyakta*). With Śāṅkara also the supreme is not a conscious person, but in alliance with an other,—in this case Ignorance, it becomes an *apparent* world-soul or deity. Both of these views are later distortions of the Aupaniṣada teaching which, descending from the Ṛg-Vedic hymns through such early Upaniṣad passages as those quoted above, finds expression in the *Kaṭha* and the *Gītā* in the theistic doctrine of a supreme personal Spirit who expresses himself in nature, which is his own and not an independent principle, and in individual souls who are one with him in that he is the basis of their being and within whom he dwells as inner guide. But this at present is an anticipation. We shall recur to it later in due course.)

The Contribution of the Brāhmanas: Dasgupta is right, however, in his emphasis. Upaniṣad thought is not *merely* a development of the monotheistic tendencies of later Ṛg-Vedic speculation. The Brāhmanas intervened and their sacrificial ideas coloured, whether by direct development or reaction, the whole trend of subsequent thought. In the *Ṛg Veda* the object of devotion was the gods, the sacrifice being merely a means of expressing that devotion and influencing their will in favour of the offerer. By the time of the *Yajur Veda* and the older Brāhmanas the sacrifice itself became the focus of thought and desire, its correct performance in every detail being all important. Even in the *Ṛg Veda* the gods were regarded as nourished by the sacrifice,—Indra, for example, is said to have conquered the drought-demons through the inspiring power of the *soma*. In the Brāhmanas, however, this idea is carried much further. The creative activity of Prajāpati is represented as exhausting him, so that his power requires to be continually renewed partly by his own *tapas* or asceticism and partly by the food of the sacrifice.¹ Again there are oft repeated stories of how the gods and the asuras competed for world-power, and how the gods only won through the correct knowledge of the sacrifice.²

¹ Cf. *Tāṇḍya B.* iv. 10. 1; Belvalkar, H.I.P. 66.

² *Kaṭha Saṃhitā*, xxii. 9; *Tait. S.* v. 3. 3; *Tāṇḍya B.* xviii. 1. 2.

What would then if the priests, whose business it was to know the sacrifice, soon came to be regarded as exercising compelling power even over the gods, and the sacrifice itself became a huge machinery of magic.

But this is not the whole truth. The sacerdotal trade is the worst enemy of true religion, but even among priests it can never quite kill devotion. The stories of Puruṣa-Prajāpati show that the sacrifice was regarded as having cosmic significance, and the true priest regarded himself as an ally of Prajāpati in his work of sustaining the universe. Moreover there were those who not only had fellowship with him in partaking, with him, of the renewing sacrifice, but who also devoted themselves to meditation upon its symbolic meaning. So, as Belvalkar says, "It can safely be asserted that among the new ideas occurring in the Upaniṣads there is hardly one that is not implicit in and logically deducible from the ideas present in different portions of the Brāhmaṇas. Thus the continuity of tradition was maintained; and this circumstance was given an outward expression inasmuch as the Brāhmaṇas, the Āraṇyakas, and the Upaniṣads were made to constitute part of one whole revealed text."¹

The *Āraṇyikas*² or "Forest-books" are appendices to the Brāhmaṇas which form a connecting link between them and the Upaniṣads. Certain specially sacred rites were performed not in the village but in the seclusion of the forest, and it is probable also that for the purpose of meditation on the mystic meaning of the sacrifice certain priests, and then teachers and their pupils, would retire to the forest. Others regard the Āraṇyaka as the Brāhmaṇa of the *Vānaprasthas*,—those who, having served their apprenticeship as Brahmin students and performed their duties as householders had retired to the forest for meditation. But, as Keith remarks, this is

¹ Belvalkar, H.I.P. 84.

² Excluding the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* there are only three extant Āraṇyakas, the *Aitareya*, *Kauṣītaki* or *Sāṅkhāyana*, and *Taittirīya*. The *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* is both an Āraṇyaka and an Upaniṣad, and many Brāhmaṇas and Upaniṣads contain portions Āraṇyaka-like in character but not formally so called, e.g. the *Jaiminīya Upaniṣad Brāhmaṇa*, of which the *Kena Upaniṣad* is a part.

probably a later conception. No clear line can be drawn between Brāhmaṇas, Āraṇyakas, and Upaniṣads, but the Āraṇyakas consist in the main of meditations on the symbolic meaning of the sacrifice. See, for example the meditation on the meaning of the *aśvamedha* or horse sacrifice in the opening section of the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*. Sometimes such meditations took the place of the actual sacrifice. "Suppose", asked Janaka of Yājñavalkya, "you had no milk or rice or barley to perform the *agnihotra*, with what would you sacrifice?" "With fruits of trees or whatever herbs there were." "If there were none?" "Then with water." "If there were no water?" "Then indeed there would be nothing here, yet this would be offered,—the truth in faith." (*Ś.B.* xi. 3. 1.)

There thus grew up the idea of what the *Gītā* later called contemplative sacrifices (*dhyāna-* or *jñāna-yajñas*), and with them the idea of a certain preparatory moral and ascetic discipline was specially associated. This idea later finds expression in the great teaching of Ghora Aṅgīrasa to Kṛṣṇa Devakīputra (which may be the original germ of the *Gītā*), which interprets all life as a sacrifice. "When a man (who is a sacrificer) hungers, thirsts, and abstains from pleasure, that is the *dīkṣā* (initiatory rite)...Austerity (*tapas*), liberality, uprightness, harmlessness, truthfulness,—these are the gifts for the priests." This idea of discipline, taught in connection with the contemplative sacrifices, was not however new. As Prajāpati practised *tapas* so ought the sacrificer, and this not merely in the sense of physical asceticism: even as early as the *Samhitās* of the *Yajur Veda* stress is also laid on a certain mental discipline. So the whole idea of *Yoga*, which the *Kaṭha*, a *Yajur Veda Upaniṣad*, is the first to teach in any systematic way, may be traced back to the passage which both the *Kāthaka* and *Taittirīya Samhitās* and a number of Brāhmaṇas of the *Yajur Veda* quote from *Rg Veda* v. 81. 1 :

"The sages of the great wise Sage (i.e. Savitṛ or Prajāpati)
Yoke their minds and yoke their thoughts."

And the whole object of the sacrifice is said to be that—

"With mind well yoked are we,
By the inspiration of God Savitṛ,
With strength for gaining heaven."

**The new element in the Upaniṣads : Salvation by
knowledge of the Brahman-Ātman.**

But while it is true that there is a continuity between the Brāhmaṇas and the Upaniṣads (and a Yajur Veda Upaniṣad like the *Kaṭha* emphasises this), nevertheless those who see in the Upaniṣads a reaction against Brāhmaṇic ritualism are also right. It is very evident that there were many who, like the Hebrew prophets, felt an unbearable dissatisfaction with the whole sacrificial system and radically revolted against it, seeking in knowledge a way of deliverance. As the commentators on *Vedānta-sūtra* iii. 4. 9 say, "The ṛṣis descended from Kavaśa said, For what purpose should we study the Veda ? For what purpose should we sacrifice ? Knowing this indeed the ancient ones did not offer the Agnihotra." It is also clear from this passage that the knowledge which they sought was not merely knowledge of the Veda but something new ; and that new knowledge was knowledge of the Brahman-Ātman.

In one sense neither of these ideas were new,—both can be traced in the Saṃhitās and find a place in the Brāhmaṇas.¹ But the emphasis of the doctrine was distinctly new, so that we may say that, while the Upaniṣads teach a Nature-mysticism derived from the Vedic hymns, and a Sacrificial-mysticism derived from the Brāhmaṇas and Āraṇyakas, their distinctive doctrine is Ātman- or Soul-mysticism : since it is at the centre of our inner being, in the Soul, that they find the secret of the universe.

The word "Brahman"² in most of its occurrences in the R̥g-vedic Hymns clearly means "prayer", usually in an objective sense, i.e. the sacred word (*mantra*), and hence it comes to denote the Vedic hymns themselves and then their sacred potency. In the *Atharva-veda* the word first means prayer or magic spell, and then the mysterious power of which these are the expression. As such is it repeatedly coupled with

¹ So Keith : "It is impossible to deny that the Ātman-Brahman doctrine has a long previous history in the Brāhmaṇas and is a logical development of the idea of unity of the *Rigveda*". (R.P.V. 494.)

² For a discussion of the derivation and original meaning of *brahman* see Keith, R.P.V. 442ff.; Belvalkar, H.I.P. 346ff.; Hillebrandt, E.R.E. ii. 796-9; Hertel, IF. xli. 185ff.

tejas and *tapas* (brilliance and heat, i.e. energy) as though practically synonymous. It supports the earth, causes the ground to produce life, shines in the sun and fire, and "into it all the gods are woven".¹ As in the *R̥g Veda* the *brahman* is specially associated with Bṛhaspati or Brāhmaṇaspati,— "the Lord of prayer", who is personally called the *brāhmaṇa* or priest and impersonally the *brahman* or sacred energy of the gods, so also in the *Atharva-veda* it occupies a similar position toward Prajāpati, called also *Virāj*, *Prāṇa* (Life or Spirit), and the *Brahmacārīn* (regarded as a personal form of *brahman*). Sometimes the personal is given priority and the *brahman* is said to spring from Prajāpati, and sometimes the impersonal is put first and the *brahman* is said to sustain the Highest Lord.² What has been said of the A.V. applies also to the early Brāhmaṇas. There Prajāpati occupies without doubt the position of supreme Creator-god, but more and more Brahman comes to the fore, not merely as a power attached to prayer or sacrifice, gods or nature, but as the highest principle of the universe, the *mysterium tremendum*, the one mysterious, supremely great and adorable reality.

A passage in the *Kena Upaniṣad* seems to preserve the memory of the gradual supplanting of the Vedic nature-gods by the one supreme Brahman. There Brahman is represented as appearing to the gods as a mysterious stranger. They deputed Agni to find out who the wonderful being was. The stranger, however, took the initiative and asked Agni, "Who are you and what power have you?" "I am Agni", he replied, "and can burn up anything". The stranger put a straw before him and said, "Burn that". Agni tried with all his might but could do nothing. Vāyu was next sent. He, boasting of his power to blow away everything, was challenged to blow away a straw: but his stormiest winds could not move it. Indra the thunderer then rushed toward the strange being but it disappeared before him. Umā, the daughter of Himavat, then appeared, and Indra asked her, "What is this wonderful

¹ A.V. xi. 5. 24 (Bloomfield, H.A.V. 217).

² Contrast A.V. xi. 5 and xix. 53. For other references see my lecture on *The concept of Brahman in the Atharva Veda*.

being ? ” “ It is Brahman ”, she said ; “ In this victory of Brahman, exult ye ”. Brahman is thus seen to be that supreme Being through whose power alone the gods enjoy greatness, and without which they can do nothing. As *Kaṭha* vi. 3 says,

“ Through fear of Him Agni doth burn,
Through fear of Him Sūrya gives heat,
Through fear Indra and Vāyu both,
With Death as fifth, speed on their way.”

The Upaniṣads do not deny the existence of the Vedic gods any more than did Xenophanes those of the Greeks but they are reduced to the rank of dependent nature-powers. Some ṛṣis however, like the radical Yājñavalkya treat them very freely. “ How many gods are there Yājñavalkya ? ” asked Śākalya. He first gave the traditional answer, 3,306 divine powers, 33 gods. But when further questioned he said successively 6, 3, 2, 1½,¹ and lastly one only. “ What is that One God ? ” “ *Prāṇa* ” (Life-power), said he, “ Men call him Brahman, the Yon ”. (*Br.* iii. 9.)

This Upaniṣad doctrine of Unity, it cannot be too strongly insisted, is not a mere metaphysical speculation : those who thus regard it entirely fail to grasp its value. As against the popular polytheism and materialism it is a liberating gospel.

As a unity only it must be looked upon,
This undemonstrable, enduring Being.
He obtains death after death,
Who views things as if separate here. (*Br.* iv. 4. 20 ; 19.)

As water rained upon a height
Runs various ways among the hills,
So he who views things as diverse
Distractedly runs after them. (*Kaṭha* iv. 14.)

Moreover, though often abstractly stated, it is not to be regarded as merely abstract Unity. It has supreme numinous value, it is a divine Unity ; and, as Professor Otto has pointed out,² this numinous value persists even in interpreters like Śaṅkara who, formally, state it most abstractly. Western scholars have often gone astray through failing to do justice to this aspect.

The Upaniṣads begin then, with what has been called a

¹ This is an etymological pun, and is probably satirical.

² Otto, M.E.W. 103, 112, 145ff.

naturalistic pantheism, or more accurately, with the conception of a unitary divine world-ground realistically viewed as the basic substance and productive, sustaining, immanent energy of all things; and when they attempt to define it they do so naturally first of all in terms of one or other of its most striking manifestations. Thus, frequently in the Brāhmaṇas, and occasionally in preliminary stages of Upaniṣad discussions, the sun, the fire or *ākāśa* (space or ether) are said to be Brahman. Very striking is Bharadvāja's statement in the *Ārṣeya Upaniṣad*,¹ "That light which shines in yonder orb, incessantly throbbing, glittering, flaring, throwing brilliant shimmer and suffusing all, that is my Brahman, . . . none can transcend its greatness." Equally striking is Gautama's reply, "You are then merely worshipping what is only the greatness of that other Brahman which is within this (sun) as the 'Golden person, golden haired, and golden bearded, resplendent even to the finger-tips'" (quotation from *Ch.* i. 6. 6). Here we have not a return to the Vedic worship of Sūrya-deva, but the *puruṣa* (person or spirit) in the sun is taken as a symbol of Brahman. A further step is taken in the "instruction of the fires" to Upakosala (*Ch.* iv. 11-13) where the teaching is first given that Brahman is the person in the sun, the moon and the lightning, but Satyakāma, his *guru*, then told Upakosala that the fires had only told him Brahman's environment but he would teach him something deeper. "That person who is seen in the eye, He is *Ātman*,—that is Brahman." (*Ch.* iv. 15.)

The concept of the *Ātman* was probably originally developed independently of that of the Brahman. The etymology of the word has been a matter of much dispute, but the most usually accepted view is that put forward by Böhtlingk-Roth who derive it from *an*=to breathe, and it is almost certainly cognate with the old High German *ātum*, "breath" (Anglo-Saxon, *ætm*; Modern German, *ātem*).²

Deussen points out that it is often found in the *Rg Veda* (especially as the reflexive pronoun, "one's self"), in the form *tman*, and suggests that *ātman* is a euphonic expansion. He regards it as meaning, "This I". Keith, however, points out that *ātman* certainly does in four places in the *Rg Veda* mean "wind" and normally means "the breath of life". Also that it is far easier to derive the meanings,

“self”, “body”, and the use as reflexive pronoun, from “wind” or “breath” than *vice versa*.

Ātman, then, seems to have originally meant wind or breath, and then life, soul, self or essential nature.

Older words than *ātman* to express the same idea were *Asu* and *Prāṇa*. So, in *R̥g* x. 121. 7, Hiraṇyagarbha is called “the one *asu* (life-breath or spirit) of the gods”. Much more frequently however, *prāṇa*, the commonest name for the life-breath, is used to denote the chief principle of the universe. *Atharva Veda* xi. 4, for example, is a hymn to *Prāṇa*, described as both the roaring wind and the supreme spirit of the universe, *Virāj* (the lustre), *Deṣṭr* (the guiding power) and *Prajāpati* (the Lord of all creatures). A theme which continually recurs in the Brāhmaṇas, Āraṇyakas and earliest Upaniṣads is the dispute between the *devas* for precedence (see e.g. *Ś.B.* x. 3. 3; *Jaim. U.B.* iv. 11-13; *Ait. Ār.* ii. 1-3; *Bṛ.* i. 3; *Ch.* i. 2). Here the cosmic deities are equated with the *prāṇas*, i.e. the life-powers or faculties of man, and the *mukhya-prāṇa* or chief life-breath is said to be the *uktha* or chief principle both of man and the universe. In *Ait. Ār.* iii. this chief *prāṇa* is called *puruṣa*, and just as all the cosmic powers and all the human functions had each its *prāṇa* or vital power so they are now said to have *puruṣas*,—hence we now read of “the person in the sun”, “the person in the eye”, etc. *Ait. Ār.* iv. makes a similar identification of the chief *prāṇa* with the *ātman*, and henceforward the term *prāṇa* tends to be dropped in favour of *puruṣa* or *ātman*.

Notes to previous page.

¹ See Belvalkar, *Four Unpublished Upaniṣad Texts*, 18.

² It has been suggested that *ātman* may also be cognate with the Greek *ἀτμός* (smoke, vapour), and the Homeric *ἀτμήν* (breath). This however is very doubtful. Uhlenbeck (*Etymologisches Wörterbuch der altindischen Sprache*) denies any connection. Boisacq (*Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue-grécque* xv. *ἀτμός*) notes that it is doubtful whether the *a* is long or short. If long *ἀτμός*=*ἀετμός* (from *ἀημι*=Sk. *av* or *vā*, to blow), and is not connected with *ātman*. If short there may just possibly be connection with *ātman*. *ἀτμήν* he connects with *ἀετμός*, and so not with *ātman*. Prof. R. L. Turner doubts the connection of *ātman* with either of these Greek words. All of these authorities however, agree on the connection of *ātman* with *ātum*.

The term *Puruṣa* goes back to the primæval cosmic "Man" or "Person" of *Rg Veda* x. 90, who through his self-sacrifice created the universe. The etymology of the word is uncertain, but the conception is clearly anthropomorphic, originally denoting man with all his bodily attributes. Then secondarily it was used to denote the inner or essential man,—the soul. But still the term denoted something more concrete than *prāṇa* or *ātman*. *Kaṭha* iv. 12 seems to be the earliest mention of the *aṅguṣṭha-mātra puruṣa* or "thumb-sized person" dwelling in the human heart, yet the conception must be much older, probably prehistoric. Later, through *puruṣa* in many cases being used as practically equivalent to *prāṇa* (as indicated above), and so used to denote powers or functions, it tended to become depersonalised in meaning; yet the suggestion of concrete personality, which was part of its original meaning, seems to have persisted at least on the fringe of its connotation (and so could be revived by the author of the *Kaṭha* and those who followed him).

At present our aim is to show the related growth of the ideas of *puruṣa* and *ātman* in the early Upaniṣads. The myth of creation given in the *Puruṣa-sūkta* is repeated in *Atharva* x. 7 and *Ś.B.* vi. 1. 1. In it all the worlds, the gods and orders of men are formed from the various parts of the primæval Person. The sun came from his eye, the moon from his mind, fire from his mouth, etc. In *Ait.* i. we have a development of the myth. There we are told that the gods or nature powers when thus created found no fitting home. Hence the creator led a human person to them. Fire then became speech and entered his mouth, the sun became sight and entered his eyes, the moon became mind and entered his heart. The creator (here called *Ātman*) then himself entered the man and thence looked around on all beings. He saw nothing as different from himself. "He saw this very person as veriest Brahman." Here we see the development of a doctrine which goes back to the Hymn of *Dirghatamas* as well as the *Puruṣa-sūkta*. There, as we saw, the sage said, "Heaven is my father, earth my kin and mother". All the parts of the world (the macrocosm) were thus recognised as standing in a relation of kinship with man (the

microcosm). Hence, in a different sense from Protagoras, it was recognised that "Man is the measure of all things", or, as *Br.* i. 4 says in its account of the *ātmā puruṣavidhaḥ* ("Self in the form of a person") from whom the world evolved,— "One should worship with the thought that He is just one's self, for this self is the footprint (*padanīya*) of the All, for by it one knows this All".

The identification of the Brahman with the Ātman.

We have advanced, then, from the conception of the *prāṇa* or "breath", which is the life-principle or spirit both of man and the universe, to that of the *antarātman puruṣa* ("person who is inner-self") who is called *prāṇasya ātmā* ("the soul of *prāṇa*"); and from the old mythic conception of the cosmic "Man" to the more spiritual *aupaniṣada puruṣa* ("person taught in the Upaniṣads"), who is identified with the *ātman* (*Br.* iii. 9. 26) and who is in *Br.* ii. 1. 16 called the *vijñānamaya puruṣa*,—"the person who consists of intelligence". What we have said involves implicitly (and in the quotation from *Ait.* i. 3. 13, explicitly) the identification of this *puruṣa* or *ātman* with the *Brahman*. Let us however trace the process a little further.

The second *adhyaīya* of the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* commences with an interesting dialogue between the learned and proud Brahmin, Bālāki Gārgya, and Ajātaśatru, King of Kāśi. This dialogue is interesting from two points of view. In the first place we see the Brahmin, who came to the king to teach him the nature of Brahman, unable to do so, and becoming in his turn the pupil of the king. In the second place we notice that Bālāki in his conception of the Brahman sets forth the view of naturalistic pantheism, which, as we have seen, was probably the first stage in the development of the idea. Ajātaśatru, on the other hand, while admitting all that Bālāki says, shows that it is quite insufficient. Bālāki has defined the Brahman first as the person in the sun (*ādītye puruṣa*). Then successively as the person in the moon, in lightning, in space (*akāśa*), in wind (*vāyu*), in fire (*agni*), in the waters; also as the person in the mirror, in the shadow, in echo and in the body. The king says in reference to all these, "But is that all?" When Bālāki confesses that he can go no further, the

king first, according to the parallel version in the *Kauṣītaki U.*, says, "He who is the maker of all these persons, He verily should be known". Then Ajātaśatru took Bālāki to a sleeping man whom he thus addressed, "O great one with white robes! Soma! King!",—and thus woke him. The king then asked, "When the man was asleep, where was the intelligent person (*vijñānamaya puruṣa*) and whence did he come back?" Bālāki did not know. Ajātaśatru then said, "When the man slept the intelligent person, having drawn in the *prāṇas* (i.e. the senses), lay in the ether within the heart; there enjoying bliss he was at rest....Just as a spider sends out its threads and sparks come forth from fire, so from this Self come forth all vital powers (*prāṇas*), all worlds, all gods, all beings. Its secret name (*upaniṣad*) is *satyasya satyam* (the reality of the real). The *prāṇas* are *satyam* (real). He is their *satyam*."

This is one of the most important passages in the Upaniṣads. Bālāki in his exegesis of Brahman sets it forth as pantheistic world-ground. To the king, however, this is misleadingly inadequate. If one would come to any adequate comprehension of Brahman it is best known as intelligent Spirit, the enduring upholder of one's own psychic existence. It is the Soul or Self (*ātman*), and this Self is the source of all existing things. They are real, but only because it constitutes their reality.

We see then, as Deussen says, that "All the thoughts of the Upaniṣads move round two fundamental ideas. These are (1) the Brahman, and (2) the Ātman. As a rule these terms are employed synonymously. Where a difference reveals itself, Brahman appears as the older and less intelligible expression, Ātman as the later and more significant; Brahman as the unknown that needs to be explained, Ātman as the known through which the other unknown finds its explanation; Brahman as the first principle so far as it is comprehended in the universe, Ātman so far as it is known in the inner self of man."¹ We have already given several examples but perhaps the most explicit of all is the *Śāṅḍilya-vidyā* (*Ś.B.* x. 6. 3 and *Ch.* iii. 14) where it is first stated that, "This whole universe is Brahman" (*sarvaṃ khalu idaṃ brahma*), and then it is said

¹ Deussen, P.U. 38.

that this Brahman is to be identified with the self within,—
 “This soul of mine within the heart, this is Brahman” (*eṣa me ātmā antar-hṛdaye, etad brahma*).

“If then”, says Deussen, “we hold fast to this distinction of the Brahman as the cosmical principle of the universe, the Ātman as the psychical, the fundamental thought of Upaniṣad philosophy may be expressed by the simple equation: Brahman = Ātman. That is to say,—the Brahman, the power which presents itself to us materialised in all existing things, which creates, sustains, preserves, and receives back into itself again all worlds, this eternal, infinite, divine power is identical with the Ātman, with that which, after stripping off everything external, we discover in ourselves as our real, most essential being.”¹ It is this identity of the Brahman and the Ātman which is expressed in the great sayings, *tat tvam asi* (“That thou art”, *Ch. vi. 8. 7*) and *ahaṃ brahmāsmi* (“I am Brahman”, *Bṛ. i. 4. 10*),—the central texts of the Vedānta philosophy.

Here we must pause to discriminate. What has happened so far is that two diverse and in some degree independently developed conceptions, the Brahman,—the power behind the universe, and the Ātman,—the inmost reality of the individual soul, have been brought into relation, and the Brahman, the world-ground, is viewed as world-soul. But the word *ātman* is ambiguous, since it denotes both the individual and the supreme soul. If we distinguish between Ātman as supreme Soul and *ātman* as individual soul (*jīva*) by the use of a capital for the first, then it is clear that the Upaniṣads teach Brahman = Ātman, but do they also teach Brahman = Ātman = *ātman*? This of course is Śāṅkara’s interpretation. He takes the statements “That thou art” and “I am Brahman” quite literally as the statement of a pure identity. In reality there is only one Soul, though to the unenlightened, under the sway of *avidyā* (ignorance) and *māyā* (illusion), there may appear to be many. Deussen also, though in some points he dissents from Śāṅkara’s exposition of the Upaniṣads, agrees with him in the main, and says that their central doctrine is “a daring, uncompromising, eccentric idealism (comparable to that of

¹ P.U. 39.

Parmenides) ”.¹ This earliest and most fundamental teaching he finds in the Yājñavalkya discourses of the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*. Now these do undoubtedly teach that the Ātman is (1) the one knowing subject, (2) which is itself unknowable, and (3) which is the sole reality (the world being the apparent projection of its thought). “That Imperishable is the unseen seer, the unthought thinker. Other than it is none that sees, other than it is none that thinks.”² “Thou canst not see the seer of seeing, thou canst not think the thinker of the thought, thou canst not know the knower of what is known.”³ “Where there is duality, as it were, there one sees another, there one knows another. But where everything has become just one’s own self, whereby and whom should one see? whereby and whom should one know?”⁴

“These three thoughts”, says Deussen, “are the kernel of the Upaniṣad teaching, and with it became permanently the kernel of the entire religious and philosophical belief of India”.⁵ In a sense we may give a qualified acceptance to the latter half of the statement, since the Yājñavalkya doctrine was the basis of that of Śaṅkara, and Śaṅkara’s interpretation, till recently, commanded the assent of probably three-quarters of the thinking minds of India. Nevertheless Deussen unwittingly uses the just word when he himself describes it as an “eccentric” idealism, since it is a departure from the central line of Hindu thought which is seen, we hold, in the *Kaṭha*, the *Gītā*, and the *Sūtras* of Bādarāyaṇa (most truly interpreted by Rāmānuja and Nimbārka). With regard to the Upaniṣads we have already in our discussion of their relative date and order of development shown reason to doubt whether the Yājñavalkya sections of the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* were either so early, so central or so influential as Deussen supposes. He himself is compelled to admit that if the Yājñavalkya teaching is the kernel of the Upaniṣads, it had (from the point of view of a subjective idealist) a very thick husk.⁶ Further, that even in the Yājñavalkya sections the idealist position is not consistently upheld, lapsing into a pantheism which was perilously close to theism when he describes the Ātman as the *antaryāmin* or inner ruler.⁷ Further,

¹ P.U. 399.

² *Br.* iii. 8. 11.

³ *Br.* iii. 4. 2.

⁴ *Br.* ii. 4. 14.

⁵ P.U. 400.

⁶ P.U. 400.

⁷ P.U. 405, 175-6.

he admits that Yājñavalkya's views found the consciousness of his contemporaries already occupied with traditional views to which they had to accommodate themselves.¹ Chief among these traditional views was the pantheistic or quasi-theistic view of the Brahman-Ātman as the evolver and ruler of a real universe which, we maintain, is the direct outgrowth of the teaching of the Saṃhitās, the Brāhmaṇas and the Āraṇyakas.

The individual soul: Among these traditional views which were accepted by the majority of the Upaniṣad thinkers, was, we hold, the belief in a plurality of real souls or selves. It is true there is no insistence on this doctrine in the early Upaniṣads, and at first sight one might suppose that the one Soul theory was far more widely accepted than is really the case. But that was just because the belief in a plurality of souls was so widely and so implicitly accepted as to render such teaching unnecessary. All the insistence is therefore upon the unity of the one supreme Self, who is the constitutive reality of the world and of individuals. As we have said before, the doctrine of unity is preached as a liberating gospel. Later, however, when the one Self theory had been sufficiently accepted to make such teaching necessary, the early metrical Upaniṣads definitely teach a plurality of individual immortal souls. This is not a new teaching as some (e.g. Stecherbatsky,² Jacobi³) suppose,—it was only a statement of what had long been implicitly accepted.

We repeat then that the central doctrine of the Upaniṣads, "This Ātman is that Brahman", means that self-consciousness, our awareness of our own inner-selves, is a revelation of the nature of Brahman,—the supreme, adorable reality, in that He too is essentially Ātman,—the supreme Self. But this is different from saying, as Yājñavalkya and Śaṅkara do, that there is only one knowing Self who is both subject and object, for that involves that the Self is unknowable,—that the Self-knowledge which the Upaniṣads teach must above all be sought, is really unattainable.

¹ P.U. 401.

² Stecherbatsky : *The Central Conception of Buddhism*, 69ff.

³ Jacobi : *Die Entwicklung der Gottesidee bei den Indern*, 19ff. For an account and criticism see Keith, R.P.V. 545ff.

Do the Upaniṣads teach that the Brahman-Ātman is knowable?

We have already very largely answered this question, but must press it further and sum up. We have said that the central thought of the Upaniṣads is that Brahman is to be known as Ātman. So Deussen rightly says, "The general view that lies at the basis of the Upaniṣads is that Brahman is an object of knowledge".¹ "The Ātman should be seen, comprehended, reflected on." (*Bṛ.* ii. 4.) "The Self...that is what we should search for and endeavour to know." (*Ch.* viii. 7. 1.) The very object then of the Upaniṣads is to communicate the knowledge of the Brahman-Ātman as a means of salvation, and so they are said to teach the *jñāna-mārga*, the way of salvation through knowledge.

If we ask what are the attributes commonly ascribed to Brahman, conceived as the reality of the universe and essentially Ātman or Self, the orthodox answer is summed up in the word *saccidānanda* (*sat, cit, ānanda*, i.e. real existence, intelligence and bliss). This word does not occur in the older Upaniṣads but the ideas which it expresses are found in *Bṛ.* iii. 9. 28, where Yājñavalkya says, "Brahman is knowledge and bliss" (*viḥjñānam ānandaṃ Brahma*), and in *Tait.* ii. 1, where we read, "He who knows Brahman as reality, knowledge, infinite (*satyaṃ jñānam anantam*), he obtains every wish together with the intelligent Brahman". This latter passage occurs at the opening of a section called the *Ānanda-vallī* in which the whole stress is upon the supreme bliss of Brahman, so that it is a natural conjecture that for *anantam* we should read *ānandam*. *Ait.* iii. takes intelligent consciousness (*prajñāna*) as the essential attribute of Brahman, called intelligent Self (*prajñātman*) and says, "Everything that heart and mind are,—sensation, perception, discrimination, conception, understanding, insight, resolve, thought, imagination, feeling, memory, volition, purpose, life, love and will,—all these are names of intelligent consciousness".

On the other hand, as we have seen, Yājñavalkya in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, in teaching which reminds us of Kant's doctrine of the transcendental self, asserts that just because the Self is

¹ P.U. 74.

the knower it cannot be known. Over and over again it is said, "That Self is not this, not that (*neti, neti*)"; and since there is no duality it is impossible to know it; yet at the same time it is said, "Lo verily, it is the Self that must be seen, thought on, pondered on. Lo verily, in the Self's being understood, this world-all is known" (iv. 5. 6.), and in iii. 8. 10, Yājñavalkya says, "Verily, O Gārgi, he who departs from this world not knowing that Imperishable, is pitiable".

Śaṅkara's answer to this puzzle is his doctrine of the two orders of knowledge,—empirical (*vyāvahārika*) and ultimate or transcendental (*pāramārthika*), corresponding to which there are two forms of Brahman,—the higher (*para*) or unqualified (*nirguṇa*) Brahman, and the lower (*apara*) or qualified (*saguṇa*) Brahman. The lower Brahman is knowable, and all the passages in the Upaniṣads which speak of Brahman in positive terms as world-soul, or psychical principle, or God, Śaṅkara takes as referring to the lower Brahman only. This lower Brahman, though called *Īśvara* (Lord or God), is only empirically real (i.e. as real as the world of our sense-experience), but from the deeper (*pāramārthika*) point of view he is an illusory being, due to the imposition of a principle called *Avidyā* or *Māyā* upon the real. The only real Brahman is the higher, who is one and without attributes (an undifferentiated unity) and therefore unknowable. So, though Śaṅkara applies to Brahman the epithets *sat*, *cit*, *ānanda*, he explains the latter two away, speaking of *ānanda* as the mere absence of sorrow ("bliss without the fruition of happiness") and regarding *cit* as abstract intelligence or knowledge, denying that Brahman is a knowing Self.

It is perfectly clear, however, that there is no mention of *Avidyā* or *Ajñāna* (in the technical sense of a cosmic principle of Ignorance) in any of the older Upaniṣads, nor yet of *Māyā* in the sense of illusion. Nor is there any support for Śaṅkara's doctrine of the two orders of knowledge or the two forms of Brahman, which, if imposed, distort the sense of the Upaniṣads. It is true that there are different ways of conceiving Brahman and *Br.* ii. 3. 6 does speak of two forms of Brahman,—the formed (*mūrta*) Brahman which is empirically knowable, and

the formless (*amūrta*) which is not an object of empirical knowledge. But though Śaṅkara claims the support of this passage, the distinction between the two forms here described and those of Śaṅkara is evident. For the *mūrta brahman* is just the universe of which the formless Brahman constitutes the Reality of reality (*satyasya satyam*). We shall see in our commentary to what desperate expedients of exegesis Śaṅkara has to resort to maintain his position. As Keith says, his whole attempt is "a clever *tour de force* without final validity, and its ingenuity is as great as its improbability".¹

The Mysticism of Yājñavalkya. It may further, I think, be said that while Śaṅkara's teaching was based upon Yājñavalkya's it does not quite correctly interpret what Yājñavalkya was trying to express. It is difficult to discern in the Yājñavalkya passages any consistent philosophy, but it is evident that his epistemological agnosticism was coupled with and subservient to a mystical religion,—he denies an intellectual understanding of a Self but seeks for an intuitive immediacy of apprehension. "As a man in the embrace of a beloved wife knows nothing within or without, so this person, when in the embrace of the intelligent Self, knows nothing within or without. Verily that is his (true) form, in which his desire is satisfied, in which the Self is his desire." (*Bṛ.* iv. 3, 21.) Specially interesting is the passage in which he teaches that while those who trust in the intellect cannot attain Brahman, yet there is an apprehension of his being by those who are childlike. "Therefore let a Brahmin, flinging away learning, take his stand on childlikeness", though even in that he is not to trust, nor in any state, but in the Self alone. (*Bṛ.* iii. 5.) Moreover it is through quietening the strivings of the will and the empirically directed intellect that the conditions are realised for the being of Brahman to shine clearly within the individual soul. "Therefore having become calm, subdued, quiet, patiently enduring and collected, one sees the Self just in the self" (iv. 4. 23).

The purpose of Upaniṣad anti-intellectualism. We cannot treat in detail the teaching of the other Upaniṣads, but

¹ R.P.V. 508.

a study of the *Īśā* and *Kena* (which devote special attention to this subject, and which stress the need for knowing Brahman yet assert that He transcends knowledge), shows that their polemic against knowledge is not based upon any metaphysical puzzle but upon a view of religious knowledge which should be quite familiar to Christians. There is (1) a sense of the uniqueness and surpassing greatness of the Supreme, which makes his apprehension quite distinct from that of finite, empirically discerned objects; (2) A Socratic (as Christ-taught) humility,—a realisation of ignorance, coupled with earnest search and childlike teachableness; (3) A realisation that while Brahman is unknowable in the sense of unfathomable, incomprehensible, He may yet be apprehended, and so truly, though partially, known, by those who truly seek. The *Kaṭha* adds the thought (found also in the *Chāndogya* and *Taittirīya*), (4) that the nature of religious truth is such that a teacher is necessary to impart it; and goes on also to add that (5) the ultimate source of illumination is Divine grace.

The teaching of the *Kaṭha*, though at first sight somewhat contradictory, is quite clear and consistent, not being complicated by the metaphysical puzzle of the unknowability of the knower. It first, like most of the Upaniṣads, emphasises the mystery and wonder of the Supreme being. "That which is hard to see, entered into the hidden, dwelling in the deep,... whom many cannot even hear of, whom many even hearing do not know." In characteristic Upaniṣad language, also, the antinomies which perplex human reason when it strives to understand Him are set forth. "Less than an atom, greater than the great." "Sitting He travels afar, lying He goes everywhere." He thus transcends the limitations of space and time, and yet is "Lord of the past and the future" and evolver and guide of a real universe. He is proclaimed by the Vedas as Brahman, and the sacrifices are means to his partial attainment, but He is above all to be recognised as the Self, "set in every creature's heart". Yet though so near He is not accessible to the senses or to the unaided intellect. "Not by reasoning is this thought obtainable."

For in the first place moral preparation is necessary.

Who has not ceased from evil ways,
 Who is untranquil, unprepared,
 And he whose mind is not at peace,
 By knowledge cannot win to Him.

In the second place a spiritual teacher (*acārya* or *guru*) is necessary. "Save by another taught there's no way thither." This follows from the very nature of spiritual truth, which is not a doctrine communicated through words but a light of vision, which requires a receptivity, an attitude of faith, which can best be communicated from one *person* to another. But the guru's work, though so important, is only preliminary. As in Christianity the Divine vision which brings salvation can only be the work of Divine grace.

Not by instruction may this Self be gained,
 Nor intellect, nor by much scripture-learning ;
 Whomso He chooses, by him He may be gained,
 To him this Self reveals His own (true) person.
 Less than an atom, greater than the great,
 The Self is hid in every creature's heart :
 The unstriving man beholds Him, freed from sorrow,
 Through the Creator's grace he sees the greatness of the Self.

Very definitely then the *Kāṭha Upaniṣad* teaches the knowability of the Self. It is true that,

Not in the range of vision stands His form,
 By outward eye no one soever sees Him.

But it is none the less true that for one who seeks in the right way,

By heart, by thought, by mind, He is apprehended ;
 Those who know Him thereby become immortal.

SPECIAL INTRODUCTION TO THE KATHA UPANIṢAD.

The Katha Upaniṣad, as its name implies, belongs to the Black Yajur Veda school of the Kathas or Kāthakas, and was almost certainly composed in the original home of that school, the Kuru-Pañcāla country (the Agra-Delhi district).

According to Patañjali,¹ the ṛṣi Katha, the traditional founder of the school, was a pupil of Vaiśampāyana. The Kāthaka school now finds its chief home in Kāśmir, and the commentary on the *Carana-vyūha*² describes how, on the separation of the Black Yajur Veda schools, the Kathas and Katha-Kapiṣṭhalas spread in the Panjāb and Kāśmir, the Maitrāyaṇiyas in Gujarāt, and the Taittirīyas in the South, while the White Yajur Veda school of the Vājasaneyins spread to the North-east (Kosala and Videha, the home of Buddhism). The original home of all of them was however the *madhya-deśa* or Kuru-Pañcāla country. The *Taittirīya Saṃhitā*, *Brāhmaṇa*, and *Āraṇyaka*, continually address themselves to the Bhāratas or Kuru-Pañcālas; the *Rāmāyana* (ii. 3. 16) describes the Katha school, together with the Taittirīya, as being in Ayodhyā;³ and Uddālaka Āruṇi, from whom the father of Naciketas is supposed to be descended, is described in *Ś.B.* xi. 4. 1, as a Kuru-Pañcāla Brahmin.

In the Black Yajur Veda there are normally no separate *Brāhmaṇas*, the prose explanations of the ritual not being (as in the case of the White Yajur) separated from the *Saṃhitās*. The *Kāthaka Saṃhitā* therefore has no *Brāhmaṇa*. In the Taittirīya school, however, in addition to the *Brāhmaṇa* material in the *Saṃhitā*, there is a supplement dealing with certain sacrifices omitted in the *Saṃhitā* and this is called the *Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa*. Macdonell considers that the last three sections of Book iii. of this *Brāhmaṇa* (as well as the first two books of the *Āraṇyaka*) originally belonged to the Kāthaka school. "The different origin of these parts", he says, is indicated by the absence of the change of *y* and *v* to *iy* and *uv* respectively, which otherwise prevails in the *Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa* and

¹ *Mahābhāṣya* on Pāṇini iv. 3. 104.

² See Keith, *Veda of the Black Yajur School*, xcii. ³ *ibid.* xciii.

Āraṇyaka."¹ In one of these Kāṭhaka sections, *Tait. B.* iii. 11, by way of illustrating the significance of a particular fire-sacrifice called *Nāciketā*, the story is told of a boy, Naciketas, to whom the sacrifice was first revealed by the god of the dead. On this story is based the *Kāṭha Upaniṣad*.

The Integrity of the Kāṭha,

(a) *The Kāṭha Upaniṣad* is divided into two *adhyāyas*, each of three *vallis*. That the two *adhyāyas* were once distinct units, or rather that the first *adhyāya* formed a complete Upaniṣad to which the second was later added is shown by:—

(1) The two summings up and *phala-śrutis* (declarations of the result of the teaching) in iii. 16, 17 and vi. 14, 15.

(2) The absence of quotations in the first *adhyāya* as against their comparative frequency in the second; among the latter also are quotations from the first *adhyāya*.

(3) The orderly development of the first *adhyāya* contrasted with the comparative absence of plan in the second.

(4) The completeness of the first *adhyāya* in itself. The second makes a new beginning and repeats certain of the teachings of the first, though with differences.

(5) The greater development in the conception of *Yoga* found in the second *adhyāya*, and the use of technical terms like *indriya-dhāraṇā*, *apramatta*; there is development also in theology, e.g. the conception of the *sarva-bhūtāntarātman*, which implies the *antaryāmin* doctrine, and in eschatology.

(b) There are also small later additions to the Upaniṣad, thus formed.

(1) vi. 16, 17, and vi. 18 are clearly two later appendices.

(2) i. 16-18, may be a later insertion, though this is doubtful.

All these parts, however, form a remarkably coherent whole so that it is possible for Charpentier to argue for the unity of the Upaniṣad by saying that the *phala-śruti* verses, iii. 16, 17 are apparently a late addition, and therefore "do not in the slightest degree prove that the original Upaniṣad was at an end here".²

¹ S.L. 212.

² *Indian Antiquary*, Dec., 1928, p. 229.

Belvalkar,¹ on the other hand, maintains that the Upaniṣad is rather more composite than we have suggested, the original Upaniṣad consisting of *vallis* i and ii only, *valli* iii being added after some considerable interval and *adhyāya* II (*vallis* iv-vi) again after rather a shorter interval. This, as to the comparative gap between the three parts, does not agree with his table of grouping, which puts a large mass of Upaniṣad material, including practically the whole Yājñavalkya section of the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, between *Kaṭha* I and II, and very little between I. i, ii and I. iii. It is true that the third *valli* forms a characteristic whole, which shows distinct advance in thought, but it also completes the argument of the first two *vallis* and Belvalkar has shown no adequate reason for separating it. (A possible reason however is given on page 48.)

The Date of the Kaṭha.

(a) Points of contact with Buddhism.

(1) Oldenberg² argued that the *Kaṭha* must be pre-Buddhist because of the very close similarity between the story of the temptation of Gautama the Buddha by Māra and the story of the temptation of Gautama Naciketas by Mṛtyu told so vividly in the first *valli* of the Upaniṣad. Keith³ says that this ignores the fact that the story is already found in the *Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa*. This, however, is not the case. The Naciketas legend of course dates back to the Brāhmaṇa, which establishes its general priority over the Buddhist legend, but the story of the temptation of Naciketas occurs for the first time in the Upaniṣad.

(2) The prevalence of *Nāstika-vādins*, i.e. those who reply "nāsti" "He does not exist"), to the question as to what happens to a man after death (see *Kaṭha* i. 20), has been taken by some to be an evidence of post-Buddhist date. Here, it is said, we see the influence of the Buddhist doctrine of *anattā* (*an-ātman*),—the denial that man has an immortal soul. But though Buddha might say of himself as enlightened, "Rebirth has been extinguished, after this life there is no beyond",⁴

¹ H.I.P. 92, 135. ² Buddha, (Calcutta, 1927), 53-8. ³ R.P.V. 502.

⁴ Sermon in the Deer-Park, *Mahāvagga* i. 6, 46.

he does not seem for the ordinary man to have denied a transmigrating entity, and Aśoka's edicts show how prevalent the hope of heaven was among the early Buddhists. Later Buddhist thinkers might draw the logical conclusion from the Master's teaching, but Buddha himself was said to have forbidden his disciples to dwell on the view, "I have not a self", just as on the view "I have a self". Certainly the early Buddhists would have repudiated the title *nāstika-vādin*, for the term is found in Buddhist literature applied to such materialistic teaching as that of Ajita Kesakambalin.¹ His was a doctrine of sceptical materialism directed both against Brahmanic ritualism and the doctrines of *karman* and the *ātman*. To all he said, "*Nāsti*",—"there is neither fruit of good or evil. A human being is built of the four elements. When he dies earth returns to earth, the fluid in him to water, the heat to fire, the breath to air, the *indriyāṇi* or faculties into space. Fools and wise men alike on the dissolution of the body are cut off, are annihilated; after death they do not exist". We find his teaching set forth among the views of contemporary philosophers given by Ajātasattu, King of Magadha, as reported in the *Sāmañña-phala-sutta*.² He was thus, if this tradition is correct, a contemporary of the Buddha, and this date, the latter half of the sixth century B.C., when such doubts were prevalent but before Buddha's own teaching had spread, is a possible date for the composition of the first part of the *Kaṭha Upaniṣad*. Arguing on this ground alone a century later would of course be equally possible, as Buddhism does not seem to have spread in the Kuru-Pañcāla country, the probable place of composition of the Upaniṣad, for some considerable time after Buddha's death. In any case the argument from silence is precarious; the only point we are entitled to make is that as there is no trace of Buddhist ideas in the first *adhyāya* of the *Kaṭha* there is nothing to make a pre-Buddhist date impossible.

Charpentier³ views the matter differently. "To me" he says, "it appears that the surroundings are entirely the same that we meet with in the old Buddhism. The question put to Yama in verse i. 20, is exactly the same as that repeatedly

¹ Belvalkar, H.I.P. 452, Dasgupta, H.I.P. 80.

² *Dīgha Nikāya*, ii.

³ *Ind. Ant.* Nov. 1928, p. 207.

put to the Buddha, viz. 'does the Tathāgata survive after death, or does he not survive?' In v. 11-12 *duḥkha* and *sukha* seem to have the same sense of 'unrest' and 'rest' that they have in Buddhist philosophy, as is proved by Professor Stcherbatsky; *sānti* is just as well Buddhist as Upaniṣadic, etc. It thus seems probable that our text belongs to about the same time as the oldest Buddhist texts—perhaps the fourth century B.C.—and that it originated in the same spiritual surroundings as did these works." The argument is very slight. It is really a matter of impression. (Also Charpentier does not distinguish between the two *adhyāyas*.)

Even when we come to the second *adhyāya* there is no clear indication of contact with Buddhist thought. Even the use of the term *apramatta* (vi. 11), may be perhaps sufficiently explained by reference to the undistractedness in meditation which *Chāndogya* i. 3, 12, says is necessary to fulfil one's desire. But I cannot resist the impression that the stress on *apramāda*, vigilant concentration, in the Buddhist discipline as reflected in the *Dhammapada*, and its importance in the Yoga discipline of the *Kaṭha* and *Muṇḍaka* (as later in the *Yoga-sūtras*) are not unconnected. The mention of *apramāda* as one of the three most important ethical requisites in the Bhāgavata religion, as seen in the Besnagar pillar inscription, and the fact that the *dhamma* of Aśoka which consisted in vigilant and unremitting unselfish exertion might equally be characterised by the same term, seem significant of the spirit of the age.

(b) The Metre of the *Kaṭha*.

An argument for a comparatively early date is afforded by what Keith calls "the really antique character of the metre" of the *Kaṭha*, *Kena*, and *Īsā* as compared with the Epic or with such early Buddhist texts as the *Sutta-Nipāta*.¹ Stcherbatsky² seems to take the metrically pre-Buddhist character of the *Kaṭha* for granted, but Keith points out the difficulty of comparison with texts written in a different language (i.e. Pāli) and Charpentier that here "pre-Buddhist" can only mean "pre-Aśokan". Keith says that a more secure standard of comparison is with the *Bṛhaddevatā*, which is with much plausibility assigned to the fourth century B.C. and suggests that the metre of the *Kaṭha* is older.

(c) Quotations by the Katha.

(1) A comparative study of the common and similar passages found in the *Katha* and other literature brings out very strikingly the originality of the first *adhyāya* and its difference from the second. Apart from the quotations from the *Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa* with which it begins, I have not been able to trace any clear quotations. It is true that the saying *Anandā nāma te lokas* ("Joyless surely are those worlds", i. 3a) occurs also in *Br.* iv. 4. 11, but one would judge that it was a common saying, describing the penalty for various offences (i.e. "He will certainly go to hell who does so and so"). *Katha* i. 8 also contains some phrases which are found almost identically in *Br.* vi. 4. 12 and the idea behind is similar. But *Br.* vi. 4 is an appendix to the Upaniṣad, which, though it contains much ancient Vedic material, is in its present form certainly later than the *Katha*. (Belvalkar calls it Neo-upaniṣadic.) We are, I think, justified in saying that *Katha* I contains no quotations from other Upaniṣads.

(2) The second *adhyāya* of the *Katha*, however, quotes several times from the Vedic Samhitās, at least four times (possibly nine) from the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, once perhaps from the *Taittirīya*, and possibly refers to the *Kauṣītaki*. Its appendix, vi. 16 is quoted from the *Chāndogya* (viii. 6. 6).

<i>Katha</i> iv. 5b.	= <i>vr.</i> <i>Br.</i> iv. 4. 15b.	<i>Katha</i> iv. 13d.	= <i>Br.</i> i. 5. 23d.
" iv. 5cd.	= <i>Br.</i> iv. 4. 15cd.	" v. 2.	= <i>Rg.</i> iv. 40. 10.
" iv. 8.	= <i>Sāma.</i> i. 2. 3. 7.	" "	= <i>Tait. S.</i> i. 8. 15.
" iv. 9ab.	= <i>Atharva.</i> x. 18. 16.	" v. 7d.	<i>cf.</i> <i>Kauṣ.</i> i. 2.
" "	= <i>Br.</i> i. 5. 23ab.	" v. 9b.	= <i>Rg.</i> vi. 47. 18.
" iv. 9c.	= <i>vr.</i> <i>Br.</i> ii. 5. 15.	" "	= <i>Br.</i> ii. 5. 19.
" iv. 10cd.	= <i>Br.</i> iv. 4. 19cd.	" vi. 3.	= <i>vr.</i> <i>Tait.</i> ii. 8.
" iv. 11ab.	= <i>Br.</i> iv. 4. 19ab.	" vi. 14.	= <i>Br.</i> iv. 4. 7.
" iv. 12cd.	= <i>Br.</i> iv. 4. 15cd.		

With regard to the metrical portion of *Br.* iv. 4 (even by Deussen admitted to be late) it is not clear whether this is prior to the *Katha*,³ or whether it is (as Belvalkar holds) largely

¹ R.P.V. 502.

² C.C.B. 68.

³ I started out with the presupposition of the priority of the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, even in its metrical portions, and the commentary sometimes betrays this. I have moved more and more however toward Belvalkar's view that the *Katha* is here prior.

made up of quotations from the *Kaṭha* and the *Īśā*, or whether there was a common store of verses which teachers of different schools felt free to use and adapt. Leaving these *Br.* iv. 4 passages aside it is curious how little definite quotation from Upaniṣad sources remains. Two of the four remaining *Br.* passages are originally quotations from the *Samhitās*. The passage *sa evādyā sa u śvaḥ* (*Br.* i. 5. 23d=*Kaṭha* iv. 13d) also occurs in the *Br.* as a quotation from another source, but I have not been able to trace it. *Tam devāḥ sarve arpitās* (*Kaṭha* iv. 9c.)=(*vr.*) *asmin ātmani sarve devāḥ samarpitāḥ* (*Br.* ii. 5. 15) is the residuum of what seemed at first sight such an impressive list of quotations from the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*. It is quite possible therefore that the author even of *Kaṭha* II made no direct use of the *text* of any other Upaniṣad.¹ On the other hand it seems quite clear that he was in touch with the school of thought represented in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*. Among the most characteristic doctrines of the Yājñavalkya section is that of the *antaryāmin* or Inner-controller, who dwells in fire, wind and sun, in the breath and bodily powers, and also in mind and understanding, and yet is other than all these. "He is your Soul, the Inner-controller, the Immortal." (*Br.* iii. 7.) Our author does not use the word *antaryāmin*, but he speaks of the *antarātman* (Inner-soul) who is also *eko vaśī* (One controller), immanent yet transcendent, in very similar terms. It seems clear that he knew and used Yājñavalkya's conception, adapting it so as to bring out more clearly its theistic nature.

¹ Re the verse in common with *Tait.* there is really nothing to show that the one Upaniṣad quotes the other.

Notes on page 47:—

² R.P.V. 500.

³ H.I.P. 95.

⁴ **Muṇḍaka and Śvetāśvatara parallels with Kaṭha.**

Muṇḍ.	i. 2. 8.	=vr.	Kaṭha	ii. 5.	Svet.	ii. 9.	cf.	Kaṭha	iii. 3.
"	ii. 1. 2.	cf.	"	iii. 11b.	"	iii. 13.ab.=	"	vi. 17ab.	
"	ii. 1. 4.	cf.	"	v. 9c.	"	iii. 13.cd.=	"	vi. 9cd.	
"	ii. 2. 10.	=	"	v. 15.	"	iii. 20. =vr.	"	ii. 20.	
"	iii. 2. 3.	=	"	ii. 23.	"	iv. 11.cd.=vr.	"	i. 17cd.	
"	iii. 2. 8.	cf.	"	vi. 8.	"	iv. 20. =vr.	"	vi. 9.	
					"	vi. 12. =vr.	"	v. 12.	
"	iii. 1. 1	=	Svet.	iv. 6.*	"	vi. 13.ab.=	"	v. 13ab.	
					"	vi. 14. =	"	v. 15.	

* (Keith quoting this parallel says, "Muṇḍ. apparently uses Śvet". But there is nothing to show this.)

(d) Quotations from the *Kaṭha*.

Keith says that "the *Īśā* is clearly dependent on the *Kaṭha*"² and cites *Īśā* 8 cf. *Kaṭha* v. 13. The case cited is not clear, but *Īśā* 4, 5, and 6, 7, may be dependent on *Kaṭha* ii. 21, and iv. 5, 12. Belvalkar holds that *Muṇḍaka* is intermediate between *Kaṭha* I and *Kaṭha* II, holding that *Muṇḍ.* ii. 2. 10 is more original than *Kaṭha* v. 15.³ Here we dissent. The *Muṇḍaka*, though probably not much later than *Kaṭha* II, quotes from and is dependent on both sections of the *Kaṭha*.⁴ The *Śvetāśvatara* also is clearly dependent on both *Kaṭha* I and II. It is probably somewhat later than the *Muṇḍaka*, its theology and its *yoga* showing much more advance on the *Kaṭha* than does the *Muṇḍaka*. Then, in order, probably come *Mahānārāyaṇa*, *Prasna* and *Maitri*, the last of which very freely quotes the *Kaṭha* and expands some of its ideas.

The *Gītā* has a specially close relation to the *Kaṭha Upaniṣad*, being virtually an expansion of the parable of the chariot. Not only does it freely quote from the *Kaṭha*, but it uses its characteristic phrases and adopts and develops its characteristic thoughts.⁵ It is also clearly dependent on the *Śvetāśvatara*.

⁵ The *Gītā* is dependent on the *Kaṭha* in the following passages :

<i>Gītā</i>	<i>Kaṭha</i>	<i>Gītā</i>	<i>Kaṭha</i>
ii. 19, 20, on	ii. 19, 18.	xi. 53, 54, on	ii. 23.
ii. 29	„ ii. 7.	xiii. 31-33	„ v. 11.
iii. 42	„ iii. 10, 11.	xv. 1	„ vi. 1.
viii. 11	„ ii. 15.	xv. 6	„ v. 15.

Compare also the following phrases :

<i>Gītā</i>	<i>Kaṭha</i>
<i>Nāyam loko 'sti na paraṅ.</i> (4. 40)	<i>Ayam loko nāsti paraṅ.</i> (2. 6)
<i>Prāk śarīra vimokṣaṇāt.</i> (5. 23)	<i>Prāk śarīrasya visrasaṅ.</i> (6. 4)
<i>Hanta te kathayisyāmi.</i> (10. 19)	<i>Hanta te idam pravakṣyāmi</i> (5. 6)
<i>Tad dhāma paramaṃ mama.</i> (8. 21).	<i>Tad viṣṇoḥ paramaṃ padam.</i> (3. 9)
<i>Ya idam paramaṃ guhyaṃ,</i> (18. 68).	<i>Ya imam paramaṃ guhyaṃ,</i> (3. 17)
<i>mad-bhakteṣu abhidhāsyati.</i>	<i>śrāvayed brahma-saṃsadi.</i>

Here we have not only obviously reminiscent phraseology which shows a very close acquaintance of the *Gītākāra* with the *Kaṭha*, but, allied with it, conscious development of the thought which can surely leave no doubt which way the dependence lies. Yet only ten years ago Sir S. Radhakrishnan could write, "The *Kaṭha Upaniṣad*...quotes freely from the *Bhagavadgītā*", and append a note, "Some scholars are inclined to the

Conclusion :

The first *adhyāya* of the *Kaṭha* shows close acquaintance with the modes of thought prevalent in the Brāhmaṇas and no trace of acquaintance with Buddhist thought, though a strong interest in the problems which moved men during Buddha's time. Spite of its metrical form all the evidence goes to favour a fairly early date, though it obviously does not belong to the earliest group of Upaniṣads. All this suggests a date somewhere about 550 to 500 B.C.

In the third *vallī*, however, we have hints for the first time of a new development of thought,—there is explicit recognition of a distinction between the individual and the supreme soul, a doctrine of *yoga*, and a suggestion of a distinction within the Supreme being which provides a basis for theism.

These hints are taken up and developed in the second *adhyāya*, and then in the *Muṇḍaka* and *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣads*, and the movement of thought culminates in the theology of the *Gītā*,—the doctrine of Kṛṣṇa as the Highest Person; of Brahman or the *akṣara avyakta* (eternal unexpressed) as his higher nature, the basis of individual souls and their goal and abode when saved by grace; and of the world as a lower expression of that same nature. The linkage is clear and the whole movement of thought may not have required more than a century.

Kaṭha and Gītā (continued from previous page).

view that the *Kaṭha* is older than the *Gītā*". (I.P. vol. I. 142.) Indian opinion is curiously inclined to cling to the antiquity of the *Gītā*, even as against other *sāstras*. Even Principal Dasgupta, who in the first volume of his H.I.P. could write, "Though we may be slow to believe such an early date as has been assigned to the *Bhagavadgītā* by Telang (4th century B.C.) yet I suppose that its date could safely be placed so far back as the first half of the first century B.C. or the last part of the second century" (p. 421) now, at the end of his second volume, suggests that it was pre-Buddhist. But the discussion of this subject demands another volume—from him.

(Re the relation of the *Kaṭha* and the *Gītā*, students may further consult Prof. D. S. Sarma's excellent little book, *The Kaṭha and the Gītā*, Madras, 1932.) Also for a description of the age and circumstances in which the *Gītā* was probably written, the chapter on "The Age of the *Gītā*" in the Introduction to his *Bhagavad Gita*.

The *Kaṭha* then is linked with the Brāhmaṇas on the one side and with the *Gītā* on the other. Intermediate is the third *vallī* which is part of the first *adhyāya* yet is the fountain-head of the new development. (It is for this reason, no doubt, that Belvalkar suggests an intermediate date for its composition.) As to the date of the *Gītā* there is still much uncertainty, but all the evidence (summarised in the Introduction to Hill's *Bhagavadgītā*, 1-18), suggests that on the one hand it is post-Aśokan and on the other not much later than the Ghasuṇḍī and Besnagar inscriptions, i.e. 230 to 150 B.C.

If then we may venture to suggest dates which fit the evidence we have been trying to summarize.

<i>Kaṭha</i> I may have been composed about	500	B.C.
„ I iii (if separate)	„	„ 400 „
„ II	„	„ 350-300 „
<i>Muṇḍaka</i>	„	„ 280 „
<i>Śvetāśvatara</i>	„	„ 250-200 „
The <i>Gītā</i>	„	„ 200 „

But there are so many elements of uncertainty that all this is still tentative.

The Argument of the *Kaṭha*.

Caveat. A synopsis, if it is not a colourless list of headings, is necessarily also an interpretation. For its justification and also, in places, for material for quite different interpretations, the reader is referred to the commentary.

Vallī I. The story of Naciketas in the house of Death.

1-9. To keep his father's word Naciketas goes to the house of Death, where for three days he remains unfed. To atone for inhospitality Death offers him three gifts.

10-11. For the First Gift he chooses return to his father.

12-19. For the Second Gift, knowledge of the Nāciketa fire-sacrifice, leading to immortality.

20-29. For the Third Gift he chooses knowledge concerning the meaning of "the great Passing-beyond". Death tests Naciketas by offering instead all that men usually value,—sons, wealth, power, long life, and every kind of pleasure. Naciketas rejects them all, for in the presence of Death he has seen their vanity. He asks again therefore to know the secret of what lies beyond death.

Vallī II. Death's teaching concerning Immortality,—the discernment and attainment of eternal reality.

1-6. There are two ways,—the way of knowledge and of good, and the way of ignorance and pleasure. Men, deluded by the fair shows of life and grasping at fancied gain, fall into a childish materialism which is the cause of their slavery to death.

7-11. Wonderful and hard to comprehend is the supreme Reality,—unattainable indeed by human reasoning. Such knowledge can only be imparted by a true spiritual teacher to a fit pupil. Yama therefore accepts Naciketas as his disciple, but recognises that in one respect he is superior to himself. For Yama, through sacrifice, has obtained the sovereignty of heaven, while Naciketas is ready to surrender all wealth, heavenly as well as earthly, that he may know ultimate reality.

Verses 12 and 13 begin the instruction. The reality Naciketas seeks is very deeply hidden, yet through *adhyātma-yoga* (spiritual yoking, or meditation on the inner self) its divine nature may be realised. Apprehending it as Spirit a true inquirer like Naciketas attains that which is of supreme value.

14. That is what I want, said Naciketas. I do not ask about religious duties or merits, or their results. I seek to know that which is deeper than all the happenings of time. Tell me about eternal Reality.

15-17. In the first place, replied Yama, eternal Reality is symbolised by the word "Om" which is, or represents, the imperishable Brahman,—the supreme goal, the supreme stay of all, and the only source of true greatness.

18-20. Now look within. Birth and death are only bodily changes. There, at the centre of your being, in the undying Soul, is eternal reality. There in your own heart you may, by Divine grace, have a vision of the greatness of the *Ātman*,—your own self, yet the Self of all, and so may be delivered from all sorrow.

21-25. Yet how may the Self be gained? For ordinary men with ordinary methods He seems a baffling enigma. Keeness of intellect, scripture learning, religious instruction,

all these by themselves are vain. But to the purified, tranquil, collected soul the Supreme Soul, in grace, manifests himself. Other men, no matter what their social or supposed religious status, are but the food of Death.

Vallī III. The Parable of the Chariot, teaching adhyātma-yoga,—the yoking of the soul with the eternal reality which is its basis.

1-9. The third *vallī* begins by distinguishing two souls, called shadow and light (*i.e.* the individual and the supreme souls). The relation of the two, and the way by which the individual may yoke all his powers for the attainment of the highest, are set forth in the parable of the chariot.

The individual soul is lord of the chariot of the body. Its active powers (the *indriyāṇi* or "senses", pictured as horses) may be potent for good or evil. Only when well yoked and controlled by mind and reason can they be guided to the right goal (described as "the highest place of Viṣṇu"). Here then we are introduced to the way of *Yoga* defined later as *indriya-dhāraṇā*,—"control of the senses", *i.e.* to the yoga of discipline.

10-13. The next section seems to teach a higher yoga,—the yoga of communion. Reason, the "charioteer", is a faculty of the *ātman*,—the individual soul, called "great" because it is lord of all the faculties. But the soul can only rise to the height of its powers and effectively control the "senses" when it realises that it is the expression of a deeper principle,—the divine nature or energy called *Avyakta* ("the Unexpressed"), the ground both of the world and of all individual souls. Still more ultimate is the *Puruṣa*, the highest Self or "Person".

14, 15. This way which goes beyond all outward, empirically describable things, beyond our finite separate personality to the eternal ground of all being, is said to be "sharp as a razor's edge". Yet for keen, earnest souls it leads beyond death to immortality.

16, 17. Here probably ended the original Upaniṣad, and these two verses describe the result of its recital. (But it raised problems concerning the nature of the Self and the meaning of *yoga*, which a later teacher sought to solve, possibly with reference to discussions in other schools of the Yajur Veda.)

Vallī IV. The need for Inner Vision, leading to the perception and attainment of unity.

1, 2. Our normal vision is outward, through the senses to the world: but a certain sage (possibly Naciketas) desiring immortality turned his vision inward and saw the Self.

3-5. What is meant by the Self? Verses 3 and 4 define it as the perceiving and knowing subject. But the experiencer, called in verse 5, *ātman jīva*, "the living soul", is not a mere individual. It is one with the eternal Lord, and knowledge of this truth strips away all fear.

6-9. Verses 6-9 quote or refer to a number of Vedic mantras which show that the One Lord, who has entered the human heart as the soul, is also the universal Soul, from which all creation has sprung. He is the supreme life-power, worshipped in the sacrifice through the sacred fire. He is seen also in the sun, which like all nature powers has its being in Him.

10, 11. All beings then, ultimately regarded, are one, and it is failure to realise this unity which is the cause of death.

12, 13. The human soul was popularly supposed to reside as a "thumb-sized person" in the heart. Yet the inner person is not to be viewed as a separate individual, for it is one with the eternal Lord.

14, 15. So, it is repeated, failure to perceive unity leads to distraction and waste. Perception of unity leads to unity.

Vallī V. The Inner-soul, immanent yet transcendent.

1-8. The Lord of the city of the body is also immanent Lord of the world. He is eternal Brahman yet as individual soul He dwells (like a dwarf) in human bodies. As such He is subject to transmigration, which is determined by knowledge and deeds. His essential nature as Self is seen in that He is eternally conscious even in those who are asleep. He is also the Brahman, the eternal world-ground.

9-11. He is, then, the *Antarātman*,—the one Inner-soul of all beings. Like air and fire he is immanent and all-pervading, "enwrapped in every form". Yet He is also transcendent: none can fully express Him. He also transcends the sorrow and imperfection of the world, being like the sun, which reveals the faults in visible things but is itself untainted by them.

12-14. As Inner-Soul He stands within the individual soul, and they are truly wise who direct their vision within and find Him there. Such vision alone brings enduring joy and peace. But how is such vision possible. Only as He himself shines into the seeking soul.

Vallī VI. The way of adhyātma-yoga further expounded.

Verses 1-3 begin by comparing the world to an inverted pipal tree, whose unseen root is Brahman. He is the mysterious awful living energy from whom the universe originates and whom its powers must ever obey.

4, 5. Through knowledge of Him a man is saved and fitted for higher life. Such vision is possible in all the worlds through which the soul may pass in its long transmigration, but nowhere is clearer vision possible than here and now, within one's soul.

6-8. In order to obtain this liberating vision a man must penetrate within to the inmost recesses of his being; beyond the senses and instincts, beyond mind, beyond reason to the great soul. Beyond that also to its unexpressed basis (the *Avyakta*). Beyond that to the highest Person (*Puruṣa*).

9-13. That Person, being all-pervading and bodiless, can never appear to outward vision, yet by heart and thought inward apprehension is possible. The senses and mind must be withdrawn from outward objects, even reason must cease to strive, and, with all one's powers held in control, one must vigilantly concentrate all one's attention within. To do this, faith in the existence of the inmost Person is first necessary, but this leads on to immediate experience in which his inner being, which transcends all description, is made manifest.

14, 15. Thus all the knots that bind the heart are cut. Desiring only Brahman one attains Brahman, and so attains to immortality.

16-18. Concluding appendices.

कठोपनिषत् ।

सो सह नावतु । सह नौ भुनक्तु । सह वीर्यं करवावहै ।
तेजस्विनावधौतमस्तु । मा विद्विषावहै ॥

ॐ शान्तिः । शान्तिः । शान्तिः ॥

Om !

*Saha nāv avatu ;
Saha nau bhunaktu ;
Saha vīryam karavāvahai ;
Tejasvi nāv adhītam astu ;
Mā vidviṣāvahai ;
Om : śāntiḥ, śāntiḥ, śāntiḥ.*

THE KATHA UPANIṢAD

Introductory Prayer.

Om !

May He protect us both !
May He be pleased with us !
With vigour may we work together !
Successful may our study be !
Let there be no variance between us !
Om ! Peace ! Peace ! Peace !

The Introductory Prayer is not part of the Upaniṣad proper and is not found (or occurs in abbreviated form) in many MSS. It is found prefixed to other Upaniṣads also, e.g. the 2nd and 3rd vallis of the *Taittirīya*. Teacher and pupil recite it together before they begin their study. Harmonious co-operation between teacher and pupil in vigorous keen study will, by God's help, lead to success. *Tejasvin* (keen, bright, energetic, successful) may refer to the brightness and keenness of the study or the splendour of its successful result, or to both.

First Vallī.—The legend of Naciketas, found in the *Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa*, III. 11. 8 (given in Appendix I, page 214) is taken to provide a dramatic setting for a discussion on the nature and conditions of immortality. The original *Brāhmaṇa* story is told to explain the origin and title of the so-called *Nāciketa* fire sacrifice and to extol the blessings which it confers. The Brahmin boy, Naciketas, is told by his father in a fit of anger to go to Death. He goes to Yama's house and finds him absent, and so for three days and nights remains there unfed. Yama, on his return, thus convicted of the sin of inhospitality to a Brahmin, offers three gifts in recompense. For the first Naciketas said, "Let me return alive to my father" For the second, "Tell me how my good works (*iṣṭā-pūrte*) may not be exhausted". For the third, "Tell me the conquest of re-death (*punar-mṛtyu*)". In answer to both the second and the third questions we are told, "He (Yama) told him this *Nāciketa* fire".

In Ṛg-Vedic times men looked forward after death to a happy immortality in which they would unite with the fathers and the gods and enjoy the reward of their good works (*iṣṭā-pūrte*, "sacrifices and works of charity") in highest heaven. (See Ṛg. X. 14, quoted p. 63.) In the *Brāhmaṇas* we see a growing doubt and fear that such happiness may not last. What if the effect of the good deeds wears out and in place of the desired immortality in the next world there comes renewed death? Hence the priestly teaching that many sacrificial rites are required to save from this: and among these is the *Nāciketa* fire. Still later, in the early Upaniṣad period, came fear of rebirth on earth (see Keith, R.P.V. 570-3).

The author of the *Kaṭha Upaniṣad*, teaching in a period when not only the doctrine of transmigration but also materialist and other *nāstika* doubts as to any continuing self had developed, substitutes for Naciketas's third request as given in the *Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa* (which is only a repetition of the second), the request that he may be taught the real meaning of the "great transition" which men call death, and by this knowledge may be set free. With the answer to this third question, which begins with the second vallī, the Upaniṣad teaching proper begins. The first vallī, with its account of the *Nāciketa*

॥ प्रथमा वल्ली ॥

ओं ॥ उग्रन्द् वै वाजश्रवसः सर्ववेदसं ददौ ।

तस्य ह नचिकेता नाम पुत्र आस ॥ १ ॥

तं ह कुमारं सन्तं दक्षिणासु नीयमानासु अद्वाऽऽविवेश सोऽमन्यत ॥ २ ॥

पीतोदका जग्धत्वा दुग्धदोहा निरिन्द्रियाः ।

अनन्दा नाम ते लोकास्तान्म गच्छति ता ददत् ॥ ३ ॥

Prathamā Vallī.

1. *Uśan ha vai Vājaśravasaḥ sarva-vedasaṃ dadau ;
Tasya ha Naciketā nāma putra āsa.*
2. *Taṃ ha kumāraṃ santaṃ dakṣiṇāsu nīyamānāsu
śraddhā 'viveśa so 'manyata.*
3. *Pītodakā jagdha-tṛṇā,
dugdha-dohā nirindriyāḥ ;
Anandā nāma te lokāś,
tān sa gacchati tā dadat.*

FIRST VALLĪ.

Naciketas and his father.

1. Being desirous (of reward) Vājaśravasa¹ gave all his goods (in sacrifice). Now he had a son named Naciketas.
2. Though he was but a boy, as the offerings were being led away faith entered into him, and he thought :
3. Their water drunk, their grass eaten,
Their milk milked, their strength worn out :
Joyless, surely, are those worlds,
To which he goes who gives these (cows).

¹ Or, Uśan Vājaśravasa.

fire, is simply a dramatic introduction, though it is interesting as representing a type of thought which, first developed in the Brāhmaṇas, still persisted alongside of the thought of the Upaniṣads and was indeed far more widely prevalent.

1. **Being desirous** (*uśan*): The first word of the Upaniṣad strikes the key-note of the religion of the Brāhmaṇas,—desire for earthly or heavenly gain, prompting sacrifices to the gods

and gifts to the priests. The key-note of the *Upaniṣads* is sounded in II. 20: "One who is free from desire beholds Him". This is the note also on which the *Upaniṣad* ends:

When all desires are given up
That dwell within the human heart,
Then mortal man becomes immortal,—
Even here to Brahman he attaineth.

Sometimes in the *Upaniṣads* and in later literature this liberation from desire tends to be spoken of as the attainment of an infra-human, stone-like indifference. The story of Naciketas is valuable as showing that this is not the true way of regarding it. The story links up the religion of the *Brāhmaṇas* and the religion of the *Upaniṣads* and shows that the latter was not merely the antithesis but also the true fulfilment of the former. In the *Brāhmaṇas* sacrifice had become mechanical and soulless. But there was a right idea behind it. *Vājaśravasa's* vow to give all that he had in sacrifice and in gifts to the priests was only a conventional exaggeration, and he interpreted it like Ananias. But his son Naciketas, into whose heart faith had entered with the enthusiasm of youth, was shocked when he saw the selection of old cattle his father really offered, and it seemed to him sheer sacrilege. Both to save his father and to keep faith, he felt bound to offer himself. Dedication of the whole self in faith is the true sacrifice. It is desireless in the sense that it is prompted by no desire of reward, but it leads to "fulfilment of desire" in the highest sense.

Re *Uśan*, we have followed the traditional interpretation given by Śaṅkara and all commentators on the *Upaniṣad*. In his *bhāṣya* on the *Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa*, however, Bhaṭṭabhāskara Mīra, commenting on *Uśan ha vai vājaśravasaḥ*, says, *Uśan nāma vājaśravaso 'patyaṃ*,—"The offspring of *Vājaśravasa* named *Uśan*", and this certainly seems a more natural reading of the Sanskrit. There still remains the possibility that the name was invented in Bunyan's fashion to suit the story,—“Mr. Desirous”; (or perhaps “Willing” or “Zealous”; for in the *Brāhmaṇa* there is no criticism of the offering on the ground that the cows were so poor or that *Vājaśravasa* was not sincere, but simply a feeling on the part of Naciketas that a son was needed to complete the offering).

Note that verses 1, 2, and 4 are in prose, and are an almost exact quotation from the *Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa*. The reflections of Naciketas in verses 3, 5, and 6, are in verse (like the rest of the *Upaniṣad*) and are an addition to the original *Brāhmaṇa* story. 3c is a tag which may possibly be quoted from *Br. iv. 4. 11a*, but more likely is a current saying variously applied in various contexts (*cf. also Iśā 3*).

स होवाच पितरं तत कस्मै मां दास्यसौति ।

द्वितीयं तृतीयं तं होवाच मृत्यवे त्वा ददामौति ॥ ४ ॥

बहूनामेमि प्रथमो बहूनामेमि मध्यमः ।

किंस्त्रिद्यमस्य कर्तव्यं यन्मयाद्य करिष्यति ॥ ५ ॥

4. *Sa ha uvāca pitaram, Tata kasmai mām dāsyasi_iti ;
Dvītiyaṃ tṛtīyaṃ taṃ ha uvāca, Mṛtyave tvā dadāmi_iti.*

5. *Bahūnām emi prathamo,
bahūnām emi madhyamaḥ ;
Kiṃsvid Yamasya kartavyam,
yan mayā 'dya kariṣyati.*

4. Then he said to his father, "Father, to whom will you give me?"

Twice he asked and thrice. Then (being angry) he answered, "To Death do I give you."

5. (*Naciketas thought*),
Out of many I go foremost,
Out of many I go midmost ;
What, I wonder, does Death need done,
That he will do by me to-day.

4. **To whom will you give me?** Śaṅkara says, *Kasmai ṛtvig-viśeṣāya dakṣiṇārthaṃ mām dāsyasi*—"To whom, i.e. to what particular priest will you give me as a *dakṣiṇā* or offering?" The explanation seems reasonable. Naciketas was willing to be given as a servant to make up as far as he could for the defect of his father's offering. His father, however, angered by the persistence of his "priggish" son, bursts forth with the equivalent of an angry Englishman's "Go to hell". His words were probably a mere expression of annoyance but Naciketas, in his piety, takes them literally, and sets out for the house of Yama, the god of death.

Quite what we are to understand by this is not clear,—the story in the *Tait. B.* as well as in the *Kaṭha* is very sketchily told. In Vedic times Yama's house was conceived as in highest heaven, usually in the sun, and inaccessible to mortals. Max Müller supposes that "the father, having once said so, though

अनुपश्य यथा पूर्वे प्रतिपश्य तथाऽपरे ।

सस्यमिव मर्त्यः पच्यते सस्यमिवाजायते पुनः ॥ ६ ॥

6. *Anupasya yathā pūrve,*
pratipasya tathā 'pare ;
Sasyam iva martyaḥ pacyate,
sasyam iv' ājāyate punaḥ.

6. Look back, as (fared) the former men,
 Look on, so will the after ones :
 Like corn a mortal ripeneth,
 Like corn, is hither born again.

in haste, had to be true to his word and sacrifice his son". Whitney is however probably correct when he says, "To suppose anything of the kind is quite out of the spirit of the story. He simply goes, as naturally as in folk-lore stories everywhere people go to the (prosaically) most impossible places."

5, 6. Śaṅkara represents Naciketas, startled at what has happened, going apart to reflect. Is it just that he should have to die? He has tried to do his duty and cannot help knowing that he is better than many sons ("Among many I go first"). At least he is not worse than the average ("Among many I go midmost"). His father has obviously spoken without purpose but there must be purpose behind. It must be, he reflects, that God has some special need of him. Then, seeing his father full of grief, Naciketas comforts him with the words of verse 6, which following Śaṅkara, we should render,

"Look back, how men of old behaved,
 Look round, so others now behave."

i.e. Your ancestors never falsified their word, and good men to-day never do so. Besides, what gain would there be? Man at best is transitory,—what will happen must have happened very soon. Do not grieve for what is inevitable and don't think of breaking your word.

We have given Śaṅkara's explanation as it merits consideration, and is followed by practically all Indian commentators, but it is surely more ingenious than convincing. We are rather inclined, with Max Müller and Whitney, to regard both, vv. 5 and 6 as a meditation of Naciketas, the subject of both being the same, the transitoriness of human life. After all it is nothing unique that has happened to him. He is one of a large company moving toward the world of the departed,—the first of many who will come after, the midst of many of his contemporaries. The important thing is to find out the meaning of it all, for it must have a meaning. Why is Yama singling him out?—what will he do through

वैश्वानरः प्रविशत्यतिथिर्ब्राह्मणो गृहान् ।
तस्यैतां शान्तिं कुर्वन्ति हर वैवस्वतोदकम् ॥ ७ ॥

7. *Vaiśvānaraḥ praviśati,*
atīthir brāhmaṇo gṛhān ;
Tasya etāṃ śāntim kurvanti,
hara Vaivasvata udakam.

Naciketas in the house of Death.

7. Like unto Fire a Brahmin guest
Makes entry into houses :
They make this his peace-offering,—
“ Bring water, O Vaivasvata ”.

him ? The same idea is repeated in another and more generalised form in verse 6. As Whitney says, “ He sends his gaze first along after (*anu*) his predecessors, and then in the other direction to meet (*prati*) those who are coming after him,”—all fare alike. Then comes the classic couplet on transmigration,—man is like corn which ripens and rots that it may be born again.

Verse 6 may possibly be an interpolation. It is unnecessary after verse 5. It is an anachronism if we have in view the supposed date of the Naciketas story (*Tait. B.* mentions *punar-mṛtyu* but not *punar-janma*). It is dramatically incorrect in that Naciketas is here represented as already knowing a good deal about “ the great passing-beyond ”. On the other hand if we view the matter from the standpoint of the author of the *Kaṭha Upaniṣad*, transmigration had by his time become an established doctrine and stood in the fore-front of men’s minds. The *Bṛhadāranyaka* had first explicitly taught it, and thereafter all the *Upaniṣads* assume it and seek deliverance from it. It is not unnatural therefore that it should find mention at this point where Naciketas is setting out on his search for eternal reality.

Between verses 6 and 7 there is a gap. In the *Brāhmaṇa* story Naciketas goes to Yama’s house at the command of a divine Voice. Śaṅkara however fills in as follows : “ Thus addressed, the father sent him to Death to keep his word, and he having gone to the mansion of Yama fasted for three nights, Yama being away. When Yama returned his ministers or wife said to him,”—then follow verses 7 and 8.

7. *Vaiśvānara* means “ belonging to all men ”. It is an epithet of Agni, occurring 60 times in the *R̥g Veda*, and is used to designate fire in all its aspects.

Vaivasvata, i.e. Yama, son of Vivasvat (the sun).

आशाप्रतीक्षे सङ्गतं सूत्रतां चेष्टापूर्ते पुत्रपशून्च सर्वान् ।

एतद्दृक्ते पुरुषस्याल्पमेघसो यस्यानन्वसति ब्राह्मणो गृहे ॥ ८ ॥

8. *Āśā-pratikṣe saṅgataṃ sūnṛtāṃ,*
ca iṣṭā-pūrte putra-paśūṃś-ca sarvān,
Etad vṛṅkte puruṣasya alpa-medhaso,
yasya anaśnan vasati brāhmaṇo grhe.

8. Hope and expectation, friendship and joy,
 Sacrifices and good works, sons, cattle, all,—
 All this is wrenched from him of little wit
 In whose house a Brahmin abides unfed.

Just as fire is appeased by water, so a Brahmin guest must be pleased with hospitable entertainment, beginning with water to wash his feet, otherwise his presence, like fire, is destructive to the house. Note the high position of the Brahmins at this period; even a god is represented as guilty and liable to great loss if he offends one of them. As the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* said, "There are two kinds of devas, the gods in heaven and the Brahmins on earth". (II. ii. 2. 6.) To some extent, however, the *Kaṭha* may be regarded as a piece of Brahmin propaganda. It represents the supreme knowledge of the *Ātman* as having been divinely revealed to a Brahmin, whereas the older Upaniṣads represent this knowledge as first attained by Kṣatriyas and communicated by them to Brahmins. Thus the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* and the *Chāndogya* represent the Brahmin sage Gautama Āruṇi, the teacher of the great Yājñavalkya, as receiving instruction from Pravāhaṇa Jaivali, King of the Pañcālas, who says, "This knowledge has never come to Brahmins before you". (*Bṛ.* vi. 2, *Ch.* v. 3, esp. 7.) In the *Kauṣītaki* (i. 1) Āruṇi is also said to have gone as pupil to King Citra Gārgyāyaṇa, and in *Bṛ.* ii. 1 and *Kauṣ.* iv. the proud Brahmin Gārgya is represented as a pupil of Ajātaśatru, King of Kāśi. (But see Keith, R.P.V. 492-6 and Dasgupta, H.I.P., 31, 33-35.)

8. *Saṅgata*=fellowship, friendly intercourse.

Sūnṛtā in Vedic Sanskrit means "joy" (see Macdonell, S.D.). In later Sanskrit, especially among the Jains, it meant the virtue of kindly speech. (Sometimes also "truth," opp. of *anṛta*.) Śāṅkara interprets, "The fruit resulting from fellowship with good men and from true and pleasant speech".

तिष्ठो रात्रौर्यद्वात्सौमिहे मेऽनन्त्रन्नत्ततिथिर्नमस्यः ।

नमस्तेऽस्तु ब्रह्मन् खस्त्रि मेऽस्तु तस्मात्प्रति त्रौन्वरान्वृषीष्व ॥ ९ ॥

9. *Tisro rātrir yad avātsir grhe me,
anaśnan brahmann atithir namasyaḥ,
Namas te 'stu brahman svasti me 'stu,
tasmāt prati trīn varān vṛṣīṣva.*

9. (*Yama returns and addresses Naciketas*).

Since Brahmin, in my house you have abode three nights,
Unfed,—a guest who should have been revered,
Homage to thee, O Brahmin, welfare to me!
Therefore in recompense choose thou three gifts.

“Sacrifices and good works” (*Iṣṭā-pūrte*):

iṣṭā, pp. of *yaj*=sacrificed, so things sacrificed, sacrifice.

pūrta, pp. of *pṛ*=filled, fulfilled, so n. (1) fulfilment, (2) merit or charitable work.

Śaṅkara says, *iṣṭāpūrte*—*iṣṭam yūgajam phalam, pūrtam ārāmādi-kriyājāṅg phalam*. “*Iṣṭam* means fruit produced by sacrifice, *pūrtam*—fruit resulting from such works as planting gardens, etc.”

This agrees with the regular Vedic use of the phrase. Cf. for example the great funeral hymn, Ṛg Veda X. 14, where the departed soul is addressed as follows:

*Sam gacchasva pitṛbhīḥ, sam Yamena,
iṣṭāpūrtena parame vioman.*

“Unite thou with the fathers and with Yama,

With the reward of thy sacrifices and good works in highest heaven.”
(See Macdonell, V.R.S. 170.)

Vṛṅkte, 3 s. pr. A. of *vṛj*, P. *vṛṅakti*, to turn, twist. A.=to remove, wrench away (from anyone, *g.* or *ab.*). The subject is *brāhmaṇaḥ*, and the literal translation, “A Brahmin wrenches away all this, (i.e. all the things enumerated in the first half verse) from the man of little understanding in whose house he remains unfed”. Śaṅkara: *vṛṅkte*—*āvarjayati, vināśayati*. (“*Vṛṅkte*=removes, destroys.”)

With verse 8 cf. *Br.* vi. 4. 12, where a Brahmin who has been injured curses his injurer with the words, “I take away your sons and cattle (*putra-paśūṃs-te ādāde*), I take away your sacrifices and meritorious deeds (*iṣṭā-sukṛte*), I take away your hope and expectation (*āsā-parūkāśau*)”.

9. *Welfare to me (svasti me astu)*, i.e. Pardon me and let me be freed from the sin of inhospitality.

शान्तसङ्कल्पः सुमना यथा स्याद्द्वैतमन्युर्गौतमो माभि मृत्यो ।
त्वत्प्रसृष्टं माभिवदेत्प्रतीत एतन्नयाणां प्रथमं वरं वृणे ॥ १० ॥

यथा पुरस्ताद्भविता प्रतीत औद्दालकिरारुणिर्मत्प्रसृष्टः ।

सुखं रात्रौः श्रयिता वीतमन्युस्त्वां ददृशिवान्मृत्युमुखात्प्रमुक्तम् ॥ ११ ॥

10. *Śānta-saṅkalpaḥ sumanā yathā syād,
vīta-manyur Gautamo mā 'bhi mṛtyo,
Tvat-prasṛṣṭam mā 'bhivadet pratīta,
etat trayāṅgāṃ prathamam varam vṛṇe.*
11. *Yathā purastād bhavitā pratīta,
Auddālakir Āruṇir mat-prasṛṣṭaḥ ;
Sukham rātrīḥ śayitā vīta-manyus,
tvam dadṛśivān mṛtyu-mukhāt pramuktam.*

The First Gift.

10. (*Naciketas said :*)

That with anxiety allayed and anger gone,
Gautama may be gracious to me, O Death,—
That he may know and welcome me, by you sent back,—
This choose I as the first gift of the three.

11. (*Yama replied :*)

Auddālaki Āruṇi having known you
Sent back by me, will be just as before :
Sweet will he sleep at night, his anger gone,
On seeing you from Death's (dread) maw released.

11. *Mat-prasṛṣṭaḥ*, "sent back by me," is nom. in apposition with the subject, Auddālaki-Āruṇi. But this gives an unsuitable meaning, since the one sent back is Naciketas, not his father. Śāṅkara interprets as *mayā anujñātaḥ*, "permitted or instructed by me". This is quite different from the obvious meaning of the phrase in the previous verse, and cannot be accepted. Böhrtlingk amends the text to *prasṛṣṭe*, "Having recognised (you) A-A will be just as before to one by me dismissed". Whitney suggests *prasṛṣṭam*, and we accept his emendation as almost inevitable. So we render, "Just as before will A-A be, having recognised

(you as) one sent back by me". Whitney himself however renders, "As of old shall A-A be cheerful (toward thee) sent forth by me,"—some-what doubtfully accepting the second meaning of *pratīta*.

Pratīta, pp. of *pratī+ī*, gone toward and therefore (1) recognised, known, acknowledged, and so (2) convinced, satisfied, cheerful. Commenting on *pratīta*, in verse 10, Śāṅkara says, *pratīto labdha-smṛtiḥ, —sa eva ayaṃ putro samāgataḥ ity-evam pratyabhijānan ity-arthaḥ*. "Pratīta means recollected, recognising this is my very own son come back again." On the whole we prefer to follow Śāṅkara here, though Hume and Deussen join Whitney in rendering, "cheerful" or "happy," and this gives rather a better order to the sentence. Deussen keeps the reading, *mat-prasṛtaḥ*, but interprets quite differently from Śāṅkara :

"Auddālaki Āruṇi will be just as before,
Happy will he be, released by me (from his words)."

If we wish to avoid emendation, this is probably the best rendering.¹

Gautama and *Auddālaki-Āruṇi* are names of Vājaśravasa.¹ *Gautama* is probably a clan name, and the other name may mean either Auddālaki, son of Aruṇa, or the son (or descendant) of Uddālaka and Aruṇa. What then is his relation to the famous ṛṣi Uddālaka Āruṇi, so prominent in *Br.*, *Ch.* and *Kauṣ.*? (See note on 7.) Possibly an unworthy son, i.e. Auddālaki, son of Uddālaka, son of Aruṇa,—Yājñavalkya being his spiritual descendant. (See the traditional list of teachers in the Vājaśaneyi school, *Br.* vi. 5.) Vājaśravasa is also a patronymic, son or descendant of Vājaśravas, a name which occurs third before Aruṇa.

But probably the names, which are all patronymics, are not intended to be historical.

¹ See note on *Uśan* (page 58) pointing out that Bhaṭṭabāhaskara Miśra in his commentary on the *Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa* takes *Uśan* as the personal name of Vājaśravasa. (See A. Mahādeva Sāstri's edition, *Aṣṭaka III*, pt. II, 234. (Mysore 1913). Also Macdonell and Keith, V.I. 282.)

Charpentier (*Indian Antiquary*, 1928, pp. 205, 223) considers that the *Kaṭha* identifies *Uśan* Vājaśravasa, the father of Naciketas, with the famous Uddālaka Āruṇi. Auddālaki Āruṇi therefore means Naciketas. So he renders verse 11 "As of old he will be full of joy; (since) the son of Uddālaka Āruṇi has (already) been let loose by me", i.e. Yama implicitly tells Naciketas that he is already free to go back. So too Hillebrandt, "Āruṇi, son of Uddālaka, is (herewith) released by me". (*Aus Brahmanas und Upanisaden*, 117.)

स्वर्ग लोके न भयं किञ्चनास्ति न तत्र त्वं न जरया विभेति ।
 उभे तौर्वाग्नायापिपासे शोकातिगो मोदते स्वर्गलोके ॥ १२ ॥

12. *Svarge loke na bhayaṃ kiñcana_asti,*
na tatra tvam na jarayā bibheti :
Ubhe tīrtvā 'śanāyā-pipāse,
śoka_atigo modate svargaloke.

The Second Gift :

Knowledge of the Sacrifice, leading to Immortality.

12. (Naciketas said :)

In the heaven-world there is no fear whatever :
 Thou art not there, nor does one fear old age :
 Having crossed over both hunger and thirst,
 Sorrow o'er-past, one rejoices in heaven.

12. *Thou art not there* : i.e. death, in the sense of the cause of decay and fear. But Yama, the god of death, though in later mythology a gloomy and fearful being, was in Vedic times regarded as the leader of men to the joys of the heaven-world, often conceived as located in the sun, where ruled his father Vivasvat. So the great Funeral Hymn, *Rg* X. 14, says :
 "Yama was first to find for us the pathway."

And the departing soul is addressed as follows :

"Go forth, go forth along the ancient pathway,
 By which our former fathers have departed.
 Thou shalt behold god Varuṇa and Yama.
Leaving behind all blemish."

With regard to the joy of the heaven-world *Rg* IX. 113, says :

"Where radiance inexhaustible
 Dwells, and the light of heaven is set,
 Place me, clear flowing one, in that
 Imperishable deathless world."

"Make me immortal in that world,
 Where dwells the King Vaivasvata,
 Where stands the inmost shrine of heaven
 And where the living waters are."

When the Katha Upaniṣad was written, however, this bright faith had passed away. Though Naciketas seems to give

स त्वमग्निं स्वर्ग्यमध्येषि मृत्यो प्रब्रूहि तं श्रद्धधानाय मह्यम् ।
 स्वर्गलोका अमृतत्वं भजन्त एतद्वितीयेन वृषे वरेण ॥ १३ ॥
 प्र ते ब्रवीमि तद् मे निबोध स्वर्ग्यमग्निं नषिकेतः प्रजानन् ।
 अनन्तलोकात्प्रिमथो प्रतिष्ठां विद्धि त्वमेतं निहितं गुहायाम् ॥ १४ ॥

13. *Sa tvam agniṃ svargyam adhyeṣi mṛtyo,*
prabrūhi taṃ¹ śraddadhānāya mahyam :
Svargalokā amṛtatvaṃ bhajante,
etaḍ dvitīyena vṛṣe vareṇa.

14. *Pra te bravīmi tad-u me nibodha,*
svargyam agniṃ Naciketah prajānan :
Ananta-lokāptim atho pratiṣṭhām
viddhi tvam etaṃ nihitaṃ guhāyām.

13. Thyself, O Death, know'st well the heavenly fire,
 To me do thou declare it, who have faith :
 (By it) heaven's people share immortal life :
 This choose I as the second of the gifts.

14. (Death said :)
 To thee do I declare it, mark me well,
 Knowing well the heavenly fire, Naciketas :
 The means of attaining the infinite world
 And its foundation,—know this hidden in the cave.

expression to it in this verse, it is clear from his later questions that the doubts as to the future life which came in toward the end of the Brāhmaṇa period and which developed into the agnosticism of Buddhism, had affected him also.

13 ff. These verses reflect the thought of the Brāhmaṇa period. In it the sacrifice became of predominant importance,—more important even than the gods. It was through the power of the sacrifice that the gods were said to have gained the victory over the *asuras* and to have gained immortality. See for example *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*, III. 6. 1, 28 and 29.

¹ 13.b. *taṃ*, so B. and C. A. reads *taṃ* but against the weight of cited *Mss.* evidence.

14. The fire of the sacrifice is called "heavenly," first because it is identical in nature with that Agni which in his heavenly form shines in the sun, and secondly because it leads to heaven.

"He who sacrifices doubtless does so that he also may obtain a place in the world of the gods. That sacrifice of his goes forth towards the world of the gods: after it follows the sacrificer. . . . He now strides the Viṣṇu strides. Gratifying the gods by sacrifice he acquires a share among them, and having acquired a share among them he goes to them. . . . When one has thus ascended these worlds, that is the goal, that is the safe refuge" (or abode, *pratiṣṭhā*). (*Śatapatha B. I. 9. 3.*)

The word *pratiṣṭhā* means that on which anything stands or rests, and so "foundation," "abode," "refuge". In the passage just quoted the heaven-world itself, identified with the sun, is spoken of as the *pratiṣṭhā* or safe abode of the blessed departed. "He looks up toward the sun, for that is the final goal, that is the safe refuge." (*Ś.B. I. 9. 3. 15.*) In our verse however the sacrificial fire is spoken of as the *pratiṣṭhā* or support of the heaven world, as later, in II. 11, it is said to be the support of the universe.

The phrase "Hidden in the Cave" (*nihitam guhāyām*) is one of the characteristic phrases of the Upaniṣads.¹ It is possible that here it may primarily refer to the fire which is hidden in the fire-sticks until it is set free by friction. (See IV. 8.) But the more usual reference is to the cave of the human heart, — "the cave in the midst of the body" (*guhā śarīrasya madhye*, *Tait. Brāhmaṇa*, I. 2. 1. 3). The prime meaning then is that Naciketas should know that that fire which is both the means of attainment and the support of the heaven-world is also the vital heat or energy in his own heart. But there is a second and deeper meaning behind which Yama will later make explicit and which forms the central teaching of the Upaniṣads: fire being the symbol of that ultimate power which is the foundation or support of the universe and which may be intuitively known as the inner Self.

The Kātha Upaniṣad thus begins with the ritual religion of

¹ Like the similar phrase *guhā-hita* (II. 12.) it is used in the *Rg Veda* of the treasure (of rain) which the drought-demons (*Vṛtra*, *Ahi*), hid in the cloud-caves. See I. 130. 3; X. 71. 1.

the *Brāhmaṇas*, but then it is shown that it is not the sacrifice itself but realisation of its inner meaning which gives salvation.

लोकादिमग्निं तमुवाच तस्मै या इष्टका यावतीर्वा यथा वा ।
 स चापि तत्प्रत्यवदद्यथोक्तमथास्य मृत्युः पुनरेवाह तुष्टः ॥ १५ ॥
 तमब्रवीत्प्रियमाणो महात्मा वरं तवेष्टाद्य ददामि भूयः ।
 तवैव नाम्ना भवितायमग्निः सृष्ट्वां चेमामनेकरूपां गृह्णाण ॥ १६ ॥

15. *Lokādīm agniṃ tam uvāca tasmai,*
yā iṣṭakā yāvatīr vā yathā vā :
Sa ca api tat pratyavadat yathoktam,
Atha asya mṛtyuḥ punar ev' āha tuṣṭaḥ.

16. *Tam abravīt prīyamāṇo mahātmā,*
varaṃ tava iha adya dadāmi bhūyaḥ :
Tava eva nāmnā bhavitā yam agniḥ
sr̥ṅkāṃ ca imām aneka-rūpāṃ gṛhṇāṇa.

15. He told him of that fire, source of the world :
 What bricks (are required for the altar), how many,
 and how best arranged ;
 And he in turn repeated it as told.
 Then, pleased with him, Death spoke even yet again :

16. Being delighted, the Great-soul addressed him :
 I give you here to-day another boon,—
 By thy name only shall this fire be called ;
 Accept also this many-pattern'd chain.

15. That fire, source of the worlds (*lokādīm agniṃ*). *lokādi=loka + ādi=lokānām ādi*. *Loka* means world in the sense of a division of the universe. So there are often said to be two lokas, earth and heaven ; or three (+ air) ; or seven, variously named.

The most obvious rendering of *lokādi* is source or origin of the worlds. Agni in the *R̥g Veda* is often identified with Prajāpati, the creator. Again in *Kaṭha* v. 9, we are told that the one Fire, having entered the universe,

15.d. Some *Mss.* read *punar āha*, making the line metrical.
 16.d. B. *ca mām*.

assumed all forms. (Cf. Heraclitus.) Also with regard to the sacrificial fire we are told in *Br.* i. 2. 7., "This fire is the *arka*, the worlds are its embodiment".

Lokādi might also mean 'first of the worlds'. So Śaṅkara says, "Fire is *lokānām ādi* because it was the first embodied existence". So in the *Ṛg Veda*, Agni is often represented as the first born son of Dyaus. Also *Ch.* vi. 8. 4, says that all other things evolved from fire (*tejas*) which was itself the first product of essential Being (*sat.*).

The simplest interpretation is that Yama taught Naciketas the proper arrangement of the fire-sacrifice, glorified in *Brāhmaṇa* fashion as source and support of the worlds.

16. Max Müller (Introd. S.B.E. XIV, p. xxv), considers that verses 16-18 are an insertion. "Death had granted three boons to Naciketas and no more. In a later portion of the Upaniṣad (ii. 3), however, the expression *śrīṅkā vittamayī* occurs, which I have translated by 'the road that leads to wealth'. As it is said that Naciketas did not choose that *śrīṅkā*, some reader must have supposed that a *śrīṅkā* was offered him by Death. *Śrīṅkā*, however, meant commonly a string or necklace, and hence arose the idea that Death must have offered a necklace as an additional gift to Naciketas."

Re *Śrīṅkā*, we do not know Max Müller's authority for saying that it commonly means necklace, since apparently it only occurs in these two *Kaṭha* verses. In this verse, joined with *aneka-rūpā* we may infer a meaning like necklace or garland, but in ii. 3, it seems to mean a road. So Śaṅkara in this verse hesitates between the two meanings, "a necklace of precious stones" (*ratnamayī mālā*), and "the way or knowledge of works (*karmamayī gatiḥ*) (i.e. the sacrifice) which is not to be despised because it is productive of many fruits". Deussen, however, suggests "chain," as suiting both cases, here an ornamental chain and in ii. 3, a golden fetter.

We accept Deussen's suggestion and point out in support that *śrīṅkā* may very well be connected with the common word for chain, *śrīṅkhalā*, which in Prākṛit appears without the aspirate as though from a Sanskrit form *śrīṅkalā*. For the variation between *s* and *ś* cf. *śṛgāla* and *śṛgāla* (jackal). (See Turner, Nepali Dictionary, s.v. *sāṅlo*.)

The chain is called *aneka-rūpā*, which might be rendered "many-coloured" if referring to a jewelled chain, but more literally means "multiform", "many-pattern'd". This may merely refer to the rich ornamentation of the chain, or the chain may have been a kind of talisman, engraved with various mantras or with figures possessing a symbolic (sacred or magic) meaning. This would lend significance to *nicāyya imām* of the next verse if we interpret it as meaning, as Prof. F. W. Thomas suggests, "gazing at this (chain)".

त्रिणाचिकेतस्त्रिभिरेव सन्धिं त्रिकर्मकृत्तरति जन्ममृत्यु ।
 ब्रह्मज्ञञ्च देवमौष्यं विदित्वा त्रिचाथ्येमां शान्तिमत्यन्तमेति ॥ १७ ॥
 त्रिणाचिकेतस्त्रयमेतद्विदित्वा य एवं विद्वांसिञ्जुते नाचिकेतम् ।
 स मृत्युपाशान्पुरतः प्रणोद्य प्रोक्तातिगो मोदते स्वर्गलोके ॥ १८ ॥

17. *Triṇācīketas tribhir etya sandhim,
 trikarma-kṛt tarati janma-mṛtyū :*
*Brahma-ja-jñam devam idyaṃ viditvā
 nicāyya imāṃ śāntim atyantam eti.*

18. *Triṇācīketas trayam etad viditvā
 ya evaṃ vidvāṃś cinute nācīketam :*
*Sa mṛtyu-pāśān purataḥ praṇodya
 śoka atigo modate svargaloke.*

17. Who thrice has lit the Nācīketa fire,
 Having attained to union with the three,—
 The doer of the triple work,
 He crosses over birth and death :
 Knowing the god adorable,
 Who knoweth what is Brahma-born,
 Revering (him) one goes for ever to this peace.

18. Having a triple Nācīketa, having known this three,
 He who, thus knowing builds the Nācīketa (fire),
 Having thrust off before the bonds of death,
 Sorrow o'er-past rejoices in the heaven-world.

17. The story of Nacīketas as we have said first occurs in the *Taitti-riya Brāhmaṇa* in connection with the Nācīketa fire sacrifice. Yama reveals the sacrifice to Nacīketas and does him the honour of calling it by his name. Nācīketa is thus treated as an adjective derived from Nacīketas (i.e. relating or belonging to Nacīketas). Whitney points out that in this case the form should be Nācīketasa.

Triṇācīketa (bahuvrīhi compound) : "Having a triple Nācīketa," i.e. "He by whom the fire of the Nācīketa sacrifice has been thrice kindled," or, "He who has kindled three Nācīketa fires". The Nācīketa seems to have been a form of the *Agnihotra*. For a description of this with its three fires (*Gūrhapatya*, *Āhavanīya* and *Dakṣiṇa*) see, e.g. the 2nd *kāṇḍa* of the *Satapatha Brāhmaṇa*. (S.B.E. XII.)

17, 18. **Union with the three :** Having known this three : Śaṅkara explains "the three" of verse 17, with whom one must have union in performing the sacrifice, as "father, mother and spiritual teacher" (*ācārya*), or alternatively "Veda, smṛti and good men". The explanation is not convincing. *The triple work* he explains as "sacrifice, study and almsgiving" (*ijyā-adhyayana-dāna*).

"*This three*," of verse 18, he explains differently, referring back to the instruction of Yama in verse 15, "What bricks, how many, and how arranged".

17b. **Brahma-ja-jña :** Śaṅkara takes *ja* and *jña* as in apposition, and interprets as "the omniscient one who is born of Brahman". He takes it as referring to *Hiraṇyagarbha* ("the golden germ" from which according to Ṛg Veda X. 121, the universe developed). This Śaṅkara takes to be a name of *Saṅgā-Brahman*. This however is reading much later Vedantic conceptions into the Upaniṣad. (See pp. 88, 133ff.)

The most natural interpretation is to take *Brahma-ja-jña* as a name of Agni, i.e. the knower (*jña*) of *Brahma-ja*, i.e. what is born of Brahman, i.e. the universe. That is to say the name is equivalent to *Jātavedas* (the all-knower)—a constant Vedic name for Agni, who is here also called *īḍya* (adorable) and *deva* (resplendent or divine).¹

Hume points out that *nicāyya* may carry a double meaning : "revering" (Agni) and "building up" (the fire which is his symbol). It might also mean "gazing at", "perceiving".

(So Śaṅkara comments, *tam . . . viditvā śāstrataḥ nicāyya dṛṣtvā ca ātmabhāvena*,—"Having known him from scripture and having realised him as the self.")

¹ *Brahma-ja-jñam viditvā nicāyya* : Quite a different rendering is proposed by Hillebrandt (followed by Charpentier),—"Having known and meditated upon (the texts) *brahma jajñānam* (A.V. iv. 1. 1) and *devam īḍyam* (some unidentified Agni hymn), he for eternal time goes to this peace". See Hillebrandt, T.K. and A.B.U. 118; Charpentier, I.A. (1928). Geldner, (V.B. 158, note 895), also says, "Because he has known and beheld the Brahman of the well-known verses *brahma jajñānam*, A.V. 4. 1."

For these texts see Bloomfield, *Vedic Concordance*, sv. *brahma jajñānam prathamam purastāt*, 656. In most of the passages the reference is to the sun or heavenly fire, called, "the *brahman* born first in the east" (*jajñāna* pf. p. A. of *jan*, cf. Gk. γίγνομαι). See for example T.S. iv. 2. 8. d. (Keith V.B.Y.S. 321) and Ś.B. vii. 4. 1. 14. (S.B.E. 41, 366.)

एष तेऽग्निर्नचिकेतः स्वर्ग्यो यमदृशीषा द्वितीयेन वरेण ।

एतमग्निं तवैव प्रवक्ष्यन्ति जनासस्तृतीयं वरं नचिकेतो दृशीष्व ॥ १६ ॥

19. *Eṣa te 'gnir Naciketaḥ svargyo*
yam avṛṇāthā dvitīyena vareṇa :
Etam agniṃ tava eva pravakṣyanti janāsas,
Trtīyam varaṃ Naciketo vṛṇīṣva.

19. This is *thy* heavenly fire, Naciketas,
 Which thou hast chosen for the second gift :
 This fire thine alone will people call :
 Choose now, O Naciketas, the third gift.

“This peace” (*imāṃ śāntim*)—Śaṅkara explains as *svabuddhi-pratyakṣam śāntim*,—the peace which is immediately realised in one's own experience. But the phrase “this peace” is grammatically awkward since, apart from verse 7, this is the first reference to *śānti*. Whitney therefore takes *imāṃ śāntim* as governed by *nicāyya*, regarding *śāntim*, in the sense of “appeasement”, as referring to the Naciketa fire. “Revering this appeasement he goes to the endless.” Grammatically, however, it would be natural to separate *imāṃ* and *śāntim*, taking *imāṃ* deictically as referring to *śrūkām*. On the other hand we note that in *Svet.* iv. 11, where our verse is partially quoted, *nicāyya* clearly governs *devam idyam*, and *imāṃ śāntim* governed by *eti* can only mean “this peace”.

Returning to the Three, which the sacrificer has to know and with which he is to be united, we suggest that the reference is to the *agni-traya*, the three sacrificial fires, but to these as representing or symbolising the triune Agni (*trivṛt agni*) who is later identified with Brahman. See again *Śatapatha* B. I. 9. 3, and after the passage quoted (p. 68) note verses 14 and 15. “He looks on the *āhavanīya* fire saying, ‘We have united with the splendour’. He then looks up toward the sun (the heavenly fire) for that is the final goal, that is the safe resort. To that goal, to that resort, he thereby goes.” This whole passage then (*Kaṭha* I. 12–19) moves within the sphere of ideas of the Brāhmanas, but note the insistence on knowledge of the symbolism of the sacrifice by which we pass to the thought of the Upaniṣads. Read again the note on verse 14.

वेयं प्रेते विचिकित्सा मनुष्येऽस्तीत्येके नायमस्तीति चैके ।
 एतद्विद्यामनुश्रियस्त्वयाऽहं वराणामेष वरस्तृतीयः ॥ २० ॥
 देवैरत्रापि विचिकित्सितं पुरा न हि सुविज्ञेयमगुरेष धर्मः ।
 अन्यं वरं नचिकेतो वृणोष्व मा मोपरोत्सौरति मा वृजैनम् ॥ २१ ॥
 देवैरत्रापि विचिकित्सितं किल त्वं च मृत्यो यन्न सुज्ञेयमात्य ।
 वक्ता चास्य त्वादृगन्यो न लभ्यो नान्यो वरस्तुल्य एतस्य कश्चित् ॥ २२ ॥
 शतायुषः पुत्रपौत्रान्वृणोष्व बह्वन्पशूद्भस्तिहिरण्यमश्वान् ।
 भूमेर्महदायतनं वृणोष्व स्वयं च जीव शरदो यावदिच्छसि ॥ २३ ॥
 एतत्तुल्यं यदि मन्यसे वरं वृणोष्व वित्तं चिरजीविकां च ।
 महाभूमौ नचिकेतस्त्वमेधि कामानां त्वा कामभाजं करोमि ॥ २४ ॥

20. *Yā_īyaṃ prete vicikitsā manuṣye,*
asti_īty-eke, na_ayam asti_īti ca_ēke ;
Etad vidyām anuśiṣṭas tvayā 'ham,
varāṇām eṣa varas tṛtīyaḥ.
21. *Devair atra_āpi vicikitsitaṃ purā,*
na hi sujñeyam aṅur eṣa dharmah ;
Anyam varam Naciketo vṛṇiṣva,
mā mā_uparotsīr ati mā srja_enam.
22. *Devair atra_āpi vicikitsitaṃ kila,*
tvaṃ ca Mṛtyo yan na sujñeyam āttha :
Vaktā ca_asya tvādr̥g anyo na labhyo,
na_anyo varas tulya elasya kaścit.
23. *Śatāyusaḥ putra-pautrān vṛṇiṣva,*
bahūn paśūn hasti-hiraṇyam aśvān ;
Bhūmer mahad āyatanam vṛṇiṣva,
svayam ca jīva śarado yāvad icchasi.
24. *Etat-tulyam yadi manyase varam,*
vṛṇiṣva vittaṃ cira-jīvikāṃ ca :
Mahābhūmau Naciketas tvam edhi,
kāmānāṃ tvā kāma-bhājaṃ karomi.

The Third Gift :

Knowledge concerning the great Passing-beyond.

20. (*Naciketas said :*)

This doubt there is about a man departed,—
Some say, 'He is,' some, 'He does not exist';
This would I know, instructed well by thee :
Of the three gifts, this gift is the third.

21. (*Death said :*)

Even the gods of old on this point doubted,
For subtle is this truth and hard to know.
Choose then another boon, O Naciketas !
Do not entreat me, give this up I pray !

22. (*Naciketas said :*)

Even the gods indeed on this point doubted,
Which thou too say'st, O Death, is hard to know :
Of it no other teacher can be found like you,
Nor is there other boon to equal this.

23. (*Death said :*)

Centenarian sons and grandsons choose thou,
Many cattle, elephants, gold, and horses :
Choose thou far-flung dominion of the earth,
And live thyself as many autumns as thou wilt.

24. Or, if thou thinkest other boon equal to this,

Choose—riches and a long extended life :
On the great earth, O Naciketas, be thou (king) ;
Of thy desires I make thee free-enjoyer.

20. *Na₂asti*—"he does not exist". The prevalence of such *nāstikas* or disbelievers in the soul's eternal existence has been considered by some to be an indication of a post-Buddhist date for the Upaniṣad. Or the reference may be to the *Cārvākas*, a school of materialists which dates from quite ancient times. But such doubts are natural to man in all ages. See Introduction.

21. d. Literally, "Do not importune me, let this go for me". *Mā uparotsiḥ*, aor. without augment used as imperative. *rudh*=to obstruct, aor. 3. s. *arotsiḥ*. *upa+rudh*=to besiege, importune.

ये ये कामा दुर्लभा मर्त्यलोके सर्गकामांश्चन्दतः प्रार्थयस्व ।
 इमा रामाः सरथाः सतूर्या न ह्यौदृशा लम्भनीया मनुष्यैः ।
 आभिर्मत्प्रत्ताभिः परिचारयस्व नचिकेतो मरणं मानुप्राप्त्नीः ॥ २५ ॥
 श्वोभावा मर्त्यस्य यदन्तकैतत्सर्वेन्द्रियाणां जरयन्ति तेजः ।
 अपि सर्वं जीवितमल्पमेव तवैव वाहास्तव नृत्यगौते ॥ २६ ॥
 न वित्तेन तर्पणीयो मनुष्यो लप्स्यामहे वित्तमद्राक्ष्य चेत्त्वा ।
 जीविष्यामो यावदौशिष्यसि त्वं वरस्व मे वरणीयः स एव ॥ २७ ॥
 अजीर्यताममृतानामुपेत्य जीर्यन्मर्त्यः क्लृप्तःस्थः प्रजानन् ।
 अभिध्यायन्वर्णरतिप्रमोदानतिदीर्घे जीविते को रमेत ॥ २८ ॥

25. *Ye ye kāmā durlabhā martya-loke,
 sarvān kāmāṃś chandataḥ prārthayasva :
 Imā rāmāḥ sarathāḥ satūryā
 na hi ōdrśā lambhanīyā manuṣyaish,
 Ābhīr mat-prattābhiḥ paricārayasva,
 Naciketo maraṇaṃ mā 'nuprākṣīh.*
26. *Śvobhāvā martyasya yad antaka etat
 sarvendriyāṇāṃ jarayanti tejaḥ :
 Api sarvaṃ jīvitam alpam eva,
 tava eva vāhās tava nṛtya-gīte.*
27. *Na vittena tarpaṇīyo manuṣyo,
 lapsyāmahe vittam adrākṣma cet tvā :
 Jīviṣyāmo yāvad īśiṣyasi tvaṃ,
 varas tu me varaṇīyaḥ sa eva.*
28. *Ajīryatām amṛtānām upetya
 jīryan martyaḥ kvadhasthaḥ prajānan,
 Abhidhyāyan varṇa-rati-pramodān
 atidīrghe jīvite ko rameta.*

28.b. One *Ms.* has *kvavasthaḥ* ; two, *kvadhasthaḥ*.
 Śaṅkara gives the *v.l.*, *kva tadāṣṭhaḥ*.
 Hillebrandt, T.K., adopts *kv-avasthaḥ*.

25. Whate'er desires in mortal world are hard to win,—
 For all desires at pleasure make request :
 These lovely girls, with chariots and lutes,
 Such as are not obtainable by men,—
 By these, by me bestowed, be waited on :
 O Naciketas, ask not about dying.
26. (*Naciketas said :*)
 Ephemeral things ! They wear away, O Death,
 Whatever vigour of his powers a man may have.
 All life, moreover, at the best is brief :
 Thine be the chariots, thine the dance and song !
27. Never with wealth can man be satisfied.
 Shall we get wealth if we have seen thee ?
 Shall we even live as long as thou shalt reign ?
 That boon then must I choose, and that alone.
28. Drawing near the agelessness of the immortals,
 What aging mortal here below that understands,
 Weighing the joys of beauty and of love,
 Would delight in an over-long life ?

23. *bhūmer mahadāyatanam*—"a great expanse of earth". Śaṅkara,—
prthivyāḥ visīrṇaṃ sāmṛjyam.

24. c. translates literally the text, *mahābhūmau*, etc. and the word "king" has to be supplied. Probably we should amend to *mahān bhūmau*—"On earth, O Naciketas, be thou great".

25. The story of the temptation of Naciketas presents points of similarity with that told of Buddha. A vision of Apsarasas is suggested.

26. *Svobhāvāḥ* : "existing till to-morrow," so "things of a day".

27. Śaṅkara treats lines b, c, as an affirmation,—“We shall obtain wealth if we have seen thee, we shall live as long as thou shalt rule,”—“for how could a man after approaching thee be poor or short-lived”. Treated as interrogative however the sense is much better. So, Müller, Hume, Whitney, etc.

With line c. cf. *Hebrews*, ii. 15, “That he might deliver them who through fear of death were in all their living subject to bondage”. Fear of death is an obsession which destroys both the power and the zest of real living.

28. *Ajīryatām*—Śaṅkara and others who follow him seem to take this for a g. pl. agreeing with *amṛtānām*. But why should *upetya* govern

यस्मिन्निदं विचिकित्सन्ति मृत्यो यत्सांपराये महति ब्रूहि नस्तत् ।
योऽयं वरो गूढमनुप्रविष्टो नान्यं तस्मान्नचिकेता वृणोते ॥ २९ ॥

29. *Yasminn idam vicikitsanti Mṛtyo,
yat sāmparāye mahati brūhi nas tat :
Yo 'yam varo gūḍham anupraviṣṭo,
Na anyam tasmān Naciketā vṛṇōte.*

29. Tell me this thing whereon they doubt, O Death,
What is the meaning of the great transition :
This boon which penetrates the mystery,
Naught else than that doth Naciketas choose.

the g. ? We have taken as acc. s. of *ajīryatā* (only here). Max Müller suggests *ajaryatā* and Whitney, *ajuryatā* or *ajūryatā*. *Kvadhaṣṭhaḥ*. (another *āp. ley.*) we have taken as=*ku* (deprecatory + *adhāḥ-stha* (standing below), i.e. on this wretched earth. Two *ἀπαξ λεγόμενα* in one verse surely suggest a corrupt text. *varṇa-ratī* ("beauty and love") : *varṇa*—external appearance, colour (so caste), beauty ; *ratī*=sense-delight, sexual pleasure, love.

29. *yat sāmparāye mahati*—"what there is in the great passing beyond," i.e. the meaning of the great transition.

Sāmparāya=*sam*+*parā*+*aya* ; *sāmparāya*, adj. relating to the *sāmparāya*, noun—the meaning of the passing beyond, the other life or world to which it leads, or (= *sāmparāya*) the passing beyond, i.e. death itself.

gūḍham anupraviṣṭa : entered into the hidden, penetrated the mystery.

It is clear from Naciketas's restatement of his question in verse 29 that verse 20 did not fully express his meaning. The question was not merely, "Does a man continue to exist after death ?" It is clear, as Rāmānuja points out, that the first two requests are meaningless except as implying a belief in such existence (*Śb. I. 2. 12.*). In the Brāhmaṇa story the question was, How shall one overcome the danger of re-death and so secure immortality ? Here the question is, What is the meaning of death ? What is the nature of the state to which death leads ? And this is later seen to mean, What is the nature of eternal Reality ? What is man's relation to it ? and how can he reach it ?

SECOND VALLĪ

The Second Vallī begins the Upaniṣad teaching proper ; from this point on Death is supposed to be the speaker.

There are two ways : the way of good and the way of pleasure, i.e. the way of illusion of a seeming material wealth, obtainable by the senses, which leads to repeated death. To enter the way of good, which is the way of knowledge of true reality, a spiritual teacher is first needed. Verses 10 and 11 next seem to point out that not only must the way of pleasure be given up but also that good which seeks heavenly satisfaction, if the highest good of all is to be obtained. This consists in the vision of the inmost reality by *adhyātma-yoga*. This reality is symbolised by "Om" and is called *Brahman*. It is identical with the *Ātman*, the self hidden in the heart. It is both too great and too subtle and deeply hidden to be gained by intellectual knowledge yet it reveals itself to those it chooses. Those alone are fit to be chosen who have gone along the way of good to a collected and peaceful mind.

The Two Ways,—of good and of knowledge, and of pleasure and ignorance. The Upaniṣads are said to teach the *jñāna-mārga*, the way of salvation through knowledge, and are often criticised as being too purely intellectual. The criticism is not unfounded, especially if Śaṅkara is taken as guide to their meaning. Knowledge is far too often conceived as intellectual assent to a philosophy of pure monism. It is fair to point out, however, that Śaṅkara, like all the commentators on the Upaniṣads and Vedānta-sūtras, emphasises preconditions for entering on the way of knowledge which are largely moral in nature. So, commenting on the first verse of the Vedānta-sūtras,—“Then therefore the inquiry into Brahman,”—he says that the preconditions for such an inquiry are, (1) Discrimination between eternal and transient things ; (2) Renunciation of the desire for the enjoyment of reward ; (3) Acquirement of tranquillity, self-control, patient endurance and reverence (*śraddhā*) ; and (4) Desire for salvation. (1. *Nityānitya-vastu-viveka*, 2. *iḥāmutrārtha-phala-bhoga-virāgaḥ*, 3. *śama-damādi-sādhana-sampat*, 4. *mumukṣutva*.) The story of Naciketas is an excellent illustration of these requirements.

॥ द्वितीया वल्ली ॥

अन्यच्छ्रेयोऽन्यदुतैव प्रेयस्ते उभे नानार्थे पुरुषं सिनीतः ।

तयोः श्रेय आददानस्य साधु भवति ह्यौघतेऽर्थाद्य उ प्रेयो वृणीते ॥ १ ॥

श्रेयश्च प्रेयश्च मनुष्यमेतस्तौ संपरीत्य विविनक्ति धीरः ।

श्रेयो हि धीरोऽभिप्रेयसो वृणीते प्रेयो मन्दो योगक्षेमाद्गृणीते ॥ २ ॥

स त्वं प्रियान्प्रियरूपांश्च कामानभिध्यायन्नचिकेतोऽत्यस्तात्तौः ।

नेतां वृद्धां वित्तमयीमवाप्तो यस्यां मज्जन्ति बहवो मनुष्याः ॥ ३ ॥

दूरमेते विपरीते विधूची अविद्या या च विद्येति ज्ञाता ।

विद्याभीष्मिन् नचिकेतसं मन्ये न त्वा कामा बहवोऽणोलुपन्त ॥ ४ ॥

अविद्यायामन्तरे वर्तमानाः स्वयं धीराः पण्डितं मन्यमानाः ।

दन्म्यमाणाः परियन्ति मूढा अन्धेनैव नीयमाना यथान्धाः ॥ ५ ॥

Dvitiyā Vallī.

1. Anyat śreya 'nyad uta eva preyas te,
ubhe nānārthe puruṣaṃ sinītaḥ ;
[Tayoḥ] śreya ādadānasya sādhu bhavati,
hīyate 'rthād ya u preyo vṛṇāte.
2. Śreyaś-ca preyaś-ca manuṣyam etaḥ,
tau samparītya vivinakti dhīraḥ ;
Śreya hi dhīro [abhi] preyaso vṛṇāte,
preyo mando yoga-kṣemād vṛṇāte.
3. Sa tvaṃ priyān priya-rūpāṃś-ca kāmān,
abhidhyāyan Naciketo 'tyasrākṣiḥ ;
Na etāṃ sṛṅkāṃ vittamayīm avāpto,
yasyām majjanti bahavo manuṣyāḥ.
4. Dūram ete viparīte viśūcī,
avidyā yā ca vidyā iti jñātā ;
Vidyā-'bhīpsinaṃ Naciketasaṃ manye,
na tvā kāmā bahavo 'lolupanta.

5. *Avidyāyām antare vartamānāḥ,
svayaṃ dhīrāḥ paṇḍitaḥ manyamānāḥ ;
Dandramyamāṇāḥ pariyaṅti mūḍhā,
andhena_eva nīyamānā yathā 'ndhāḥ.*

The Two Ways.

1. One thing is the good (*śreyas*), quite other the pleasant (*preyas*) :
Both these with different aim bind man (to action) :
Well is it for him who takes hold of the good ;
He fails of his aim who chooses the pleasant.
2. Both the good and the pleasant approach a man :
Going all round them the wise discriminates :
For good before pleasure a wise man chooses ;
The fool, for¹ property, prefers the pleasant.
3. But thou, the pleasant and sweet-seeming objects,
Examining, O Naciketas, hast renounced,
Not having fastened on that chain² of riches
Wherein so many mortals sink to ruin.
4. Far opposite are these two and divergent,—
Ignorance and what is known as knowledge :
Eager for knowledge deem I Naciketas ;
Many delightful things did not distract you.
5. Abiding in the midst of ignorance,
Self-wise, thinking themselves learned,
Fools go about, rushing round and round,
Like blind men led by the blind.

¹ Or, to property.

² Or, Not having taken to that way of riches.

1. *Śreyas*, cp. of *śrī*, splendour, beauty, fortune, means generally superior. Here, and a number of times in the *Gītā*, it means the morally excellent, the good.

preyas, cp. of *priya*=dearer; here means the pleasant, that which to most is dearer than the good.

“He fails of his aim” or “misses the goal” (*hīyate arthād*). Many of the Biblical words for sin mark it as a missing of the aim or goal of life. (So Gk. *ἀμαρτία* and Heb. *חַטָּא*, *hātā'* and its derivatives.)

2. *Yoga-kṣema* is generally interpreted as "getting and keeping". So Śaṅkara here takes as meaning *śarīrādi-upacaya-rakṣaṇa-nimittam*, i.e. "The fool prefers the pleasant,—such things as cattle, etc. for the purpose of fattening and preserving his body". But this does not bring out the ironic punning of the text. The most usual meaning of *yoga-kṣema* is "property", "possession", "prosperity". So, the fool, i.e. the worldly-wise materialist, for the sake of getting and keeping, i.e. for property, prefers things which give bodily comfort. But the ablative may also mean "in preference to", "rather than". So, the fool to (real abiding) property (i.e. the good) prefers the pleasant. This agrees with the use of the phrase in *Gītā* ix. 22, where it is said that Kṛṣṇa himself undertakes the maintenance of his devotees, or provides their *yoga-kṣema*, i.e. property, security, all that they really need.

"Those men who think on me alone,
Who worship me and naught beside,
Of these, my constant devotees,
I myself take the maintenance."

(Or, "I furnish full prosperity",

Yoga-kṣemam vahāmy aham.)

Our text, we take it, plays on the two meanings of the ablative to point the folly of the materialist view of life. Compare *Matthew* vi. 19-34.

3. **Chain of riches** (*śṛṅkā vittamayī*): As we said in commenting on I. 16, the meaning of *śṛṅkā* is uncertain. Śaṅkara treats it there as meaning "necklace" and here as meaning "way". Hume, to be consistent, renders by "garland" in this verse also, which obviously does not suit the context. Whitney says "The use of *majjanti*, 'sink' indicates that *śṛṅkā* means something like 'slough' or 'pool'", but that does not suit I. 16. Deussen's 'chain' (*Kette*), which might in I. 16 mean an ornamental chain set with jewels and here a fetter, is the only conjecture which suits both cases. Following him we read, "Not having fastened on that chain of riches".

All difficulties would disappear if, following Geldner and Charpentier, we amend *majjanti* to *sajjanti* and so read, "Not having fastened on (or accepted) this chain of riches, wherein so many mortals are entangled".

4. **Divergent**: *viṣūci*, f. dual of *viṣvañc* (*viṣu*=on both sides, and *ñc*=to go or lead).

Distract: *alolupanta*, 3 pl. imperf. A. intensive of *lup*, to injure, tear. The intensive is said to have the meaning 'confound' but Whitney thinks it is invented to suit this case. He and Hume take the primary meaning and render "Many desires do not rend thee". (? amend to *lolupyante*.) We have taken *kāmā* objectively.

5. Cf. *Matthew* xv. 14. "If the blind lead the blind, both shall fall into the ditch." The words refer to the obstinate self-conceit of the Pharisees.

न सांपरायः प्रतिभाति बालं प्रमाद्यन्तं वित्तमोहेन मूढम् ।
अयं लोको नास्ति पर इति मानो पुनः पुनर्वशमापद्यते मे ॥ ६ ॥

6. *Na sāmparāyaḥ pratibhāti bālaṃ,
pramādyantaṃ vitta-mohena mūḍham ;
Ayaṃ loko na asti para iti mānā,
punaḥ punar vaśam āpadyate me.*

The cause of repeated death.

6. The passing-beyond is not clear to the childish,
Careless, befooled with the glamour of wealth :
“ This world exists, there is no other,”—thinking,
Again and again he falls within my power.

6. *Na sāmparāyaḥ pratibhāti bālaṃ* : The meaning of the passing-beyond (i.e. death) does not shine (i.e. is not clear, intelligible) to the child.

Child (*bāla*) is here synonymous with fool, and so is rendered “ childish ”. It ironically refers to the materialistically minded man who prides himself upon his hard sense.

It is interesting to contrast this with the quite opposite conception of the child-mind set forth in *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* III. 5. 1. Uṣasta asks Yājñavalkya to explain the Brahman who is the self within. Yājñavalkya says negatively, “ Thou canst not see the seer of the sight, . . . thou canst not know the knower of what is known ”. How then, asks Kahola, is it possible to come into touch with the inner-self ? Yājñavalkya then replied, “ Let a Brahmin, casting aside his learning, take his stand on childhood ” (*pāṇḍītyam nirvidya bālyena tiṣṭhāset*). Here *bālyā* (childhood) evidently betokens a state of simplicity and intuitional understanding, and the saying may be compared with that of Jesus, “ Except ye become like little children ye shall not see the kingdom of God ”. Although the conception of childhood differs in the two passages, the *Kaṭha Upaniṣad*, in the verses which follow, resembles the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* (l.c.) in that it sets small value on argumentative reasoning as a means of reaching the Self. So verse 9 announces very emphatically, “ Not by reasoning (*tarka*) is this thought to be obtained ”. This thought may be the thought of the *sāmparāya*,

the meaning of the great transition beyond death. But it evidently means also the thought of the ultimate reality to which that transition leads if one has been enlightened and delivered.

श्रवणायापि बहुभिर्यो न लभ्यः प्रह्वन्तोऽपि बहवो यं न विद्युः ।

आश्चर्यो वक्ता कुशलोऽस्य क्त्वाऽऽश्चर्यो ज्ञाता कुशलानुश्रितः ॥ ७ ॥

न नरेणावरेण प्रोक्त एष सुविज्ञेयो बहुधा चिन्त्यमानः ।

अनन्यप्रोक्ते गतिरत्र नास्त्वशीयान्छतर्क्यमणुप्रमाणात् ॥ ८ ॥

7. *Śravaṇāya api bahubhir yo na labhyaḥ,
śrṇvanto 'pi bahavo yaṃ na vidyuh ;
Āścaryo vaktā kuśalo 'sya labdhā,
āścaryo jñātā kuśalānuśiṣṭaḥ.*

8. *Na nareṇa avareṇa prokta eṣa
suviñṇeayo bahudhā cintyamānaḥ ;
Ananya-prokte gatiḥ atra nāsti,
aṇīyān hy atarkyam anupramāṇāt.*

The Need of a Spiritual Teacher.

7. He whom many cannot even hear of,
Whom many, even hearing, do not know,—
Wondrous His teacher, skilful His attainer,
Wondrous His knower, skilfully instructed.
8. Not taught by an inferior man can He
Be truly understood, though much considered ;
Save by another taught there's no way thither,
For He is inconceivably subtler than the subtle.

7—9. One of the things on which Hinduism has always most strongly insisted is the need for a *guru* or spiritual teacher. This has sometimes been extravagantly and unintelligently stated, but in essence it is correct and follows from the very nature of religious truth.

7. Literally, "He who by many is not obtainable even for hearing". Śaṅkara comments, "Of thousands who seek good, it is only some one like you who becomes the knower of the *ātman*". This is due to (1) the subtlety of the self which is beyond argumentative reasoning or

नैषा तर्केण मतिरापनेया प्रोक्तान्येनैव सुज्ञानाय प्रेष्ट ।

यां त्वमापः सत्यवृतिर्बतासि त्वादृङ्गो भूयान्नचिकेतः प्रष्टा ॥ ९ ॥

9. *Na_eṣā tarkeṇa matir āpaneyā,*
proktā 'nyena_eva sujñānāya preṣṭha ;
Yāṃ tvam āpaḥ satya-dhṛtir bata_sasi,
tvādrk_no bhūyāt_Naciketah praṣṭā.

9. Not by reasoning is this thought obtainable,
 Though, by another taught, well may one know it,
 friend :
 Thou hast obtained it, being true and steadfast ;—
 May we find, Naciketas, a questioner like thee !

demonstration, (2) the need of an absolutely sincere and steadfast purpose (*satya-dhṛti*) on the part of the seeker, (3) the need of a *guru* who himself has realised the highest.

8. Though much (or manifoldly) considered (*bahudhā cintya-mānaḥ*) : We have supplied the word "though". Śāṅkara supplies "because" and obtains an opposite meaning. For him an inferior teacher means a dualist. "Taught by a man of inferior, i.e. worldly, understanding the *Ātman* is not easily knowable, because He is variously discussed by disputants. But if the *Ātman* is taught by a preceptor who is free from the notion of duality and has become one with the Brahman, there is no doubt, . . . for there is nothing else knowable." The explanation seems forced : the simple meaning is that no amount of individual thinking will supply the place of a good teacher.

Ananya-prokte gatir atra nāsti : We have rendered, "Not taught by another there is no way thither," i.e. to Brahman or the true Self. Śāṅkara takes *ananya-prokte* as meaning, "taught by one who is non-different",—i.e. who has realised his oneness with Brahman. Then, "there is no way thither" means there is no way beyond Brahman,—knowledge stops there ; or else, "there is no further travelling into *saṃsāra*".

Almost certainly Śāṅkara is here, as in so many places, forcing his own interpretation upon the text.

8. Subtler than the subtle (*aṅṣīyān aṅupramāṇāt*) : literally, "more atomic in measure than an atom".

Atarkyam may be taken in two senses. (a) It may be used adverbially ; in that case *aṅṣīyān hi atarkyam aṅupramāṇāt* will be rendered as above : so M.M., W., H. (b) Śāṅkara, however, takes it as an adjective qualifying the subject—"For He is subtler than the subtle and unprovable by argument." So most Indian commentators. This suits the general meaning of the passage.

In verses 7-9, then, the reality reached by the great transition,—the Supreme Self, is with equal emphasis said to be quite unknowable if sought by argumentative reasoning and readily knowable if revealed by a true teacher. This is because the object sought is so "subtle" as to be beyond the reach of the senses and of the understanding based upon sense-perception; also because religious truth is of the nature of an intuition, an immediate apprehension of value, communicated through faith or suggestive illumination from one person to another, but only capable of very partial expression through abstract concepts. This should be borne in mind in our subsequent discussion as to whether Brahman is or is not knowable.

जानाम्यहं श्रेयधिरित्यनित्यं न ह्यध्रुवैः प्राप्यते हि ध्रुवं तत् ।

ततो मया नाचिकेतस्त्वितोऽग्निरनित्यैर्द्रव्यैः प्राप्तवानस्मि नित्यम् ॥ १० ॥

10. *Jānāmy ahaṃ śevadhīr ity-anityam,*
na hy adhruvaiḥ prāpyate hi dhruvam tat ;
Tato mayā Nāciketaś cito 'gnir,
anityair dravyaiḥ prāptavān asmi nityam.

Naciketas superior to Yama.

The worthlessness of wealth,—heavenly as well as earthly.

10. I know full well that wealth, so called, is transient,
 For not by the unsteadfast is what is firm obtained :
 Yet is the Nāciketa fire laid by me,—
 By transient things I have obtained the enduring.

Who is the speaker in verse 10? Max Müller and Hume attribute to Naciketas. (Whitney also, though with some doubt, saying that it is so without recognisable pertinence as to seem an intrusion.) But Naciketas has not yet performed the sacrifice called by his name. Śaṅkara therefore, we judge rightly, attributes the words to Yama, who glorifies the sacrificial fire because by it, most transient of transient things, he has obtained the enduring sovereignty of heaven. Yet he goes on to commend Naciketas because he seeks something more enduring still.

10. *śevadhī*, *n.m.*, a rare Vedic word. *śeva-dhī*=treasure-receptacle, treasury, also treasure, wealth. (*śeva*, like *śiva*, *adj.* dear, kind, precious; *n.n.* treasure.)

Not by the unsteadfast (*na hi adhrvavāḥ*): Hume has, "those who are unsteadfast". We have left the translation ambiguous like the original, but it should probably be taken as referring to means rather than men,—to all earth's transient treasures.

Yet: the two halves of the verse are joined by the word *tataḥ*, which usually denotes consecution ("then", "after that"). Śaṅkara takes it as equivalent to *tasmāt* ("therefore"). So also M.M., H., W., D. But this seems to leave a contradiction between the two halves of the verse,—a distinct *non sequitur*. We follow therefore the suggestion of Ānanda-jñāna that *tataḥ* here should be taken as equivalent to "yet" or "nevertheless". Sarvānanda, who agrees, says, "The commentator Ānanda-jñāna suggests that Yama here eulogises Naciketas, saying that he himself, though fully aware of the ephemeral nature of *karman* and its results, and that nothing permanent can be achieved by it, nevertheless performed the sacrifice to attain the Yama state (i.e. the sovereignty of the heaven-world), but Naciketas is his superior since he looked beyond to a truer eternity."

कामस्याप्तिं जगतः प्रतिष्ठां क्रतोरनन्त्यमभयस्य पारम् ।

स्तोममद्दुःखगायं प्रतिष्ठां दृष्ट्वा घृष्ट्या घौरो नचिकेतोऽब्रुवाक्षीः ॥ ११ ॥

11. *Kāmasyāptiṃ jagataḥ pratiṣṭhāṃ,*
krator anantyaṃ abhayasya pāram ;
Stoma-mahad urugāyaṃ pratiṣṭhāṃ, [dṛṣṭvā],
dhr̥tyā dhīro Naciketo 'tyasrākṣiḥ.

11. The attainment of desire, the world's foundation,
The endless fruit of rites, the fearless shore,
The exceeding praised, the far-stretching, the goal,—
Being wise, Naciketas, firmly hast thou let go.

11. B. *ānantyaṃ ; stomaṃ mahad. dṛṣṭvā* ("having seen"), at the end of line c, has been omitted as hypermetric and redundant.

Kāmasya-āpti: the fulfilment of desire, that by obtaining which, all desire is satisfied.

jagataḥ pratiṣṭhā: *pratiṣṭhā* means that on which anything stands or rests, so—foundation, abode or refuge.

krator anantyaṃ: *kratu* may mean (1) power or will, (2) sacrificial rites. Hume takes in the first sense and renders "the endlessness of will" with a note, "or perhaps work". Śaṅkara takes *kratu* in the second sense and inserts *phalam*: "*Krator upāsānāyāḥ phalaṃ ānantyaṃ*"—"The endlessness which is the fruit of *kratu*, i.e. worship".

abhayasya pāra: the further shore of fearlessness.

stoma-mahat: Hume and Deussen render, "The greatness of praise". Max Müller, "That which is magnified by praise". Śaṅkara follows the v.l. *stomaṃ mahat*, (so B.) "The praiseworthy and great," and says,

stomam=*stomyam*, *stutyam*. We have taken as a *bahurīhi* compound,—
“having great praise”.

uru-gāya : “wide-going,”—used in the *R̥g Veda* as an epithet of Soma who is called “wide-spreading” (*R̥g IX. 62. 13*), of Viṣṇu (“far-striding” *VIII. 29. 7*), and of the wide-spreading glory of the dawn (*VI. 65. 6*).

What is it, described in such high sounding language, that Naciketas has let go ?

Śaṅkara interprets the passage as referring to what he calls the state of *Hiraṇyagarbha* (*Hiraṇyagarbha-pada*).

Hiraṇyagarbha—the Golden Germ—is first mentioned in the famous Creation Hymn, *R̥g X. 121*, as the first born of creation, which appeared on the face of the primæval waters and gave rise to the rest of the world. With regard to it Deussen says (P.U., 199) “Because it is the first principle itself which appears in its creation as first-born, therefore the latter also is denoted by *Brahmān* (masc), as though it were *Brāhman* personified.” In the text of the older *Upaniṣads* this conception is but little developed. It is first developed in the *Svetāśvatara* (iii. 4, iv. 12, v. 2, 3, 5, 6), where the great primæval *Puruṣa* is said to develop his own nature and so behold the birth of *Hiraṇyagarbha*, called also the Great Soul (*mahātman*) and *Brahmā*. In the still later *Nṛsiṃhottara Upaniṣad* it is called the Universal Self-consciousness. Śaṅkara takes it therefore as a name for one aspect of his *Saguṇa Brahman*, and the *Hiraṇyagarbha-pada* is the state of those who, not being able to realise the unreality of all that is phenomenal and knowing *Brahman* not as the One Self within but as a divinity opposed to themselves, worship him by sacrifice and meditation and so obtain *aiśvaryam*,—a lordship and a joy which though illusory from a higher point of view are yet as real as anything in our experience.

Ram Mohan Ray, following this interpretation of Śaṅkara, has translated the verse as follows :—

“Thou, O Naciketas, hast through firmness refused, though offered, the state of *Brahmā*, which satisfies every desire and which is the support of the world,—the best consequence of the performance of rites, without limit and without fear, praiseworthy, full of superhuman power, extensive and stable.”

Śaṅkara’s explanation is natural from his point of view but it is an anachronism. A much simpler interpretation is possible if we look at the text not in the light of later Vedantism but of the mode of thought of the *Brāhmaṇas*. It seems to us almost certain that the passage, with its double use of the word “*pratiṣṭhā*,” refers back to the description of the sacrifice and the heaven-world obtained by it given in the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa I. ix. 3*.

"He who sacrifices assuredly does so with the desire that there may be a place for him in the world of the gods, . . . The sacrifice being complete it goes forth toward the world of the gods, and after it follows the sacrificer. . . . He strides the Viṣṇu strides (i.e. from earth, through the intermediate region, to heaven). Having acquired a share among the gods (i.e. by sacrifice) he goes thither. When one has thus ascended these worlds, that is the goal, that is the safe abode (*pratiṣṭhā*)."

"He (the sacrificer) looks toward the east. He looks with the text, 'We have gone toward the realm of light; we have united with the splendour,'—meaning 'We have united with the gods'. He then looks up toward the sun, for that is the final goal, that is the safe refuge (*pratiṣṭhā*)."

These passages, with their repeated reference to the world of the gods, particularly the sun, as the final goal or refuge, *pratiṣṭhā*, seem to show that the most natural interpretation of verse 11 is to take it as a description of the Heaven-world attained by the sacrifice, which Naciketas has not cared to claim because of his desire for something better. That is to say, he has renounced the old Vedic ideal of immortality and is seeking the new ideal of the Upaniṣads,—immediate realisation of unity with the Supreme Being. These two ideals are set in close and sharp contrast in verses 11 and 12, 11 giving the old Vedic ideal of the goal of life and 12 giving the ideal of the Upaniṣads.

(Additional note.) In fairness to Śaṅkara's interpretation it should perhaps be pointed out that there are certain verses in the *Satapatha Brāhmaṇa* account which suggest that already at that time a more mystical interpretation was beginning. Eg. I. ix. 3. 10, says, "When one has ascended these worlds, that is the goal, that is the *pratiṣṭhā*. The rays of the sun which burns there are the righteous departed, and the highest light—that is Prajāpati or the heavenly world". "Also he looks up with the text, 'Self-existent art thou, best ray of light. The sun, indeed, is the best ray of light.'" Here in this passage the general reference is still to the Heaven-world as the place of refuge of the departed, but the statement, 'That is Prajāpati' and the ascription of self-existence, point to a personal power behind the heaven-world as its basis." In Ṛg IV. 53. 2. Savitr̥ is called Prajāpati and in Ṛg X. 121, Hiranyagarbha is called Prajāpati.

There is thus an identification between Prajāpati (the Creator-god), the Sun-god, and Hiranyagarbha. In Epic and Sūtra times, i.e. shortly after the time when the Kāṭha was probably written, the Creator and Father-god was usually known (in popular religion) as Brahmā, and the world to which the righteous go as the Brahma-world.

There is a certain justification therefore for taking II. 11, as referring

to the state of Brahmā or Hiraṇyagarbha. The difficulty however comes in here. Śāṅkara's Hiraṇyagarbha is not the "Golden Germ" of the Veda but a very specialised conception,—his name for Saḡuṇa Brahman as illusorily associated with a cosmic subtle body. The root objection to Śāṅkara's interpretation is that it unwarrantably imports into the Upaniṣad his doctrine of the two-fold Brahman, with its corollary, the doctrine of illusion.

(For a fuller treatment of the Hiraṇyagarbha conception, see pp. 133 and 156.)

तं दुर्दृशं गूढमनुप्रविष्टं गुहाहितं गङ्गरेष्ठं पुराणम् ।

अध्यात्मयोगाधिगमेन देवं मत्वा धीरो हर्षशोकौ जहाति ॥ १२ ॥

12. *Taṃ dur-darśaṃ gūḍham anupraviṣṭaṃ,
guhā-hitaṃ gaḥvareṣṭhaṃ purāṇam ;
Adhyātma-yoga, adhigamena devaṃ
matvā dhīro harṣa-śokau jahāti.*

Apprehension of the Supreme Being through adhyātma-yoga.

12. He who is hard to see, entered into the hidd'n,
Set in the cave, dwelling in the deep, ancient,—
Perceiving God through spiritual concentration,¹
The wise man leaves behind both joy and sorrow.

¹ or, Spiritual communion.

or, Communion (yoking) with the Essential Self.

Naciketas, in I. 29, has asked to be instructed in the meaning of the great passing-beyond, a boon which he says penetrates the mystery (or, has entered into the hidden). He refuses to be put off with transient earthly joys, or even with the joys of heaven. Yama therefore now speaks to him of that mysterious divine being, hidden behind all the phenomena of the world and in the depths of his own being, so difficult of access by any ordinary means, yet accessible by what is called *adhyātma-yoga*.

Entered into the hidden (*gūḍham anupraviṣṭa*): This epithet is used in I. 29 to describe the third boon, the instruction by which Yama will penetrate and make plain the mystery of that which lies beyond death. Here it describes the inmost, deepest, reality.

Set in the cave (*guhā-hita*): This phrase occurs a number of times in the Ṛg Veda as applied to drought demons (e.g. Vṛtra or Ahi, "the dragon") who lurk in the cloud caves and hold back the waters (see, e.g. II. 11. 5). Here, like the similar phrase *nīhitaḥ guhāyām* (see I. 14); it is used to describe the supreme reality as inner self, the cave being usually regarded as the cave of the heart. (Śaṅkara comments *buddhau sthita*—"located in the intellect".)

Dwelling in the deep (*gaḥvare-stha*): Repeats the idea expressed by the preceding phrases, emphasising as strongly as possible the mystery and difficulty of access of the inmost reality which is the object of search.

Perceiving God (*devam matvā*): *tam* from line *a* should probably be understood with *devam*: so we should render, "Perceiving (or recognising) him as God (or, as divine)". Or *deva* may possibly be used in its root sense of "shining,"—"perceiving that resplendent one".

Adhyātma-yoga. This is the only occurrence of the phrase in the Upaniṣads so there is difference of view as to its exact meaning. Moreover, except for a reference in *Tait.* II. 4. 1, which does not help, and for the phrase *yoga-kṣema* in II. 2, this seems to be the earliest use of the word *yoga* in the Upaniṣads.

As this is a very important passage it may be of interest to quote several translations, particularly of the third line.

"The wise who, by means of meditation on his Self, recognises the Ancient, who is difficult to be seen, etc., as God." (Max Müller.)

"Regarding (him) as god by study of devotion to the overself."

(Whitney.)

"By considering him as God through Yoga-study of what pertains to self." (Hume.)

"He who lays hold of God by means of devotion within his own soul." (Deussen.)

"Having known him as God by means of meditation on his Self."

(Thibaut, S.B.E. 48, p. 361.)

"Knowing the resplendent soul through a mind abstracted from earthly objects." (Ram Mohan Ray.)

"Having realised, by the knowledge obtained through spiritual communion, that Divine Being." (Tattvabhūṣaṇa.)

Yoga comes from the root *yuj*, to join or unite, and signifies both the act or state, and the means of union. A primitive Vedic (and apparently Indo-European) meaning was that of the yoke by which oxen were coupled for ploughing (cf. L. *jugum*, Gk. *ζυγόν*, Eng. *yoke*). It is also used of the harness of horses, and so came to mean any kind of equipment or arrangement. More often it meant the act of yoking or harnessing, and so more generally, setting to action. Perhaps the most usual meaning of yoga is therefore, (1) *exertion, disciplined activity*. With regard to the mind it means (2) *meditative concentration or control*, i.e. the yoking or uniting of all the powers of the mind for a single end, and then, negatively, as a means to this (2b) *abstraction* from outward sense objects. So Śaṅkara, combining these two says that "Yoga means deep meditation (*samādhāna*) with thought abstracted from external objects". In the early yoga of the *Kaṭha* the positive aspect is prominent; in the later yoga of Patañjali,³ the negative, so that yoga comes to mean sense-suppression and the ceasing of bodily activity. The Gītā on the other hand usually stresses activity, using yoga in sense (1), i.e. activity not merely in meditation but in the ordinary duties of life.²

So far yoga has no religious connotation (and much of the later yoga is only very casually theistic), but we maintain that while in the *Kaṭha Upaniṣad* yoga certainly means yoking in the sense of control through meditative concentration, back of this it also means (3) yoking in the sense of *union or communion* with God,—the divine reality realised as one's inmost self. So Keith, speaking of the development of the idea of yoga as first clearly revealed in the *Kaṭha* and *Śvetāsvatara Upaniṣads* says, "In the conception of Yoga, literally yoking, there seems to be an almost necessary, or at least normal, reference to a fixing of the mind on God". (S.S. 55).¹

Adhyātma is used both as a noun and as an adjective. The prefix "*adhi*" has (1) the primary meaning "above," but it is also used with the sense (2) "within", and (3) "pertaining to". So the noun *adhyātma* may mean (1) higher self, (2) inner or essential self. As an adjective the word may mean (3a) spiritual, or (3b) pertaining to the self.⁴

Here *adhyātma-yoga* may be rendered "spiritual concentra-

tion" or, more specifically, "concentrated meditation upon the Self." Later, the idea of yoking or communion with the Essential Self is farther developed. (See pp. 105, 142, 205.)

¹ Re the meaning of Yoga, see Keith, S.S. 54 ff.; R.P.V. 549, 589 ff.; Dasgupta, H.I.P. 226; Edgerton, M.S.Y. 37 ff.; Oltramare, H.I.T. i. 300 ff.; Tuxen, *Yoga*, 20 ff.

Dasgupta points out that "in Pāṇini's time the word *yoga* had attained its technical meaning, and he distinguished the root 'yuj *samādhai*' (*yuj* in the sense of concentration) from 'yujir *yoga*' (root *yujir* in the sense of connecting)". Charpentier (Z.D.M.G. xlv. 846 ff.) considers that neither of these meanings are original but rather "praxis", practical effort (as opposed to Sāṃkhya knowledge and abandonment of action). Edgerton agrees.

We have thus three views as to the primary sense of yoga:

(1) praxis or active effort. (Charpentier, Edgerton.)

(2) *samādhi* or concentration. (Tuxen.)

(3) yoking or union. (Olttramare, Keith.)

The variation is largely due to the section of Yoga literature on which attention is focused. In the *Kaṭha* and *Svet.* yoga is mainly 2 + 3, in the *Gītā* 1 + 3, in the *Yoga-sūtras*—2.

² Yoga in the *Gītā*: Note that in the *Gītā*, yoga is used in three (or four) senses.

(1) When used alone yoga usually means *karma-yoga* or *niṣkāma-karma-yoga*, the method of the selfless performance of duty, irrespective of results. This is clearly a development of the first meaning given above, i.e. disciplined exertion, as opposed to the *sāṃkhya-yoga* (or *jñāna-yoga*), the method of *samnyāsa* or abandonment of action and trust in knowledge only.

(1b) A subsidiary but very frequent sense of yoga in the *Gītā* is that of "method" or "rule", or more fully "the method of control by means of". So the *Gītā* speaks of the three methods, *karma-yoga*, *jñāna-yoga*, and *bhakti-yoga*.

(2) In the sixth *adhyāya* is described a meditative yoga very like that of the *Kaṭha* but more distinctly ascetic.

(3) "It must also be borne in mind that for the *Gītā*, unlike the *Yoga-sūtras*, yoga could retain its fuller, more original content, control that leads to union with Vāsudeva-Brahman." (Hill, B. 41.)

³ The Yoga of Patañjali's *Yoga-sūtras* should be carefully distinguished from that of the *Kaṭha* and the *Gītā*. It is entirely a yoga of *samādhi* in the more negative sense, a method of control of the bodily and mental powers but not a method of union, since no supreme Self was recognised. Its aim was by the restraint or suppression of the activity of the senses and mind (*citta-vṛtti-nirodha*) to realise *kaivalya*, the release of the self by its isolation from aught beside. It is of this Pātañjala Yoga that Otto is speaking when he says that, "Yoga is not a mysticism of union, but purely a mysticism of the soul." (M.E.W. 143.)

⁴ *Adhyātma* is used repeatedly in the earlier Upaniṣads, (e.g. *Br.* I. 5. 21; II. 3. 4; II. 5. 1; III. 1. 10; III. 7. 15; *Oh.* I. 2. 4; I. 5. 3; I. 7. 1; III. 18. 1; *Tait.* I. 3. 1; *Kauṣ.* II. 12; but always in the sense (3b) —“pertaining to one’s self” as opposed to *adhībhūta*, “pertaining to the material elements,” or *adhīdaiṣa*, “pertaining to the deities”.

In the *Gītā* however the meaning is a combination of (2) and (3). It is applied to Brahman with the sense “essential self.” (*Gītā* VII. 28; VIII. 1; VIII. 3; XI. 1. Śāṅkara commenting on VII. 28,—“They know that Brahman, the whole essential self” (*Te brahma tad viduḥ kṛtsnam adhyātmam*) says “the reality underlying the individual self” (*pratyagātma-viśayaṃ vastu*). The word *adhyātma* is used elsewhere in the *Kātha* only once,—in the closing verse which says, “Then Naciketā having obtained this knowledge and *yoga-vidhi*, declared by Death, and so having attained to Brahman, became free from passion, free from death, and so may any other who thus knows the *adhyātma*”. The meaning here seems to be the same as in the *Gītā*, i.e. “knows the Supreme Self who is also his essential self,” though it may also be rendered “who knows what relates to the self”.

We append in full Śāṅkara’s commentary on the two important verses 12 and 13 :

12. *Yaṃ tvam jñātum icchasi ātmānam, taṃ durdarśaṃ—duḥkhena darśanam asya, iti durdarśam, atisūkṣmatvāt. Gūḍhaṃ gahanam, anupraviṣṭaṃ prākṛta-viśaya-vikāra-vijñānair praicchannam iti etat. Guhāhitam—guhāyāṃ buddhau hitam nihitam sthitam, tatra upalabhya-mānatvāt. Gahvareṣṭham—gahvare viśame aneka-anarthasakṣate tiṣṭhate iti gahvareṣṭham. Yata evaṃ gūḍham anupraviṣṭo guhā-hitaś-ca, ato’sau gahvareṣṭhaḥ, ato durdarśaḥ. Taṃ purāṇaṃ purāṇanam adhyātma-yogādhiḡamena—viśayebhyaḥ pratisaṅhṛtya cetasa ātmani samādānam adhyātma-yogaḥ, tasya adhiḡamaḥ, prāptiḥ, tena matvā devam ātmānam, dhiro harṣa-śokau, ātmana utkarṣa-apakarṣayor abhāvāt, jahāti.*

“That” self you wish to know is “hard to see” since it is extremely subtle; “entered into the hidden”, i.e. concealed by the modifications of consciousness due to material objects; “set in the cave”, i.e. located in the intellect (since he is there realised); “dwelling in the deep”, i.e. he stands amid many difficulties, (i.e. in the body). Since he is thus concealed by material objects and located in the intellect, hence he dwells in a difficult situation, hence he is hard to see. “By attaining that ancient one through *adhyātma-yoga*”, i.e. deep meditation on the self with thought abstracted from external objects, thus “perceiving the divine” Self, “the wise man leaves behind both joy and sorrow”, since there is neither elevation nor depression of the Self.

13. *Kiñ-ca “etat” ātmā-tattvam yad ahaṃ vakṣyāmi, tat “brutvā” ācārya-sakāśāt samyagātmabhāvena “parigrhya” upādāya, “martyo” maraṇadharmā, dharmād-anapetaṃ “dharmyaṃ” “provrhya”—udyamya, pṛthak-kṛtya śarīrādeḥ, “aṇuṃ”—sūkṣmam “etat” ātmānam “āpya” prāpya, “sa” martyo vidvān “modatē”, “modanīyam hi” harṣaṇīyam*

एतच्छ्रुत्वा संपरिगृह्य मर्त्यः प्रवृह्य धर्ममगुमेतमाप्य ।

स मोदते मोदनीयं हि लब्ध्वा विवृतं सद्ग नचिकेतसं मन्ये ॥ १३ ॥

13. *Etat śrutvā samparigṛhya martyaḥ,
pravṛhya dharmyam aṅum etam āpya ;
Sa modate modanīyam hi labdhvā :
vīvṛtaṁ sadma Naciketasam manye.*

—as Spirit.

13. Hearing and comprehending this a mortal
Extracts its essence,¹ gaining that Subtle (Being) :
He joys as gaining that which is joy-worthy :
An open house, I think, is Naciketas.

¹ or, Tears off the qualified, or, Discerns the Holy, or, Puts off the conventional.

13. The general purport of the verse is clear : it repeats and completes the thought of the previous verse, calling the deep-hidden divine reality, perceived through *adhyātma-yoga*, "that Subtle Being" (*aṅum etam*), i.e. intangible Spirit, as opposed to that which is gross or material. To perceive Him (says v. 12), is to be carried beyond all distracting emotions,—the elation of joy as well as the depression of sorrow,—largely organic in character,—as one realises, in the depths of one's own self, one's unity with the deepest reality who is also Self or Spirit. But does this mean the fading out of all the colour of feeling,—the merging in a characterless absolute,—"the night in which all cows are black" ? This is how the teaching of the Upaniṣads and the Vedānta has been often interpreted

*ātmanam "labdhvā". Tad-etad-evaṁ-vidhaṁ brahma "sadma" bhavanam
"Naciketasam" tvāṁ prati apūṛta-dvāraṁ "vīvṛtam" abhimukhī-
bhūtaṁ "manyē" : mokṣārhaṁ tvāṁ manye iti abhīprūyaḥ.*

Again, "having heard" from a religious teacher "this" truth about the Self which I shall tell you, "and having grasped" or apprehended it truly and entirely as *self*, "a mortal" man "extracting", i.e. lifting up or separating "the *dharmyam*" (i.e. that which is possessed of *dharma*) from the body, etc. so "obtaining that subtle" self,—"he," i.e. the wise man "rejoices" "because he has obtained the joy-worthy", i.e. the Self, in which one ought to find delight. I think that such a Brahma-abode is wide open to you, Naciketas, (is facing you with open door) : the meaning is, I think you worthy of salvation.

(see Lanman, p. 207) and Yoga practice has often been directed toward this end. But our text goes on to say that the deepest Being is the highest Value,—the supremely joy-worthy, and to attain Him is to gain supreme, abiding bliss (see V. 12–14).

Pravṛhya dharmyam : The one difficulty is the interpretation of the phrase *pravṛhya dharmyam*.

Pravṛhya is from the root *vṛh*, *bṛh*, *barh*=to pull out or root up (distinguish from similar root=to grow). So *pravṛhya* means "having torn or pulled out," "extracted". See VI. 17, where it is said of the soul, *tam svāt śarīrāt pravṛhet* :

"From ones own body one should draw it out,
Firmly, as from its sheath (one pulls) a reed."

Having heard and comprehended the truth expressed in v. 12, and "having extracted the *dharmyam*", one attains "that Subtle Being" and so supreme bliss.

Dharmyam, which occurs only here in the Upaniṣads, is an adj. from *dharma* used as a neuter noun.

dharma is from the root *dhr*=to hold. Hence it means "that which is held fast", so "law", "custom", "anything proper to any state, person or thing." (So justice is the *dharma* of a king, courage of a warrior, ferocity of a tiger.) Hence philosophically *dharma* means "characteristic quality". Ethically it is specialised to mean "duty", "right", "virtue", and this in ordinary usage is its most common meaning.

dharmya, therefore, may mean (1) ethically—"lawful", "righteous", "connected with duty". (So three times in the Gītā, and once apparently—"sacred" or "holy" XVIII. 70, also perhaps XII. 20.) Or (2) in a more general philosophical sense it may mean "qualified" or "possessed of a certain character or essential nature".

Now one may extract a thing either to get rid of it or to preserve it. So one may regard the *dharmyam* (whichever meaning we give it) either (A) as something alien from "that Subtle Being", which is to be pulled off before one can reach it; or (B) as something fundamentally one with the "Subtle", which must be extracted, i.e. discriminated from other things, before its real (subtle) nature can be realised.

(A) Most European commentators, connecting the verse with that which follows rather than that which precedes, take the *dharmyam* as "the qualified", whether (1) ethically, or (2) in the more general philosophical sense, and its qualities must be stripped off to attain to absolute, unqualified ("subtle") being. So—

- (1) Hume .. "Has torn off what is concerned with the right."
Whitney .. "Having flung away what is concerned with duty."
(2) M. Müller .. "Who has separated from it all qualities."
Deussen .. "Who has put off what is external."¹

The occurrence of the phrase "Apart from dharma and adharma," apparently in an ethical sense, in the next verse favours (1).

The contrast (or close connection) of the *dharmyam* and the subtle supports (2).

(B) Śaṅkara, whom one might expect to take the above line of explanation, lending support as it does to his general position, explains quite differently, in the light of the previous verse, taking *dharmyam* = *aṅum etam* = *ātmanam*, and interpreting *pravṛhya dharmyam* as "Separating (i.e. clearly distinguishing) the *dharmyam*, i.e. the Self, from the body, etc. (all that is not-self) and so realising that subtle one, i.e. the Self". Śaṅkara defines *dharmyam* as *dharmād-anapetam*, not separated from, i.e. possessed of, *dharmā*, which leaves it ambiguous whether it is to be taken in senses (1) or (2).

(1) Most of his modern Indian followers take in an ethical sense as the Righteous or Pure one. So—

Arabinda Ghose	..	"When he has separated the Righteous one from the body."
Tattvabhūṣaṇa	..	"Having discriminated the Pure one from other things."
Sītārāma Śāstrī	..	"Having abstracted the virtuous <i>ātman</i> from the body, etc."

We have suggested that *dharmyam* should be given a *numinous* rather than an ethical meaning, and in this sense have given the alternative rendering "Discerns the Holy", i.e. the mysterious Being of v. 12, realising Him as Spirit.

(2) Taking the more general philosophic meaning Tattvabhūṣaṇa as an alternative suggests *dharmyam* = *guṇa-viśiṣṭham* (*ātmanam*), i.e. by discriminating the qualified, i.e. individual embodied Self from its material environment one learns the true nature of the *ātman* and so attains that subtle (i.e. unqualified) Self.² This gives excellent sense and fits Śaṅkara, but it is curious that if this is his meaning he did not say so more specifically.

On the whole, we are inclined to the simple rendering suggested in the text. Hearing and comprehending that truth about the deepest reality given in v. 12, a man extracts its essential nature, or discerns its real character, and so attains that subtle, i.e. essentially spiritual, Being. Alternatively we suggest either, "Discerns the Holy", or, (bearing in mind the next verse), "Puts off the conventional", i.e. all that is merely customary, whether in thought, morals or religion.

¹ *Abtat was äusserlich.* S.U. 273.

² This is an interpretation of Tattvabhūṣaṇa's Bengali commentary. Rōer apparently intends a similar meaning: "Having distinguished the (soul as) endowed with qualities (*dharmyam*) (from the body) and obtained it in its subtle nature, the mortal rejoices".

An open house, i.e. for the habitation of the Supreme Self. Cf. *Muṇḍ.* III. 2. 3. (which follows a verse identical with *Kātha* II. 23). "Into his Brahma-abode this Self enters." Also *Chānd.* VIII. 1. 1. Śaṅkara inserts "*tvām prati*" after "*Naciketasam*", "Such a Brahma-abode is I think wide open to thee, Naciketas". This apparently involves an amendment of the text to *Naciketase*,—"Wide open seems the house to Naciketas". Or to "*Naciketo*" (*voc.*), with "*tvām prati*" understood, making the line metrical. But the text as it stands (*pace* Whitney who thinks it senseless) gives a good meaning. Alternatively we might punctuate differently and read, "Hearing and comprehending this, extracting its essence, gaining that subtle being, a man rejoices: so I consider Naciketas one who has obtained a joyful open house."

अन्यत्र घर्मादन्यत्राघर्मादन्यत्रास्मात्कृताकृतात् ।

अन्यत्र भूताच्च भव्याच्च यत्तत्पश्यसि तद्वद ॥ १४ ॥

14. *Anyatra dharmād [anyatra] adharmād,*
anyatra_asmāt kṛta-akṛtāt,
Anyatra bhūtāt [ca] bhavyāt_ ca :
yat tat paśyasi tad vada.

14. Apart from duty (*dharma*) and non-duty (*adharma*),
 Apart from what is done or not done,
 Apart from past and future time,—
 What thus thou seest, that declare.

14. *Anyatra (adv.)*—as other than, different from, independent of.

Adharma is always used in an ethical (or at least quasi-ethical, i.e. legal or social) sense. In this verse therefore *Dharma* must be used in the same sense. There is however some difference as to the exact meaning.

"Independent of good and evil" (Deussen, Gough).

"Apart from right and apart from unright" (Hume).

"Different from virtue and vice" (Röer, Śāstri, Tattvabhūṣaṇa).

"Apart from duty, apart from non-duty" (Whitney).

It is interesting to note Śaṅkara's different shades of meaning in different contexts, of which Thibaut's translations are a fair reflection. So *Sūtra-bhāṣya* I. 2. 11. (T. 118) has "That which thou seest as different from religious duty and its contrary". I. 1. 4 (T. 28), "Different from merit and demerit", with the comment, "That bodiless entity to which merit and demerit, with their consequences and threefold time do not apply". In a number of places however Thibaut considers that *dharma* and *adharma* are used in the general philosophical sense and renders, "That which thou seest as neither this nor that" (231, 248, 251). This is also Max Müller's rendering. Śaṅkara's comment in the *Kāthaka-bhāṣya* is given below.

Anyatra asmāt kṛta akṛtāt. Śaṅkara says, “*Kṛtam* = *kāryam*, effect; *akṛtam* = *kāraṇam*, cause”.

Just as the previous verse has been interpreted as meaning that one must strip off all attributes to reach the (negatively) Absolute Being, so this verse has been understood as asserting that among those attributes to be stripped are all moral qualities,—that the Supreme Reality is supra-temporal, supra-causal and supra-moral, beyond good and evil. Undoubtedly the Param Brahman of Śaṅkara, like the Absolute of Plotinus, is “beyond the Good”. Ethical distinctions, like all other distinctions, belong to the phenomenal world and are transcended in the Absolute. We doubt however whether this is the meaning here.

In the first place we note that it is misleading to translate *dharma* and *adharma* by “good and evil”. This is responsible for much of the disagreement of Indian and European scholars. *Dharma* usually means “duty” in the sense of what ought to be done under particular conditions: what St. Paul called “the law of commandments contained in ordinances” (*Eph.* 2. 15), which does not bind the freed man, much less God. Good is for man an infinite ideal, and in God an eternal actuality. Śaṅkara commenting on our verse says, “Other than *dharma*, means different from acts enjoined by the scriptures and from their results and means of attainment”.

In the second place, instead of treating the Upaniṣad as a collection of disjointed texts let us note the context. Naciketas is dissatisfied with the religion of works, no matter how productive of prosperity. He has refused even the happiness of the heaven-world obtained by sacrifices and good works, and is seeking that salvation which comes from knowledge of supreme reality. Yama, therefore, seeing he is fit for the revelation, has spoken of that mysterious Divine Being, set in the cave of the heart, which may be gained not by outward works but by *adhyātma-yoga*, inner concentration. Stripping off extraneous externalities, discerning divine reality, laying hold of its essential nature as Spirit (the different interpretations of v. 13 are complementary), a sincere inquirer like Naciketas may obtain that which is supremely joy-worthy. “That is what I want”, says Naciketas. I am not asking about religious duties or works of merit or the results of doing or not doing them.

I wish to know that which is deeper than all the happenings of time. If you know such an eternal reality, which is beyond all worldly experience, tell me that.¹

Apart from the past and the future : Even if we interpret lines b and c with Śaṅkara as "independent of causality and time", or with Deussen, "independent of becoming and time", this does not necessarily mean that Brahman is here viewed as timeless in the sense that time is an illusion (though that is Śaṅkara's view). "Independent of past and future" means not timeless but eternal, imperishable (*akṣara*). So in *Bṛ.* iii. 8. 9, discriminate time is derived from the Imperishable, and in *Bṛ.* iv. 4. 15, and *Kātha* iv. 5. 12. 13, Brahman is spoken of as "Lord of the past and future", i.e. Lord of the time-order. (See note on iv. 13. Also Keith, R.P.V. 560.)

सर्वे वेदा यत्पदमामनन्ति तपांसि सर्वाणि च यद्ददन्ति ।

यदिच्छन्तो ब्रह्मचर्यं चरन्ति तत्ते पदं संग्रहेण ब्रवीम्योमित्येतत् ॥ १५ ॥

एतद्ब्रह्मोत्तरं ब्रह्म एतद्ब्रह्मोत्तरं परम् ।

एतद्ब्रह्मोत्तरं ज्ञात्वा यो यदिच्छति तस्य तत् ॥ १६ ॥

एतदालम्बनं श्रेष्ठमेतदालम्बनं परम् ।

एतदालम्बनं ज्ञात्वा ब्रह्मलोके महोयते ॥ १७ ॥

15. *Sarve vedā yat padam āmananti,
tapāṃsi sarvāṇi-ca yad vadanti,
Yad icchanto brahmacaryaṃ caranti,
tat te padaṃ saṅgrahaṇa bravīmi :*
Om iti etat.

16. *Etad hi eva akṣaram brahma,
etad hi eva akṣaram param,
Etad hi eva akṣaram jñātvā,
yo yad icchati tasya tat.*

17. *Etad ālambanaṃ śreṣṭham,
etad ālambanaṃ param,
Etad ālambanaṃ jñātvā,
brahma-loke mahīyate.*

¹ *Yad idṛśaṃ vastu sarva-vyavahāragocarātitaṃ paśyasi jñāsi, tad vada mahyam.*—Śaṅkara.

“Om”—the symbol of Brahman.

15. That word which all the Vedas glorify,
 And which all austere practices proclaim,
 Desiring which men follow holy living (*brahmacarya*),—
 That word to thee I briefly do declare :
 That (word) is “Om”.
16. For truly this word is Brahman,
 This word indeed is the highest :
 Knowing indeed this very word,
 What any man desires is his.
17. This support is best (of all),
 This support is the highest :
 Knowing this support a man
 Grows great within the Brahma-world.

Naciketas has asked to be taught eternal reality. The answer is here given that all revelation and religious practice declare the eternal Brahman, symbolised by the word “Om”. Then in verses 18 ff. Yama goes on to declare that that Brahman is the Ātman, the eternal Self.

15. Word (*pada*).—*Pada* means footstep, footprint, sign, word; also place, abode, goal. Śaṅkara here takes it as meaning goal (*padanīyam, gamanīyam*). The goal is Brahman of whom Om is the symbol. Acts of austerity declare Him because they have Him as their goal,—otherwise they would be senseless.

Brahmacarya denotes the condition of life of a *brahmacārin* or religious student. This is first referred to in *Rg Veda* x. 109, and is described in *Atharva Veda* xi. 5. It normally lasted twelve years but might be longer. Śvetaketu (*Ch. U.* vi. 1. 2.) was a *brahmacārin* from 12 to 24. The student lived in the house of his teacher, and served him, tending the house and the cattle, often begging his own and his master's food, looking after the sacrificial fires and studying the Veda. He was required to be chaste, obedient, to drink only water and not to sleep in the daytime (see *Āśvalāyana Gṛhya-sūtra* i. 22, 1. 2.). The word later became generalised to mean holy living, particularly continence and self-restraint.

16. Word in this verse translates *akṣara*, which may also mean "imperishable". There is thus as in the previous verse a double meaning; there is reference to the word "Om" but still more to that which the word symbolises,—the goal of all study and discipline,—the highest Imperishable One who is our support (*ālabanam*) and only source of true greatness.

Re. Om—Deussen says, "Essentially it was the unknowableness of the first principle of the universe, the Brahman, and the impossibility of expressing it by word or illustration, which compelled the choice of something so entirely meaningless as the symbol Om as a symbol of Brahman". The statement is misleading since, by the time Om became a symbol of Brahman it had acquired a meaning.

The word Om (not found in the Ṛg or Atharva Vedas) occurs in the *Taittirīya Saṃhitā* of the Black Yajur Veda (iii. 2. 9. 6) where it is called the *praṇava* which, says Keith, indicates the prolongation and nasalisation of the last syllable of the offering verse, uttered by the *hotṛ*. It first becomes frequent in the Brāhmaṇas where it is generally a response by the *adhvaryu* (offering priest) to each Ṛg-Vedic verse uttered by the *hotṛ*. It thus corresponds to the Hebrew 'Amen' and like it comes to be used as a solemn "Yes, So be it".

Already by the time of *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa* v. 32, Om, regarded as =AUM, had acquired such numinous value that it is treated as a mystic syllable representing the essence of the Vedas and the universe. Prajāpati by *tapas* created the three worlds and their light-givers: earth, air and sky: Agni, Vāyu and Āditya. From these he produced the three Vedas and the three pure sounds: Agni→Ṛg→*bhūh*; Vāyu→Yajur→*bhuvah*; Āditya→Sāma→*svah*. These sacred sounds are called the internal fastenings of the Vedas and expiate any errors in recitation. Again from these, representing their essence A, U, M were produced. So Aum (=Om) represents all these,—the threefold sacred knowledge, the world-powers and the One whence all these proceed. The *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa* does not here attempt an etymological derivation of Om, but it was natural that later some should say A=Agni, U=Vāyu, therefore M=the Āditya Mitra. Om is also in *Maitri* vi. 5 identified with the later trinity, Brahmā, Rudra, Viṣṇu.

When therefore the Upaniṣads take Om as the symbol of Brahman the thought behind is surely not, as Deussen suggests, that an unknowable absolute is fitly expressed by an unintelligible word. For the word by usage in worship had been charged with sacred meaning and expressed not something abstract (however difficult of definition), but rather the whole fullness of numinous (mysterious yet adorable) reality. Further, just as AMEN, used as a response to solemn statement or prayer with the meaning, 'It is true' or 'May it be true', is converted by St. John into a most impressive name for God revealed in Christ ("The Amen, the

faithful and true witness", Rev. iii. 14), so we believe it is not fanciful to say that OM, used originally as a response in worship, becomes in such phrases as *Om satyam* and *Om tat sat*, expressive of the Hindu belief in the truth and reality behind all.

(See Keith, article "Om", E.R.E., ix; Deussen, P.U., 390-2; Gough, P.U., 67-74. Also Keith, R.V.B., 256. We do not of course deny the absurdities and the magic that have often attached to the use of Om.)

न जायते म्रियते वा विपश्चिद्रायं कुतश्चिन्न बभूव कश्चित् ।

अजो नित्यः शान्त्वतोऽयं पुराणो न हन्यते हन्यमाने शरीरे ॥ १८ ॥

हन्ता चेन्मन्यते हन्तुं हतस्वेन्मन्यते हतम् ।

उभौ तौ न विजानौतो नायं हन्ति न हन्यते ॥ १९ ॥

18. *Na jāyate mriyate vā vipaścīt,*
na ayam kutaścīt na babhūva kaścīt :
Ajo nityaḥ śāśvato 'yam purāṇo
na hanyate hanyamāne śarīre.

19. *Hantā cet manyate hantum,*
hataś-cet manyate hatam,
Ubhau tau na vijānīto :
na ayam hanti na hanyate.

The Unborn Eternal Self.

18. The wise (self) is not born and does not die,
From naught else comes it nor does aught become :
Unborn, eternal, endless, this the Ancient,
Is slain not with the slaying of the body.

19. If the slayer think he slays,
Or if the slain think he is slain,
Both of them do not understand,
This slays not, neither is it slain.

Here and in the following verses the answer to both the questions of Naciketas, in I. 29 and II. 14, is given. The meaning of the great transition, that which lies beyond the mystery of death, is just this : the soul or self is eternal and death a mere bodily appearance. Also, that eternal changeless reality of which Naciketas has inquired is just the Soul. These verses are quoted in *Gītā* ii. 20. 19, and form the substance of Kṛṣṇa's

teaching to Arjuna when he hesitates to engage in battle against his kinsfolk.¹ In the *Gītā* they occur in a section called *Sāṃkhya-yoga* and seem to refer to the eternity and changelessness of the individual soul. Here however, in the verses which follow, it is clear that it is the One Supreme Soul (*ātman*) that is referred to as individuating itself and constituting the inner reality of each living being.

In verses 15–17, the eternal reality is called *Brahman*. In verses 20 ff. it is called *Ātman*. We have here then, by implication, the central thesis of the *Upaniṣads*,—*Brahman* = *Ātman*, i.e. the mysterious power behind the world is one with the central reality of our own inner being. So in the *Śāṅḍilya-vidyā* (*Ś.B.* x. 6. 3 and *Ch.* iii. 14) it is first stated, “Verily this whole world is Brahman” (*sarvaṃ khalu idaṃ Brahma*), and then it is said, “This soul of mine within the heart, this is Brahman” (*eṣa me ātmāntarhṛdaye, etad Brahma*).

But does this mean, as Yājñavalkya usually taught (*Br.* ii. 4. 12. 14; iii. 8. 23, etc.) and Śāṅkara taught consistently, that there is really only one Soul, that the Soul is a pure undifferentiated Unity, and that all plurality, of souls as well as objects, is an illusion? It is not till *Valli III* that the *Kaṭha Upaniṣad* draws any explicit distinction between the individual and the Supreme Souls, and right through the basic unity of the two, the fact that the individual soul owes all its reality to the

¹ Relation of the *Kaṭha* and the *Gītā* in this passage.

It is interesting to note the variations of *Gītā* II. 20 and 19 from *Kaṭha* II. 18 and 19. *Gītā* II. 20. c.d. = *Kaṭha* II. 18. c.d. and *Gītā* II. 19. c.d. = *Kaṭha* II. 19. c.d.

Gītā II. 19. a.b. has, *Ya enaṃ vetti hantāraṃ, yaś-caiṃaṃ manyate hatam.*
He who thinks of him as slayer,
And he who thinks of him as slain.

Gītā II. 20. a.b.—*Na jāyate mriyate vā kadācit*
Na ayaṃ bhūtvā bhavitā vā na bhūyaḥ.

He is not ever born, and never dies,
He came not into being, nor shall come hereafter.

Some have thought that the *Kaṭha* verses are an interpolation from the *Gītā*. But *kadācit* for the Vedic *vipāścit* is surely a deliberate simplification on the part of the *Gītākāra*: it is improbable that the change took place the other way. The *Kaṭha* version of 19. a.b. also seems the more original.

Supreme, is insisted on. But though the writer concentrates attention on the Supreme Soul he seems, even in this valli, to assume the reality of individual souls who see and attain the Supreme.

In this connection the name here given to the Soul, i.e. *Vipaścīt*, is surely significant.¹ This word means literally 'knowing inspiration' and therefore 'inspiring' or 'inspired', and is used of Savitṛ in *R̥g Veda* v. 81. 1, in a passage which seems to be the fountain-head of the idea of Yoga :

"*Yuñjate mano uta yuñjate dhīyo, viprā viprasya bṛhato vipaścītaḥ.*"

"The sages of the great wise (i.e. inspiring) Sage,
Yoke their minds and yoke their thoughts."

This passage is quoted (and elaborated) again and again in the *Samhitās* of the *Yajur Veda*, the *Brāhmaṇas*, and later in *Śvet. U.* : and in a number of passages *Savitṛ*, the life-giving Sun-god, is identified with Prajāpati, and, as in the *Gāyatrī*, taken as representing the Supreme Being. Especially we should note the central position of this passage in the directions for the piling of the Fire Altar in both the *Taittirīya* and *Kāthaka Samhitās* of the Black *Yajur Veda*. (See Keith, V.B.Y.S., 289.) This surely makes it clear that it is not by accident that the word *Vipaścīt* is here used for the *Ātman*. The whole object of the sacrifice is said to be :

"With mind well-yoked are we,
By the inspiration of God Savitṛ,
With strength for gaining heaven."

(*Taittirīya Samhitā* iv. 1. 1. c.)

And now the Upaniṣad goes on to teach that immortality consists in the yoking of the individual soul with the Supreme Soul which constitutes its inmost being and inspires it for the highest.

¹ *Vipaścīt* comes from the root *vip*=to quiver or tremble; hence the adj. *vip*=inwardly stirred, inspired; noun *vipas*=inspiration; *vipaś-cīt*=knowing inspiration. *Sāyaṇa* renders by *medhāvin*=wise. It occurs as we have said,

(1) *R̥g Veda* v. 81. 1, and this passage is quoted, V.S. v. 14, xi. 4; T.S. i. 2. 13. 1, iv. 1. 1. d.; K.S. ii. 10, xv. 11; M.S. i. 2. 9, ii. 7. 1; also in the following *Brāhmaṇas*, A.B. iv. 30. 4; K.B. xx. 2, xxii. 1; Ś.B. iii. 5. 3. 11; vi. 3. 1. 16; xiv. 1. 2. 8. Also *Śvet. U.* ii. 4.

(2) *R̥g Veda* ix. 86. 44; *vipaścīte pavamānāya gāyata*.

"Praise the wise (or inspiring) Purifier", i.e. Soma.

(3) *Tait. U.* ii. 1. 1 refers to *Brahman* as identical with the *Ātman* perceived in the soul within, yet transcendent in heaven. "He who knows Him who is hidden in the cave and set in highest heaven, he obtains all desires, together with the wise *Brahman* (*brahmaṇā vipaścitā*)."

(4) *Gītā* ii. 60 refers to men. "The senses even of a wise man (*puruṣasya vipaścitāḥ*) carry away his mind."

अणोरणुयान्महतो महौयानात्मास्य जन्तोर्निहितो गुहायाम् ।

तमक्रतुः पश्यति वीतशोको घातुः प्रसादान्महिमानमात्मनः ॥ २० ॥

20. *Aṇor aṇūyān, mahato mahūyān,*
ātmā 'sya jantor nihilo guhāyām :
Tam akratuḥ paśyati vīta-śoko,
dhātuḥ prasādāt¹ mahimānam ātmanaḥ.

¹ A. *dhātu-prasādāt.*

Opposite characteristics of the Self :

Vision through Grace.

20. Less than an atom, greater than the great,
 The Self is hid in every creature's heart :
 The unstriving man beholds Him, freed from sorrow,
 Through the Creator's grace* (he sees) the greatness of
 the Self.

* Or, With tranquil mind.

20. **Less than an atom** (*aṇor aṇūyān*): When the *ātman* is thought of as psychical principle its smallness is emphasised. So in v. 3, using old animistic language, it is called "the dwarf", and in iv. 12, "thumb-sized". It is also said to be "smaller than a grain of rice, or mustard, or millet" (*Ch.* iii. 14. 3), and here "more atomic than an atom". On the other hand when the Soul is thought of as cosmic its vastness is emphasised. So in ii. 22 it is called "the great, all-pervading Self", and in *Ch.* iii. 14. 3, "greater than the earth, greater than the sky, greater than all these worlds". When the two aspects as here and in the *Śāṅḍilya-vidyā*, are set in contrast side by side, it is clear that the *ātman* is regarded as essentially spaceless, i.e. not limited by the form of space. This means, as Śāṅkara remarks, that all things, however small or great, exist only through the Self and apart from the Self have no reality. But it does not mean, as he goes on to say, that all things small or great are only names and forms (illusorily) imposed upon it.

The unstriving man (*akratuḥ*). Śaṅkara comments, *Akratuḥ* = *akāmaḥ*. Max Müller and Röer follow by rendering, "One who is free from desire"; Arabinda Ghosh, "When a man is stripped of wishes"; Hume, "One who is without active will"; Deussen (P.U.), "Indifferent".

The latter translation does not give the right colour here. It is true that the Indian religious ideal has often expressed itself in complete inaction and the suppression of all desire and will. But here the negative is for the sake of a positive. If like Śaṅkara we interpret as "desireless", then that means as he says, freedom from those desires for external objects, whether earthly or heavenly, which distract the soul and prevent vision. As in the case of Naciketas it is clear that *mumukṣutva*, desire for salvation, thus becomes all the keener. Yet even desire for salvation may be over-anxious. "Blessed are they that hunger and thirst after righteousness", said Jesus. "Strive to enter in at the straight gate." But there comes a point where striving must cease and the soul must rest in God alone. Here, then, we have rendered the word *akratuḥ*, which might grammatically mean 'actionless' or 'will-less', by 'unstriving'. It denotes the man whose will is at peace, who possesses what the Greeks called *ἀραξία*. Christian *ataraxia*, the untroubled peace of true faith, of trust which leads to vision, is taught very emphatically by Jesus in the passage in *John* 14 beginning, *Μὴ ταρασσέσθε* ("Let not your hearts be troubled"), and in the Sermon on the Mount with its repeated warning against anxious striving as a hindrance in the way of entrance into the Kingdom of Heaven.

The Grace of the Creator.

The first line of *Kātha* ii. 20 suggests the difficulty of knowing Brahman, the infinitely subtle and infinitely great, though as Self He dwells in our own hearts. The third line says that nevertheless the man of tranquil unselfish will may have a vision of Him? How? Does the fourth line add anything new? Śaṅkara says, No,—it simply further explains 'akratuḥ' and says that it is through the tranquillity of the senses and the mind that the vision comes. If on the other hand our text is correct the vision is through the self-revelation of a personal and gracious God.

Note that there is here an important difference of reading.

- (1) *dhātuḥ prasādāt* : Bibliotheca Indica text (C) and the Bombay text of Tukarāma Jāvaji (B).
 (2) *dhātu-prasādāt* : Ānandāśrama text (A) and most Indian editions that follow Śaṅkara's *bhāṣya*.

Dhātuḥ is the genitive of *dhātṛ*=sustainer or creator.
dhātu means "element" and is interpreted by Śaṅkara as referring to the mental elements,—the mind and the senses.

prasāda is from the root *sad*, to sink down.

pra+*sad*=to grow calm, bright, pleased, gracious.

So the noun *prasāda* may mean (1) calmness, (2) clearness, (3) kindness, grace.

(1) *Adopting the first reading,*

Max Müller	..	"By the grace of the Creator".
Hume	..	"Through the grace of the Creator".
Whitney	..	"By the power of the Creator".
Regnaud	..	"Par la faveur du Créateur".
Geldner	..	"Durch die Gnade des Schöpfers".

(2) *Adopting the second reading,*

Rammohan Ray	..	"Through the steadiness of the senses".
Röer	..	"By the tranquillity of the senses".
Gough	..	"In the limpid clearness of his faculties".
Sitarama Sastri	..	"With his mind and senses composed".

Hume, in an important note (p. 350) says : "This is an important passage as being the first explicit statement of the doctrine of Grace (*prasāda*). The idea is found earlier in the celebrated Hymn of the Word (*Vāc*), R.V. x. 125.5. c.d. This same stanza occurs with slight verbal variations at *Śvet.* iii. 20 and *Mahānārāyaṇa* viii. 3 (= *Taittirīya Āraṇyaka* x. 10. 1).

"Inasmuch as the method of salvation 'through the grace of the creator' is directly opposed to the general Upaniṣadic doctrine of salvation 'through knowledge', Śaṅkara interprets *dhātuḥ prasādāt* as *dhātu-saṃprasādāt*, 'through the tranquillity of the senses' according to the practice of the Yoga method."

Now Śaṅkara, it is true, is sometimes rather arbitrary in his interpretations, bending texts to suit his philosophy. Here however, he may not be so arbitrary as Hume suggests. In the first place the difference of reading *may* date back before his time (Hume does not mention it). In the second place 'tranquillity' is quite as primary a meaning of *prasāda* as 'grace'.

This Hume admits when he goes on to say, "There is this possibility of different interpretation of the word *prasāda*; for it occurs unquestionably in the sense of 'tranquillity', at *Maitri* vi. 20 and 34; compare also the compounds *jñāna-prasāda*, 'the peace of knowledge', at *Muṇḍ.* iii. 1. 8, and *varna-prasāda*, 'clearness of complexion', at *Śvet.* ii. 13. In the *Bhagavad-Gītā* there is the same double use; 'peace', or 'tranquillity' at 2. 64, 65; 18. 37; and 'the grace of Kṛishna', at 18. 56, 58, 62, 73."

Deussen, who generally leans toward Śaṅkara in his interpretations, remarks concerning this verse, "Another verse which in all probability promised the vision of the *ātman* concealed in the heart to him who 'by pacifying the organs of sense' has become 'indifferent' (*akratu*), has received a theistic colouring in *Śvet.* 3. 20, and *Māhānār.* 8. 3, in that it represents the knowledge of the *ātman* as received 'by the favour of the creator'." (P.U. 78.) Immediately before this, however, he has recognised that *Kaṭha* ii. 23 does contain a doctrine of grace, when he says: "The knowledge of the *ātman* cannot be gained by speculation concerning it, but only by a revelation communicated through the teacher. According as the *ātman* is conceived as a divine person this revelation is represented as an act of his grace."

"Not through instruction is the *ātman* won,
Not through genius or much book-learning;
Only by the man whom he chooses is he comprehended:
To him the *ātman* reveals his essence." ii. 23.¹

In conclusion, we may sum up with the judgment that apart from verse 23, and following only the general trend of the teaching of the *Kaṭha Upaniṣad* so far, Śaṅkara's interpretation of verse 20 would seem to be intrinsically the more probable. Apart from verse 23 we might conclude with Deussen that the version given in *Śvet.* 3. 20 and *Māhānārāyaṇa* 8. 3,

"Paśyati . . dhātuḥ prasādāt mahimānam īsam".

"Through the grace of the Creator he sees the Lord and his greatness",—is a later theistic modification. Taken in conjunction with verse 23, however (which Deussen admits does teach a doctrine of grace), we conclude that the reading '*dhātuḥ prasādāt*' represents the original text, and in *Kaṭha* ii. 20 as in *Śvet.* iii. 20 we should render, "By the grace of the Creator".

It should be noted however that Śāṅkara interprets *Kaṭha* ii. 23 quite differently and does not admit that it contains a doctrine of grace, and if we were to accept his interpretation there our judgment on ii. 20 might be quite different.²

आसीनो दूरं व्रजति श्यामो याति सर्वतः ।

कस्तं मदामदं देवं मदन्यो ज्ञातुमर्हति ॥ २१ ॥

अशरीरं शरीरेष्वनवस्थेष्ववस्थितम् ।

महान्तं विभुमात्मानं मत्वा धीरो न शोचति ॥ २२ ॥

21. *Āsīno dūraṃ vrajati,*
śayāno yāti sarvataḥ,
Kas tam mada-amadaṃ devaṃ
mad-anyo jñātum arhati.

22. *Aśarīraṃ śarīreṣu,*
anavastheṣv avasthitam,
Mahāntaṃ vibhūm ātmānaṃ
matvā dhīro na śocati.

¹ See note on ii. 23 and mark how Deussen here departs from Śāṅkara's guidance.

² There is another argument for the originality of the reading *dhātuḥ prasādāt* which is worth mentioning. Regnaud considers that it is a reminiscence of *dhātur dyutanāt* (*Rg Veda* X. 181).

Dhātur dyutanāt savitūś-ca viṣṇo (h)
Rathantaram ā jabhārū Vasiṣṭhaḥ,
Aviṣṇan te atihitaṃ yad āsīt
Yajñasya dhāma paramaṃ guhā yat,
Dhātur dyutanāt savitūś-ca viṣṇor
Bharadvājo bṛhad ā cakre agneḥ.

From radiant Dhātṛ, Savitṛ, and Viṣṇu,
Vasiṣṭha cultivated the *rathantara*;

From radiant Dhātṛ, Savitṛ, and Viṣṇu,—

From Agni,—Bharadvāja brought the *bṛhat*;

They found out what was very deeply hidden,

That cave which was the high abode of *yajña*.

(Or, The sacrifice's loftiest secret essence.)

This certainly fits in with one of the main themes of the *Kaṭha*. It begins with the sacrifice but seeks to find its inner meaning. It is intended to yoke the mind for perception of and communion with the Self. But for this divine inspiration is needed. See the previous note on the Self as *Vipascit*.

21. Sitting, He travels afar;
Lying, He goes everywhere:
Who else than I is able to know
That active yet tranquil God?*
22. The bodiless amid bodies,
The stable amid the unstable,—
The great and omnipresent Self
Knowing, a wise man does not grieve.

* Or, That joyful-joyless deity.

Compare *Īśa Up.* 4, 5.

“One motionless, yet swift as thought;
Standing still, He yet o’ertakes all runners.
Resting is He and yet restless,
Afar is He and yet near;
He is within all,
And yet yonder outside all.”

Deussen (P.U. 149) says, “Here opposite predicates are ascribed to Brahman in such a manner that they mutually cancel one another, and serve only to illustrate the impossibility of conceiving Brahman by means of empirical definitions”.

Śaṅkara’s comment is much the same,—“He has mutually opposed characteristics, hence, because it is impossible to know him (i.e. for ordinary men with ordinary methods),—‘Who else but I can know this joyful-joyless deity?’ It is only by persons like us (Yama), of subtle intellect and learning, that the Self can be known.”³

Śaṅkara, however, does not balance impartially between the antinomies. He always inclines to the negative or static side as giving a nearer approach to ultimate reality. So here he goes on to say, “Though fixed in its own nature, because it is invested with qualifying conditions (upādhis) through the motion of the mind and other organs it seems to travel to a distance. In reality however it remains here alone.”⁴

Madāmada: Whitney, following the St. Petersburg Lexicon, takes as a reduplicated formation from *mad*=to be intoxicated or excited. So “that

³ *Viruddha-āharmavūn ato-śakyateāj-jñātum,—Kaś tam madāmadaṅ devaṅ, mad-anya jñātum arhati.*

⁴ *Svena rūpeṇa sthita eva san, mana ūdī gatiṣu tad-upādihikatevā dūrāṅ vrajati_iva. Sa ca_īha_eva vartate.*

ever-excited divine one". Deussen also in S.U. apparently takes in the same way, translating,

"The god's moving (rolling) hither and thither,
Who but I can understand?"

Taking *madāmada* with Śāṅkara as *mada-amada-viśiṣṭha* we might render 'exhilarated yet sober', i.e. 'energetic yet tranquil'.

We doubt whether the opposites are intended to cancel. We take it that the contrast of the whole verse is between the energy and peaceful stability of the Self. Both are real, but only one who is inspired by the divine Self can understand it.

22. Realising the essential nature of the Self, knowing that though now embodied and therefore subject to change, he is one in nature with the enduring omnipresent Self, a wise man has no need for fear.

नायमात्मा प्रवचनेन लभ्यो न मेधया न बह्वना श्रुतेन ।
यमेवैष दृश्यते तेन लभ्यस्तस्यैष आत्मा विदृश्यते तन् स्वाम् ॥ २३ ॥

23. *Na ayam ātmā pravacanena labhyo,*
na medhayā na bahunā śrutena,
Yam eva eṣa vṛṇute tena labhyas,
tasya eṣa ātmā vivṛṇute tanūṃ svām.

**The Supreme Self knowable through self-revelation
to a fit person.**

23. Not by instruction may this Self be gained,
Nor intellect, nor by much scripture-learning :
Whomso He chooses, by him He may be gained,
To him this Self reveals His own (true) person.

23. There are two roots *vṛ* meaning (1) to choose, (2) to cover. (cf. Latin, *velle* and *aperio*.) So here *vṛṇute* means chooses; *vivṛṇute*=uncovers, reveals.

tasya="to him",—genitive instead of dative of indirect object with verb of showing (Maodonell, S. G., 202. e.)

tanūṃ svām=literally "his own body", i.e. person, or character.

This verse teaches that while the Supreme Self is difficult to know, and indeed unknowable by the unaided intellect even though that intellect is directed to the study of the Scriptures,—yet He is knowable through His own self-revelation to the man whom He chooses. Quite clearly then, if the translation we have given is correct, this verse teaches a doctrine of Divine Grace and conceives the Supreme Self as personal God.

(N.B.—With the rendering given above Max Müller, Deussen, Hume, Whitney, Geldner, Arabinda Ghose, Tattvabhusana, Ranade (C.S. 345) and Radhakrishnan (I.P. 234) substantially agree.)

Śaṅkara, however, interprets quite differently.—He changes the subject in the second half of the verse, taking *eṣa* ("he") as meaning not the Self but the man who chooses, i.e. seeks and meditates on, his own inner self, and so obtains it.

Yam eva eṣa vṛṇute, tena labhyas, literally translated means, "Whom this one chooses, by him he is obtainable".

Śaṅkara comments :

Yam eva—svām ātmānam. Eṣa—sādhako.

"Whom" (*Yam*) means "his own self". "He" (*eṣa*) means "the aspirant". "The passionless man chooses, i.e. meditates on, his own self, and so the self is obtained by the self."

So he would render the second half of the verse—

"It is obtainable by the man who chooses (i.e. seeks) it alone,
To him this self shows its own real nature."

By this inversion of subject and object Śaṅkara turns a verse which would tell strongly against his doctrine into a means of support. It is very clever exegetical acrobatics, but we doubt whether it can be grammatically justified.

Rāmānuja, who supports the interpretation we have given above, takes the first half of the verse to refer to that hearing the scripture (*śravaṇa*), reflecting on it (*manana*=*pravacana*), and steady meditation (*nididhyāsana*=*medhā*) which are the preliminary stages of knowing God. So, commenting on this verse he says, "By this it is said that the gaining of the Self is not effected by mere hearing, reflection and meditation. 'Whom the Self chooses, by him it may be gained.' Now a chosen one means a most beloved one. And he is most beloved of the Self by whom the Self is held most dear. That Bhagavān Himself endeavours that this most beloved person should gain the Self, He himself declares :

'To those who are constantly devoted and worship with love,
I give that knowledge by which they reach Me.' (*Gītā* x. 10.)

Hence he who possesses steady remembrance (which is a form of direct perception), which is dear to him above all things because of the inexpressible dearness of its object,—he is

chosen by the Highest Self and by him alone is the Highest Self obtained. Such steady remembrance (*dhruvā smṛti*) is denoted by the word 'bhakti'".

Rāmānuja's exposition is of course a development rather than a strict exegesis of our text,—but if what we have said is correct it is a legitimate development. Moreover though Rāmānuja's own Bhāgavatism is some 1,500 years later than the *Kāṭha*, there is fairly good evidence that the Bhāgavata religion was already in existence when the *Kāṭha* was written and passages like this seem to have been influenced by it or a kindred theistic development.

नाविरतो दुश्चरितान्नाश्रान्तो नासमाहितः ।

नाश्रान्तमानसो वापि प्रज्ञानेनैनामाप्नुयात् ॥ २४ ॥

24. *Na avirato duścāritāt,*
na śānto na asamāhitāḥ,
Na śānta-mānaso vā-'pi,
prajñānena nam āpnuyāt.

Additional Note on Śaṅkara's Exegesis of ii. 23.

We append Śaṅkara's comment in full.

Yadyapi durvijñeya 'yam ātmā, tathā 'py upāyena svvijñeya eva,—ity āha 'Na ayam ātmā pravacanena'—*aneka-veda-svikaraṇena, 'labhyo'—jñeyāḥ,* 'na' api 'medhayā'—*granthārtha-dhāraṇa-śaktyā, 'na bahunā śrutena' kevalena. Kena tarhi labhyaḥ? ity ucyate, 'Yam eva'—svātmānam, 'eṣa'—sādḥako, 'vṛṇute'—prārthayate, 'tena'—eva ātmanā, varitrā, svayam ātmā 'labhyo'—jñāyate, evam-ity-etat. Niškāmaś-ca ātmānam eva prārthayate; ātmanā eva ātmā labhyate,—ity arthaḥ. Kathaṃ labhyate? ity ucyate, 'Tasya'—ātmā-kāmasya,—'eṣa ātmā vivṛṇute'—prakāśayati,—pāramārthikīm 'svaṃ tanūm'—svakīyaṃ yāihātmyam,—ity arthaḥ.*

"Although this self is hard to know, still by proper means it can be well known. So it is said, 'Not by instruction' (*pravacana*),—i.e. the correct exposition of many Vedas, 'is this self obtainable' (i.e. knowable), 'nor yet by intellect' (*medhā*)—i.e. power of grasping the meaning of books,—'nor by any amount of mere scripture-learning'.

How then is it obtainable? It is explained as follows: 'Him alone' (i.e. his own self) 'whom he' (i.e. the aspirant) 'chooses' (i.e. seeks), 'by that same self' (i.e. by the seeker) 'is it' (i.e. his own self) 'obtainable' (i.e. known)—this is the meaning. The passionless man seeks only the self; by the self alone can the self be obtained. How is it obtained? 'To him' (i.e. to the one who seeks the self) 'that self reveals' (i.e. manifests) 'its own' essential 'form' (i.e. its own 'real nature')."

24. Who has not ceased from evil ways,
Who is untranquil, unprepared,
Or he whose mind is not at peace,
By knowledge cannot win to Him.

24. May be either a repetition of the first half of 23,—i.e. one cannot obtain the Self by mere intellectual knowledge; or *prajñāna* may mean wisdom, saving knowledge, which cannot be had without the moral qualifications here described.

Rāmānuja (*Śrībhāṣya* iv. i. 13) says that "this verse teaches that meditation, which should become more perfect day by day, cannot be accomplished without the devotee having broken with all evil. This is the indispensable condition of pleasing the Lord and winning His grace."

Concerning the moral qualifications for the vision of the Self the *Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad* says,

"This Self is obtainable by truth, by austerity (*tapas*).

By proper knowledge (*samyag-jñāna*), by the student's life of chastity (*brahmacarya*), constantly practised" (iii. 1. 5).

"Not by sight is it grasped, nor by speech,

Nor by any sense organ, austerity, or work :

By the peace (or clear light) of knowledge (*jñāna-prasāda*), one's nature purified—

In that way, by meditating, does one behold Him who is without parts." (iii. 1. 8).

Concerning this verse Ranade (C.S. 341) says, "The *Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad* tells us that it is only when a perfect katharsis of the whole moral being takes place by the clearness of illumination, that one is able to realise the immaculate God after meditation."

Then, immediately after *Muṇḍ.* iii. 2. 3 (which is identical with *Kaṭha* ii. 23), and corresponding therefore with our verse, *Muṇḍ.* has

*Na ayam ātmā balahinena labhyo,
Na ca pramādāt, tapaso vāpy alingāt ;
Etair upāyair yatate yas-tu vidvāṃs,
Tasya eṣa ātmā viśate brahma-dhāma.*

"This Soul is not to be obtained by one destitute of fortitude,
Nor through slackness, nor without distinctive mark of discipline,
But he who strives by these means, being wise,—
Into his Brahma-abode this Soul enters."

Asamāhīta, unprepared, unconcentrated, possibly refers back to *Br.* iv. 2. 1, where Yājñavalkya says to Janaka, "Verily, as

a king about to go on a great journey would prepare a chariot or a ship, even so you have a soul prepared with these mystic doctrines (*upaniṣadbhiḥ samāhita-ātmā*)." And the whole passage may have in view *Br. iv. 4. 23*, "Therefore having this knowledge, having become calm, controlled, quiet, patiently enduring and collected (*śānto dānta uparatas titikṣuḥ samāhito*) one sees the self just in the Self. One sees everything in the Self. Evil does not overcome him; he overcomes all evil. . . . This is the Brahma-world, O king." (*Cf. Galatians v. 22, 23*).

It is right that we should do justice to Hinduism by keeping in mind these moral qualifications which are insisted on in many Upaniṣad passages. At the same time it remains true that there are numerous other passages in Hindu scripture which teach that morality, though a necessary propædeutic, belongs to the phenomenal world which must be transcended.

यस्य ब्रह्म च क्षत्रं च उभे भवत ओदनः ।

मृत्युर्यस्योपसेचनं क इत्या वेद यत्र सः ॥ २५ ॥

25. *Yasya brahma-ca kṣatram-ca
ubhe bhavata odanaḥ,
Mṛtur yasya upasecanam,
ka itthā veda yatra saḥ.*

25. For whom the priest and warrior both,
Are as a meal of cooked rice,
Of which death is the curry-spice :
Who knows for certain where He is ?

25. This verse reads like an agnostic interpolation on the part of one who objected to the teaching of the knowability of the Supreme Being contained in the previous verses. It reminds one of *Rg Veda x. 129*,

"Who knows for certain? Who shall here declare it?
Whence it was born, and whence came this creation."

If it is not an interpolation but fits into the context, then we must accept Śaṅkara's suggestion that its purpose is to declare emphatically the impossibility of knowing Brahman on the part

of those who lack the qualifications described in the previous verse.¹

The vivid picture of Brahman as the universal destroyer reminds one of *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* i. 2. 1, where the creation of the universe is ascribed to Death, *Mṛtyu* being there evidently a name for the Supreme. "In the beginning nothing existed. All was concealed by Death. He thought, Let me be possessed of a body. By worshipping he produced water, foam, earth, fire and air men, cattle. Whatever he brought forth, that he began to eat. Verily he eats (*atti*) everything: that is the *aditi* nature of Aditi" (i.e. the Infinite, here explained as the Eater).

In our text however death is not a name of Brahman but is said to be the Destroyer's spice or curry powder as though it were that which gives flavour to an otherwise dull universe.

The Brahmin and the Kṣatriya are mentioned as the two highest orders of creatures, those regarded as fitted to inquire into the nature of Brahman. Yet after all how little fitted they are.

"As for man, his days are as grass,
As the flower of the field, so he withereth." (*Psalms* 103: 15).
"What is man that thou art mindful of him?" (*Psalms* 8: 4).

And yet, in grace, He is mindful. (*See Hebrews* ii. 9.)

¹ And so, adds Rāmānuja, lack Divine grace. "The clause, 'Who knows him where he is?' clearly shows that we have to recognise here the Self (or highest Brahman, which is the topic of the entire section), of whom it has been said that He is hard to know unless He assists us with His grace." (*Sṅ.* I. 2. 10.) He further says that the clause, "To whom (or of which) death is a condiment", means that death leads to the reabsorption by Brahman of the entire world in which the Brahmins and Kṣatriyas hold the foremost place, death itself also being absorbed in the Eternal.

॥ तृतीया वल्ली ॥

ऋतं पिबन्तौ सुकृतस्य लोके गुहां प्रविष्टौ परमे परार्धे ।

ह्यायातपौ ब्रह्मविदो वदन्ति पञ्चामयो ये च त्रिणाचिकेताः ॥ १ ॥

Tṛtīyā Vallī.

1. *Ṛtaṃ pibantau sukṛtasya loke,
guhāṃ praviṣṭau parame parārdhe :
Chāyā-tapau brahmavido vadanti,
pañcāgnayo ye ca triṇāciketāḥ.*

THIRD VALLĪ.

The Two Selves.

1. Two drink the *ṛta* in the righteous world,
Lodged in the cave in the high upper realm :
Shadow and Light do Brahma-knowers call them,—
And those who tend five fires, three Nāciketas.¹

¹ Pious householders, especially those who tend the Nāciketa fire.

The connection of thought seems to be as follows :

The First Vallī, which is introductory, ends with the third and chief request of Naciketas that he may be taught the meaning of the "great passing-beyond". The Second Vallī first points out that there are two ways, the way of pleasure and ignorance which leads to repeated death, and the way of good and of knowledge which alone leads to that which is enduring. This eternal reality, greater than anything this world or the heaven of the gods can give, is deeply hidden but may be obtained, not indeed by ordinary empirical (scientific) knowledge, but by meditation on one's own inner self. To the one whose will is at peace (from foolish egotistic striving) and thus concentrated, the Supreme Self manifests Himself : otherwise it is impossible for human knowledge to reach Him. The Third Vallī again takes up more in detail the question how Brahma,—the Supreme Self, may be known and the goal of immortality attained. The first verse seems to teach that meditation on the inner self leads to knowledge of the Supreme

because the Supreme Self dwells in close fellowship with the individual self in the cave of the human intelligence. The parable of the chariot then goes on to set forth the method of *yoga*, the yoking of all the powers of our nature so that our whole being may be controlled and guided to its goal by the Supreme Person.

Rāmānuja, whose guidance we have largely followed in the above exposition, summarises Valli III as follows: "The sloka, iii. 1, 'There are two drinking, etc.' shows that, as the object of devout meditation and the devotee abide together, meditation is easily performed. Then the section, 'Know the Self to be him who drives in the chariot', teaches the true mode of meditation and how the devotee reaches the highest abode of Viṣṇu." (*Śrībhāṣya*, 1. 4. 6.)

This interpretation is not without its difficulties and requires justification in detail, but if the first three vallīs are to be taken as a literary unity it provides the best clue we have discovered to their meaning.

1. "There are two drinking the *ṛta*" (*ṛtaṃ pibantau*).

Ṛta, from the root *r*=to move, means as an adjective 'fitting', 'right', 'true'. As a noun it is one of the great key words of the Veda and means established order, divine law or truth. It signifies the divinely established order of the universe, both natural and moral. Hume here renders 'righteousness'. This is hardly the right shade of meaning in this context. It probably here refers to that law or divine order connecting deeds with their results. So Śaṅkara comments, "*Ṛtaṃ,—satyom avasyambhāvitoṭ karma-phalaṃ pibantau*"—"There are two that drink *ṛta*, i.e. true because inescapable fruit of action".

"In the world of righteousness"—The two words *sukṛtasya loke* naturally go together. Macdonell, S.D. notes the phrase as Vedic and renders as above, referring to heaven. Śaṅkara, however, takes *sukṛtasya* as equivalent to *sva-kṛtasya* and construes with *ṛta* (*phala*). So he would render—"There are two who eat the fruit of their own deeds". *Loke* he takes separately as=*asmin śarīre*: "In the world, i.e. in this body".

Another possibility is to take *sukṛtasya loke* together but to interpret as *svakṛtasya loke*: so Thibaut in his translation of *Rāmānuja's Śrībhāṣya* I. 2. 10 (p. 287) has, "There are two drinking their reward in the world of their own works," i.e. the world created by their own deeds. This seems preferable to Śaṅkara's reading, but we prefer to keep *sukṛtasya* and render—"There are two that drink their recompense in the world of righteousness".

Who are the two here referred to ?

We should probably interpret in the light of a passage which occurs identically in *Mund.* iii. 1, and *Śvet.* iv. 6 and 7, and goes back to *Rg Veda* I. 164. 20. (Introduction, p. 15.)

“Two birds, fast bound companions,
Clasp close the self-same tree :
Of these, one eats the sweet fruit,
The other looks on without eating.

On the self-same tree a person, dejected,
Grieves for his impotence, deluded :
But when he sees the other, his loved Lord—
And all his greatness—sorrow is departed.”

The two birds are evidently the individual soul (*jīvātman*) and the Supreme soul (*Paramātman*) personified as the Lord (*Īśa*), and the two here referred to are evidently the same, though with less personification. Śāṅkara, Rāmānuja and Nimbārka in their comments on Vedānta-sūtra I. 2. 11, all agree in this view. But how can the Supreme Self, which in *Śvet.* and *Mund.* is said to look on without eating, be here said to drink the recompense or reward of deeds? Śāṅkara, Rāmānuja and Śrīnivāsa (in his supercommentary on Nimbārka) all explain away the difficulty by citing the example of two men walking under an umbrella, of whom one might loosely say, “There go the umbrella-bearers”, whereas only one carries the umbrella. Probably however the intention in our passage is to emphasise the close fellowship of the two selves, spite of the fact that they are so different that they are called “Shadow and Light”. The Supreme Self dwells with the individual self in the cave of the heart, making it possible by His fellowship for the individual to drink the recompense of reward in the world of righteousness, and, by sympathy, sharing in that reward. So Madhva quotes the *Bṛhat-Saṃhitā* and says, “The Lord Hari dwells in the heart of beings and accepts the pure pleasure arising from their good works”.

“In the highest upper sphere”—may indicate that the “cave” of the heart is not to be understood in the bodily sense. Deussen has, “On high, in the world beyond” (“*Droben im Jenseits*”), which is quite a literal translation of *parame parārdhe*.

The heaven, however, referred to here and in the phrase *sukṛtasya loka* is surely that kingdom of heaven which Jesus said is within us, the deepest and highest reaches of our personality where the human soul holds fellowship with God.

The last line shows that the Kāṭha Upaniṣad, while extolling the way of meditation or of spiritual knowledge of the Brahma-knowers, does not regard the older way of sacrifice or ritual religion as valueless. Pious householders may also reach a measure of spiritual understanding through due performance of the appointed sacrifices.

यः सेतुरीजानानामक्षरं ब्रह्म यत्परम् ।

अभयं तित्तीर्षतां पारं नाचिकेतं शक्यमहि ॥ २ ॥

2. *Yaḥ setur ījānānām,*
 akṣaram brahma yat param,
Abhayaṃ titīrṣatām pāraṃ,
 nāciketam śakemahi.

2. That bridge for sacrificers,
 The imperishable highest Brahman,
 For crossers to the fearless shore :
 That Nāciketa may we master.

Verse 2 continues the theme of 1.d. There are two ways of crossing the river of *samsāra* (over the change and sorrow of this world), (1) the sacrifice, by which (so the Vedas taught) men cross to the heaven of the gods, and (2) the knowledge of Brahman, which is the supreme means. The first is in that it symbolises the second, and should prepare the way for it. So it is said in B.A.U. iv. 4. 22, "Him Brahmins desire to know through sacrifice".

The verse seems to be a prayer in which master and pupil unite before commencing the *yoga-vidhi* which is the real *Nāciketa*,—the new and characteristic contribution that the Kāṭha Upaniṣad has to make to human salvation.

आत्मानं रथिनं विद्धि शरीरं रथमेव तु ।
 बुद्धिं तु सारथिं विद्धि मनः प्रग्रहमेव च ॥ ३ ॥
 इन्द्रियाणि हयानाञ्जर्विधयांस्तेषु गोचरान् ।
 आत्मेन्द्रियमनोयुक्तं भोक्तेत्याज्जर्मनौषिणः ॥ ४ ॥
 यस्त्वविज्ञानवान्भवत्ययुक्तेन मनसा सदा ।
 तस्येन्द्रियाण्यवश्यानि दुष्टान्वा इव सारथेः ॥ ५ ॥
 यस्तु विज्ञानवान्भवति युक्तेन मनसा सदा ।
 तस्येन्द्रियाणि वश्यानि सदन्वा इव सारथेः ॥ ६ ॥
 यस्त्वविज्ञानवान्भवत्यमनस्कः सदाऽशुचिः ।
 न स तत्पदमाप्नोति संसारं चाधिगच्छति ॥ ७ ॥
 यस्तु विज्ञानवान्भवति समनस्कः सदा शुचिः ।
 स तु तत्पदमाप्नोति यस्माद्भूयो न जायते ॥ ८ ॥

3. *Ātmānaṃ rathinaṃ viddhi,
śarīraṃ ratham eva tu ;
Buddhiṃ tu sārathiṃ viddhi,
manaḥ pragrahaṃ eva-ca.*
4. *Indriyāṇi hayān āhur,
viśayāṃs teṣu gocarān ;
Ātmā indriya-mano-yuktaṃ,
bhoktā ity āhur manīṣiṇaḥ.*
5. *Yas tv avijñānavān bhavaty-
ayuktena manasā sadā ;
Tasya indriyāṇy avasīyāni,
duṣṭāśvā iva sārathēḥ.*
6. *Yas tu vijñānavān bhavati
yuktena manasā sadā ;
Tasya indriyāṇi vasīyāni,
sadaśvā iva sārathēḥ.*
7. *Yas tv avijñānavān bhavaty-
amanaskaḥ sadā 'suciḥ ;
Na sa tat padam āpnoti
saṃsāraṃ ca adhigacchati.*

8. *Yas tu vijñānavān bhavati
samanaskah sadā śuciḥ ;
Sa tu tat padam āpnoti
yasmād bhūyo na jāyate.*

The Parable of the Chariot (*Ratha-rūpaka*).

3. Know the soul (*ātman*) as lord of a chariot,
The body the chariot itself;
Know reason (*buddhi*) as chariot-driver,
And the mind (*manas*) as bridle and reins.
4. The senses (*indriyāṇi*), they say, are the horses,
The objects of sense (*viśaya*) are their path ;
The soul, yoked with mind and the senses,
Learned men call the 'enjoyer' (*bhoktr*).
5. He who has no understanding,
Always of unrestrained mind (*ayuktena manasā*),
His senses are out of control,
Like a charioteer's bad horses.
6. But he who has right understanding
Always with mind well restrained (*yuktena manasā*).
His senses are under control,
Like a charioteer's good horses.
7. He who has no understanding,
Careless and ever impure,
Never attains to that goal,
But goes on to transmigration (*saṃsāra*).
8. But he who has right understanding,
Always attentive and pure,
Attains at length to that goal,
Whence he is no more reborn.

The Parable of the Chariot constitutes quite a distinct section of the Kāṭha Upaniṣad and introduces its most characteristic teaching. The soul (*ātman*) is compared to the lord or

owner of a chariot (*rathin*), (the chariot being of course the body). There is a driver (*sārathi*) called *buddhi* (reason, intellect), or *vijñāna* (true or discriminating understanding). The horses are said to be the *indriyāṇi*. This word is usually rendered "senses" but "life-powers" would perhaps be more appropriate. They fall into two groups,—the five *jñānendriyāṇi* or powers of knowing, i.e. the five senses, and the five *karmendriyāṇi* or powers of acting,—generally enumerated as the organs of speech, reproduction, evacuation and the hands and the feet (by which is meant not simply the organs themselves but the powers or functions they express). The *indriyāṇi* are therefore, in modern language, the senses and the instincts.¹

As horses must be controlled by the driver by means of bridle and reins (*pragraha*) so intelligence, the driver of the chariot of the soul needs an instrument, the *manas* through which it may control the senses and instincts (*indriyāṇi*).

The term "*manas*" has passed through very various shades of meaning in the course of the long history of Indian thought. It is derived from the root *man* to think, and at first meant mind in its widest sense as the seat of thought, feeling and will. In this wide sense it is often used as synonymous with soul (*ātman*). This is the meaning in the *R̥g Veda* and it has persisted in popular usage till the present day. Quite early however a narrower specialised meaning was also developed. So in a number of passages in the *Bṛhadāranyaka* and *Chāndogya*, *manas* is one of the five *prāṇāḥ* or organs, i.e. breath (smell), speech, eye, ear and *manas*. All these are organs or functions of the *ātman*. "As breathing he is called breath, as under-

¹ N.B.—We have enumerated the *indriyāṇi* as in the developed Sāṃkhya and Vedānta philosophy. The first clear reference to *ten indriyāṇi* is in *Praśna* iv. 2, which is distinctly later than the *Kātha*. In the earlier Upaniṣads (*Br.* and *Oh.*) *indriyam* means vital power and *prāṇāḥ* is generally used for the organs. These are usually given as five but the five are not our five senses (the *jñānendriyāṇi*) since speech is almost invariably put first among them. In *Br.* iii. 2. 2-9, eight organs are mentioned (called *grahāḥ*, i.e. 'graspers')—breath (*prāṇa*), speech, hands, eye, ear, tongue, skin and *manas*. The exact number thought of by the *Kātha* is not clear, but the powers symbolised by the horses must include both those by which we become aware of objects and those by which we react upon them.

standing mind (*manas*): all these are only names for his effects". (*Br.* i. 4. 7.) The other organs or powers are however subordinated to the *manas*. So it is said in *Br.* i. 5. 3, "I was elsewhere with my mind, therefore I did not see. For only with the mind do we see, and only with the mind do we hear" (*cf.* Plato: *Theaetetus*, 184. C.D.).

In our passage then the *manas* is the central organ of the conscious life which shapes into perceptions the impressions of the senses, and also translates these perceptions into conative acts expressed through the organs of action. The mind should be under the control of a higher power,—the reason, intelligence or discriminating understanding (*buddhi* or *vijñāna*). He who has such a discriminating understanding controlling the impulses of the mind, which is then said to be yoked (*yukta*), is called *vijñānavān* (wise, of right understanding); while the man without such a discriminating controlling judgment, whose mind therefore is unyoked (*ayukta*), is called *avijñānavān* (without understanding). A controlling understanding makes a man attentive and steady-minded (*samanaska*) while without it the mind is inattentive and shifty (*amanaska*). Such an inattentive mind cannot control the senses and instincts. Mind in verse 9 means a steady or attentive mind.

Plato's Parable of the Chariot.—The Parable of the Chariot reminds one very strongly of Plato's similar parable in the *Phaedrus*.¹

"Every soul is immortal. . . . For every body which derives motion from without is soulless, but that which has motion within itself has a soul, since that is the nature of the soul."

"About its form we must speak in the following manner. To tell what it really is would be a matter quite superhuman and of long discourse but it is within human power and a shorter matter to say what it is like. Let it then be likened to the combined power of a pair of winged horses and a charioteer. Now the horses and charioteers of the gods are all good but those of others are mixed. Our ruling power (*ὁ ἄρχων*) then, drives a pair of horses, one being beautiful and noble and the other quite the opposite in breed and character. Therefore in our case the driving is necessarily difficult and troublesome.

¹ §§ 24-28 in Fowler's Edition, Loeb Library; pp. 471-9.

... Now the chariots of the gods, whose well-matched horses obey the rein, advance easily;² but the others with difficulty, for the horse of evil nature weighs the chariot down, making it heavy and pulling toward the earth the charioteer whose horse is not well-trained. There the utmost toil and struggle await the soul. . . . Yearning for the upper region but unable to reach it, they (i.e. earth-bound souls) are carried round and round beneath, trampling upon and colliding with one another, each striving to pass his neighbour. So there is the greatest confusion and sweat of rivalry, wherein many are lamed and many wings are broken through the incompetence of the drivers."

The charioteer (ὁ ἡνίοχος) or ruling power (ὁ ἄρχων) Plato, calls νοῦς, i.e. intelligence or reason. The two horses symbolise (1) θυμός the spirited principle of the soul,—the higher emotions, which on the whole side with reason, and (2) τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν, the lower, more animal appetites and instincts.

These two parables, which must be almost contemporaneous in composition, show differences which are probably too great for any dependence, one way or the other. The *Kāṭha* parable, for example, differs from Plato's in that it does not explicitly recognise a double nature of our life-activities (the horses); and even if, in accord with later thought, we distinguish two classes of *indriyāṇi*, these two classes do not correspond to Plato's and there is no moral difference between them.³

Spite of various differences, however, the *Kāṭha* Upaniṣad and the *Phædrus* agree in the main purpose of the parable.

² i.e. upward, toward heaven (ὑπὸ τῆν ὑπουράνιον ἀψίδα). Cf. St. Paul's conception of the Christian life in *Ephesians* as ἐν τοῖς ἐπουρανίοις.

³ It would be a more serious difference if we were to treat literally the remark of the *Phædrus* that the soul is a composite power made up of three parts. This is opposed to the trend of the argument on the immortality of the soul which immediately precedes the parable of the chariot and still more opposed to the whole argument of the *Phædo* which asserts that the soul is one and indivisible. As Fowler says, "It is important to bear in mind that the description of the soul in the *Phædrus* is figurative, otherwise we are involved in hopeless confusion". "It is evident that Plato did not consider the soul a composite creature, but a single being. The two horses then represent not distinct parts of the soul, but modes of the soul as it is affected by its contact with the body." ⁴ Loeb Library, Plato, Vol. I., 408, 409.

They agree in their insistence that the ruling power of the soul, called by the Kāṭha *buddhi* or *vijñāna*, and by Plato *nous*, must really rule and set in order and direct to one end all the powers of our nature. So Plato elsewhere (in the *Republic*, Bk. IV. 443⁴) remarks, "The just man sets in order his own inner life, and is his own master and at peace with himself; and when he has bound together the three principles within him (i.e. reason, emotion and the sensual appetites), and is no longer many but has become one entirely temperate and perfectly adjusted nature, then he will proceed to act, if he has to act, whether in state affairs or in private business of his own." This is in entire agreement of spirit with the Kāṭha Upaniṣad, and like it sets forth the true nature of *yoga*,—not as it is often conceived a kind of magic or a set of rules about breathing and posture but the yoking or complete control of all the powers of our complex psychical and physical nature and their direction to the highest end.

विज्ञानसारथिर्यस्तु मनःप्रयत्नवान्नरः ।

सोऽध्वनः पारमाप्रोति तद्विष्णोः परमं पदम् ॥ ९ ॥

9. *Vijñāna-sārathir yas tu,*
manaḥ pragrahavān naraḥ,
So 'dhvanaḥ pāram āpnoti,
tad Viṣṇoḥ paramaṃ padam.

9. With reason for chariot-driver,
The man who has mind well-reined,
Reaches the end of the journey,—
The highest abode of Viṣṇu.

Viṣṇoḥ paramaṃ padam. The end of the journey is said to be the highest step or place of Viṣṇu. This is a reference to *Rg Veda*, I. 154.,

1. I will proclaim the mighty deeds of Viṣṇu,
Of him who measured out the earthly spaces :
Who, firmly holding up the higher station,
Strode out in triple regions, widely-pacing.
4. I would attain to that dear home of his,
Where men devoted to the gods rejoice ;
There is the friendship of the mighty-strider,—
In Viṣṇu's highest step a spring of nectar.
(“ *Viṣṇoḥ pade parame madhva utsaḥ* ”.)

Śaṅkara comments: "What the goal is, is now explained: the man who has discerning intelligence for driver, whose mind is under control and thought concentrated, and who is pure, i.e. the wise man, reaches the end of the road of *saṃsāra*. That is to say that wise man reaches 'the highest place of Viṣṇu', i.e. the nature of the all-pervading Brahman, the Paramātman known as Vāsudeva".

This seems to be the first place in the Upaniṣads in which the personal name Viṣṇu is used for the Supreme Self, but the identification is regularly made in the *Gītā* and later Vaiṣṇava literature. The *Kaṭha Upaniṣad* is not a sectarian Vaiṣṇava book (this is the only occurrence of the name Viṣṇu) but it seems to be on the direct line of development of Bhāgavata or Vaiṣṇava ideas.

इन्द्रियेभ्यः परा ह्यर्था अर्थेभ्यश्च परं मनः ।

मनसस्तु परा बुद्धिर्बुद्धेरात्मा महात्परः ॥ १० ॥

महत्तः परमव्यक्तमव्यक्तात्पुरुषः परः ।

पुरुषान्न परं किञ्चित्सा काष्ठा सा परा गतिः ॥ ११ ॥

एष सर्वेषु भूतेषु गूढोऽत्मा न प्रकाशते ।

दृश्यते त्वग्रया बुद्ध्या सूक्ष्मया सूक्ष्मदर्शिभिः ॥ १२ ॥

यच्छेदाङ्गनसौ प्राञ्जस्तद्यच्छेच्छान् आत्मनि ।

ज्ञानमात्मनि महति नियच्छेत्तद्यच्छेच्छान्त आत्मनि ॥ १३ ॥

10. *Indriyebhyaḥ parā hy arthā
arthebhyas-ca param manasḥ,
Manasas-tu parā buddhir
buddher ātmā mahān paraḥ.*

11. *Mahataḥ param avyaktam
avyaktāt puruṣaḥ paraḥ,
Puruṣān na paraṃ kiñcit
sā kāṣṭhā sā parā gatiḥ.*

12. *Eṣa sarveṣu bhūteṣu
gūḍho 'tmā na prakāśate,
Drśyate tv agrīyā buddhyā
sūkṣmayā sūkṣma-darśibhiḥ.*

13. *Yacched vān-manasī prājñās
 tad yacchet, jñāna ātmani,
 Jñānam ātmani mahati niyacchet
 tad yacchet, śānta ātmani.*

**The order of progression to the Highest Person :
 The Way of Yoga.**

10. Beyond the senses are sense-objects, (*artha*)
 Beyond the objects is the mind, (*manas*)
 Beyond the mind is the reason, (*buddhi*)
 Beyond the reason, the great self. (*ātmā mahān*)
11. Beyond the Great (*mahat*) is the Unexpressed, (*avyakta*)
 Beyond the Unexpressed, the Person, (*puruṣa*)
 Beyond the Person there is nothing ;
 That is the end, that is the final goal.
12. Hidden in all living beings
 This Self does not shine forth :
 Yet he is seen by subtle seers,
 With subtle keen intelligence.
13. The wise man should restrain speech and mind,
 He should restrain it in the knowing self,
 The knowing one he should restrain in the Great Self,
 That he should restrain in the Self of Peace.

The parable of the chariot has taught that the lower elements of our being must be controlled by the higher if the goal of life is to be attained. An attempt is now made to formulate a progressive order of superiority in these elements, which however does not stop with the individual self but leads beyond it to a cosmic principle or being called the Unexpressed (*avyakta*), and beyond that again to the ultimate being, the *Puruṣa*, who is the final goal.

In these verses we meet with a kind of hierarchy of principles or beings which are described by names which have become technical terms in the later Sāṃkhya and Vedānta philosophies, and the difficulty is to avoid being unduly influenced by these later developments of thought in our interpretation of the passage.

Let us note certain preliminary details.

First of all, What exactly is the kind of superiority or ultimateness indicated by *para*? Does it indicate causal priority, and is the series therefore to be regarded as evolutionary? This is how Rāmānuja takes it¹ (so that one point in his attack on a Sāṃkhya interpretation is that in Kapila's system the objects are not viewed as causes of the senses nor the mind as cause of the objects,² all these being the effects of *aḥamkāra*). Or perhaps it would be more correct to say that he considers that the series would have to be regarded as causal and evolutionary if given a Sāṃkhya interpretation.

The statement, "Higher than the senses are the sense-objects", certainly cannot be interpreted causally. Moreover, however we interpret *para*, the objects come in rather oddly in a series, the other members of which have to do with the self, and they are omitted in the order of yoking in verse 13. We suggest that the passage is a *vidyā* or meditation in which, starting from the outward life of sense, the aspirant moves inward and upward till he reaches the central and highest reality of his own being. But at the first step comes the reflection that sensation is dependent on objects, and that might have led to quite another path of meditation such as we have in *Br.* iii. 8, where one passes from outward nature to the one world-ground,—the *Akṣara* (*Avyakta*). But here, in our passage, stopping at the first step outward the aspirant turns inward, reflecting that the life of sense, though dependent on sense-objects, is still more dependent on the mind,—as also are the objects, because "the relation of the senses and their objects (i.e. sense-perception) is based upon the mind".³

In verse 13, *vān-manasī* seems to be clearly a *dvandva*, i.e. "speech and mind". Śāṅkara however says, *vāk-vācam, manasī-manasī, chānda-saṃ dairghyam*. The suggestion is that in Vedic language *manasī* may optionally be written for the usual locative form *manasi*, while *vāk* is written for *vācam*. The translation will then be, "A wise man should restrain speech in mind". But this is surely an unnecessary straining of grammar (though Śāṅkara has distinguished followers). Speech here stands for all the *īndriyāṇi*. The dual compound "speech-and-mind" indicates the perceptive (and active) self. Beyond and controlling this is the *jñāna ātman*,—the self of knowledge, called for short *jñāna*, which is identical with the *buddhi* and *vijnāna* of the preceding passage and the *satva* of vi. 7. Beyond this the *mahān ātmā*. Beyond this the *sānta ātman*, or peaceful self, which is probably to be identified with the *avyakta* (*cf. Praśna* v. 7.) or else represents the inmost Self as *avyakta-puruṣa* combined.

¹ *Śrībhāṣya*, i. 4. 1. (Th. 357).

² It is interesting to note that in the theistic Sāṃkhya of the Mokṣa-dharma section of the *Sānti-parvan* of the *Mahābhārata* (Bk. xii, 306. 27-8, Bombay edn.) the mind is spoken of as the cause of the five elements.

³ Śāṅkara, *Sb.* i. 4. 1. (Th. I. 239).

We will now consider various traditional interpretations.

(i) Is a Sāṃkhya interpretation permissible?

The Sāṃkhyas maintain that this passage gives scriptural warrant for their philosophy, because there is here enumerated, by the same names and in the same order, the three highest principles of the universe as taught in the Sāṃkhya system, i.e. the *mahat*, *avyakta* and *puruṣa*, and because the whole passage is best interpreted on the supposition that the elements here enumerated are the 25 principles of the Sāṃkhya.

The twenty-five principles of the Sāṃkhya are as follows:—

(1) *Avyakta* (the unevolved), called also *Prakṛti* (Nature or undifferentiated energy-matter) and *Pradhāna* (or chief principle, since it is the productive cause of all others except *Puruṣa*). From this, when its equilibrium (the balance of its three *guṇas*, i.e. moods or constituent elements) is disturbed by the attraction of *Puruṣa*, proceeds the evolution or *śreṣṭi*, of the whole of the manifest (the world of experience), consisting of the following 23 principles.

(2) *Mahat* (the great principle) or *Buddhi* (intelligence)—the first product of *avyakta*. This gives rise to—

(3) *Ahaṃkāra* (egoism or self-consciousness, the principle of individuation). From it are evolved—

(4) *Manas* ("mind")—the central co-ordinating sense-organ, the organ of perception;

(5-9) Five *buddhindriyāṇi* or sense-organs.

(10-14) Five *karmendriyāṇi* or organs of action.

(15-19) Five *tanmātrāṇi* or subtle objects of sense,—the primary elements of touch, sound, colour, taste and smell. Also called *sūkṣma-bhūtāni* or subtle elements, i.e. subtle ether, air, light, water and earth. From these subtle elements are evolved—

(20-24) The five *sthūla-bhūtāni* or gross elements, i.e. perceptible ether, air, light, water and earth, and the material bodies of which they are the constituents.

Lastly, there is the 25th principle—

(25) *Puruṣa* or spirit—an infinite multiplicity of souls, totally distinct in nature from all the other principles, being neither producer or produced, though by its influence on *Prakṛti* it produces consciousness and causes the evolution of the manifest world. In itself it is quite inactive, a spectator only, and is compared to a lame man who has to be carried on the shoulder of a blind man (unperceiving matter) before he can do any thing. The simile however is not quite accurate as *Puruṣa* though called a spectator, only rises to consciousness through its material instruments,—the intelligence and the mind.

Essentially then the Sāṃkhya is dualistic—explaining the universe by two fundamental principles,—*Puruṣa* (a multiplicity of so-called "souls")

and the one *Prakṛti*, or energy-matter, existing in two forms, unmanifest (*avyakta*) and manifest (*vyakta*)—all the other principles, i.e. intelligence, self-consciousness, mind, the senses and organs of action and all material objects being only manifestations of *Prakṛti*.

We have given above an outline of the classical Sāṃkhya as it appears in the *Sāṃkhya-kārikā*.⁴ This cannot be dated at the earliest before the fourth century A.D., but the essential features of the system are found in the great Epic (particularly the *Anugītā* and the *Mokṣadharmā* section, c. 3rd century A.D.). Traces of Sāṃkhya ideas, however, are found much earlier, e.g. the *Gītā*. Can we say that *Kaṭha* iii. 10-13 is a still earlier expression of them?

We note first the absence in the *Kaṭha* list of the principle of *ahaṃkāra*. This however is not a serious difference for, as Keith remarks in dealing with the early Sāṃkhya of the great Epic, "The distinction between intellect and individuation is a slight one and is not normally made. Rather it is assumed that intellect *per se* involves individuation". (S.S. 35.)

Much more serious is the criticism made by Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja, and all the chief Vedantic commentators, that the *Kaṭha Upaniṣad* does not identify the *buddhi* and the *mahat* but specifically distinguishes them. "Beyond the *buddhi* is the *ātmā mahān*" (also called *mahat*). Moreover in Kapila's system the *mahat*, which is a manifestation of *prakṛti* could not be called a 'self'.

Further, as Śaṅkara remarks, from the general purport of the passage it is obvious that the terms *avyakta* and *puruṣa* as used here mean something quite different from the *avyakta* and *puruṣa* of the Sāṃkhyas. The *puruṣa* of the Sāṃkhya is not beyond the *avyakta* which is an ultimate principle, i.e. there is no Supreme *Puruṣa*. If then there are Sāṃkhya ideas in our passage it is not the classical Sāṃkhya but a theistic Sāṃkhya of the type found in the *Gītā*, which recognises a *Puruṣottama* or Highest Person.

Again as Śaṅkara says, the word *avyakta* in itself merely indicates something unexpressed, unevolved or unmanifested,

⁴ See the *Sāṃkhya-kārikā*, secs. 22 ff. (Davies, *Hindu Philosophy*, pp. 54 ff.). Also with its commentary the *Tattva-Kaumudī* in Gangā Nāth Jhā's Edn., 60 ff.

and the fact it occurs here between the *mahat* and the *puruṣa* no more proves that it refers to the *pradhāna* or unintelligent matter of the Sāṃkhya as cause of the world than the fact that a cow is tied in a place usually occupied by a horse proves that it is a horse. (See Śaṅkara's comment on *Vedānta-sūtra* I. 4. 1.) Further verse 13 seems to refer to the *avyakta* as 'the Self of peace' or else it omits to refer to it at all, either of which suppositions would preclude its being the *prakṛti* of the Sāṃkhya.

Kāṭha iii. 10-13, we conclude, does not give scriptural warrant for the (classical) Sāṃkhya, nor is it permissible to interpret it according to Sāṃkhya ideas. If however, by the Sāṃkhya we mean not merely the atheistic dualism later formulated by Īśvara Kṛṣṇa (the author of the *Kārikā*) but also the qualified monistic theism called in the *Gītā* by that name, then it is probable that in our passage we have the earliest extant basis for certain Sāṃkhya ways of thought.

(2) Can Śaṅkara's interpretation be adopted?

(a) *Re. the Mahat or Mahān Ātmā.*

In his *Kāṭhaka-bhāṣya* Śaṅkara interprets the *mahat* or *mahān ātmā* as referring to *Hiraṇyagarbha*, the Great-soul of the universe, the internal principle of the intelligence of all living beings, who is said to be the first-born of *Avyakta*.

In his *Sūtra-bhāṣya* I. 4. 1, however, he says, "Higher than the intellect is the Great Self which was represented as Lord of the chariot. The same self is referred to in both passages. The soul is appropriately called 'Great' as it is the master" (i.e. of all its powers represented by the chariot, etc.). He proceeds, however, to give as an alternative the same explanation as in the *Kāṭhaka-bhāṣya*: "Or else the phrase 'the Great Self' may here denote the intellect of the first-born *Hiraṇyagarbha* which is the basis of all intellects."

The conception of Hiraṇyagarbha: This conception of a world-soul goes back to Ṛg Veda X. 121,—the Hymn of the Golden Germ. There we read that in the beginning there was a chaos of waters, floating on which appeared *Hiraṇyagarbha*—'the Golden Germ'—the first-born of creation and the creator of all other beings. Concerning the conception Deussen says

(P.U. 199), "Because it is the first principle itself which appears in its creation as first-born, therefore it also is denoted by *Brahmán* (with a change of gender and accent), as though it were *Bráhma* (neut.) personified"¹. That is to say, Śaṅkara takes the Great Soul, or *Hiraṇyagarbha*, as another name for his *Saguṇa Brahman* or *Īśvara*, the product of the imposition of *avidyā* (cosmic ignorance) or *māyā* (illusion) upon the absolute unqualified Brahman.

Deussen goes on to say concerning our passage (see P.U. 201), "To the series of primæval being, primæval waters, and first-born (*Brahmán*, *Hiraṇyagarbha*) there corresponds the description of *puruṣa*, *avyaktam*, and *mahān ātmā*, given after abandoning the mythological form in *Kaṭh.* 3. 10-11, 6. 7-8, as the three earliest principles. Here, in contrast with the individual *ātman*, the *Mahān ātmā* is the soul of the universe, i.e. the 'self-conscious of all' *Hiraṇyagarbha*... For the metaphysical comprehension of the universe this idea is indispensable. We know that the entire objective universe is possible only in so far as it is sustained by a knowing subject. This subject as sustainer of the objective universe is manifested in all individual subjects, but is by no means identical with them. For the individual subjects pass away, but the objective universe continues to exist without them; there exists therefore the eternal knowing subject also (*Hiraṇyagarbha*) by whom it is sustained."

On this *Dasgupta* comments (H.I.P. vol. I. 52),—"This seems to me wholly irrelevant, since the *Hiraṇyagarbha* doctrine cannot be supposed to have any philosophical importance in the *Upaniṣads*". Moreover, we would add, it is gratuitous, for Śaṅkara in his polemic against the *Sāṃkhya* interpretation of our passage has said, "We must avoid the mistake of abandoning the matter in hand and taking up a new subject". And he has also said, "Higher than the intellect is the Great Self which was represented as the lord of the chariot. That the same Self is referred to in both passages is manifest." Why then bring in *Hiraṇyagarbha* (except as a support for

¹ Base ब्रह्मन् *bráhma*n, nom. sing. ब्रह्म *bráhma*, neuter.

„ ब्रह्मन् *brahmán*, „ „ ब्रह्मा *brahmā*, masc.

his doctrine of the two forms of Brahman)? As a commentator Śāṅkara cannot help admitting that the *mahān ātmā* of our text most naturally refers to the individual self, but as a philosopher seeking support for his particular doctrine, he puts forward as an alternative the Hiranyagarbha view.

(b) *Re. Avyakta.*

Following out the principle of interpretation that the beings or principles mentioned in verses 10 and 11 are the same as those spoken of symbolically in the parable of the chariot, Śāṅkara says that *avyakta* must mean the body (symbolised by the chariot). But the term *avyakta* which means 'unmanifest' cannot refer to the gross body. It must, therefore, mean the subtle body. (*Sūtra-bhāṣya* I. 4. 2.) This has Ignorance (*avidyā*) as its cause and is of the nature of illusion (*māyā*), "For *Māyā* is properly called undeveloped or non-manifested since it cannot be defined as that which is or that which is not". (*Sūtra-b.* I. 4. 3. Th. 243.) In support he quotes *Śvet.* iv. 10, "Know that *prakṛti* is *māyā*". Śāṅkara thus objects to the Sāṅkhya teaching that *avyakta* means independent matter or *prakṛti* but interprets it as that illusory power which imposes itself on the supreme Brahman to produce *Saguṇa* Brahman and the whole world, of which from the empirical standpoint he is regarded as the soul.

All this, however, is a much later theory, imposed upon our text and not naturally deduced from it.

(3) Rāmānuja's interpretation.

Rāmānuja has a very full discussion of our passage which occupies the greater part of the fourth pada of the first adhyāya of the *Śrībhāṣya*. (See S.B.E. xlvi, 354-407.)

(a) *Re. the meaning of the mahat or mahān ātmā.*

Rāmānuja says that the text under discussion refers only to those entities which have previously appeared in the parable of the chariot. The intellect is compared to the chariot-driver. "Higher than the intellect is the individual self, for that self (symbolised by the owner of the chariot) is the agent whom the intellect serves. And as all this (intellect, mind and senses) is subject to the wishes of the Self the text characterises it as 'the great Self'."

Then, quoting *Kaṭha* iii. 12. 13, Rāmānuja comments, "This passage, after stating that the Highest Self is difficult to see with the outer and inner organs (of knowledge) unsubdued, describes the mode in which the 'senses,' compared to horses, are to be held in control. He should restrain speech, which stands for the *karmendriyāṇi* and *jñānendriyāṇi* of which it is the first, in the mind; that he should restrain in the knowing self or *buddhi*; the knower or intellect he should restrain in the great Self, i.e. the active individual Self (*kartr*); that he should restrain in the Self of Peace, i.e. that active (individual) self he should restrain in the highest Brahman who is the Inner Ruler (*antaryāmin*) of all. By such a chariot-owner the place of Viṣṇu must be attained." (I. 4. 1.)

Rāmānuja, we conclude, is correct in regarding the *mahat* or *mahān ātmā* as the individual self, not however as being a separate and self-sufficient being like the Sāṃkhya *puruṣa* but as indwelt by the Highest Self.

(b) *Re. Avyakta.*

In brief he says, "The word *avyakta* does not denote a *pradhāna* (primary matter) independent of Brahman; it rather denotes the body represented as a chariot in the simile". (I. 4. 1.) But how can the term *avyakta* (unevolved, unmanifest) denote the evolved body? Like Śāṅkara, Rāmānuja replies that it denotes the elements in their fine or unevolved state, which, entering into a particular condition, become the body. (I. 4. 2.) Then, say the Sāṃkhyas, you have admitted that *avyakta* means subtle matter, i.e. *prakṛti* or *pradhāna*. Not so, says, Rāmānuja. We, by no means, wish to deny *prakṛti* (in the sense of unevolved matter), but we do deny a *prakṛti* of the Sāṃkhya kind—i.e. matter as an ultimate principle independent of the Lord. For the fact is that it constitutes his body or means of manifestation, He himself being both its productive and material cause. So he quotes *Gītā* ix. 8, "Presiding over nature (*prakṛti*) which is my own, I send forth again and again this whole company of beings". (See I. 4. 8.)

Moreover, even a theistic Sāṃkhya view which admits a Lord as productive and ruling cause, but regards *prakṛti* associated with Him as the material cause of the world, is not

admissible. There is only one ultimate cause. So he maintains, " *Prakṛti* (or *avyakta*) denotes Brahman in its causal phase, when names and forms are not yet distinguished".

Further, as against Śaṅkara, *Avyakta* is not *māyā*,—an illusory manifestation of Brahman. It is a real mode (*prakāra*) or development (*pariṇāma*) of Brahman, through which Brahman evolves a real universe. (See esp. I. 4. 23-27.)¹

We may note that Madhva and Nimbārka substantially agree with Rāmānuja. Madhva says, "The word *avyakta*, which primarily denotes the supreme Lord alone, also denotes the other (i.e. matter) for it is dependent on Him and like unto a body of the Lord"². He goes on to say that it is the will or creative purpose of the Lord that is spoken of as *prakṛti* (i.e. *avyakta*).³ So also Nimbārka, "Through the statement of reflective purpose in the words, 'He thought, may I become many', (*Ch.* vi. 2. 3.) Brahman's state of being *prakṛti* or his creativeness is declared"⁴.

All the chief schools of the theistic Vedānta, then, agree in regarding *avyakta*, in its higher sense as used in our passage, as a divine hypostasis, the supreme Brahman in its causal aspect, the creative, purposive energy or will of the Supreme Person.

¹ *Re. Ramanuja's interpretation of avyakta.* Though justified as against the Sāṅkhyas and Śaṅkara he is too scholastic. Like Śaṅkara he says that the text under discussion only refers to those entities which have previously appeared in the simile of the chariot. Therefore *avyakta* must mean the body, symbolised by the chariot itself. This involves the absurdity that the body is higher than the self, and constrains him to go on to explain the body as meaning subtle matter or nature in its unmanifested state as a mode of the Lord. This gives quite good sense, but Rāmānuja would probably have said much less about matter if in the *Śrībhāṣya* he had been directly interpreting our passage instead of indirectly discussing its use by the Sāṅkhyas. That this is so seems evident from the way in which he interprets certain *Gītā* passages referring to *avyakta* (in his *Gītā-bhāṣya*) without any reference whatever to matter.

² *Sūtra-bhāṣya* I. 4. 1.

³ *Sūtra-bhāṣya* I. 4. 25.

⁴ ' *Tad aikṣata bahu syām* ' ity *abhidyā-upadeśād brahmaṇaḥ sraṣṭṛtva-prakṛtīve vartete.* I. 4. 24.

(4) Avyakta in the Gītā and Upaniṣads.

Let us now attempt a more independent treatment based upon the literature nearest in time and thought to the *Kaṭha*, i.e. the *Gītā* and early metrical Upaniṣads.

The *Gītā* sometimes uses the word *avyakta* in what we may call a quasi-Sāṃkhya sense to denote *prakṛti* or subtle matter in the *pralaya* state, as when it says: "From the unmanifest sprang forth all manifest existence at the coming of day." (viii. 18.) But it goes on to say,

"But higher than that Unmanifest
Is another eternal unmanifest existence,
Which, when all beings perish, does not perish.
Unmanifest, Imperishable, (*avyakta-akṣara*) is it named,
Men call that the highest goal,
Attaining which they come not back :
That is my highest dwelling-place.
That higher (Unmanifest) is the Person (*puruṣa*)
To be gained by undivided devotion,
Wherein do beings abide,
Whereby all this is pervaded." (viii. 20-22).³

³ *Paras tasmāt tu bhāvo 'nyo 'vyaktāt sanātanaḥ,
Yaḥ sa sarveṣu bhūteṣu naśyatṣu na vināśyati.*

*Avyakto 'kṣara ity uktas, tam āhuḥ paramāṃ gatim,
Yam prāpya na nivartante, tad dhāma paramaṃ mama.*

*Puruṣaḥ sa paraḥ pārtha, bhaktyā labhyas tv ananyayā,
Yasya antaḥsthāni bhūtāni, yena sarvam idaṃ tatam.*

It is curious how variously '*Puruṣaḥ sa paraḥ*' has been translated. If it were prose it could surely only mean, "That higher (one) is *puruṣa*". Hill renders, "This is the Person Supreme", and Barnett similarly, "This is the Supreme Male". We doubt whether this is admissible, but even if it is our interpretation would not be affected. Dr. P. M. Modi (*Akṣara*, 148, 149.) renders verses 20, 21 and 22 as follows: "However, beyond that Unmanifest (technically so called), there is another 'eternal Unmanifest Existence' which does not perish when all beings perish. This (latter) Unmanifest Existence is (technically) called the Immutable (*akṣara*); (the sages) call it the Highest Goal. That (Existence) (from which the liberated) after having reached it, do not return, is my Supreme Abode. Higher (than the Immutable) is that *puruṣa* obtainable through undivided devotion, in the interior of whom (all) beings rest and by whom all this (visible world) is permeated."

I agree with his general interpretation, but doubt whether his translation of verse 22 can be grammatically justified.

The *Gītā* then uses *avyakta* in a double sense :

(a) lower,—subtle or unevolved energy-matter, not independently existing as in the classical Sāṃkhya but a lower expression of the Lord's nature ;

(b) higher,—eternal or *sanātana avyakta*, called also *akṣara*, the Imperishable. It also uses the term *prakṛti* (nature) in much the same double sense : (a) the lower nature,—*aparā* or *guṇamayī prakṛti*, and (b) the higher nature,—*parā prakṛti*, of which it is said in vii. 5. that it is "very Life (*jīvabhūtā*), by which this universe is upheld". The lower nature is called in xv. 16. *kṣara* (perishable), since it is subject to *pralaya*, and the higher, *akṣara* and *kūṭastha* (immovably exalted). Then in xv. 18. it is said, "Because I transcend the Perishable and am higher also than the Imperishable (*akṣarād api ca uttamah*) therefore am I known as the Person Supreme (*Puruṣottama*)". Here then as in the *Kaṭha* the *Puruṣa* is said to be higher than the *akṣara* (*avyakta*). The same is true of viii. 21. since Kṛṣṇa, who is *puruṣottama*, says that the *avyakta akṣara* is his highest dwelling (*dhāma paramam*) and the highest goal (*paramā gati*) of human life (cf. *Kaṭha* iii. 9, *Viṣṇoḥ paramaṃ padam*).

The next verse however (*Gītā* viii. 22.)³ at first sight presents a difficulty, since it identifies the higher *avyakta* with the *puruṣa* and speaks of the latter in terms which in the previous verse have been used of the *avyakta*. But taken in conjunction with viii. 21. and ix. 4, (which says that it is in the form of *avyakta* that Kṛṣṇa pervades the universe), there need surely be no doubt as to the meaning. The *avyakta* is one with the *puruṣa* in that they are not two separate beings, for the *avyakta* is the Supreme Person's own nature. But though one with the Highest Person or Self there is yet a distinction, for it is that Person, not in its inner being as the One self-subsistent Reality but in its outward movement as the constitutive reality of the many,—not only the cause of the world but the source and ground and dwelling-place of souls, "in whom we live and move and have our being". For one whose movement of thought is toward the One it is still therefore possible to say, "Beyond the *avyakta* is the *puruṣa*".⁴

⁴ I had reached this point in the exposition and was discussing it with Professor F. W. Thomas, when he introduced me to a work which had

We have dwelt at some length on the Gītā doctrine of the *akṣara-avyakta* because there we see in somewhat developed form, and so are able to realise the significance of the distinction made by the *Kaṭha* between *puruṣa* and *avyakta*. Let us note first however that the root of the distinction is found in the old prose Upaniṣads and possibly goes back to the still older distinction between the *ātman* and the *brahman*,—the principle of personality and the more impersonal, though numinous, world-ground. These two conceptions, which probably originated independently, were afterward identified,¹ so that in the early Upaniṣads the distinction was practically obliterated. The term *puruṣa* ("man" or "person") goes back of course to the *Puruṣa-sūkta* (*Rg.* x. 90) and is probably older than *ātman*. It originally denoted "the human being with his peculiar bodily structure" and is distinctly personal in meaning.¹ Another term which occurs fairly frequently is *akṣara*. This may be an adjective meaning "imperishable" or "immutable" and so is used to qualify Brahman. But, as Modi has pointed out it, it frequently stands alone and becomes a technical term for the eternal world basis,—a predominantly impersonal conception. See e.g. *Br.* iii. 8, "Across what is space (or ether) woven, warp and woof? He said, That O Gārgi, Brāhmins call the *akṣara*. It is not coarse, not fine, not short, not long, etc." (i.e. *avyakta*, unexpressed). Contrasted with this we find in *Br.* iii. 7. a description of the *antaryāmin*, the *ātman* or *puruṣa* who is Inner-controller, a distinctly personal conception. This suggestion of a difference between an impersonal

recently been sent to him by the author, *Akṣara, a forgotten chapter in the History of Indian Philosophy*, by Dr. Prataprai M. Modi, Professor of Sanskrit in the Samaldas College, Bhavnagar, an inaugural-dissertation for the doctorate of Kiel University, (published at the Baroda State Press, 1932). In my discussion of *Avyakta* in the *Kaṭha* and the *Gītā* I thought I had explored new (or forgotten) ground, but I find that Dr. Modi has anticipated me in much that I have said and has pressed into much wider fields in the discussion of *Akṣara* in the schools of the later *Mahābhārata* and in the *Vedānta-sūtras*. I have written the following paragraph after reading Dr. Modi's treatise. If I had met it before I should have made much more use of it, but it is perhaps just as well that we should have reached our conclusions independently.

¹ On these points see Introduction, pages 24-34.

and a personal absolute is not however maintained, (in *Br.* iii. 8. 11, and iii. 7. 23, the two are described in identical terms) and nowhere in the old prose Upaniṣads is there a suggestion that the one is subordinate to the other.¹

The *Kaṭha Upaniṣad* seems to have originated a new movement for distinguishing more clearly between the *akṣara* and the *puruṣa*, definitely subordinating the impersonal to the personal, regarding the former as the nature of the latter, by which He moves to manifestation in a world of matter and finite spirits. This movement may be traced through the other early metrical Upaniṣads, (i.e. the *Munḍaka*,² *Praśna* and *Śvetāśvatara*³) and leads to very important developments in philosophy and theology which cannot be considered here. For our present purpose its chief importance is that it led to the personal theism of the *Gītā*.

1 "This identification did not satisfy the philosophers of the Earlier Metrical Upaniṣads, who seem to have gone on reasoning 'How could the personal and the impersonal be identified? Were they not both of them mentioned separately in the Oldest Prose Upaniṣads? If they should be kept separate what should be their relation? Can the impersonal be master of the personal? No. The personal must be higher than the impersonal.' This seems to have been the view prevalent during the age of the Earlier Metrical Upaniṣads. All of them agree in placing *puruṣa* above *akṣara*. (*Munḍ.* ii. 1. 1-2; *Praśna* v. 5. 7; *Svet.* i. 7-12, v. 1.)" Modi, *Akṣara*, 12, 13.

2 *Munḍaka* ii. 1. 1-2, probably represents the next stage in the movement:

Just as, from a well-blazing fire, sparks
By thousands issue forth, all of like form,
So from the Imperishable (*akṣara*) beings manifold
Are born, and thither also go again.

Heavenly, formless, is the Person (*puruṣa*),
He is without and within, unborn,
Without breath, without mind (*manas*), pure,
Higher than the high Imperishable.

(*akṣarāt parataḥ paraḥ*).

3 The *Śvetāśvatara* describes reality as a triad (*trividhaṃ brahmam*, i. 12.) of three unborns, *puruṣa* (*īśa, deva*), *akṣara* (*avyakta*, higher *prakṛti*), and *jīva*. *Akṣara* is called *ajā* (female unborn) in contrast with *puruṣa* (male), and *yoni*, i.e. the womb or source of creation; also apparently *devātma-śakti*.

(5) Summarising the various views.

The <i>Mahat</i> of the Sāṃkhya is the intellect regarded as a material instrument.	
” ”	Śaṅkara ” either (a) the individual soul or (b) the soul of the world.
” ”	Rāmānuja ” the individual soul.
The <i>Avyakta</i> of the Sāṃkhya is <i>Prakṛti</i> , i.e. Nature or independent matter-energy.	
” ”	Śaṅkara ” Nature or subtle matter-energy regarded as <i>Māyā</i> —an illusory appearance.
” ”	the <i>Gītā</i> and theistic Vedānta ” (a) Nature or subtle matter-energy as a real mode of Brahman. (b) The inexpressible eternal Brahman himself as having such a mode: the Divine Nature as creative cause and ground of subsistence of the world and of individual souls.
The <i>Puruṣa</i> of the Sāṃkhya is a multiplicity of “souls”.	
” ”	Śaṅkara ” <i>Paramātman</i> , the supreme, unqualified Brahman.
” ”	the <i>Gītā</i> and theistic Vedānta ” <i>Puruṣottama</i> , the highest Self regarded as supreme personal God.

(6) Conclusion.

If, for the general reader, we might venture to sum up freely in modern terms, our conclusion would be as follows:

The parable of the chariot teaches the necessity of *yoga* in the sense of the yoking or ordered control of all the elements in our nature so that they may work to a common end. So far it is at one with Plato's parable. But vv. 10-13 carry the *Kāṭha* teaching beyond Plato's, teaching not merely the *yoga* of self-discipline but the *yoga* of mystical religion. Plato regards reason as the highest controlling principle. The *Kāṭha* says that “beyond reason is the great self”. Reason is one of our highest faculties but it is not the whole self, and in our self-discipline we must keep the whole in view. But

the whole self is more than an individual self. Every stage in the process by which we rise from the life of instinct and sense to the life of scientific understanding and of reason, is a transcendence of our subjective individuality and an entrance into truth which is universal. So with morality, we realise our higher self in which we are one with others in proportion as we control our instinctive and individual desires and satisfactions. But religion puts it the other way. It is through the intuition that we are not merely separate individual selves that we find power to overcome our lower nature. Deep within and fundamental to the individual self there is another. When first we meet that other it appears mysterious and inexpressible (*avyakta*). Yet those who feel its reality, centre their thought upon it in recollected meditation and yield themselves to its control for ordered unselfish living, find more and more that that *other* behind our own lives and the world is not merely a mysterious power or energy but is essentially one with us in nature. "Higher than the unexpressed is the Person." And with that realisation religion comes to full moral as well as full devotional power.

It is to this fully religious *yoga* that the *Gītā* applies the name "*Rāja-yoga*"—the royal rule, and says, "On me be thy mind, to me be thy devotion,—thus having yoked thy soul, making me thine aim, to me shalt thou come". With this we may compare the saying of Jesus, "Take my yoke upon you and learn of me, for I am meek and lowly of heart, and ye shall find rest to your souls". Here the yoke of Jesus means the moral discipline to follow in His steps, but it also means the fellowship which enables one to follow.

St. Paul expresses what we may call the lower Christian *yoga* of self-discipline when he says, "Everyone that striveth for the mastery keeps a grip upon himself in every respect". (*πᾶς δὲ ὁ ἀγωνιζόμενος πάντα ἐγκρατεῖται*; i *Cor.* 9. 25) but he expresses the higher or royal Christian *yoga* when he says, "But it is not I (the separate individual) that live, but Christ liveth in me, and the life that I now live in the flesh I live by the faith of the Son of God who loved me and gave himself for me". (*Gal.* 2. 20.)

उत्तिष्ठत जाग्रत प्राप्य वरान्निबोधत ।

क्षुरस्य धारा निशिता दुरत्यया दुर्गं पथस्तत्त्ववयो वदन्ति ॥ १४ ॥

अशब्दमस्पर्शमरूपमव्ययं तथाऽरसं नित्यमगन्धवच्च यत् ।

अनाद्यनन्तं महतः परं ध्रुवं निचाय्य तन्मृत्युमुखात्प्रमुच्यते ॥ १५ ॥

नाचिकेतमुपाख्यानं मृत्युप्रोक्तं सनातनम् ।

उक्त्वा श्रुत्वा च मेधावी ब्रह्मलोके महीयते ॥ १६ ॥

य इमं परमं गुह्यं आववेद् ब्रह्मसंसदि ।

प्रयतः आद्भकाले वा तदानन्त्याय कल्पते ।

तदानन्त्याय कल्पत इति ॥ १७ ॥

इति प्रथमोऽध्यायः समाप्तः ॥

14. *Uttiṣṭhata jāgrata,
prāpya varān nibodhata ;
Kṣurasya dhārā niśitā duratyayā,
durgam pathas tat kavayo vadanti.*
15. *Aśabdām asparśam arūpam avyayam,
tathā 'rasam nityam agandhavat ca yat ;
Anādy-antantaṁ mahataḥ param dhruvam,
nicāyya tan mṛtyu-mukhāt pramucyate.*
16. *Nāciketam upākhyānaṁ
mṛtyu-proktaṁ sanātanaṁ ;
Uktvā śrutvā ca medhāvī
brahma-loke mahīyate.*
17. *Ya imaṁ paramaṁ guhyaṁ
śrāvayed brahma-saṁsadi,
Prayataḥ śrāddha-kāle vā
tad ānantyāya kalpate,
tad ānantyāya kalpate_iti.*
- Iti prathamo 'dhyāyaḥ samāptaḥ.*

Concluding Exhortation.

14. Arise! awake!
 Obtain your boons and understand!
 Sharp as a razor's edge and hard to cross,
 So difficult that path,—sages declare.
15. That soundless, touchless, formless one, unchanging,
 Is likewise tasteless, odourless, eternal:
 Endless, beginningless, beyond the Great, abiding,—
 Discerning That from death's dread maw one finds
 release.
16. This Naciketas story,
 Death's immemorial teaching,—
 Hearing and telling this the wise
 Grows great within the Brahma-world.
17. Whoso then this highest secret
 Shall recite in Brahmin-session,
 Or at śrāddha-time devoutly,
 For eternity prepareth:
 For eternity prepareth.

It must be admitted that the *Kaṭha Upaniṣad* only adumbrates, and never fully reaches the kind of conclusion given above. These concluding verses of the Third Valli (and probably of the original Upaniṣad) make it plain that though, as we hold, the *Kaṭha Upaniṣad* is on the main line of development toward a personal theism which resulted in the *Gītā*, that development, spite of the use of the term "*Puruṣa*" for the highest being, had not yet proceeded very far. There is real mystical religion in the *Kaṭha Upaniṣad* but the writer after repeated essays toward a positive conception of the Divine repeatedly falls back to negative conceptions like v. 15. Truly he describes the difficulties of such a way, "Sharp as a razor's edge and hard to cross". The way of religion is never easy. "Strive to enter in at the strait gate, for narrow is the gate and straitened the way that leads to life, and few be they that find it",

said Jesus. But if His way was strait, how much more that of the Upaniṣads.

Though in verse 11 the *puruṣa* is said to be the final goal, it would seem that the Upaniṣad sage had difficulty in penetrating further than the *akṣara-avyakta*. In the first place the negatively described being of verse 15 is described as "beyond the Great" (*mahataḥ param*), which in the context is most naturally taken as technical expression, referring to *avyakta*. In the second place the *Gītā* clearly has this passage in view when, in chapter xii, it discusses the two ways or goals,—the *akṣara-gati*, or way of meditation upon the nature of the soul, and the *puruṣa-gati*, its own distinctive way of devotion to the Highest Person.

1. Those devotees who, constantly yoked, thus worship Thee (i.e. Kṛṣṇa as *puruṣottama*), and those who worship the Imperishable-Unmanifest (*akṣara-avyakta*),—which of these are better versed in *yoga* ?

2. (The Blessed One said :) Those who have fixed their minds on me, who ever-yoked worship me, who are possessed of supreme faith,—these I consider perfect in *yoga*.

3. But those who worship the Imperishable (*akṣara*), the Undefinable, the Unmanifest (*avyakta*), that is omnipresent, inconceivable, immutably-exalted, unchanging, firm-abiding,—

4. Who hold in control the group of the senses, whose judgment is in all things balanced, who delight in the good of all beings,—these indeed win to me.

(That is to say, those who follow the *avyakta-gati*, the Upaniṣad way of meditation, especially as developed into the *Kaṭha* way of *yoga*, may attain the Highest Person. But the way is very difficult.)

5. Greater is the toil of those whose thoughts are fixed on the Unmanifest, for painfully is the way of the Unmanifest won by them that wear the body.

6. But those who, casting all their works on me, intent on me, meditate on me and worship me with single-hearted devotion (*yoga*),

7. Soon will I save them from the ocean of this life of death (*mṛtyu-saṁsāra*), O son of Pritha, for their thoughts are stayed on me.

Perhaps we might rather say that the way of soul-mysticism (or as the *Gītā* sometimes calls it *dhyāna-yoga*) and the way of personal devotion or faith (*bhakti-yoga*) are not so much alternative as complementary paths. The way of soul-mysticism may lead to the very heights of religious experience, or, without adequate basis, it may lead to a barren ego-centrism or a vague and equally sterile pantheism. It needs as its basis the firm

objective ground of historic divine revelation. Then, in Christian language, faith in the Son or manifest Word of God, leads on to union with the unmanifest Word or creative will of God which is the true basis of the soul's being. And such union, ever growing more complete as sin, which is creaturely self-will, is done away, issues in the realised communion of the Holy Spirit, which is God's ever renewed self-impartment of his own power, truth and joy, of his eternal life and very being, to the soul which he created and sustains, and now in love indwells.

14. *Obtain your boons (prāpya varān)* Śaṅkara says *varān—prakṛṣṭān ācāryān*, i.e. most excellent religious teachers. But the primary reference is surely to the boons of Naciketas in which hearers of the *Kaṭha* who have his devotion and keenness are privileged to share.

17. The *śrāddha* or funeral feast would be a most appropriate and solemn time for reciting the Naciketas's story which here finds an appropriate ending. The other three vallīs were probably added later.

Here ends the First Adhyāya.

द्वितीयोऽध्यायः ॥

॥ चतुर्थी वल्ली ॥

पराञ्चि खानि व्यदधात्स्वयम्भूस्तस्मात्पराङ्पश्यति नान्तरात्मन् ।
कश्चिद्धीरः प्रत्यगात्मानमैच्छदाटत्तचक्षुरमृतत्वमिच्छन् ॥ १ ॥

Caturthī Vallī.

1. *Parāñci khāni vyatrñat svayambhūs
tasmāt parāñ paśyati na, antarātman.
Kaścid dhīraḥ pratyagātmānam aikṣad
āvṛtta-cakṣur amṛtatvam icchan.*

Second Adhyāya.

FOURTH VALLĪ.

The Self is not to be sought through the senses.

1. The Self-existent pierced the senses outward :
Therefore one looks without, not at the Inner-self.
Desiring immortality a certain sage
With eyes averted saw the Self-within.

The Self-existent (Svayam-bhū). In *Śat. Brāh.* I. ix. 3. 10, the word is applied to the Sun as symbol of Prajāpati. "Self-existent art thou, best ray of light" (see p. 89). *Tait. B.* III. xii. 3. 1 speaks of *Svayambhu Brahman.* *Br.* three times at the end of genealogical lists of spiritual teachers says, "Brahman is the Self-existent" (II. vi. 3 ; IV. vi. 3 ; VI. v. 4). The conception here is obviously theistic.

The terms *Antar-ātman* and *Pratyag-ātman* seem to be used here for the first time in Upaniṣad literature. The latter (according to Jacob, C.) is used only here and in the *Sarvo-paṇiṣad*. Both here seem to indicate the One Self or Soul as variously embodied (a difference from the doctrine of the two selves in the previous vallī). (*Pratyag-ātman* in later literature generally denotes the individual soul as distinguished from the Supreme Soul, but the two terms here are identical in meaning.)

Pierced the openings (i.e. of the senses). The eyes and ears are regarded as holes through which the soul can look.

Śaṅkara comments: (In the preceding vallī) it has been said that, "This Self hidden in all living beings does not shine forth, yet it is seen (by subtle seers) with keen intellect". Now it is asked, What is the obstacle to the keen intelligence because of which the Self is not (usually) seen? . . . The senses go outward to reveal their objects. . . . Therefore the perceiver sees or perceives external objects (which are not the *ātman*), and not the *antarātman*. Though this is the nature of the world some wise or discerning man, as though going against the current of a river, sees the *pratyagātman*,—the Self which is within. . . . How he sees is thus explained,—with *āvṛtta cakṣu*. He whose eyes, ears, etc. are averted (*vyāvṛtta*) from all the numberless objects of sense is called *āvṛtta-cakṣu*. Thus prepared he sees the Inner-self. For it is not possible for the same man to be intent on external objects and to have vision of the Inner-self".

We may agree with Śaṅkara in his last remark if by external objects is meant "objects of desire" (*kāmāḥ*), as in the next verse. But what of the unselfish intentness of the scientist,—or of the artist, who, as Plato says, "uses the beauties of earth as steps along which he mounts upward for the sake of that other Beauty, absolute and everlasting".

Śaṅkara, in commenting on the phrase, "The Self-existent pierced the senses", interprets it as meaning that Parameśvara has cursed or injured them¹. It is an estimate such as this which has cursed with sterility much of India's best effort, just as it was the verdict of *Genesis*, "God beheld everything that he had made and behold it was very good", which prepared the way for modern science. And not only for science but for such a spiritual view of the world as that of Wordsworth, who, to the influence of natural objects revealed by sense owed

"That blessed mood

In which the burthen of the mystery,
Of all this unintelligible world,
Is lightened:
While with an eye made quiet by the power
Of harmony, and the deep power of joy,
We see into the life of things."

¹ *Vyatṛṇat—himsitavān hananaṃ kṛtavān ityarthah*. (Sītārāma Śāstri; "Parameśvara has damned them.")

Śarmā: "God has doomed our senses.")

Our text does not say like Śaṅkara that the senses are accursed, but it does, at first sight, seem to say they are something to be ignored. This would be quite different teaching from that of the previous *vallī* where the senses are compared to horses which, properly guided, may lead us to our goal. Surely the charioteer must come to grief if he keeps his eyes averted.

Vallī IV then, if thus interpreted, would be a distinct declension from *Vallī* III. It would teach the negative *yoga* of sense-suppression instead of the positive *yoga* of sense-direction. This, however, I am now convinced, would be a misinterpretation. It may rather be argued that *Vallī* IV takes the truth stated in the parable of the chariot for granted but stresses the complementary truth reached in the sequel. Coleridge does not contradict Wordsworth when he says :

"It were a vain endeavour
Though I should gaze for ever
On that green light which lingers in the west.
I may not hope from outward forms to win
The passion and the life whose fountains are within."

Spiritual seeking has two movements,—*outward* to find liberation from the narrow, self-seeking self in the vision of God's revelation in the wonder and beauty and harmony of nature, and *inward* to a deeper vision in which even these are forgot in the surpassing wonder of the immediate self-revelation of God the Spirit in our inmost soul (and outward also again to find and serve God in our fellow men). These two movements, says Dean Inge, are the systole and diastole of the spiritual life, and each is helpless without the other. Indian mysticism under the domination of the doctrine of illusion has too often turned away from all the wonder and beauty of the world and taken only the inward, which has then become a negative path. On the other hand we must remember that the Indian, far more than the Westerner, has always worshipped in the open air,—his temple the river-side, his sacrament the rising or setting sun, and even where the doctrine of illusion has been most dominant it has seldom succeeded in closing the mind to the suggestions of Nature. Further, though the second *adhyaīya* of the *Kāthā* may have been somewhat influenced by the school which produced the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, the doctrine of illusion is no more to be seen there than in the first *adhyaīya*. One of the

most interesting features of *Vallī* IV is its use of Vedic nature-symbolism and one of our chief tasks in its exegesis is to show how Śāṅkara misinterprets it in the interest of his illusion doctrine.

The correct view of our verse, then, is that it is a summary comment on the final result reached in the first *adhyaṅga*. Most men lead a purely outward life, but a certain sage, i.e. Naciketas, turned his gaze inward and saw the Self. But though attention is thus focussed on the final stage or result of *adhyātma-yoga*, there is no intention, we take it, to ignore the necessity of the earlier stages set forth under the simile of the chariot.

पराचः कामाननुयन्ति बालास्ते मृत्योर्यन्ति विततस्य पाशम् ।

अथ धीरा अमृतत्वं विदित्वा ध्रुवमध्रुवेष्विह न प्रार्थयन्ते ॥ २ ॥

2. *Parācaḥ kāmān anuyanti bālās*
te mṛtyor yanti vitatasya pāsam ;
Atha dhīrā amṛtatvaṃ viditvā
dhruvam adhruveṣu iha na prārthayante.

2. The childish follow after outward pleasures,—
 They walk into the snare of wide-spread death :
 The wise, then, knowing immortality,
 Seek not the eternal midst things transient here.

Verse 2. Cf. II. 6 and 10. Dhruvam adhruveṣu: Seek not the stable or enduring amid the unstable or transient. Yet II. 10, speaking of the right symbolic use of so unstable a thing as fire, says, "By means of transient things I have obtained the eternal. In its feeling IV. 2 may be compared with the hymn,

"Swift to its close ebbs out life's little day ;
 Earth's joys grow dim its glories pass away ;
 Change and decay in all around I see :
 O Thou who changest not, abide with me."

But II. 10 and Blake's *Auguries of Innocence* are nearer the heights of both Hindu and Christian mystic experience :

"To see a world in a grain of sand,
 And a heaven in a wild-flower ;
 Hold infinity in the palm of your hand,
 And eternity in an hour."

वेन रूपं रसं गन्धं शब्दान्स्पर्शांश्च मैथुनान् ।
 एतेनैव विजानाति किमत्र परिशिष्यते । एतद्वैतत् ॥ ३ ॥

स्वप्नान्तं जागरितान्तं चोभौ येनानुपश्यति ।
 महान्तं विभुमात्मानं मत्वा धीरो न शोचति ॥ ४ ॥

3. *Yena rūpaṃ rasaṃ gandhaṃ
 śabdān sparśāṃś-ca maithunān,
 Etena eva vijānāti :*
kim-atra pariśiṣyate : Etad vai tat.
4. *Svapnāntaṃ jāgaritāntaṃ
 ca ubhau yena anupaśyati,
 Mahāntaṃ vibhūm ātmānaṃ
 matvā dhīro na śocati.*

Yet the Self is the agent in all perception and knowledge.

3. That by which (one perceives) form, taste, smell,
 Sounds also and touches of love,—
 By that also one gains knowledge.
 What is there here remains (unknown to it) ?
 This indeed is that.
4. That whereby one both perceives
 Dream-objects and the waking state,—
 That great and omnipresent Self
 Knowing, the wise man grieves no more.

Though the Self is not manifest to the senses yet it is the agent in all sense-perception and in all knowledge, whether in the waking or the sleeping state. It is both all-pervading and all-knowing, and is that supreme Reality concerning which Naciketas has inquired.

3. *What is there here remains ? (kim-atra pariśiṣyate ?)*

Max Müller takes as a relative clause, "By that we also know what exists beside". Pelly's rendering, "What else is there in the world ?" takes the passage as teaching a thorough-going idealism. Hume is literal and non-committal, "What is there left over here ?" but may mean the same. We prefer to follow Śaṅkara who comments, "What is there in this world

remains unknowable by the Self? Nothing so remains,—for everything is knowable by the Self. That Self to which nothing remains unknowable is omniscient.”

This is that (Etad vai tat): Śaṅkara says, “The meaning is that this is that which was inquired about by Naciketas (about which even the gods were puzzled, and which has been spoken of as ‘apart from dharma, etc.’ ‘the highest place of Viṣṇu’, than which there is nothing higher)”.

If the ultimate reality inquired about is called Brahman (which is very seldom in the *Kaṭha*), then “This is that (inquired about)” is equivalent to “This (ātman) is that (Brahman)” or in the words of *Chāndogya* III. 14. 4, “*Eṣa ma ātmāntarhṛdaya, etad brahma*”—“This self of mine within the heart, that is Brahman.” This is afterward summarised in *Ch.* VI. 8. 6, in the phrase, “*Tat tvam asi*”,—“Thou art that”.

य इमं मध्वदं वेद आत्मानं जीवमन्तिकात् ।

ईशानं भूतभव्यस्य न ततो विजुगुप्सते । एतद्वैतत् ॥ ५ ॥

5. *Ya imaṃ madhvadaṃ veda
ātmānaṃ jīvam antikāt,
Īśānaṃ bhūta-bhavyasya
na tato vijugupsate : Etad vai tat.*

The individual soul is one with the Universal.

5. He who knows this honey-eater,—
The living spirit close at hand,—
As Lord of future and the past,
No longer seeks to hide (through fear):¹
This truly is that.

¹ Or, From Him he does not shrink away.

5. *Madhv-ada: Honey-eater:* the individual experiencing soul, compared to a bee, obtaining pleasure from the various objects of perception.

(Śaṅkara says, *Madhvada*=*karma-phala-bhujā*,—“the enjoyer of the fruit of action”.)

Ātman jīva=*jīvātman*: “the living soul”, a term generally used to distinguish the self as individual from the Supreme soul (*paramātman*).

The soul not only experiences pleasure but also pain and fear in the midst of what is apparently a hostile and alien world. But when it realises that it is not a separate individual but is one with that Supreme soul who is Lord and ruler of the whole course of the world, then all cause of fear is removed.

This truly is that: means either as before, This is that which was inquired about, or, This (individual percipient) is that (supreme eternal Lord).

5d. *Na tato vijugupsate*, recurs *Bṛ. iv. 15d.*, *Iśā 6d.*, and *Kaṭha iv. 12d. 5c.* also=*Bṛ. iv. 15c.* *Tatas* may mean "thereafter", "from Him" (i.e. the Ātman or God), or (in the *Iśā*) "from them" (i.e. "all beings", at first viewed as alien but now "in the Self"). In the *Bṛ.* passage it is clearly God from whom one does not shrink away or seek to hide.

"When one perceives Him
As the Self, as God, clearly,
As Lord of the past and the future,
One does not shrink away from Him."

In our verse and verse 12 the shrinking may be from God, or alien things, or both. When one ceases to shrink from God one fears nothing else.

Śaṅkara comments: "*Na vijugupsate* means 'does not wish to hide', because he has attained fearlessness. So long as dwelling in the midst of fear he thinks himself to be non-eternal, he desires to conceal (or protect) himself. But when he knows the Self to be eternal and without a second, then who would wish to hide what?—and from what?"

Na vijugupsate—na gopāyitum icchati abhaya-prāptatvāt. Yāvad hi bhayamadhyastho 'nityam ātmānaṃ manyate, tāvad gopāyitum icchati ātmānaṃ. Yadā tu nityam advaitam ātmānaṃ vijūnāti, tadā kiṃ kaḥ kuto vā gopāyitum icchet.

We doubt whether quite such a simple doctrine of non-duality or complete monism can be read into our text.

यः पूर्वं तपसो जातमद्भ्यः पूर्वमजायत ।

गुह्यां प्रविश्य तिष्ठन्तं यो भूतेभिर्बुधैश्चत । एतद्देवत् ॥ ६ ॥

6. *Yaḥ pūrvaṃ tapaso jātam
adbhyaḥ pūrvam ajāyata,
Guhyaṃ praviśya tiṣṭhantaṃ
yo bhūtebhir vyapaśyata:
Etad vai tat.*

6. He who born of old from *tapas*

Was formerly born of the waters,—

Entering the cave one sees him stand

Who looked forth through the elements :²

This truly is that.

² Or, through beings.

6. Max Müller says, "The text of these verses (6, 7) is abrupt, possibly corrupt. The two accusatives, *tiṣṭhantam* and *tiṣṭhantīm*, seem to me to require *veda* to be supplied from verse 5". Hume says, "This stanza contains an ungrammatical form and impossible constructions. The text here, as also in v. 7, is probably corrupt".

We have supplied *tam* with *tiṣṭhantam*, and also *paśyati* used impersonally, continuing the idea of *kaścid dhīraḥ aikṣad* of verse 1; We also read *jātaḥ* for *jātam*, and *vyapaśyat* for *vyapaśyata*.

Pūrvam may be either an adverb meaning "first", "formerly", "long ago", or an adjective meaning "before" (governing the ablative).

Almost all translators take the first "*pūrvam*" adverbially but many, as also Śaṅkara, take the second adjectivally; "was born before the waters". Hume takes it as we have done above. Grammatically both are equally possible but we have taken it adverbially because it fits better the Hiraṇyagarbha hymn.

Śaṅkara does not need to supply *paśyati* because he takes *vyapaśyata* as = *paśyati*, its subject being "yo" in the sense of *kaścid dhīraḥ* or *mumukṣuḥ*. This involves taking *tiṣṭhantam* along with *bhūtebhir*. Even so he does not escape the need of supplying at the end—*sa etadeva paśyati*. Translating under his guidance our version would be as follows :

"He (i.e. the Universal Soul) who, first produced from *tapas* (i.e. Brahman characterised as knowledge, etc.), was produced before the waters (i.e. the five elements),—he who sees Him (i.e. this first-born) who, (after creating bodies), entering the cave (of the heart) remains standing (i.e. perceiving) with the elements (i.e. senses):—he indeed sees that (i.e. the Brahman which is the subject of discussion)."

The objection to Śaṅkara's rendering is that it twists the words out of the order of the text and in so doing destroys the parallelism with the following verse. "*Yo bhūtebhir vyapaśyata*" is clearly parallel with "*Yā bhūtebhir vyajāyata*", and no translation which obscures this can be correct. Hume renders :

"He who was born of old from austerity (*tapas*)

Was born of old from the waters,

Who stands entered into the secret place (of the heart),

Who looked forth through beings—This verily is that!"

This apparently involves reading "*tiṣṭhati*" for "*tiṣṭhantam*", but he does not give an amended text.

We have purposively left the reference of "Entering the cave" (*guhām pravīṣya*) ambiguous as in the original. The meaning may be, "Entering, i.e. looking, within oneself one sees Him", or, "One sees Him who

has entered within one's own inner nature." Both meanings may be intended.

The One born of tapas : Hiranyagarbha ?

Śaṅkara says that the subject of the verse is *Hiranyagarbha*,—the Universal Soul (*sarvātman*). We both agree and dissent.

(1) It is clear that the idea expressed in our text goes back to the *Hiranyagarbha* hymn, *Rg Veda X. 121* and to the great Creation hymn, *Rg. X. 129*. For these see the *Introduction*, pages 16–18. Note especially 129, verses 1–4, and 121, verses 1, 7, 8, 9. See also pages 88–90 and 133–5.

The myth appears in various forms in the *Brāhmaṇas* (see, e.g. *Śatapatha* vi. 1. 1. and xi. 1. 6), and in the *Upaniṣads* (see, e.g. *Chāndogya* iii. 19). An interesting though unusual form is that in *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* i. 2 where the first-existent is called Death.

"Formerly there was nothing here whatever. By Death this was concealed. He made up his mind,—'Let me be possessed of a self (*ātman*, probably here = 'body'). From him as he was praising (*arcana*) water was produced. The foam of the water hardened and became earth. On it he toiled. From him as he toiled and became heated (*tapta*, ? performed austerity) fire was produced whose essence is brilliance (*tejas*). He made himself threefold—(Agni, Āditya and Vāyu. He is that thrice divided life (*prāṇa*)."

Here the primitive being evolves himself and becomes manifold, producing the world and the gods. Here *tapas* is not simply natural heat but the energy of will and of austerity. The "desire" (*kāma*) of *Rg. 129. 4* is apparently a different description of the same energy.

The developed *Hiranyagarbha* myth as found stated in the *Manu-saṃhitā* i. 5–9 is as follows :

"This (universe) was formerly immersed in darkness, unperceived, without distinctive marks.... Then the Self-born Lord (*Svayambhur bhagavān*), himself at first unexpressed (*avyakta*), making this (world), i.e. the elements, etc. discernible, became manifest, dispelling the darkness. Wishing to create various offspring from his own body, he first by thought created the waters, and put his seed in them. That seed became a golden egg, in splendour like the thousand-rayed sun. In that egg he himself was born as *Brahmā*, the progenitor (*pitāmahaḥ*) of the whole world."

This is of course later than the *Kaṭha* but practically all the elements in the myth as here given can be found in earlier literature.

Philosophically then the Hiranyagarbha myth is an attempt to explain how the first-existent evolved the world from its (or rather his) own being or energy, and then entered into it, becoming manifest as world-soul. We agree with Śaṅkara when he says that the subject of our verse,—the one born of *tapas* and the waters,—is that Universal Soul referred to in the Hiranyagarbha hymn, etc. Our text is therefore equivalent in meaning to *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* i. 4. 7: "Verily that which is this (i.e. the universe) was then undifferentiated. It became differentiated by name and form... He then entered in here even to the finger-nail tips." He is manifested in life, speech, sight, mind. But these are only effects. His real nature is best expressed by *Ātman*—Self. "For this self is the *padanīya* (trace or footprint) of the All," i.e. it is the One Self which is active and conscious in all beings and our own inner nature is therefore the clue to His nature.

(2) While we agree with Śaṅkara that the subject of our verse might legitimately be said to be *Hiranyagarbha* in that it is the Soul of the world referred to in the Hiranyagarbha hymn and myth, we totally dissent from the view that it is *the Hiranyagarbha of his philosophy*.

For Śaṅkara *Hiranyagarbha* is a name for *Saguṇa Brahman* or *Īśvara*, a being who possesses only empirical reality, the product of the imposition of *avidyā* or Ignorance on the highest or *Nirguṇa Brahman*. So here Śaṅkara explains *tapas* as "the Brahman defined as knowledge", but knowledge here does not imply consciousness. The supreme Brahman only comes to apparent consciousness through the elements or creatures of its (apparent) creation. This is a conception in some ways akin to the *Sāṃkhya*, where *puruṣa*, though called pure intelligence, is not in any distinctive sense conscious, till it rises to self-consciousness through the sense-organs which are evolved from nature (*prakṛti*).

We may note, by the way, that both Deussen and Hume interpret the one born of *tapas* as the *Sāṃkhya puruṣa* and *Aditi* of v. 7 as *prakṛti*.

As against both Śaṅkara and the *Sāṃkhya* interpretation we maintain that the Self-existent of *Kaṭha* iv. is conceived as, from the beginning, a knowing, conscious being. It is true that He is described as looking forth through the elements or

senses of his creatures, but he does not there for the first time gain consciousness. Moreover, as against Śaṅkara, the evolution of the world and of conscious individuals, is not conceived as an illusory development from a characterless absolute but as a real evolution of the Self-existent. In other words this passage teaches not acosmism but a naturalistic (though idealistic) pantheism. There are a number of passages in the *Kātha* (and in this valli) which seem to favour Śaṅkara, but on the whole we agree with Keith when he says, "We have efforts in the *Kātha* to accept as real and deduce from the Brahman the whole of the spiritual and non-spiritual world, efforts which lead to antinomies regarding the relation of the absolute and individual souls, and end in the abolition of the absolute in the Sāṅkhya, (of the individual in Śaṅkara*), and of both absolute and individual in Buddhism". (R.P.V. 513,* inserted.)

या प्राणेन संभवत्यदितिर्देवतामयी ।

गुह्यां प्रविश्य तिष्ठन्तीं या भूतेभिर्ब्रूयायत । एतद्देवत्वम् ॥ ७ ॥

7. *Yā prāṇena sambhavati,
aditir devatāmayī,
Guhāṃ praviśya tiṣṭhantīm
yā bhūtebhir vyajāyata : Etad vai tat.*

7. She who arises ¹ with life,—
Aditi, soul of the gods,—
Entering the cave one sees her stand
Who was born through the elements : ²

This truly is that.

¹ Or, "as Life".

² Or, "through beings".

7. Aditi: probably derived from *a + diti*, not bound, bondlessness, boundlessness (Macdonell, V.M., 121), though Śaṅkara, following *Bṛ. i. 2. 5*, derives from root *ad*, to eat.

The Ādityas are sons of Aditi and she is sometimes called the mother of all the gods,—hence the epithet *devatāmayī* = 'containing all the gods' (Śaṅkara comments *Sarva-devātīkā*, i.e. the soul of all the gods). Aditi sometimes seems to be a personification of the boundless sky and sometimes of universal Nature (e.g. *Rg. i. 89. 10*—"Aditi is the sky, Aditi the air,

Aditi is mother, father, and son, Aditi is all the gods and the five tribes, Aditi is whatever has been and will be born"). It is in this latter sense of universal Nature (*Natura genitrix*—Mother Nature) that Aditi is probably used here. Substantially this agrees with Deussen and Hume's interpretation of Aditi as *prakṛti* though we deny that the idea is specifically Sāṃkhyan (see above).

Śaṅkara takes Aditi as another name of Hiranygarbha to express the fact that he is the universal "eater", i.e. enjoyer or experiencer. "That soul of the gods called Aditi, because it eats (i.e. experiences) sounds, etc. is born from the highest Brahman as *prāṇa* (Life), i.e. in the form of Hiranygarbha." Ānandagiri says that the reference is to another modification of Hiranyagarbha. (*Hiranyagarbhasya eva viśeṣanāntaram āha.*) If by Hiranyagarbha is meant the being of the hymn (x. 121) who is described as "*devānām asur ekaḥ*"—"the one Life of the gods", we have no objection. If Aditi represents universal Nature it is not dead unconscious nature but that Life-power which comes to separate life and consciousness through the material elements and the living creatures which are the products of its own evolution.

Verses 6 and 7 then state that the creative energy which made the world is present in the material elements he has made as World-Soul, and Ruler. Further as supreme Life-power it is born to separate life in the creatures which are the product of the evolution of the elements. It has entered into the cave of the heart of each conscious creature, so that the wise man, looking within his own heart, realises that his own inner self is an expression of the nature of that energy, life and soul manifest in Nature, which again is an expression of that eternal reality which is the subject of inquiry.

Additional Note. Rāmānuja's interpretation.

In the *Sri-bhāṣya* I. 2. 11, Rāmānuja connects *Kaṭha* iv. 7 with "the two entered into the cave" of *Kaṭha* iii. 1, and says: "To the individual soul there refers iv. 7, 'Who is together with the vital breath, who is Aditi, made of the deities, who entering into the cave abides therein, who was born variously through the elements'. Aditi here means the individual soul which enjoys (*atti*) the fruits of its works; which is associated with the vital breath; which is made of the deities, i.e. whose enjoyment is dependent on the different sense-organs; which abides in the hollow of

the heart; and which being connected with the elementary substances, earth and so on, is born in various forms, human, divine, etc.

अरख्योर्निहितो जातवेदा गर्भ इव सुभृतो गर्भिणीभिः ।

दिवे दिव ईद्यो जाग्रवद्भिर्हविष्यद्भिर्मनुष्येभिरग्निः । एतद्वैतत् ॥ ८ ॥

8. *Aranyor nihito jātavedā*
garbha iva subhṛto garbhīṇībhiḥ,
Dive dive jāgyo jāgrvadbhir
haviṣmadbhir manuṣyebhir agniḥ : Etad vai tat.

8. All-knowing Agni hidden in the fire-sticks,
 Just like an embryo borne by pregnant women,
 Daily should be adored by the awakened,—
 By mortals offering their oblations.

This truly is that.

8. This verse is a quotation from *Sāma Veda I. i. 8. 7*, and is found with slight variation in *Ṛg III. 29. 2*.

Jātavedas, n.s. *Jātavedāḥ*: a title of Agni which occurs 120 times in R.V. It apparently means "He who knows (all) beings" (*jātaṃ sarvaṃ vetti iti jātavedāḥ*) and so is equivalent to *viśvavid* and *viśvavedas* ("all-knowing"), other titles of Agni (see Macdonell, V.M. 97).

Hidden in the fire-sticks (aranyor nihitaḥ): the sacrificial fire, produced by friction of the upper and lower fire-sticks (*uttarā* and *adharā arañī*) is regarded as existing previously in the sticks.

Offering oblations (haviṣ-mat): the *havis* was a burnt-offering of grain, soma, milk or butter. One who offers such a sacrifice is called *haviṣ-mat*. In the *Ṛg* and *Sāma Veda* passages only one class of people is referred to. Men when they wake in the morning offer sacrifice to Agni. Or "awakened" (*jāgrvat*) may mean "watchful" (so Stevenson, *Sāma V.* p. 12, "By watchful attendant priests").

Śaṅkara however distinguishes two classes: *ṛtviks* or *karmins*, those who follow *karman* in the sense of the Vedic ritual and offer oblations of ghee, etc., and "awakened" men, i.e. *yogins*, who offer in the heart contemplation and meditation (*dhyāna—bhāvanā*). Both in their different ways worship Agni and this (Agni) is that Brahman who is the subject of inquiry.

यतश्चोदेति सूर्योऽस्तं यत्र च गच्छति ।

तं देवाः सर्वे अर्पितास्तदु नात्येति कश्चन । एतद्वैतत् । ९ ।

9. *Yataś-ca udeṭi sūryaḥ
astam yatra ca gacchati,
Tam devāḥ sarve arpitās
tadu na tyeti kaścana : Etad vai tat.*

9. From whence ariseth forth the sun,
And whither too he goes to rest,
On him all deities are fixed,
Beyond that none soever goes.
This truly is that.

9. The first two lines are a quotation from *Br. I. 5. 23* and also occur *Atharva Veda X. 18. 16*. In the *Br.* passage the sun, as representing all the *devatāḥ*, is said to rise from and set in *Prāṇa*, who among the cosmic powers (*devatāḥ*) is specially manifest in the unresting wind (*Vāyu*) and among the psychic powers is the life-breath.

Sāṅkara comments :

“That *prāṇa* from which the sun arises, in which day by day it also sets, that Life or Self (*ātman*) in which all the gods beginning with Agni (speaking of its *adhidaiva* or theistic aspect) or all the senses beginning with speech (speaking of its *adhyātma* or psychical aspect) are during the time of their existence fixed, like spokes in the axle of a chariot,—he is certainly Brahman. This is that Brahman who is the Self of all. Beyond that none soever goes, i.e. no one ceasing to be of that nature becomes other than that.”

Note that the existence of the ancient Vedic gods is recognised by the Upaniṣads as the old Greek gods are recognised by Epicurus, but they have become shadows of their former selves, all their reality consisting in the One from whom they derive their being.

We thus see that verses 5–9, with the continual refrain *etad vai tat*, first (verse 5) identify the living soul which experiences sensation with the eternal Lord, then (6) the Soul of the universe with the individual percipient soul, and (7) infinite Nature or the supreme life-power with the individual soul in which it is born. In verses 8 and 9 there is no specific reference to the individual,—Fire worshipped in the daily sacrifices as itself

divine is taken as a symbol of Brahman, and the Sun and all the gods (or powers) are said to have their reality in Brahman, but probably we should again interpret the refrain, "This is that", as meaning "This Agni and this Sūrya, all the gods or adorable nature-powers are or represent that Brahman,—that supreme reality of which you ask, of which it has been said that it is specially manifest in the cave of your own heart.

यदेवेह तदमुत्र यदमुत्र तदन्विह ।

मृत्योः स मृत्युमाप्नोति य इह नानेव पश्यति ॥ १० ॥

मनसैवेदमाप्त्यं नेह नास्ति किञ्चन ।

मृत्योः स मृत्युं गच्छति य इह नानेव पश्यति ॥ ११ ॥

10. *Yad-eva iha tad amutra,
yad amutra tad anv iha ;
Mṛtyoḥ sa mṛtyum āpnoti
ya iha nānā iva paśyati.*
11. *Manasā eva idam āptavyam,
na iha nānā 'sti kiñcana ;
Mṛtyoḥ sa mṛtyuṃ gacchati
ya iha nānā iva paśyati.*

Failure to realise unity leads to reincarnation.

10. Whate'er is here, that too is there,
Whate'er is there, that too is here ;
Death after death that man obtains
Who sees things as if different here.
11. By mind alone This is to be obtained :
There is no difference here at all ;
From death to death he travels on
Who sees things as if different here.

10. *Nānā iva*, as if different, various, manifold. *Iha* ('here') usually means in this world, in this context it must mean in the ultimate reality.

10. c.d.=*Br. iv. 4. 19. c.d.* 11. a.b.=*Br. iv. 4. 19. a.b.*, except that for *āptavyam* (to be obtained) *Br.* reads *draṣṭavyam* (to be perceived).

These two verses then are clearly cognate with the teaching of Yājñavalkya to King Janaka in *Br. iv. 4.* "As a caterpillar

when it has come to the end of a blade of grass draws itself together for the next step, so with the soul. . . Whereto one's mind is attached—the inner self goes thereto. Obtaining the end of his action, whatever he does in this world, he comes again from that world, to this world of action. But as for the man who does not desire. Being very Brahman, he goes to Brahman." Then comes the verse quoted *Kaṭha vi. 14*, and then the passage on the unity of Brahman as given above, continuing in verse 20—

"As a unity only It is to be looked upon—
This undemonstrable enduring being."

The passage culminates in the famous saying, "That self is not this, not that" (*Sa eṣa ātman neti neti*).

Whereas however the *Br.* passage above makes rebirth (or rather re-death) dependent on desire, this passage traces it back to the very perception of plurality or difference. The doctrine of non-duality could not be stated more emphatically than in these two verses: "Death after death he obtains who sees (things) as if different here".

It is curious that with such an emphatic statement of non-difference should be coupled the saying, "By mind indeed This is to be obtained" (*manasā eva idam āptavyam*). If the word "*idam*" (this) may be interpreted, as Hume interprets it, as meaning "this truth", then there is no difficulty. But Śaṅkara interprets '*idam*' as '*Brahman*', and Hume also in the parallel passage *Br. iv. 4. 19* interprets in the same way.

"By the mind alone is It to be perceived" (T.P.U. 143).

Our text then is parallel to *Kaṭha vi. 9*, and teaches that Brahman is knowable by the mind,—not a lower Brahman but the Brahman in whom there is no difference. Yet how the mind can know a pure undifferentiated unity is unintelligible.

Śaṅkara tries to get out of the difficulty by saying, "Before the knowledge of the oneness by the mind prepared by the spiritual teacher and scripture, This, i.e. Brahman, the one essence, should be obtained,—(through such scripture passages as) 'There is the Self alone, nothing else exists'. When obtained, through the removal of Ignorance (*avidyā*), which is the cause of the perception of difference, then here, i.e. in the

Brahman, there is no difference whatsoever, not even the slightest." (*Continued below*).

अङ्गुष्ठमात्रः पुरुषो मध्य आत्मनि तिष्ठति ।

ईशानो भूतभव्यस्य न ततो विजुगुप्सते । एतद्वैतत् ॥ १२ ॥

अङ्गुष्ठमात्रः पुरुषो ज्योतिरिवाधूमकः ।

ईशानो भूतभव्यस्य स एवाद्य स उ श्वः । एतद्वैतत् ॥ १३ ॥

12. *Aṅguṣṭha-mātraḥ puruṣo
madhye_ātmani tiṣṭhati ;
Īśāno bhūta-bhavyasya
na tato vijugupsate : Etad vai tat.*
13. *Aṅguṣṭha-mātraḥ puruṣo
jyotir-iva_adhūmakah ;
Īśāno bhūta-bhavyasya
sa eva_adya sa u śvah : Etad vai tat.*

12c. Some *Mss.* have *īśānaṃ*.

Reassertion of the identity of the individual and the Supreme Self : The aṅguṣṭha-mātra puruṣa is the eternal Lord.

12. A person the size of a thumb
Stands in the midst of the body :
Lord of the past and the future :
Therefore one does not seek to hide :¹
This truly is that.
13. A person the size of a thumb
Like a flame devoid of smoke :
Lord of the past and the future,—
Alpha and Omega He :² This truly is that.

¹ Or, From Him one does not shrink away.

² Or, *literally*, He is (the same) today and tomorrow.

Śaṅkara's position has been represented as similar to that of Herbert Spencer. Just as Spencer maintained that one can know of the existence of the infinite and absolute though otherwise it is unknown, so it is said Śaṅkara maintained

that we can know the existence of the One though we cannot know anything about it except that it is One. This however is not a fair statement of Śaṅkara's position: if an agnostic he is of the type of Mansel rather than Spencer: that is to say, he holds that while Brahman is not proveable by reason its existence and unity are known by the mind of the prepared seeker through scripture and a qualified spiritual teacher. This knowledge is however only preliminary,—it so dispels investing Ignorance that the light of Brahman's own self-manifestation is able to shine in the seeker's soul producing not merely intellectual knowledge but an immediate realisation of oneness with the Supreme. (See later note on vi. 12.) At bottom he is a mystic, though His mysticism sometimes finds strangely agnostic expression.

12, 13. The term *aṅguṣṭha-mātra puruṣa* ("person the size of a thumb"), occurs in the *Taittirīya Āraṇyaka* x. 38. 1; *Kaṭha* iv. 12, 13; vi. 17; *Śvet.* iii. 13; v. 8; *Maitri* vi. 38; *Mahānārāyaṇa* xvi. 3. See also *Mahābhārata*, *Vana Parvan*, line 16765 (Calcutta edn.), where in the story of Sāvitrī we are told,

*Tataḥ Satyavataḥ kāyāt, pāsabaddhaṃ vaśaṅgatam,
Aṅguṣṭha-mātram puruṣam, nīśakarṣa Yamo balāt.*

"Then from the body of Prince Satyavān,
Yama with his grim force extracted out,
A person of the measure of a thumb,—
Bound with his snare and brought in his control."

The thumb-sized person here referred to is obviously the individual soul, called "thumb-sized" because it is conceived of as occupying the cavity of the heart. It is said to stand *madhye ātmani*,—*ātman* here clearly meaning the body.

Śaṅkara discusses the meaning of these two verses in his *Sūtra-bhāṣya* I. 3. 24, 25. The question at issue is, Is the person described as *aṅguṣṭha-mātra* the individual or the highest Self? It is natural at first sight to take it as referring to the individual soul for how can the supreme self which is infinite be said to be of the size of a thumb? But then the person here referred to is spoken of as "Lord of the past and future". Moreover the words "This verily is that" expressly identify it with the Supreme Self. Our passage teaches then

that the soul which is said to be the size of a thumb is in reality Brahman. Rāmānuja and Nimbārka agree but add that the highest self can be called thumb-sized because He dwells in the heart of the worshipper.

Perhaps the better way of stating it is to say that the "thumb-sized person is primarily the individual soul but it is here taught that this is not a separate entity in each creature but is the *antarātman*,—the one eternal Self present in each individual. So the Upaniṣad ends with the verse : (vi. 17) :

A person of the measure of a thumb,
The inner-self, dwells in each creature's heart :
So from the body one should draw it forth
As from its sheath one firmly draws a reed :
Then know that as the deathless and the pure.

We remarked at the beginning of the valli on the difference between vallis iii and iv. Valli iii spoke of two selves. Valli iv sets forth a doctrine closely akin to the single self theory which is so prominently associated with the name of Yājñavalkya, and it is perhaps significant that it borrows very largely from the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, or draws from the same material.

Lord of the past and the future,—Alpha and Omega He: the last clause translated literally reads, "He alone is to-day, and also to-morrow" (*sa eva adya sa u śvaḥ*), and is a quotation from *Br. i. 5. 23. Cf. Rev. i. 8*. The one Self is not viewed as a timeless absolute (as with Śaṅkara) but as Lord and ruler of the time-order. This comes out even more strikingly in *Br. iv. 4. 15, 16* with which 12. c.d. is connected.

At whose feet time rolling on,
In years and days goes by ;
Whom as light of lights the gods,
Adore as immortality :

On whom the fivefold host of living things,
And also space depend,—
Him know I, being wise, as my own soul,
Immortal, the immortal Brahman.

यद्योदकं दुर्गे वृष्टं पर्वतेषु विधावति ।

एवं धर्मान्पृथक्पश्यंस्तानेवानुविधावति ॥ १४ ॥

यद्योदकं शुद्धे शुद्धमासिक्तं तादृगेव भवति ।

एवं मुनेर्विजानत आत्मा भवति गौतम ॥ १५ ॥

14. *Yathā udakam durge vrṣṭam
parvateṣu vidhāvati,
Evaṁ dharmān pṛthak paśyaṁs
tān-eva anuvindhāvati.*

15. *Yathā udakam śuddhe śuddham
āsiktam tādṛg [eva] bhavati,
Evaṁ muner vijānata
ātmā bhavati Gautama.*

Perception of multiplicity and unity, and their results.

14. As water rained upon a height
Runs various ways among the hills,
So he who views things as diverse
Distractedly runs after them.
15. Just as pure water into pure
Poured forth, becomes the very same,—
So, Gautama, becomes the soul
Of the sage who really knows.

14. *Height*: Hume, "rough ground"; *durga* means a place where it is difficult to go. Here it must mean a mountain ridge from which rain-water flows in different directions.

Dharmān pṛthak paśyan: He who views things as diverse.

Hume: He who sees qualities separately, runs to waste after them.

Deussen: He who attends to sense-impressions as distinct existences himself runs after them.

Śaṅkara: He who sees *dharmān*, i.e. different selves as separate, i.e. different in each separate body, runs after them only, responsive to the variety in the bodies,—i.e. again and again he obtains a separate body.

The interpretation turns on the meaning of *dharmān*. The various meanings of *dharma* are discussed in connection with ii. 13 (page 96). Philosophically we said *dharma* means the characteristic quality or nature of anything. Here we take it the meaning is, He who views the natures of things (and therefore things themselves) as quite separate, etc. Śāṅkara limits the things to 'selves' but the text is more general. It insists on the necessity of perceiving the unity of law and nature among the apparently quite separate individual things (and selves) of experience, otherwise there is not only intellectual error but moral distraction and running to waste. (If this is too much to read into *anuvīdhāvati* we believe that it represents the spirit of the passage.) The continual warnings of the Upaniṣads against pluralism are wearisome repetitions if regarded only as the enunciation of a metaphysical monism: we only understand them if we credit the writers with something of the moral and religious feeling which animated Xenophanes and the Hebrew prophets in their protest against polytheism.

15. This verse attempts to describe through a simile the state of the soul when liberated through true knowledge (i.e. of oneness with the Supreme Self). Does it become identical with the Supreme? Yes says Śāṅkara,—the perception of difference due to the limiting conditions (which are the product of Ignorance) having been destroyed then, "Just as pure water poured into pure becomes just such (*tādṛg eva*), i.e. completely of one essence and not otherwise (*eka-rasam-eva na anyathā*) so also the soul of the sage, i.e. the man practised in meditation, who knows the oneness, becomes just similar (*evam-eva bhavati*)."
The nature of the simile seems to favour Śāṅkara's interpretation of *tādṛg eva* and therefore we have translated it as "the very same". Literally however it means simply "just such" or "exactly similar".

The interpretation given by Rāmānuja and Nimbārka is not therefore excluded by this verse,—i.e. the view that the liberated soul is non-different (i.e. not in any way separate—*prthak*) but not metaphysically identical with the Supreme. It is one with Him in will and nature (except that it does not share His

power of ruling the world), but not identical in a sense that would exclude the supreme bliss of the contemplation of the perfection of the Supreme Lord. (See *Vedānta-sūtra-bhāṣya* iv. 4. 17-22.)

With our verse we may compare *Muṇḍaka* iii. 2. 8 :

Even as rivers flowing to the ocean
Merge in it and relinquish name and form,
Just so the wise, from name and form delivered,
Attains unto the highest, heavenly Person.

Prima facie this also teaches the merging of identity. Yet the highest being is conceived theistically. The oneness therefore cannot be that of bare identity but must permit of personal relationship.

It is interesting to note that a Christian mystic with so ardent a personal religion as Bernard of Clairvaux could use a simile like that of our text and say: "As a drop of water poured into wine loses itself and takes the colour and savour of wine, so in the saints all human affections melt away, by some unspeakable transmutation, into the will of God. For how could God be all in all if anything merely human remained in man? The substance will endure, but in another beauty, a higher power, a greater glory."

St. Theresa also says, "Spiritual marriage is like rain falling from the sky into a river, becoming one and the same liquid, so that the river water and the rain cannot be divided; or it resembles a streamlet flowing into the ocean, which cannot afterward be dis severed from it".

"Lord, we are rivers running to Thy sea,
Our waves and ripples all derived from Thee:
A nothing we should have, a nothing be,
Except for Thee."

—Christina Rossetti.

॥ पञ्चमी वल्ली ॥

पुरमेकादशद्वारमजस्यावक्रचेतसः ।

अनुष्ठाय न प्रोचति विमुक्तश्च विमुच्यते । एतद्वैतत् ॥ १ ॥

हंसः शुचिषदसुरन्तरिक्षसद्भोता वेदिषदतिथिर्दुरोगसत् ।

नृषद्वरसदृतसद्भोमसदक्षा गोत्रा ऋतत्रा अद्रित्रा ऋतं वृद्धत् ॥ २ ॥

Pañcamī Vallī.

1. *Puram ekādaśa-dvāram
ajasya avakra-cetasah ;
Anuṣṭhāya na śocati
vimuktaś-ca vimucyate. Etaḍ vai tat.*
2. *Haṁsaḥ śuciṣad vasur antarikṣa-sad,
hotā vedi-ṣad atithir duroṇa-sat ;
Nṛ-ṣad vara-sad ṛta-sad vyoma-sad,
ab-jā go-jā ṛta-jā adri-jā ṛtam bṛhat.*

FIFTH VALLĪ.

The Lord of the city of the body is Lord of the world.

1. There is a city of eleven gates,
Owned by the unborn uncrook'd intelligence :
By ruling it one does not grieve,
And being freed is freed indeed.

This truly is that.

2. The swan in the sky, the Vasu in space,
The priest at the altar, the guest in the house :¹
In men and their betters, in right and the sky,—
Born in water and earth, born in right and in rock,
is the Right and the Great.

¹ Or, jar.

The Fifth Valli simply reinforces the argument of the fourth that the soul of each individual is not a separate soul but is the one eternal Ātman dwelling in each individual as Inner-self

(*antarātman*). The later verses of the vallī, however (from v. 12), seem to depart from the one soul theory, and, at least provisionally, speak of two souls,—the *antarātman* being spoken of as *ātma-stha* (standing in the soul) : an apparent return to the standpoint of the third vallī.

1. The eleven-gated city : Bunyan, in his *Holy War*, describes the human soul as living in a city with five gates, i.e. the five senses. So in the *Gītā* (v. 13) we are told that, "Renouncing with the mind all (attachment to the results of) works, the embodied soul sits happily as master in the nine-gated city". The nine gates of the body there referred to are the two eyes, two ears, two nostrils, mouth, anus and generative opening. The other two to make up eleven are the navel and sagittal suture (*vidṛtī*),—the opening at the top of the skull, perceptible only in children, through which the liberated soul is supposed to escape at death.

The uncrooked intelligence (avakra-cetas) : uncrooked, i.e. upright, righteous. By implication there must exist, at least in appearance, crooked, perverted (human) intelligences. This verse however says nothing of such. It apparently assumes that there is only one Self eternal and perfect, which is Lord of all bodies, directly, without vicegerents.

Renderings of the second half of the verse vary according to the meaning given to *anuṣṭhāya*. *Anu + sthā* means (1) to stand near, (2) to perform, practise, (3) to rule, govern. Śāṅkara takes a modification of the second meaning and interprets *anuṣṭhāya* as *dhyātṛvā*. "*Anuṣṭhāya* means contemplating that Highest Lord, the master of the city." Following him we should translate, "Contemplating (or meditating on) Him one does not grieve." Like Hume however we prefer the third meaning, which gives a more natural construction, the object being *param*.

We take the verse as resuming the theme of iv. 1, and to some extent also reconciling it with that of the Parable of the Chariot. The senses "pierced outward" are not merely openings from which the soul must turn away ; they are like the gates of a city through which its Lord receives influences from the outer world and through which also he acts upon it. As by controlling the gates the Lord of a city dwells in happy peace, secure from attack, so the soul, controlling the senses, is free from sorrow, being free from insurgent desire.

This is the true freedom which begins even here and leads after death to complete release from the task of controlling a body.

2. This verse, except the last word, occurs *Rg Veda* iv. 40. 5, and in full in the *Taittirīya Saṃhitā* of the Black *Yajur Veda*, i. 8. 15; iv. 2. 1; ² the *Vājasaneyī Saṃhitā* of the White *Yajur Veda*, x. 24; xii. 14; and the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*, vi. 7. 3. 11.³

As quoted in the *Śatapatha B.* the passage refers to the triune *Agni* who is identified with the Sun in heaven, *Vāyu* (wind) in the interspace, and dwells on earth both as the divine priest (symbolised by the sacrificial fire) and as the guest in the homes of men (*atithir duroṇasat*).

Here in our text the triune *Agni*, the supreme energy that sums up all the gods, all the powers of the universe, is implicitly identified with Brahman, who is the universal *Ātman*.

Śaṅkara says: The Self is not a dweller in one city only but dwells in all cities. He is *haṃsa* (the swan), i.e. the mover, *śuciṣad*—dwelling in the clear (sky) as the Sun (*Āditya*). He is the *Vasu* (so called because he animates all) dwelling in the interspace (*antarikṣa*) as the Wind (*Vāyu*). As a priest (*hotā*), i.e. as *Agni* at the altar, i.e. on earth. As a guest, i.e. *Soma*, he is called *duroṇa-sat*, i.e. dwelling in a jar; or else *duroṇasat* may mean that he dwells in houses as Brahmin guests. *Nṛsat*—dwelling in men; *varasat*—dwelling in betters, i.e. gods (*Śatapatha* says *vara*=space); *ṛtasat*—dwelling in *ṛta*, i.e. truth (*satya*) or the sacrifice (*yajña*), *vyomasat*—dwelling in the sky or ether. *Ab-jāh*—born in water in the form of conches, whales, etc.; *go-jāh*—born of earth as rice and barley, etc.; *ṛta-jāh*—born as adjuncts of the sacrifice (*yajñāṅga*); *adrijāh*—rock-born, born of mountains as rivers. Though the soul of all yet he is *ṛtam*—i.e. of unchanging nature, and because he is the cause of all he is called *bṛhat*—great. The meaning of the mantra is that the all-pervading Soul of the world is only One and there is no distinction of self (*ātma-bheda*).

Apart from the interpretation of *ṛta-jāh*, which we have rendered "born in right" we have on the whole followed Śaṅkara. Keith² renders *ṛta*—"holy order" and Eggeling—"law". "Right" is intended as including these two meanings, for *ṛta* in the *Rg Veda* signifies that sacred Law or order of the world which is both true, i.e. dependable, and right, i.e. morally good.

² See Keith: *Veda of the Black Yajus School*, Vol. I. 127, II. 308.

³ See Eggeling: *The Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*, part III (S.B.E. XLI), p. 281.

ऊर्ध्वं प्राणमुन्नयत्यपानं प्रत्यगस्यति ।
 मध्ये वामनमासीनं विश्वे देवा उपासते ॥ ३ ॥
 अस्य विखंसमानस्य शरीरस्यस्य देहिनः ।
 देहाद्विमुच्यमानस्य किमत्र परिशिष्यते । एतद्वैतत् ॥ ४ ॥
 न प्राणेन नापानेन मर्त्यो जीवति कश्चन ।
 इतरेण तु जीवन्ति यस्मिन्नेतावुपाश्रितौ ॥ ५ ॥

3. *Ūrdhvaṃ prāṇam unnayati,
 apānaṃ pratyagasyati ;
 Madhye vāmanaṃ āsīnaṃ
 viśve devā upāsate.*

4. *Asya visraṃsamānasya
 śarīrasthasya dehinaḥ ;
 Dehād vimucyamānasya ;
 Kim atra pariśiṣyate.
 Etad vai tat.*

5. *Na prāṇena na apānena
 martyo jīvati kaścana ;
 Itareṇa tu jīvanti
 yasminn etāv upāśritau.*

3. Upward the outbreath he leadeth,
 The inbreath downward he casts :
 The dwarf who is seated in the midst
 All the *devas* do worship.

4. When this embodied soul that dwells
 Within the body, is unloosed
 And from the body is set free,—
 What is there here that then remains ?
 This truly is that.

5. Not by outbreath nor by inbreath
 Does any man whatever live,
 But by another do they live
 On which these (life-breaths) both depend

3. *Prāṇa and Apāna*: i.e. the life-breaths or vital powers. *Prāṇa* is a word of very varied meaning. Originally it meant "breath", then "life", and was also, even as early as the *Atharva Veda*, used as a name for the Supreme Being (so=*Ātman*). In the early Upaniṣads all the vital powers (e.g. speech, breath, eye, ear, *manas*) are called *prāṇāḥ*. Then a distinction is made between the *prāṇāḥ*, as forces of unconscious life, and the *indriyāṇi* and *manas*,—the forces of conscious life. The *prāṇāḥ* are distinguished as five,—*prāṇa*, *apāna*, *vyāna*, *samāna*, *udāna* (e.g. *Br. i. 5. 3*, *Tait. i. 7*). These are sometimes looked upon as varieties of breath and sometimes as powers presiding over different parts of the body. When *prāṇa* is used alone it usually means "breath" (both inspiration and expiration), but when used with *apāna* it generally means expiration, while *apāna* means inspiration. *Apāna* also came to mean the "wind" or power of digestion and evacuation. For a fuller discussion see Deussen, P.U. 274-280.

The dwarf (vāmana): another name for the *aṅguṣṭha-mātra puruṣa*, i.e. the embodied self. This person within, "nearer to us than breathing" is the Supreme Being whom all the gods or nature powers worship. Śāṅkara however interprets "all the *devas*" as the senses and vital powers (*prāṇāḥ*) which are subject to the person within who is their Lord and worship him by their uninterrupted activity on his account. In any case the main point of the verse is that it leads on to v. 5.

4. "Here", i.e. in the body. Śāṅkara answers, "Nothing remains". For when the soul leaves it, then this assemblage of causes and effects we call the body becomes powerless and perishes. But *atra* may equally mean there or then. What remains after the soul is freed from the body? Just the one Self,—the *dehin* or embodied soul is one with the universal Soul (*sarvātman*). "This is that."

5. This verse may have in view the Buddhist doctrine of *anattā* (*an-ātmān*) that what we call a person is only an assemblage of parts, but is more likely to refer to the Cārvāka doctrine.¹ Śāṅkara says, the theory may be urged that man lives only by the life-breaths, etc. and is destroyed by their exit,—that a man, like a house, is a combination of parts. But a house does not exist for itself but for one who directs the combination of its parts. So the bodily powers are not self-explanatory: they depend on and exist for another,—the Soul.

¹ See *Vedāntasāra vi*, J. 77. Also *Introduction*, 43.

इन्त त इदं प्रवक्ष्यामि गुह्यं ब्रह्म सनातनम् ।
 यथा च मरणं प्राप्य आत्मा भवति गौतम ॥ ६ ॥
 योनिमन्ये प्रपद्यन्ते शरीरत्वाय देहिनः ।
 स्थानमन्येऽनुसंयन्ति यथाकर्म यथाश्रुतम् ॥ ७ ॥

6. *Hanta te idam pravakṣyāmi
 guhyaṃ brahma sanātanam ;
 Yathā ca maraṇam prāpya
 ātmā bhavati Gautama.*
7. *Yonim anye prapadyante
 śarīratvāya dehinaḥ ;
 Sthānam anye 'nusaṃyanti,
 yathā karma yathā śrutam.*

The Eternal yet Transmigrating Soul.

6. Come then, to you I will declare
 This hidden Brahman everlasting ;
 And also, after reaching death,
 How the soul fares, O Gautama.
7. Some souls go forth into a womb,
 Unto a new embodiment ;
 Some enter stationary things :
 According to their knowledge and their deeds.

6, 7. **Soul** (v. 6)=*ātman*; Souls (v. 7)=*dehinaḥ*. The soul or self (*ātman*) which in its essential nature is one with Brahman, becomes a *dehin* (owner of a *deha* or body). How this occurs is nowhere clearly stated. Embodiment is not, as with Śāṅkara, an illusion. "In the Upaniṣads we have, on the one hand the constant efforts to show that there is but one self, and on the other hand the reality of the individual self is constantly insisted on." (Keith, R.P.V. 552.) But embodiment having occurred, souls go on after death to new embodiment—*yathā karma*—in accordance with their deeds. As *Br. iv. 4. 5*, says, in one of the earliest statements of the doctrine of transmigration, *yathā karma tathā bhavati*,—"as one acts so one becomes". Our verse mentions only two of the kinds of possible embodiment,—as men and trees. For a fuller statement see *Chāṅḍ. v. 10. 7* and *Kauṣ. i. 2*.

The nature of rebirth is also said to be "according to knowledge" (*Kauṣ. i. 2, yathā vidyām*, here *yathā śrutam*), since knowledge is largely determinative of deeds. True knowledge however, of the kind here communicated, leads beyond all rebirth.

We have taken *dehinaḥ* as nom. pl. agreeing with *anye*. (So Śāṅkara) Hume takes as gen. sing. "Some go into a womb for the embodiment of a living being." (So apparently also Deussen and Max Müller.)

य एष सुप्तेषु जागर्ति कामं कामं पुरुषो निर्मिमाणः ।
 तदेव शुक्रं तद्ब्रह्म तदेवान्तमुच्यते ।
 तस्मिँल्लोकाः श्रिताः सर्वे तदु नात्येति कश्चन ॥ एतद्वैतत् ॥ ८ ॥

8. *Ya eṣa supteṣu jāgarti,*
kāmaṃ kāmaṃ puruṣo nirmimāṇaḥ ;
Tad eva śukraṃ tad brahma,
tad eva amṛtam ucyate.
Tasmin lokāḥ śritāḥ sarve,
tad u na atyeti kaścana. Etad vai tat.

The Inner Soul is ground of the world.

8. He who is awake in the sleeping,
 The person who fashions desire on desire,—
 That is the Pure : That is Brahman :
 That indeed is called the Immortal ;
 On that do all the worlds depend ;
 Beyond it none soever goes. This truly is that.

8. The Upaniṣads hold that the oneness of the individual with the supreme Self is more manifest in the sleeping than in the waking state. See for example *Chānd. vi. 8. 1*, where *svapiti*—"he sleeps" is connected with *svam apīta*—"he has entered into himself": "When it is said that the man is asleep, then has he attained to union with the self-existent". Moreover dream-consciousness is regarded as a proof of the existence of the *Ātman*. In sleep the *prāṇāḥ*—all the bodily powers, are laid to rest. What is it then that remains active ?

"Striking down in sleep what is bodily,
 Sleepless he contemplates the sleeping (organs)."

“There are no chariots there, no teams (of horses), no roads, but he creates for himself chariots, teams, roads. There are no blisses there or pleasures or delights, but blisses, pleasures, delights he creates for himself” (see the whole passage, B.A.U. iv. 3).

Desire on desire (kāmaṃ kāmaṃ): *Kāma* primarily means desire but here as in i. 24, 25, “objects of desire”, probably as in the B.A.U. passage just quoted, “dream objects of desire”. Śāṅkara, commenting on *nirmīmāṇṣāḥ*, i.e. fashioning or creating, adds *avidyayā*, “by Ignorance”. Rāmānuja however objects. Dream-objects, like the objects of our waking consciousness, are creations of the Supreme Person and are only *māyā*, not in the sense of illusion but in the sense of “wonderful”.

अग्निर्यथैको भुवनं प्रविष्टो रूपं रूपं प्रतिरूपो बभूव ।

एकस्तथा सर्वभूतान्तरात्मा रूपं रूपं प्रतिरूपो बहिःश्च ॥ ९ ॥

वायुर्यथैको भुवनं प्रविष्टो रूपं रूपं प्रतिरूपो बभूव ।

एकस्तथा सर्वभूतान्तरात्मा रूपं रूपं प्रतिरूपो बहिःश्च ॥ १० ॥

9. *Agnir yathā_eko bhuvanam praviṣṭo,*
rūpaṃ rūpaṃ pratirūpo babhūva,
Ekas tathā sarva-bhūta-antarātmā,
rūpaṃ rūpaṃ pratirūpo bahiś-ca.

10. *Vāyur yathā_eko bhuvanam praviṣṭo,*
rūpaṃ rūpaṃ pratirūpo babhūva,
Ekas tathā sarvabhūtāntarātmā,
rūpaṃ rūpaṃ pratirūpo bahiś-ca.

The One Inner-soul : Immanent yet Transcendent.

9. As Fire, though one, having entered the world,
Adapts itself in form to every form,
So the one Inner-soul of every being,
Enwrapped in every form is yet outside.
10. As Air, though one, having entered the world,
Adapts itself in form to every form,
So the one Inner-soul of every being,
Enwrapped in every form is yet outside.

9, 10. *Rūpaṃ rūpaṃ pratirūpo babhūva* : literally, "Has become the counterform of every form" so also line d. : "Is the counterform of every form and is outside".

This is a quotation from *Rg Veda* vi. 47. 18, the famous *Māyā* verse,

*Rūpaṃ rūpaṃ pratirūpo babhūva,
Indro māyābbhiḥ pururūpa īyate.*

It tells, how, in his conflict with the demons,

"Indra went multiform through his magic powers.
He became the counterform of every form."

The thought of the passage is, however, probably more based on *Rg* x. 51. 1-3, which tells how Agni, fearing to be injured by continual use in sacrificial worship, hid himself in animals and plants, assuming their forms.

The interest of this verse lies in its teaching of the immanence and yet the transcendence of the Supreme Self. The thought is evidently a development of *Rg Veda* x. 90 (the *Puruṣa-sūkta*), where it is said

"The Person had a thousand heads,
A thousand eyes, a thousand feet :
He filled the earth on every side
Yet stood ten-fingers' length beyond.

Such is his greatness, and yet more
Than all this is the *Puruṣa* :
All beings are one-fourth of him ;
Three-fourths immortal in the heaven."

The *Śvetāśvatara* develops the thought by quoting the *Puruṣa-sūkta* and saying,

"By him, the Person, this whole world is filled"
"Who utterly transcends this world." (*Śvet.* iii. 9. 10.)

Śaṅkara says, *Bahīś-ca,—svēna avikṛtena rūpeṇa, ākāśavat.* That is to say, The Self, like the ether assumes many forms and yet is outside them in its own unmodified nature. This implies that all modification is in appearance only. But this surely is going beyond the text which intends to preserve transcendence while at the same time teaching immanence.

सूर्यो यथा सर्वलोकस्य चक्षुर्न लिप्यते चाक्षुर्वैर्बाह्यदोषैः ।

एकस्मथा सर्वभूतान्तरात्मा न लिप्यते लोकदुःखेन बाह्यैः ॥ ११ ॥

11. *Sūryo yathā sarva-lokasya cakṣur,*
na lipyate cākṣuṣair bāhya-doṣaiḥ,
Ekas tathā sarvabhūtāntarātmā,
na lipyate loka-duḥkhena bāhyaḥ.

The Impassive Self, untouched by the world's pain.

11. Just as the Sun, the eye of all the world,
 Is not defiled by outward faults of vision,
 So the one Inner-soul of every being
 Is touched not by earth's pain, being outside it.

11. Śaṅkara says, "If one is the *Ātman* of all he may be regarded as subject to the grief of *saṃsāra*, therefore this is said. As the sun, manifesting unclean things like dung, is not tainted by their outward visible faults, so the one inner Self of all is not tainted by the misery of the world, being outside it. For the world, by ignorance (*avidyā*) superimposed on the *Ātman*, experiences misery arising from desire and *karman*, but that is not really in the *Ātman*: just as a snake superimposed on a rope (by mistaken imagination) does not really exist as a blemish in the rope. Thus the world having superimposed on the *Ātman* the false notion of deed, agency and fruit of action (*kriyā-kāraka-phala*) suffers thereby the misery of birth, old-age, death, etc. But the *Ātman*, although the soul of all the world, is not tainted by the misery of the world through such false attribution: because like the rope he is external to the false notion imposed upon him."

We quote this explanation more because it is so characteristic than because we consider it gives a correct interpretation of our text. Śaṅkara denies the reality of the world's misery: it is an illusion. The Upaniṣad admits its reality though it denies that it touches the Self. Śaṅkara's teaching here is based on his acosmism. He denies not only the world's pain but the world itself except as a creation of Ignorance. The teaching of the *Kaṭha*, though it sometimes seems to

follow the one soul theory (the absolute idealism of Yājñavalkya which is the precursor of Śaṅkara's teaching), is on the whole a panentheism more akin to Rāmānuja's teaching, in which the world, including individual souls, constitutes the body of Brahman, while Brahman is *antarātman*, not as being the only self, the sole real existence, but as the Self within all selves, their innermost reality (see *ātma-stha* next verse).

To return to our text. It does not deny pain and misery, and it may have been written about the time when another Gautama, the Buddha, saw in *duḥkha*,—human suffering, the one great indubitable fact which bulked so large it almost shut out the vision of all else. Our text however denies that human suffering (*loka-duḥkha*) touches (literally "smears") that Supreme Being who is also our inner-self. May not such teaching have been one reason why Buddha found no use for God or the *ātman*. A reality transcendent in this sense was too out of touch with the desperate facts of life to be of any practical value.

The doctrine of the impassiveness of God has infected most theologies. Even Christian theology took it over from Aristotle and counted Patristianism a heresy: and this spite of the teaching of the Old Testament that "In all our afflictions He was afflicted", and of the New, that the cross of Christ is not merely an event in time but is the manifestation of the eternal spirit of God.

एको वशी सर्वभूतान्तरात्मा एकं रूपं बहुधा यः करोति ।

तमात्मस्थं वेऽनुपश्यन्ति धीरास्तेषां सुखं शान्धतं नेतरेषाम् । १२ ।

निव्योऽनित्यानां चेतनश्चेतनानामेको बहूनां यो विदधाति कामान् ।

तमात्मस्थं वेऽनुपश्यन्ति धीरास्तेषां शान्तिः शान्धतौ नेतरेषाम् । १३ ।

12. *Eko vaśi sarvabhūtāntarātmā,
ekam rūpaṃ bahudhā yaḥ karoti,
Tam ātma-sthaṃ ye 'nupaśyanti dhīrās
teṣāṃ sukhaṃ śāṅdhataṃ na, itareṣām.*

13. *Nityo 'nityānām cetanaś cetanānām,
eko bahūnām yo vidadhāti kāmān,
Tam ātmasthaṃ ye 'nupaśyanti dhīrās
teṣām śāntiḥ śāśvatī na_itareṣām.*

13. Some *Mss.* : *Nityo nityānām.*

The Vision of God within the soul leads to eternal bliss.

12. The One Controller, Inner-soul of all things,
Who makes his one form manifold,—
The wise who see Him, standing in the soul,
They and no others have perpetual joy.
13. Eternal mid the transient, Conscious mid the conscious,
The One amid many who grants their desires,—
The wise who see Him, standing in the soul,
They and no others have perpetual peace.

12. *The One Controller (Eko vaśī)*: This title is a name for the supreme Self only occurs here and *Śvet. vi. 12*, but it goes back in thought to *Br. iv. 4. 22*. "Verily He is the great, unborn Soul, who is this (person) consisting of knowledge among the senses (*prāṇaḥ*). In the ether within the heart lies the Controller of all, the Lord of all, the King of all." (*Sarvasya vaśī, sarvasya īśanaḥ, sarvasya adhipatiḥ.*) Our verse is reproduced in *Śvet. vi. 12* with the first two lines in the following form:—

"The One Controller of the inactive many,
Who makes the one seed manifold."

Standing in the soul (Ātma-stha):

Here surely we have a clear reversion to the two soul stand-point,—Brahman being regarded as the Inner-soul of our individual souls. It is true that *ātman* sometimes means "body". Śaṅkara, while desiring to uphold the one soul stand-point, denies that it means "body" here. He explains it as meaning the Self manifest in the form of intelligence in the *buddhi* (conditioned intellect) in the ether within the heart. (*Tam ātmasthaṃ—sva-śarīra-hṛdayākāśe buddharū caitanya_ākāreṇa abhivoyaktam iti etat*). This explanation, however,

ultimately involves his illusion doctrine, which, as Rāmānuja remarks, makes nonsense of the Vedas (see *Śrībhāṣya* ii. 3. 42, Thibaut 561, 2). Supporting his contention that individual souls stand to the Supreme in a *bhedābheda* relation, i.e. are eternally distinct but not separate, Rāmānuja several times quotes *Kāṭha v. 13* (see *Śrībhāṣya* i. 1. 4; ii. 3. 43).

13. We have translated verse 13 literally keeping the order of the original, but the sense is perhaps better rendered in Thibaut's translation, "He who, one, eternal, intelligent, fulfils the desires of many, non-eternal, intelligent beings". Better still, "grants (or disposes) the objects of desire," (taking *kāmān* objectively as in i. 24, 25; v. 8). Deussen sees in this a doctrine of Divine providence. (P.U. 212.)

Cetanaś-cetanānām—"Conscious mid the conscious", "Intelligent mid the intelligent". Śāṅkara says, The intelligence of other conscious beings, beginning with Brahmā is due to the intelligence of the Ātman (*ātma-caitanya-nimittena*). Yet elsewhere he denies intelligence of a conscious character to the supreme Brahman.¹

Returning to our discussion of *ātma-stha*, we have surely in these verses a doctrine which is not Absolutism nor mere Pantheism but something analogous to the Christian doctrine of the Spirit. We hope to discuss this more fully elsewhere. Here we will only ask whether it is fanciful to compare *Śvet. vi. 6*, which continues the thought of our passage, "Know Him who stands within the soul, the immortal abode of all", with *John iv. 13*,—"Hereby know we that we abide in Him and He in us, because He hath given us of his Spirit." There are of course important differences, but there is surely also an equally important agreement.

तदेतदिति मन्यन्तेऽनिर्देश्यं परमं सुखम् ।

कथं नु तद्विजानीयां किमु भाति विभाति वा ॥ १३ ॥

¹ See note on *cit*, *Vedāntasūtra*, Introdn. Jacob 3-5 or Rawson, *Gist of the Vedānta*.

न तत्र सूर्यो भाति न चन्द्रतारकं नेमा विद्युतो भान्ति कुतोऽयमग्निः ।
तमेव भान्तमनुभाति सर्वं तस्य भासा सर्वमिदं विभाति ॥ १५ ॥

14. *Tad etad iti manyante,*
'nirdeśyaṃ paramaṃ sukham ;
Kathaṃ nu tad vijānīyām,
kim u bhāti vibhāti vā.
15. *Na tatra sūryo bhāti, na candra-tāraḥ,*
na jīmā vidyuto bhānti, kuto 'yam agniḥ ;
Tam-eva bhāntam anubhāti sarvaṃ,
tasya bhāsā sarvaṃ idaṃ vibhāti.

14.d. One Ms. : *na bhāti vā.*

The Light of the World.

14. "This is that"—thus they recognise,
The supreme indescribable bliss.
How then may I come to know this ?
Does it shine, or does it reflect ?
15. There shines not sun, nor moon, nor any star ;
These lightnings shine not, how then could this fire ?
Him, the resplendent, everything reflects,
His shining only all this world illumines.

14. Recognising that this, the Inner-soul, the Dweller in the innermost, the Spirit, is that supreme Reality of which they are in search, the wise or steadfast taste supreme bliss. But how can one know the supreme Reality ? Ordinary knowledge takes place when objects reflect back the light of the mind. Is the Supreme Being such an object or do those who have been prepared know it through its own self-luminous manifestation ? (N.B.—This involves taking *vibhāti* here as equivalent to *anubhāti*—reflect.)

15. No earthly light can illumine the Supreme for He is the source of all light. So our knowledge cannot find Him out except as He communicates himself as "the master-light of all our seeing." Cf. *Revelation* xxi. 23.

॥ षष्ठी वल्ली ॥

ऊर्ध्वमूलोऽवाक्प्राख एषोऽश्वत्यः सनातनः ।

तदेव शुक्रं तद्ब्रह्म तदेवामृतमुच्यते ।

तस्मिँल्लोकाः श्रिताः सर्वे तद् नात्येति कश्चन ।

एतद्वैतत् ॥ १ ॥

यदिदं किञ्च जगत्सर्वं प्राण एजति निःसृतम् ।

महद्भयं वक्षमुद्यतं य एतदिदुरमृतास्ते भवन्ति ॥ २ ॥

भयादस्याग्निस्तपति भयात्तपति सूर्यः ।

भयादिन्द्रश्च वायुश्च मृत्युर्धावति पञ्चमः ॥ ३ ॥

Ṣaṣṭhī Vallī.

1. *Ūrdhva-mūlo 'vāk-sākha*
eṣo 'śvatthaḥ sanātanaḥ ;
Tad-eva śukraṃ tad brahma
tad-eva amṛtam ucyate,
Tasmīn lokāḥ śritāḥ sarve,
tad-u na atyeti kaścana :
Etad vai tat.
2. *Yad idaṃ kiñca jagat sarvaṃ*
prāṇe jati niḥśṛtam ;
Mahad bhayaṃ vajram udyataṃ ;
ye etad vidur amṛtās te bhavanti.
3. *Bhayād asya agnis tapati,*
bhayāt tapati sūryaḥ ;
Bhayād indras-ca vāyus-ca
mṛtyur dhāvati pañcamah.

SIXTH VALLĪ.

The World Tree.

1. With root above and branches down
 Is this eternal pipal tree.
 That is the Pure ; that is Brahman,
 That indeed is called the Immortal ;
 On that do all the worlds depend ;
 Beyond it none soever goes.
 This truly is that.

A picture is here drawn of an *āsvattha* or pipal tree (*Ficus religiosa*) with its root upward, presumably out of sight, and its branches hanging down¹. The question arises, what is the point of comparison? Is the whole tree compared to Brahman? This seems the most natural interpretation if we take this verse alone into account. Taken however in conjunction with the next verse which says that the whole world springs from Brahman, we judge, with Śaṅkara, that the unseen root represents Brahman.

Śaṅkara says that the tree represents the world of experience (*samsāra*), and the object of this *vallī* is to ascertain the nature of Brahman, the root or cause, by examining the nature of the effect, i.e. the tree of the world. If so one would expect the root to be of the same essential nature as the tree. Yet in describing the tree he says, The tree of *samsāra*, always shaking to the wind of desire, like the *āsvattha* tree, has as its branches all the worlds (heaven, the world of the fathers, the world of men, etc.)—with nests thereon built by the birds (i.e. all living beings), reverberating with the singing, laughing and crying produced by mirth and grief, ... changes in its nature every moment, like jugglery, like a mirage, like cloud-cities

¹ Some confusing the pipal with the banyan have supposed that "branches down" refers to the aerial rootlets of the banyan which drop down from its branches. Hill also commenting on this passage as partially quoted in *Gītā* xv. (p. 236) is very anxious to turn the tree right side up. This seems only to detract from a striking simile.

in the sky, and ultimately vanishes, cut down by the sword of the realisation of the *Paramātman*.

But if the tree is so unreal, what of its root? That root is said to be the Highest Brahman yet in the same breath the tree is said to be produced from the seed of Ignorance (*avidyā*). That is the fitting source for such a tree. The reality of the world is very explicitly taught in the next verse.

The Great Fear.

2. The whole world, whatever here exists,
In Life originates and moves :
A great fear! An upraised thunder-bolt!—
Those who know that become immortal.
3. Through fear of Him the Fire burns ;
Through fear (of Him) the Sun gives heat ;
Through fear, Indra and Vāyu both,
With Death as fifth, speed on their way.

2, 3. Here Brahman is described as the *mysterium tremendum*, the source and the moving energy of the universe. He is called *Prāṇa*—Life-force (*élan vital*) and the universe is said to originate (literally, “be emitted”—*niḥśṛtam*) from Him and to continue to move (vibrate or tremble—*ejati*) in Him. Evolution is no mechanical process,—the world trembles with awe as it moves to obey that Living One on whom it depends.

Verse 3 is very similar to *Tait. ii. 8. 1*

Bhīṣāsmād vātaḥ pavate, bhīṣāudeti sūryaḥ.

“Through fear of Him the Wind doth blow,
Through fear of Him the Sun doth rise,
Through fear of Him, Fire and the Moon,
With Death as fifth speed on their way.”

Note on page 187.

4. *śakat*, 2 aor. of *sak*, to be able, have power. So, “If a man has been able to know”. *Tattvabhusan* says, *śakat*=*na śakat* (*saknuyāt*) and translates, “If anyone fails to know it”. So too *Sarvananda* “*śakat*=become unable”. But this is a grammatical *tour de force*. *visras*, V.=falling, decay, dissolution (fr. *srams* to fall). *visrasaḥ* (abl.) *prāk*=C. Sk. *visrasanāt pūrvam*.

इह चेदशकद्भोजं प्राक्शरीरस्य विस्वसः ।
 ततः सर्गेषु लोकेषु शरीरत्वाय कल्पते ॥ ४ ॥
 यथादर्शं तथात्मनि यथा स्वप्ने तथा पित्रलोके ।
 यथाप्सु परीव ददृशे तथा गन्धर्वलोके ।
 छायातपयोरिव ब्रह्मलोके ॥ ५ ॥

4. *Iha ced aśakad boddhum
 prāk śarīrasya visrasaḥ,
 Tataḥ sargeṣu lokeṣu
 śarīratvāya kalpate.*
5. *Yathā (ā)darśe tathā (ā)tmani,
 yathā svapne tathā pitṛloke,
 Yathā 'psu pari_iva dadṛśe
 tathā gandharva-loke,
 Chāyā-tapayor-iva brahma-loke.*

4.c. One *Ms. sarveṣu kāleṣu* (Weber, I.S., 196);
 Böhlingk, *svargeṣu lokeṣu*;
 Geldner, *sarveṣu lokeṣu*.

Degrees in the vision of Brahman.

4. If here a man has come to know (Him),
 Ere the falling of the body,
 Then in the created worlds,*
 He partakes embodiment.
5. As in a mirror, so (it is seen) in the soul;
 As in a dream, so in the Fathers' world;
 Just as if seen in the waters,
 So in the Gandharva world;
 As in shadow and light (it is seen) in the Brahma-world.

* Or, Then within the heavenly worlds.

4. *śarīratvāya kalpate* may mean "he is fit for embodiment", but *kīp* with the dative commonly means "to partake of".

For *sargeṣu* we may amend to *svargeṣu*,—"in the heavenly worlds",—a much more suitable meaning. There is, however, no *MSS.* support and one wonders why such an obvious reading should have been changed

to one more difficult. The same remark applies to Geldner's emendation. He reads *sarveṣu* and emphasises the possible idea of fitness contained in *kalpate*, rendering,

Then indeed in every world,
He is fit to bear a body.

If we keep the reading *sargeṣu*, we may understand it as meaning "other" (and higher) created worlds, e.g. those enumerated in the next verse. Either of these interpretations however only mitigates the difficulty that this verse contradicts the theory that knowledge of Brahman produces release from reincarnation immediately after death.

Śaṅkara attempts to avoid the difficulty by treating the verse as containing an *ellipsis* and renders as follows: "If here, in this life, a man is able to know the awe-inspiring Brahman before the falling of the body, he is freed from the bond of *samsāra*: if he is not able to know, then, for lack of knowledge, he takes embodiment in earth and other created worlds". This, however, quite changes the meaning, and it would be better frankly to emend the text and supply a negative. Max Müller says, "I doubt whether it is possible to supply so much (as Śaṅkara), and should prefer to read, *iha cen nāśakāḥ*, though I find it difficult to explain why so simple a text should have been misunderstood and corrupted". Ranade (U.P. 327) also reads a negative—"Unless a man can know Him". This certainly seems the simplest way to deal with the text.

Another way to deal with the text is to understand it (as Deussen does) as teaching *krama-mukti* (salvation by stages). If a man can know Brahman (e.g. by scripture and works) even though he has not attained to that intuitive vision of Him in his own soul which is attained through *adhyātma-yoga*, he enters on the *devayāna*, or path of the gods, from which there is no return to earth and which leads gradually to the Brahma-world. The difficulty of this interpretation is that it would require us to take the *Pitṛ-loka* and the *Gandharva-loka* of the next verse as stages on the path. But the *Pitṛ-loka* or world of the Fathers is usually represented as the terminus of the other path,—the *pitṛyāna*, by which, after a period in the world of the Fathers (usually pictured as the moon) souls return to re-incarnation on earth. This difficulty may perhaps be surmounted by regarding our text as following *Kauṣītaki* 1. 2, which represents all souls as first going to the moon (or *pitṛ-loka*), some returning thence to earth but others going thence by the *devayāna* through the worlds of Agni, Vāyu, Varuṇa, Indra and Prajāpati to the Brahma-world.

The *Gandharvas* ("angels") are spirits which, in the *R̥g Veda*, are said to dwell in the fathomless spaces of air (*R̥g VIII. 65. 5*), but they are also associated with the sun and in *Atharva Veda IV. 34. 3* the blest are said to live with them in heaven. In *Bṛ. IV. 3. 33*, we are told that the bliss of the world of the Fathers is a hundred times the highest bliss of men; the bliss of the Gandharva-world is a hundred

fold that of the Fathers' world; the bliss of the gods by works a hundred-fold that of the Gandharva-world; the bliss of the gods by birth is a hundred-fold that of the gods by works of merit. Again the bliss of the Prajāpati-world is a hundred-fold that of the gods by birth, and the bliss of the Brahma-world and of him who is learned in the Vedas, without crookedness and free from desire, is a hundred-fold the bliss of the Prajāpati-world. Here we have a series of stages which may be stages on the *devayāna* corresponding in some degree with that in *Kauṣ* I. 3, and our text may give a similar but abbreviated series. Further our text is almost certainly connected with *Bṛ. IV. 4. 4.*—"As a goldsmith taking a piece of gold, reduces it to other and more beautiful forms, just so this soul, striking down the body and dispelling its ignorance, makes for itself other and more beautiful forms, like those of the Fathers, or the Gandharvas, or the gods, or Prajāpati or Brahmā".

But though it is possible to regard verse 4 as referring to *krama-mukti*, it is clear from verse 5 that this method of salvation is not taught in the sense of recommended. Almost in the spirit of an evangelical preacher, warning those who would put off the business of salvation to some purgatorial world hereafter, our text says in effect, "Now is the day of salvation". For, as Śaṅkara says, Here, in this world, the vision of the Ātman may be as clearly visible as one's own face reflected in a mirror, but not in other worlds except the Brahma-world. Just as in a mirror one sees oneself very clearly reflected, so here, in the soul, i.e. in one's own purified intelligence, a clear vision of the Self may be obtained. As in a dream perception is confused, so indistinct is the vision of the Self in the world of the Fathers (because one is engrossed in the enjoyment of the fruit of one's deeds). Just as in water one sees as if an image of oneself with the parts not clearly defined, so is Self-vision in the Gandharva-world. It is only in the Brahma-world that a vision may be attained clearer than that possible on earth, and that world is hard to reach. The meaning is, therefore, that one should seek to attain the vision of the Self here and now.

इन्द्रियाणां पृथग्भावमुदयास्तमयौ च यत् ।

पृथगुत्पद्यमानानां मत्वा घौरो न श्लोचति ॥ ६ ॥

इन्द्रियेभ्यः परं मनो मनसः सत्त्वमुत्तमम् ।

सत्त्वादधि महानात्मा महतोऽव्यक्तमुत्तमम् ॥ ७ ॥

अव्यक्तात्त परः पुरुषो व्यापकोऽलिक एव च ।

यं ज्ञात्वा मुच्यते जन्तुरमृतत्वं च गच्छति ॥ ८ ॥

6. *Indriyāṅām pṛthag-bhāvam,
udayāstamayau ca yat,
Pṛthag-utpadyamānānām,
matvā dhīro na śocati.*
7. *Indriyebhyaḥ paraṃ mano,
manasaḥ sattvam uttamam ;
Sattvād adhi mahān ātmā,
mahato 'vyaktam uttamam.*
8. *Avyaktāt-tu paraḥ puruṣo,
vyāpako 'līṅga eva ca,
Yaṃ jñātvā mucyate jantur,
amṛtatvaṃ ca gacchati.*

**The order of progression to the inmost Self,—
to the highest Person.**

6. The separate nature of the senses,
And that their rising and setting
Is of things produced separately (from the self),
The wise man notes and does not grieve.
7. Beyond the senses is the mind,
Higher than mind is its essence (*sattva*, i.e. reason)
Above that essence is the great self (*mahān ātmā*)
Higher than the Great—the Unexpressed (*avyakta*)
8. Beyond the Unexpressed is the Person, (*puruṣa*)
All-pervading and bodiless, (*alīṅga*)
By knowing whom a man is freed,
And goes to immortality.

6. How then is the vision of Brahman to be realised in the mirror of the soul? The first thing is to recognise that the senses and their objects are quite distinct from the self. Their fluctuation does not trouble the wise and steadfast man. Verses 7-9 are practically a repetition in slightly modified form of iii. 10-12, and our verse stands to them in the same relation as the Parable of the Chariot stands to iii. 10-12. *Rising and setting*: i.e. activity and its cessation in the waking

and sleeping states. *Things separately produced* : i.e. the senses are regarded as produced from the subtle elements and not from the self, of which they form the instruments.

This verse lends itself naturally to a Sāṃkhya interpretation:—the senses belonging to the sphere of *prakṛti*, the first essential to the attainment of salvation, which consists in *kaivalya* is the recognition of their total separateness from the *puruṣa*. We have already discussed, however, whether a distinctively Sāṃkhya interpretation of iii. 10, 11, is permissible and decided in the negative. The arguments apply here also.

7, 8. Comparing the series here given with that in iii. 10, 11, we note (1) the omission of the sense-objects, (2) *sattva* corresponds to *buddhi*, i.e. reason or intelligence. *Sattva* is either used here untechnically in its primary sense of essence or reality, reason constituting the essence of mind; or semi-technically, the *buddhi* being called *sattva* because in it the *guṇa* or quality of "goodness" predominates. But with this very doubtful exception there is no trace of the Sāṃkhya doctrine of the *guṇas* (*sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*) before the much later *Maitrī Upaniṣad*.

The Alīṅga Puruṣa :

The highest being is here called the *alīṅga puruṣa*. The word '*liṅga*' has two main meanings :

(1) A mark or sign, particularly a characteristic or distinctive mark. Later special applications of this meaning are—

(a) to distinctive sex marks,—so the word is applied to the outward male generative organ, the phallus ;

(b) as a logical term *liṅga* means an invariable sign which is a basis of inference.

(2) The subtle body (*sūkṣma śarīra*),—the transmigrating entity consisting of *buddhi*, *aḥamkāra*, *manas*, *indriyāṇi*, and subtle elements. (This is the sense of the term in the Sāṃkhya philosophy but it is used in the other systems also.) Derivatorily—

(a) it sometimes seems to be used in the general sense of 'body' ;

(b) it may be applied to anything 'perishable'.

Alīṅga may have a corresponding variety of meaning¹ but there are two main meanings, (1) without distinctive mark, (2) without subtle body or psychic apparatus.

In seeking to determine the meaning here we note that this

seems to be the first occurrence of the term. Rather later occurrences are *Muṇḍ.* iii. 2. 4 and *Maitri* vi. 31 ; vi. 35 ; vii. 2, in all of which the first meaning is most suitable. *Līṅga* occurs in the sense of 'mark' or 'characteristic' in *Maitri* ii. 5 ; v. 2 ; vi. 30. 31 ; *Gītā* xiv. 21, and in the sense of 'subtle body', *Śvet.* vi. 9 (probably) ; *Maitri* vi. 10. 19. There is however a very important earlier usage in the famous transmigration verse, *Br.* iv. 4. 6, and as the *Kaṭha* refers repeatedly to this section of the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* it probably may be taken as determinative of the meaning here.

Tad-eva saktāḥ saḥakarmanā_eti,
Līṅgaṃ mano yatra niṣaktam asya.

"Where a man's mind and *līṅga* (subtle body, i.e. whole psychic disposition are fixed, there he goes, together with his work, being attached to that alone." Here '*līṅgam*' seems clearly to refer to the transmigrating entity. Deussen, commenting on this verse (P.U. 282), says, "Here we meet, apparently already a technical term, the word *līṅgam*, by which the adherents of the Sāṃkhya were accustomed later to denote the subtle body." It is perhaps to be taken in the same meaning in *Kaṭh.* vi. 8, and *Śvet.* vi. 9, where moreover the ātman is described as "Lord of the lord of the senses", i.e. lord of the subtle body. Keith (S.S. 18) partially disagrees, preferring to adopt the meaning, "bearing a characteristic mark" in *Br.* iv. 4. 6, but says that *Kaṭha* vi. 8 and *Śvet.* vi. 9 may refer to the 'subtle body'. In his later R.P.V. (565), however, he says, "The term *līṅga* is apparently used technically to denote the entity which transmigrates as early as the *Kaṭha* at least."

We take it then that the meaning is that while the individual self or person has a psychic organisation (reason, mind, senses) which of itself may be perishable, deep within it, constituting its ultimate reality, there is another Person, which needs no such psychic organs and is not subject to transmigration or decay. Truly knowing that Highest Person the individual self shares in His immortality.

If however the other meaning is preferred (i.e. 'without mark') we should note that this passage cannot be taken as supporting the doctrine of a characterless Absolute, which

could not by any possibility be known. Even Śaṅkara says,² "He is called *aliṅga*, meaning devoid of all *empirical* attributes".³ And the *Maitri Upaniṣad* which takes *aliṅga* in the sense of 'without marks', speaks of "the mark of Him who is without marks" and says, "He is to be apprehended by his own peculiar marks" (vi. 31). "He verily is pure, clean, tranquil, undecaying, eternal, etc." (ii. 4).

¹ Here are some of the renderings of *aliṅga* given by different translators: Hume: "Without any mark"; Sitarama Sastri: "Devoid of distinctive marks"; Mead: "Far beyond distinction's power"; Max Müller: "Entirely imperceptible"; Tattvabhusan: "*asarīra*" ("bodiless"). Deussen (S.U. 286) says that it may mean either (1) "without mark" (ohne Merkmale), (2) "imperishable" (unvergänglich), or (3) "devoid of a subtle body" (ohne feinen Leib).

² Śaṅkara's comment is as follows:—

Avyaktāt tu paraḥ puruṣo vyūpako, vyūpakasya apy ākāśādeḥ sarvasya kāraṇatvāt. Aliṅgaḥ—liṅgyate gamyate yena tal-liṅgaḥ—buddhyādi, tad-avidyamānam asya, iti so'yaṁ aliṅga eva. Sarva-saṁsāra-dharma-varjīta ity etat. Yaṁ jñātvā, ācāryataḥ śāstrataśca mucyate jantur avidyādi-hṛdaya-granthibhir jīvanneva, patite 'pi śarīre 'mṛtatvaṁ ca gaṇchati.

"Beyond the *Avyakta* is the Puruṣa called 'all-pervading' because it is the cause of all things like the ether which are all-pervading. Re. *aliṅga*—that by which anything is reached or known is *liṅga*,—such as the *buddhi*, etc. and just because of its absence in His case He is called *aliṅga*. The meaning is, He is devoid of all empirical attributes. Knowing Him through teacher and scripture, even while living a man is freed from the knots of the heart, beginning with Ignorance, and when the body falls he goes to immortality."

³ The Śiva-liṅga: Though unnecessary for the interpretation of this passage it is interesting to note that while we have here a statement that the Highest Person is *aliṅga*, and while the *Svetāśvatara* some hundred years or so later identifies that Highest Person with Maheśvara-Śiva and says, *naśva-ca tasya liṅgaḥ*, "He has no liṅga at all", India is now full of stone liṅgas or phallic emblems of Śiva. It is true that as we have seen *Svet.* vi. 9, uses *liṅga* in a different sense, but it could hardly have made the statement if the author were familiar with the stone phallus as an emblem of Śiva. Bhandarkar, V.S. 114, says that he could find no trace in literature of the Śiva-liṅga as an object of worship before the late *Anuśāsana-parvan* of the *Mahābhārata* (? c. 300 A.D.). He considers that it was borrowed by the Āryas from the aborigines of the sub-Himalayan forest region (Vrātyas, Niṣādas, etc.).

न संदृशे तिलुति रूपमस्य न चक्षुषा पश्यति कश्चनैनम् ।

हृदा मनोषा मनसाऽभिकूलतो य एतद्विदुरमृतास्ते भवन्ति ॥ ९ ॥

9. *Na samdr̥śe tiṣṭhati rūpam asya,
na cakṣuṣā paśyati kaścana enam :
Hṛdā maṇiṣā manasā 'bhikūpto,
ye etad vidur amṛtās te bhavanti.*

Inner Vision.

9. Not in the field of vision stands His form,
By outward eye no one soever sees Him :
By heart, by thought, by the mind apprehended :
Those who know Him thereby become immortal.

9. *Of. Taittiriya Āraṇyaka, x. 1. 3, and also, (probably quoted from the Katha), Svet. iii. 13 ; iv. 17 ; Mahān. i. 11.*

9. This verse is one of the most striking in the Upaniṣad. Negatively, the first half insists on the utter impossibility of forming a visual image of the Supreme Person ; positively, the second half insists with equal emphasis that there is a way by which the Supreme Person may be apprehended or known. "By heart, by thought, by the mind apprehended."

The Heart (hṛd) is in Vedic usage the seat of the emotions and mental activities. No antithesis is therefore intended between heart and mind (in its wider sense). The reference is not to a merely emotional religious experience but to an apprehension or intuition of the supreme reality which involves the whole self through the *yoga*, i.e. yoking or concentrated direction of all its powers. The apprehension by the heart referred to here, then, is something which goes beyond the mere processes of the understanding. "Not by learning or power of intellect (*medhā*) is this Self to be obtained. Only by the man whom He chooses is He obtainable. To him the Self reveals His person." But though mere intellect can never attain Him, nevertheless intelligence or reason is not superseded. "By thought, by mind He is apprehended."

Maniṣā is a Vedic word meaning "reflective thought". Śāṅkara interprets as *vikalpa-varjita-buddhi*,—"Intelligence freed from false notions, ruling as controller of the purposive mind".

(Note that in V.Sk. the *inst.* of *maniṣā* has the same form as the nom. In C.Sk. it would be *maniṣayā*.)

Manas (see p. 124) in V.Sk. does not mean merely the organ of sense-perception as in later Sāṅkhya and Vedānta usage, or as in the parable of the chariot and the scale of the faculties, iii. 10 ff. and vi. 7, but is often used in a wider sense. It is in this wider sense it is used here and is evidently intended to be synonymous with *maniṣā*. Śāṅkara interprets as *manana-rūpeṇa samyagdarśana*—"true insight in the form of meditation".

Abhikṣpta (apprehended): A common V. use of the root *kṣp* is in the sense 'to share or partake of' (e.g. *yajño deveṣu kalpatām*, "Let the sacrifice be partaken by the gods"). Śāṅkara explains as *abhisamarthita*, *abhiprakāśita*, i.e. 'realised' or 'revealed'.

Śāṅkara does not attempt to explain away the force of this verse. Instead he says, "The *Ātman* can be known, should be added to complete the sentence" (i.e. "Being realised by heart, thought and mind the *ātman* can be known").

Rāmānuja has a very illuminating reference to our text in its relation to others of similar import in *Śrībhāṣya* i. 4 (Sk. text, 159). "I maintain that by such scripture texts as the following,—'He should be heard (i.e. through scripture), reflected on, steadily meditated upon' (*Bṛ. ii. 4. 5*); 'He who knows Brahman obtains the highest' (*Tait. ii. 1. 1*); 'Not by the eye is He apprehended nor yet by speech' (*Muṣ. iii. 1. 8*) but by a pure mind; "By heart, by thought, by mind, He is apprehended"—it is proved that through the injunction of meditation (*dhyāna-niyoga*) the mind becomes pure, and that the mind so purified gives rise to direct (intuitive) knowledge of Brahman" (*Nirmalaṃ ca mano Brahma aparokṣa-jñānaṃ janayati*).

Compare the greatly simple words of Jesus, "Blessed are the pure in heart, for they shall see God".

यदा पञ्चावतिष्ठन्ते ज्ञानानि मनसा सह ।
 बुद्धिश्च न विचेष्टति तामाहुः परमां गतिम् ॥ १० ॥
 तां योगमिति मन्यन्ते स्थिरामिन्द्रियधारणाम् ।
 अग्रमत्तस्तदा भवति योगो हि प्रभवाप्ययौ ॥ ११ ॥

10. *Yadā pañca avatiṣṭhante
 jñānāni manasā saha,
 Buddhiś-ca na viceṣṭati¹
 Tām āhuḥ paramāṃ gatim.*
11. *Tāṃ yogam iti manyante,
 sthīrām indriya-dhāraṇām ;
 Apramattas tadā bhavati,
 yogo hi prabhavāpyayau.*

The Way of Yoga further expounded.

10. When the five means of knowledge rest,
 Together with the knowing mind,
 And intellect no longer strives,—
 That is, they say, the highest way.
11. This they consider as Yoga,—
 The firm control of the senses :
 Then one becomes concentrated,
 For Yoga is acquired and lost.²

¹ C. *viceṣṭate*.

² Or, Yoga is creation and passing away,
 or, Yoga is beginning and end.

Yoga: In ii. 12, in the phrase *adhyātma-yoga*, we have the first usage of the word “*yoga*” in the Upaniṣads in a philosophical or religious sense. The verse emphasised as strongly as possible the utter mystery and inaccessibility of the supreme being yet stated that He might be perceived through *adhyātma-yoga*. This theme is taken up and expounded in the Parable of the Chariot and throughout the third valli. The word *yoga* is not used, but the nature of *yoga* is expressed when it is said

that the senses and all the powers of one's nature must be yoked (*yukta*) so that there may be complete restraint or control of the lower by the higher,—the object being the direction and concentration of our whole being upon the goal,—the realisation of that Highest Person who is also our inmost self. Vallis iv and v emphasise this identity in various ways and point out as a prerequisite to Self-realisation what the later Yoga calls *pratyāhāra*—the turning aside of the senses, and mind from outward objects with a view to inner concentration. This is the state referred to in verse 10.

In verse 11, *Yoga* is defined as *indriya-dhāraṇā*,—the holding firm of the senses (including the mind). The term is probably here used non-technically, and means very much the same as the yoking and restraint (*yama, niyama*) of the senses in valli iii. In the developed Yoga however, as set forth in the *Yoga-sūtras* of Patañjali (c. iv century A.D.) the eight parts or *aṅgas* of *yoga* are said to be: *yama, niyama, āsana, prāṇāyāma, pratyāhāra, dhāraṇā, dhyāna, samādhi*. Here *yama* has become specialised to mean 'abstinence' from injury, falsehood, theft, incontinence, and greed, and *niyama* means such positive religious duties as cleanliness of body and mind, contentment, austerity, study and devotion to God.¹ *Āsana* of course refers to bodily postures and *prāṇāyāma* to the control of breathing, subjects to which the later Yoga devoted disproportionate attention. These are aids to *pratyāhāra* and so to *dhāraṇā*, with which *yoga* in its higher sense begins. This is the concentration of the mind in fixed attention upon some symbol or object. In its higher stage it passes into *dhyāna*,—meditation or contemplation, when the object thought of completely occupies the mind, and this again into *samādhi* when one is so absorbed in the object that one loses sight of oneself.

Eight centuries intervene between the first exposition of *Yoga* in the *Kaṭha Upaniṣad* and its full formulation in the *Yoga-sūtras*, so that one obviously ought not to be particularly guided in one's interpretation of the former by the latter. It is fairly certain, however, that the *aṣṭāṅga-yoga* is much earlier than its formulation in the *Sūtras*, and in any case it is of interest to note its relation to *yoga* as set forth in our text.

¹ *Sūtra* ii. 29 (Woods, 177 ff.).

Apramatta : Resuming our exegesis : As a result of the *yoga* which consists in *dhāraṇā*,—steady control, one is said to become *apramatta* (concentrated). This too is a technical Yoga term. In *Yoga-sūtra* i. 30, *pramāda*, literally “intoxication”, “excitement”, but generally used in the sense of “carelessness” is mentioned as one of the distractions that stand in the way of *yoga*. *Apramatta* occurs *Ch.* i. 3. 12 and ii. 22. 2 in the sense “careful”, “intent”. In *Muṇḍ.* ii. 2. 4, it is used of undistracted or concentrated attention to one’s aim. “The *praṇava* (*Om*) is the bow, the arrow is the soul, Brahman is called the mark. By the ‘undistracted’ man it should be pierced : like an arrow he should become one with it.” *Śvet.* ii. 8, *mano dhārayeta apramattah*, is obviously a development of our passage : “Like a chariot yoked with vicious horses a wise man should control the mind, being ‘undistracted’.” *Apramatta* then means as Śaṅkara says, negatively, free from carelessness and distraction, and positively, constant endeavour toward complete concentration (*apramattah—pramāda-varjitaḥ, samādhānaṃ prati nityam prayatnavān*).

It is of interest to note the central importance of *apramāda* (Pāli, *appamādo*) in Buddhist ethics. All the virtues are said to have their root in it.¹ (Fausböll translates it by ‘*vigilantia*’; Max Müller, ‘earnestness’; Saunders, ‘zeal’; I suggest ‘keenness’.) The whole of the second chapter of the *Dhammapada* (called by Barua the *Apramāda-vaga*²), is concerned with this root virtue. It begins, in the Pāli version,

Appamādo amata-padam, pamādo maccuno padam ;
Apamattā na mīyanti, ye pamattā yathā matā.

“Keeness is the way of immortality, slackness the way of death ;

The keen never die, the slack are as if dead already.”

The *Dhammapada* seems to have been accepted at the Council of Asoka in 240 B.C. as a collection of the sayings of Gautama Buddha, and certainly this chapter breathes the spirit of the Buddha and also of his kingly disciple, with his continual exhortation, “Let everyone exert themselves, both small and great.”³

It is further of interest to note that *apramāda* is one of the

three virtues which, according to the short summary of the ethical requirements of the early Bhāgavata faith, given in the second part of the Besnagar pillar inscription (c. 180 B.C.), "lead to heaven".

*Nayaṃti svaga dama cāga (i.e. tyāga) apramāda.*⁴

"Self-control, self-denial, and keen concentration lead to heaven." Though the *Kaṭha Upaniṣad* is not specifically a Bhāgavata or Vaiṣṇava work it is, we hold, on the general line of development of thought which connects *Chāndogya iii. 17* with the Besnagar inscription and the *Gītā*.

Further, on this line of development it is clear that Buddhism is not, as once supposed, an intrusion. The Buddhist ethics and Buddha's own living example help to provide the foundation for the ethical *yoga* here set forth. We may also surmise that the second *adhyaṃya* of the *Kaṭha* may be Asokan in date, though there is no real proof of this.

Yogo hi prabhava_apyayau : The fourth line gives a reason for the concentration of attention,—literally "Yoga is an arising and passing away", the meaning of which is ambiguous.

(1) Śāṅkara says, *Yogo hi yasmāt prabhava_apyayau—upajana-apāyadharmakaḥ—iti arthaḥ*. "Because yoga has the attributes of being acquired and being lost. Hence the meaning is that to avoid the risk of losing it vigilance is necessary." Hence, following Śāṅkara, Max Müller translates, "For Yoga comes and goes", and Sadananda and Sitarama Sastri, "For yoga can be acquired and lost". The difficulty some have found is that the essential characteristic of *yoga* is defined at the beginning of the *Yoga-sūtra* as "the restriction of the fluctuations of the mind" (*Yogas citta-vṛtti-nirodhaḥ*). How can this be if yoga itself fluctuates?

¹ *Ye keci kusala dhamma sabbe te appamāda-mūlakā*. Note on *Dhammapada*, S.B.E., X., p. 9.

² Barua and Mitra, *Prākṛit Dhammapada*, 119 ff.

³ Read the whole chapter, Max Müller's *Dhammapada*, S.B.E., X., 9-11, or Wāgīswara and Saunders, *The Buddha's Way of Virtue*, 24, 25.

⁴ Raychaudhuri, *Early History of the Vaiṣṇava Sect*, 59. J.R.A.S. 1909, pp. 1051-6, 1087-94.

Even if with Patañjali we regard *Yoga* simply as mental concentration the difficulty is more dialectical than real. The mind of the *Yogin* is liable to fluctuation and therefore his degree of attainment of *yoga*. As the *Yoga-bhāṣya* (i. 14) says, "Practice when it has been cultivated for a long time and carried out with self-castigation and continence, with knowledge and with faith,—in a word, with earnest attention,—becomes confirmed",—not otherwise. Ignorance, egoism, desire, aversion and attachment are the five obstacles at the beginning of the path, but not at the beginning only: in various forms they recur,—for every stage of the path there is its own obstacle, and the greater the restraint the greater may be the recoil. Self-complacency, leading to heedlessness, is the most deadly spiritual foe. So in *Yoga-bhāṣya* ii. 34, the devotee in whose mind resentment at injury may arise is bidden to reflect, "Baked in the terrific fire of transmigration I have taken refuge in the virtue of yoga through charity and love to all beings. So if I revert to questionable paths after giving them up, I am a miserable cur, reverting as a dog to its vomit."

But the *Yoga* of the *Kaṭha Upaniṣad* differs from Patañjali's *Yoga* and is not definable as *citta-vṛtti-nirodhaḥ*. There are of course points of agreement, and Patañjali and his successors develop one side of the *Kaṭha* teaching in a way that is worthy of the attention of all aspirants after spiritual discipline. But the *Yoga-sūtra* and *bhāṣya* are painfully lacking in religious motive. True, devotion to God is mentioned along with asceticism and study as a means of attainment, but God has very little real importance in the system. The *Yoga* of the *Kaṭha*, on the other hand, is distinctively religious. It includes mental concentration and the firm control of sense and appetite, but recognises that this can only be accomplished by yoking the soul in communion with the Supreme Self. Now religious communion notoriously 'comes and goes'. It cannot, here in this life at least, remain on one level. Hence the higher we rise the greater the need for keen and vigilant attention. "Watch and pray" said, Jesus, "that ye enter not into temptation," for the tighter we hold the reins of the senses, the greater the danger of reaction unless we vigilantly maintain that communion through which alone our strength comes.

(2) Another type of interpretation of the phrase *Yogo hi prabhava apyayau* is indicated by Hume's rendering, "Yoga is the origin and end", and Deussen's, "Yoga is creation and passing away".¹ These we reject as involving much later ideas which are foreign to the *Kātha*.

(a) Commenting on his rendering, "Yoga is the origin and the end" Hume says, "Perhaps of 'the world' of beings and experiences,— here too, as in *Māṇḍ* 6, where the phrase occurs. That is: the 'world' becomes created for the person when he emerges from the Yoga state, and passes away when he enters into it". The *Māṇḍūkya* says, "This self is Brahman, This self has four fourths, i.e. the waking state, the dreaming state, the state of deep sleep and 'the fourth'." Concerning the self in the third state (*susupta-sthāna*) it is said, "This is Lord of all, this is the all-knowing, this is the inner-controller, this is the source of all, for it is the origin and end of all beings". (*Ēṣa yoniḥ sarvasya, prabhavāpyayau hi bhūtānām.*) The self in the fourth state is described as unthinkable, ungraspable, completely one without a second. For the self in the fourth state then, in that complete *samādhi* in which yoga culminates, there is no world. But when the self passes back into the third state then the world is created in consciousness.

This doctrine of absolute idealism, however, is not the doctrine of the *Kātha Upaniṣad* but is a later development.

(b) Deussen gives a similar rendering: "Yoga is creation and passing away", and comments, The world sinks down in Yoga and again is created afresh". He refers however not to the *Māṇḍūkya* passage but to *Yoga-sūtra* i. 35, which reads, "He (the Yogin) gains stability when a sense-activity arises connected with an object, bringing the central organ (*citta*) into a relation of stability", i.e. an object is needed on which to focus attention. Then, says the *Yoga-bhāṣya*, the Yogin will without hindrance acquire faith and energy and mindfulness and concentration (*samādhi*). But though a lower *samādhi* may be thus acquired, in the higher *samādhi* all consciousness of objects is transcended.

All this, however, is Patañjali's Yoga and is a later development.

(c) A third and quite different interpretation of the rendering "Yoga is the origin and the end", is possible, i.e. that Yoga in its various stages is both the alpha and omega of religion. A similar idea is expressed about *bhakti* in the *Nārada-bhakti-sūtra*, 25, 26. "It is higher than *karman*, *jñāna* and *yoga*: because it is its own result". Also about 'faith' in *Romans* i. 17 where it is said of Christ's gospel that, "Therein is revealed a righteousness of God from faith unto faith."

This possibly is Whitney's interpretation when he translates "Yoga is beginning and end." The objection may be raised that *apyaya* does not mean 'end' in the sense of consummation, but if by *apyaya* we understand *brahmāpyaya* (see *Svet.* vi. 10) this may certainly be the meaning.

¹ *Yoga ist Schöpfung und vergang.*

(3) Geldner says, "For Yoga is an arising of a new inner-world and a passing away of the outer-world".¹ As an alternative to (1) this is probably best.

Whether one has in view (1) the fluctuating character, (2c) the importance, or (3) the difficulty, of Yoga, vigilant keenness is necessary.

नैव वाचा न मनसा प्राप्तुं शक्यो न चक्षुषा ।
अस्तीति ब्रुवतोऽन्यत्र कथं तदुपलभ्यते ॥ १२ ॥
अस्तीत्येवोपलब्धव्यस्तत्त्वभावेन चोभयोः ।
अस्तीत्येवोपलब्धस्य तत्त्वभावः प्रसिदति ॥ १३ ॥

12. *Na_eva_vācā_na_manasā
prāptuṃ_śakyo_na_cakṣuṣā ;
Asti_iti_bruvato_'nyatra
katham_tad_upalabhyate.*

13. *Asti_ity_eva_upalabdḥavyas,
tattva-bhāvena_ca_ubhayoḥ ;
Asti_ity_eva_upalabdhasya
tattva-bhāvaḥ_prasidati.*

Faith essential in Yoga.

12. Not by sight can one obtain Him,
Nor yet by speech or by the mind :
Except by* one who says, ' He is ',
How can He be experienced ?
13. He should be apprehended as " He is ",
And by His real nature,—in both ways :
When He is apprehended as " He is ",
His real nature is made manifest.

*Or, from (i.e. from a true guru).²

12. Hume's rendering, " How can He be apprehended otherwise than by one's saying ' He is ' ? " implies a Spencerian

¹ denn Yoga ist Entstehen (einer neuen Innenwelt) und Vergehen (der Aussenwelt). V. B. 168. ² See Appendix IV, p. 228.

agnosticism, i.e. the existence of the Absolute may be known but otherwise He is unknowable. Deussen's rendering is similar: "He is"—by this word alone, And in no other way is he comprehended". He treats the verse as a declaration that the *ātman* as knowing subject can never become an object for us, and is therefore itself unknowable. (P.U. 403, 4.)

This is surely to misinterpret the emphasis of the verse by ignoring the context. The general subject is the apprehension of the Highest Person through *yoga*,—it is admitted that He transcends the ordinary means of apprehension, and it is therefore urged that faith in His existence is an indispensable prerequisite to that immediate experience which comes by the way of *yoga*. As the writer of the *Epistle to the Hebrews* says, "He that cometh to God must believe that He is". Such faith is often criticised as an assumption at the start of that which we set out to discover: yet what adventures of discovery in science or in life start in any other way than with a conviction of the reality of that which is sought?

Śaṅkara's comment may be condensed as follows: True, Brahman cannot be apprehended by the senses or intellect as specifically this or that. Nevertheless since He is conceived as root or source of the universe He certainly exists (*jagato mūlam ity-avagatatvād asti eva*). The chain of effects being traced back and back leads to the conviction that real being must exist (i.e. the ontological postulate is inevitable: we cannot conceive of the world as produced from nothing). Those then who, following the general teaching of scripture and having faith, maintain His existence, are able to apprehend Him, but in the case of the atheist or nihilist (*nāstika-vādin*) who maintains that no *ātman*, the source of the world, exists, and that this world-effect, not being inseparably connected with a cause is absorbed into non-existence,—in the case of one who thus sees perversely how can Brahman be truly apprehended? It is obviously impossible.

Śaṅkara is here arguing against the atheism and nihilism of the Buddhist doctrine of *anātman* and exhibits a side of his teaching too often ignored by his European expositors: Śaṅkara the mystic and man of faith, as opposed to Śaṅkara the metaphysical agnostic.

13. The most obvious way of rendering the second line is "And by the real nature of both" (so Hume). So too Max Müller renders, "And by (admitting) the reality of both"; and Deussen, "In so far as he is the essence of both". But what in this case is meant by "both"? Two things have not been referred to, so the meaning is decidedly obscure. Inferring a meaning of "both" from the context Hume suggests that they are "his comprehensibility and incomprehensibility"; Max Müller, "the invisible Brahman and the visible world as coming from Brahman"; Mead, "*asti* and *nāsti*, *sat* and *asat*, the manifested and unmanifested aspects of Brahman"; most Indian commentators, "*ubhayoḥ* = *sopādhika-nirupādhikayoḥ*" (the qualified and unqualified Brahman).

Surely the plain antithesis of the text is between the *astitva* (existence) and the *tattva-bhāva* (essence, inner being or real nature) of the Supreme Being. These are the "both" referred to, and the whole difficulty disappears if *ubhayoḥ* is separated from *tattva-bhāvena-ca* and taken either (1) as a genitive expressing the agent (M. 202. 3)—"He should be apprehended as existent, and by His essential nature,—i.e. by both"; or (2) *ubhayoḥ* may be taken as Śaṅkara suggests as a definitive genitive (*nirāhāraṇārthā ṣaṣṭhī*),—

"He should be apprehended as existent,
And by His real nature: Re. these two—
When He is apprehended as existent
His real nature is made manifest."

Rational faith in the Divine existence should lead on to spiritual experience in which His nature is immediately revealed to and apprehended by the believer. This is the end or culmination of true *yoga* (spiritual yoking).

At first sight there seems to be a contradiction between verse 12 and verse 9 with its emphatic declaration that the Highest Person may be apprehended or realised "by the mind". This leads Ranade (U.P. 339, 340) to suggest that in verse 9 we should read a negative right through. "Never has any man been able to visualise God by sight, nor is it possible to realise Him either by the heart, or by the imagination, or by the mind. It is only those who know this sublime truth who become immortal." This is surely almost perversely gratuitous! *Manas* is in verse 12 used in its narrower meaning of the central organ of ordinary perception, while in verse 9 it is used in a much wider sense (see note on 9).

This verse brings to a point all that we have previously noted in the teaching of the Upaniṣad re: the knowability of Brahman. To recapitulate: II. 9 says that He is not to be obtained by argumentative reasoning (*tarka*) yet when taught by a fit *guru* He may be well known. II. 12 emphasises the difficulty of seeing Him by any ordinary means, yet says that He may be perceived by *adhyātma-yoga*. II. 20 and 23 set forth the greatness and subtlety of the Supreme Self and teach that He cannot be obtained by force of intellect, nor even by instruction in and knowledge of Scripture, but also affirm that to the man whose will is at rest in Him there comes, by His grace, a vision in which He makes His person manifest. The Third *Vallī* goes on to speak of the discipline of *yoga* by which a man's whole being may be unified and concentrated on the realisation of the Highest Person who is our inner and most real Self. This subject is resumed in *Vallī* VI. It begins with the picture of the world tree of which Brahman is the root, and goes on to speak of Brahman as the mysterious life and energy of the universe. This Brahman must be known if we are to escape death and transmigration and attain true, abiding reality, and He may be known, not indeed by the outward ranging senses and striving intellect, but by the thought which has been disciplined and concentrated within upon the Highest who is also the inmost Person, the Inner-Self,—Brahman. Thus, though we may not be able to demonstrate the existence of Brahman (since He is *alīṅga*, 'without empirical marks'), we may have a rational conviction of His existence as root or ground of the world and of our own being (as also from scripture and the communicated experience of spiritual teachers). Religion then begins with the conviction or rational faith in the Divine existence and this opens the way to the higher faith of spiritual experience (*adhyātma-yoga*), in which the real nature or inner being of God, which transcends description, is revealed or immediately realised.

The *Kaṭha Upaniṣad* does not describe the stages of this *adhyātma* or *rāja-yoga*,¹ but the *Maitrī Upaniṣad* and Patañjali

¹ Nor does it give any detailed account of the practice of *yoga*. For this as described in the *Svetāśvatara* and the *Gīṭā* see Appendix III.

later speak of them as *dhāraṇā*, *dhyaṇa*, and *samādhi*. Using these terms to express what we conceive to be the nature of the *adhyātma-yoga* of the *Kaṭha* we might summarize as follows. In *dhāraṇā* (concentration) the soul, when it has controlled the sense-life, concentrates attention on the thought of God. In *dhyaṇa* (contemplation) the soul is at rest in the thought of God. In *samādhi* (ecstasy) the thought of God wholly occupies the consciousness. "The sense of separateness, the consciousness of 'I' and 'my', disappears. We attain *sayujyatā*,¹ the consciousness of being completely yoked with God." "To him the Self reveals His own person." "His inner nature is made manifest."²

यदा सर्वे प्रमुच्यन्ते कामा वेऽस्य हृदि श्रिताः ।
अथ मर्त्योऽमृतो भवत्यत्र ब्रह्म समश्नुते ॥ १४ ॥

यदा सर्वे प्रभिद्यन्ते हृदयस्येह ग्रन्थयः ।
अथ मर्त्योऽमृतो भवत्येतावदनुशासनम् ॥ १५ ॥

14. *Yadā sarve pramucyante*
kāmā ye 'sya hṛdi śritāḥ,
Atha martyo 'mrto bhavaty
atra brahma samaśnute.

15. *Yadā sarve prabhidyaṇte*
hṛdayasya iha granthayaḥ,
Atha martyo 'mrto bhavaty
etāvad anusāsanam.

15.d. A. *etāvad hi anu°*

¹ "So when this chariot-rider is liberated from those things wherewith he was filled full and overcome, (i.e. delusion, passion, self-conceit, and attachment to external objects), then he attains complete union (*sāyujya*) with the Ātman." (*Maitrī* iv. 4.)

² We should remind ourselves once more of the great difference between the fully theistic *yoga* we have been considering and the *yoga* of Patañjali. In the latter God (*Īśvara*) is simply a special *puruṣa*, untouched by afflictions or the fruits of *karman*, who assists the devotee by removing the obstructions in the lower stages of *yoga*. Even then meditation on him is optional. In any case completed (*nirbīja*) *samādhi* is objectless, a trance supposed to lead to dissolution of the *citta* (including intellect, self-consciousness and mind) and the attainment by the *puruṣa* of *kaivalya*, the freedom of absolute isolation.

The Consummation of Yoga.

14. When all desires are given up
That dwell within the human heart,
Then a mortal becomes immortal,
Even here to Brahman he attaineth.
15. When are cut asunder all
The knots that fetter here the heart,
Then a mortal becomes immortal :
Thus far is the instruction.

14, 15. These verses refer to the state of *samādhi* (ecstatic union) in which yoga culminates, in which all separate desires, all self-will is given up. The knots of the heart, which bind it to a lower life, are *kāma* (self-seeking desire), *avidyā* (ignorance) and *saṃśaya* (fear and doubt). (See *Munḍ.* ii. 1. 10, ii. 2. 8.) When self is lost sight of in the vision of God all these knots are finally cut.

*Na paśyo mṛtyuṃ paśyati, na rogaṃ na śuta duḥkhatām ;
Sarvaṃ ha paśyaḥ paśyati, sarvaṃ āpnoti sarvaśaḥ.*

“The seer does not see death,
Nor sickness nor any distress :
The seer sees only the All,
Obtains the All entirely.”

Through such firm recollection (*dhruvā smṛtiḥ*), Sanatkumāra taught Nārada (*Ch.* vii. 26. 2) “the knots (of the heart) are unloosed. To such a one, his stains wiped away, is shown the further shore of darkness.”

What is the nature of the consummation here described ? Lanman has said that, “The great practical aim of all the teaching (of the Upaniṣads) is, by exterminating in the soul all desires and activity, root and branch, to lead to the realisation of the unity of the soul and the Supreme Soul. This realised it is liberated ; and death can only do away with what no longer exists for the emancipated soul, the last false semblance of a difference between itself and the Supreme.”¹

¹ *Transactions of the American Philological Association*, Vol. XXI, p. xiv.

At first sight our text might seem to justify this statement. But *Br. iv. 4. 7*, of which it may be a quotation, speaks of the man who is freed from desire not as being entirely impassive but as one "whose desire is satisfied, whose desire is the Self". And *Ch. viii. i. 5. 6*, distinguishes desires that fetter from "true desires" (*satya-kāmāḥ*) that liberate, and speaks of the Supreme Self also as *satya-kāmāḥ satya-saṅkalpaḥ* ("desiring and purposing truth").

Lanman's words are true of course for many Upaniṣad texts, but they are by no means generally true, the theistic element in the Upaniṣads being much stronger than was once supposed. In particular, the *Kaṭha Upaniṣad*, though quoting (in its second *adhyaīya*) from the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, and possibly affected in parts by the idealistic monism of Yājñavalkya, is on the whole distinctly theistic.

Verse 14, though in its context in *Br.* accompanied by the comment of Yājñavalkya, "Being very Brahman he goes to Brahman", does not in itself read like an assertion of metaphysical monism. It is rather a statement, in final answer to the third question of Naciketas, that that fellowship with God which is the consummation of spiritual experience is immortality. "This is life eternal, that they might know thee, the only true God." "The soul utterly puts off itself (i.e. its self-centred desires) and puts on divine love; and being conformed to that beauty which it has beheld, it utterly passes into that other glory." (Richard of St. Victor.)

Thus far is the instruction: These words seem to mark the end of the enlarged Upaniṣad (the original Upaniṣad ending at iii. 17). The remaining verses are a still later appendix.

शतं चैका च हृदयस्य नाड्यस्तासां मूर्धानमभिनिःसृतैका ।
तयोर्ध्वंमायन्नमृतत्वमेति विष्वङ्ङन्या उत्क्रमणे भवन्ति ॥ १६ ॥

अङ्गुलमात्रः पुरुषोऽन्तरात्मा सदा जनानां हृदये संनिविष्टः ।
तं स्वाच्छरौरात्प्रवहेन्मुञ्जादिवेधीकां धैर्येण ।
तं विद्याच्छुक्रममृतं तं विद्याच्छुक्रममृतमिति ॥ १७ ॥

16. *Śataṃ ca ekā ca hṛdayasya nāḍyas,*
tāsāṃ mūrdhānam abhiniḥṣṭā ekā ;
Tayā ūrdhvam āyan amṛtatvam eti,
viṣvaṅṅ anyā utkramaṇe bhavanti.
17. *Aṅguṣṭha-mātraḥ puruṣo 'ntarātmā,*
sadā janānāṃ hṛdaye saṃniviṣṭaḥ ;
Taṃ svāt śarīrāt pravṛhet,
muñjād-iva iṣīkāṃ dhairyaṇa,
Taṃ vidyāt śukram amṛtaṃ,
taṃ vidyāt śukram amṛtam—iti.

16.d. Two Mss. : *viśvag anyā.*

The parting of soul from body.

16. A hundred and one are the veins of the heart ;
Of these one leads up to the top of the head ;
Rising by this one attains immortality ;
The others are for going forth in various ways.
17. A thumb sized personage, the Inner-self,
Dwells ever in the heart of every creature :
Him from one's body one should draw,
Firmly, as from its sheath a reed :
Him know as the pure, the immortal ;
Him know as the pure, the immortal.

16. This verse is taken from *Chānd.* viii. 6. 6. There it is said that if a man has lived the chaste life of a student of sacred knowledge (*brahmacarya*) and so "found the Self", then at time of death his soul, dwelling in the heart, will pass upward by a vein or artery, known later as *suṣumnā* (*Maitri* vi. 21.—? the carotid vein) to an aperture in the crown of the skull

known as the *brahmarandhram* or *vidṛti* (the junction of the sagittal and coronal sutures, the opening in the child's skull known as the anterior fontanelle), by which at the beginning of life it first entered. Thence the soul arises by the sun's rays to the sun, which is a doorway to the Brahma-world to those who know, but a stopping place for non-knowers.

Śaṅkara, very naturally from his point of view, says that the verse only applies to those who have *not* attained the immediate knowledge of Brahman spoken of in the preceding instruction,—to those who by knowledge of the lower Brahman and by worship attain a relative immortality. With regard to the liberated man of the preceding section who “even here attains to Brahman”, the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* in the prose part of the section from which *Kaṭha* vi. 14 may be quoted, says, “His breaths (*prāṇāḥ*) do not go forth. Being very Brahman, he goes to Brahman”. Yājñavalkya pictures the body of the freed man as it appears to an outward observer, “As the slough of a snake lies on an ant-hill, dead, cast off, even so lies this body”. But the man himself “the incorporeal immortal life”, has not departed anywhere: being spirit, attaining Spirit, he is free from the form of space.

Chānd. viii. 6. 6 and *Bṛ.* iv. 4. 6. 7, are written, then, from very different view-points. The first with its mixture of quaint physiology and cosmology is naturalistic, the second is the view-point of idealistic metaphysics. To Śaṅkara these correspond to his *vyāvahārika* and *pāramārthika* points of view and he naturally takes vi. 16 as expressing the first. The editor of the *Kaṭha*, however, does not seem to have minded the discrepancy in the points of view of his sources, and *pace* Śaṅkara he certainly intends vi. 16, b, c, to refer to the completely freed man of 14 and 15. With Śaṅkara we take line d. to mean that the other veins are for leading the unliberated soul to re-embodiment.

17. This verse is distinctly composite, consisting of half a *triṣṭubh* stanza united with an *anuṣṭubh*. The half verse 17 a, b, is identical with Śvet. iii. 13, a, b, and there the verse is completed by the words found in *Kaṭha* vi. 9, c, d:

By heart, by thought, by the mind apprehended:
Those who know Him thereby become immortal.

मृत्युप्रोक्तां नचिकेतोऽथ लब्ध्वा विद्यामेतां योगविधिं च कृत्स्नम् ।
ब्रह्मप्राप्तो विरजोऽभूद्विमृत्युरन्योऽप्येवं यो विदध्यात्ममेव ॥ १८ ॥

इति षष्ठी वल्ली समाप्ता ॥

सहो सह नावतु । सह नौ भुनक्तु । सह वीर्यं करवावहै ।
तेजस्विनावधोतमस्तु । मा विद्विषावहै ॥

ॐ शान्तिः । शान्तिः । शान्तिः ॥

इति कठोपनिषत्समाप्ता ॥

18. *Mṛtyu-proktāṃ Naciketo 'tha labdhvā,*
vidyām elāṃ yoga-vidhiṃ-ca kṛtṣnam,
Brahma-prāpto virajo 'bhūd vimṛtyur,
anyo 'py evaṃ yo vid adhyātmam eva.

Iti ṣaṣṭhī vallī samāptā.

Om!

Saha nāv avatu;

Saha nau bhunaktu;

Saha vīryaṃ karavāvahai;

Tejasvi nāv adhītam astu;

Mā vidviṣāvahai;

*Om! śāntiḥ! śāntiḥ! śāntiḥ!*¹

Iti Kāṭhōpaniṣat samāptā.

¹ Some *Mss.* read: *Saha nāv-iti śāntiḥ.*

Conclusion.

18. Then Naciketas having gained the knowledge
Declared by Death, and the whole rule of Yoga,
Found Brahman and was freed from evil, freed from
death :

So may another who thus knows the Real Self.

Om! May He protect us both!

May He be pleased with us!

May we act manfully together!

Successful may our study be!

Let us not hate one another!

Om! Peace! Peace! Peace!

18. Whitney notes the use of the forms *Naciketa* and *viraja* for *Naciketas* and *virajas* as an indication of late and careless origin. Max Müller and Böhtlingk suggest that *viraja* may be a slip for *vijara*, "free from old age". Taking it as *virajas*, the meaning may be "free from earth's dust" (see the description of the gods seen by Damayanti, *Nala* v. 24), or ethically, "free from taint of evil", "free from passion". The final prayer, which repeats the opening, though not a part of the Upaniṣad is found in most manuscripts.

Here ends The Kātha Upaniṣad.

APPENDICES

I. *The Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa account of the Naciketas Story*, is really part of the Introduction.

II. *The Parable of the Chariot*, is partly introductory and in part gives the later development of the parable.

III. *The Practice of Yoga in the Gītā and Śvetāśvatara* illustrates the nature of *yoga* from the literature nearest in time and spirit to the *Kaṭha* and leads on to a concluding *Epilogue*.

IV and V are merely supplementary notes which have been placed here rather than in the body of the book so as not to distract the general reader.

The book as it stands is obviously incomplete. It was my intention to add two concluding chapters: One on *The Doctrine of God in the Kaṭha Upaniṣad*: the other on the whole theistic movement initiated by the *Kaṭha*, tracing the ideas of *puruṣa*, *akṣara-avyakta*, and *mahān ātmā* through the other early metrical Upaniṣads, (*Muṇḍaka*, *Śvetāśvatara* and *Praśna*), the *Vedānta-sūtras*, and the schools of the *Mahābhārata*. Here, in essence, we see the assertion of an internal differentiation within the unity of the Divine Being which presents obvious analogies to the Christian doctrine of the Trinity,—the philosophical object in both cases being to provide a basis for the reality of personality both in God and man, and so for real religious experience. Actually, however, it was from a religious experience of communion, which could not but be taken as real, that the philosophical doctrine in both cases has grown.

We may also see how the concept of the *akṣara-avyakta* has been developed in most untheistic directions into the independent *prakṛti* of the Sāṃkhyas and the *avidyā* or cosmic principle of illusion of Śaṅkara's Vedānta. Yet again the *avyakta*, which as divine creative energy is called in *Śvet. devātma-śakti*, and also the womb (*yonī*) from which creation is derived, being personified as female and called *śakti* and *devī* is used to provide philosophical justification for that goddess-worship which is perhaps India's most popular religion.

All this however requires much more than two chapters. This book therefore remains a *Preliminary Study* in the Hindu Doctrine of God, gathering material which we hope later to develop in more systematic form.

APPENDIX I.

The Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa account of the Nāciketā story.

उग्रन् वै वाजश्रवसः सर्ववेदसं ददौ । तस्य ह नचिकेता नाम पुत्र आस । तं ह कुमारं सन्तम् । दक्षिणासु नोयमानासु श्रद्धाऽऽविवेश । स होवाच । तत कस्मै मां दास्यसीति । द्वितीयं तृतीयम् । तं ह परीत उवाच । मृत्यवे त्वा ददामीति । तं ह स्मोत्थितं वागभिवदति । १

गौतमकुमारमिति । स होवाच । परेहि मृत्योर्गृहान् । मृत्यवे वै त्वाऽदामिति । तं वै प्रवसन्तं गन्तासीति होवाच । तस्य स्म तिष्ठो रात्रौरनाश्रागृहे वसतात् । स यदि त्वा पृच्छेत् । कुमार कति रात्रौरवात्सौरिति । तिष्ठ इति प्रतिब्रूतात् । किं प्रथमां रात्रिमाश्रा इति । २

प्रजां त इति । किं द्वितीयामिति । पशूंस्त इति । किं तृतीयामिति । साधुकृत्यां त इति, इति । तं वै प्रवसन्तं जगाम । तस्य ह तिष्ठो रात्रौरनाश्रागृह उवास । तमागत्य पप्रच्छ । कुमार कति रात्रौरवात्सौरिति । तिष्ठ इति प्रत्युवाच । ३

किं प्रथमां रात्रिमाश्रा इति । प्रजां त इति । किं द्वितीयामिति । पशूंस्त इति । किं तृतीयामिति । साधुकृत्यां त इति । नमस्ते अस्तु भगव इति होवाच । वरं दृशीष्वेति । पितरमेव जीवन्नयानीति । द्वितीयं दृशीष्वेति । ४

इष्टापूर्तयोर्मेऽपजितिं ब्रूहीति होवाच । तस्मै हैतमग्निं नाचिकेतमुवाच । ततो वै तस्येष्टापूर्ते नाक्षीषेते । नास्येष्टापूर्ते क्षीषेते । योऽग्निं नाचिकेतं चिनुते । य उ चैनमेवं वेद । तृतीयं दृशीष्वेति । पुनर्मृत्योर्मेऽपजितिं ब्रूहीति होवाच । तस्मै हैतमग्निं नाचिकेतमुवाच । ततो वै सोऽप पुनर्मृत्युमजयत् । ५

अप पुनर्मृत्युं जयति । योऽग्निं नाचिकेतं चिनुते । य उ चैनमेवं वेद, इति ।

Being desirous (of reward)¹ Vājasravasa gave away all his wealth. Now he had a son named Naciketas. When he was still a boy, as the offerings were being led away faith entered into him. He said, "Father, to whom will you give me?" Twice he asked and thrice. Then, overcome (with annoyance),² he said, "To Death do I give you".

As he stood up (to go) a Voice addressed him. It said to young Gautama,³ "He has said, 'Go to Death's house. To Death have I given you'. Go therefore while he is away from home. Stay in his house for three nights without eating. If he should ask you, 'How many nights have you stayed here, boy?'—say 'Three'. (When he asks) 'What did you eat the first night?' (answer) 'Your offspring'; 'What the second?' (answer) 'Your cattle'; 'What the third?' (answer) 'Your good works'."

He went (to Death's house) when he was away from home. He stayed in his house three nights without eating. When he returned he asked him, "How many nights have you stayed here, boy?" He answered, "Three." "What did you eat the first night?" "Your offspring". "What the second?" "Your cattle." "What the third?" "Your good works."

Then he (Yama) said, "I bow to you, Sir. Choose a gift." "May I return living to my father", he said. "Choose a second". "Tell me how my sacrifices and good works (*iṣṭā-pūrte*) may be imperishable", he said. So he explained to him this *Nāciketa* fire. Thereafter his sacrifices and good works did not perish. He who prepares the *Nāciketa* fire and who moreover thus knows it, his sacrifices and good works do not perish.

He said, "Choose a third gift". "Tell me the conquest of re-death (*punar-mṛtyu*)", said he. Then he explained to him this *Nāciketa* fire: thus indeed he conquered re-death. He who prepares the *Nāciketa* fire and who moreover thus knows it, he conquers re-death.

¹ Following Śaṅkara. But *uśan* here, if an adjective, may mean 'willing', "of his own free-will", or, as Bhaṭṭabhāskara Mīra says, *Uśan* may be a proper name, "Now *Uśan* Vājasravasa (i.e. descendent of Vājasravasa) gave away all his wealth". (See p. 58, 65.)

² Commentary, *krudhā-iva*,—"as though angry".

³ *Gautama-kumāram iti*—the translation given above is doubtful since *iti* should mark what is said. The commentator, Bhaṭṭabhāskara

APPENDIX II.

The Parable of the Chariot.

The theme of the chariot recurs many times in the history of Indian religious thought.

In Vedic mythology almost all the gods are represented as riding in cars, usually drawn by horses. In the case of the various Sun-gods this imagery is specially prominent and vivid. Sūrya is represented as riding in a golden chariot (*ratha*) drawn by seven bay mares. Savitṛ's shining chariot is drawn by two radiant horses.

So too to-day, two figures of horses precede the car of Jagannāth at Serampore, and four at Puri.

This imagery is often treated symbolically and we have a number of chariot parables. That of the *Kaṭha* is the most famous and important, but it may be of interest to examine some of the others.

(1) **The Dīrghatamas parable.** The first chariot parable is that found in *Rg Veda* I. 164 (see Introduction, page 13ff.). There the wheeled car with seven horses primarily denotes the sun, but the sun as symbolising the one universal reality. The sage then goes on to speak of that which possesses bone (the body) as sustained by the "boneless", i.e. by an incorporeal reality more fundamental than the blood or the life-breath, i.e. by the *ātman*, the invisible soul. This *ātman*, moreover, not only upholds the body but the whole universe.

(2) **The Aitareya Āraṇyaka parable.** *Ait. Ār.* II, i-iii, is considered by Keith¹ to be the earliest Upaniṣad extant. The general theme is the allegorical significance of the five-

Misra (c. 1188 A.D.) reads *Gautama kiṃ kumāram itī*, and comments, *Āha, he Gautama ! kiṃ kumāram itī, kim evam bālaṃ mṛtyave dadāsi*. Following him we should translate, "As he (Vājasravasa) stood up a Voice addressed him. It said, 'Gautama ! What of the boy ?' ('What kind of son have you given to Death ? Does this befit your Gautama race ?'). He (i.e. the father) said, 'Go to Death's house (that I may not sin). To Death, indeed, have I given you. But go while he is away from home, etc'."

Ṛṣīpūrtayor akṣitīm; "The imperishability of sacrifices and good works". The commentator reads, *ṛṣitīm=sthānam*: "The abiding-place of... good works".

fold hymn (*uktha*), sung in connection with the Mahāvratā rite, as symbolising the Self. "He who knows himself as the fivefold hymn from whence all springs is wise. . . . He who knows more and more clearly the Self obtains fuller being. In plants and trees sap only is seen, in animals consciousness. The Self is more and more clear in man for he is most endowed with intelligence. He knows to-morrow, he knows the world and what is not the world. By the mortal he desires the immortal, being thus endowed. As for animals, hunger and thirst comprise their knowledge. But this man is the sea, he is above all the world,—whatever he reaches he desires to be beyond it."

The chariot parable is introduced abruptly in II. iii. 8, as follows :

"Here are these verses :²

"That fivefold body the undying (*akṣara*) enters,
That which the harnessed steeds draw to and fro,
In which is yoked the trueness of the true,
In that are all the gods in one combined.

Which, from the undying, the undying joins,—
That which the harnessed steeds draw to and fro,
In which is yoked the trueness of the true,
In that are all the gods in one combined.

In which revealed the poets did rejoice,
In it, in unity, the gods exist ;
Casting aside all evil by this lore,
The wise man rises to the world of heaven."

¹ Keith, *The Aitareya Āraṇyaka* (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1909), from which the translation given above is quoted.

² *Tatra_ete ślokāḥ,*

*Yad akṣaram pañcavidhaṃ sameti,
yujō yuktā abhī yat samvāhanti,
Satyasya satyam anu yatra yujyate,
tatra devāḥ sarva ekaṃ bhavanti.*

*Yad akṣarād akṣaram eti yuktam,
yujō yuktā abhī yat samvāhanti,
Satyasya satyam anu yatra yujyate,
tatra devāḥ sarva ekaṃ bhavanti.*

*Yasmīn nāma samatṛpyāḥ chrute 'dhi,
tatra devāḥ sarvayujō bhavanti,
Tena pāpmānam apahatya brahmaṇā,
Svargaṃ lokam apyēti vidvān.*

"There is a chariot of the gods that destroys desire. Its seat is speech, its two sides the ears, the horses the eyes, the driver the mind. This life-breath (*prāṇa*) mounts upon it.

A Ṛṣi says (*Rg* X. 39. 12), 'Come hither on what is quicker than the mind', and (*Rg* VIII. 73. 2), 'On what is quicker than the winking of an eye'.¹

There is much in this passage that is obscure, but yet it would seem clear that we have here (especially in the verse portion which Keith considers the older), a foreshadowing of some of the most distinctive ideas of the *Kaṭha*.² The car of the body, made of the five elements, is drawn by horses, which the prose identifies with the eyes but the verse probably with all the *indriyāṇi* (described also as *devāḥ*). The soul, called in the prose *prāṇa* and in the verse *akṣara* ("the undying" or "imperishable") mounts the chariot of the body and so is united with the senses, controlling them by means of his driver, the mind (the *buddhi* of the *Kaṭha*) so that they act in unison. In the second verse the soul is called *akṣarād akṣara* ("undying from the undying"), and Sāyaṇa comments that the first "undying" is *prāṇa* and the second Brahman. It is Brahman also that is probably described as *satyasya satyam* ("trueness of the true", "reality of reality"). Brahman therefore or the *akṣara* (*avyakta*), being the basis of the soul, may truly be said to be yoked in the chariot, controlling all our life-powers to harmony. In verse 3 also, where Keith translates *brahmaṇā* "by this lore", Sāyaṇa says "by this Brahman".

(3) **The Chāgaleya parable.** The *Chāgaleya Upaniṣad* also speaks of the body as a chariot, sustained by its rider, the soul. The parable is introduced by a story which seems to be based on *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa* ii. 19. Certain Brahmin sages, holding a sacrificial session on the banks of the Sarasvatī, debarred Kavasa Ailūṣa from initiation because he was the son of a maid-servant. He asked by what right they did this. "Because we are Brahmins, and so it is our right." What makes

¹ *Anakāma-māro 'tha deva rathas. Tasya vāg uddāhiḥ, śrotre pakṣasī, cakṣusī yukte, manaḥ saṃgrahītā. Tad ayam prāṇo 'dhitiṣṭhātī.*

Tad uktam ṛṣinā, Ā tena yātaṃ manaso javīyasā. Nimisāś cij javīyaseti.

² i.e. *Yoga* and the *akṣara-avyakta*. Modi seems to have overlooked this passage which is of obvious importance for the development of the *Akṣara* doctrine.

a Brahmin? he asked. The birth-rites and initiation (*upanayana*), they replied. He then took them to the corpse of the celebrated Brahmin priest, Ātreya, which was lying close at hand, and asked, Did he lack birth-rites or *upanayana*? Then where are his powers departed? The Brahmins, being at a loss, asked that Kavasa would teach them. Surely such a low-born one cannot teach the highest persons, he smilingly said, and sent them to the Child-sages (*bālīśas*) of Kurukṣetra.

The Child-sages showed the Brahmins a chariot, rushing along a road, and then, at the end of the day, the same chariot tumbled down and inert, with its horses unyoked. What is the difference, they asked; What has departed from it? The driver, of course, said the Brahmins. Quite so, said the Child-sages. "The Soul is the impeller of this (body), the senses (*karaṇāni*) the horses, the veins the straps, the bones the reins, blood the lubricant, volition the whip, speech the creaking and the skin the outer top.¹ And just as the chariot, abandoned by the driver, could not move or creak, so (this body) abandoned by the intelligent self (*prajñātman*) neither speaks or even breathes; it just putrefies: and dogs may run at it, crows alight on it, vultures tear it, and jackals devour it."

No application of the teaching is made, but its obvious meaning is that the *ātman* is the one source of power and greatness, and caste and caste-privilege belong merely to the perishable body. The Brahmins, we are told, received the teaching and learned humility.

Belvalkar is inclined to date this parable earlier than the *Kaṭha* ("judged by language alone").² Of this we are doubtful. The account of the *bālīśas* is surely dependent on the *bālyā* teaching of *Bṛ.* iii. 5, and they correspond to the *vāḷakhilyas* of *Maitri* ii. 3.³ But for our purpose the question of priority is not important as the chariot parables of the *Kaṭha* and the *Chāgaleya* are obviously independent.

¹ *Ātmā vā asya pracodayitā, karaṇāny aśvāḥ, sirā naddhayo, 'sthiny upagraha, asṛg aṅjanaṃ, karma pratodo, vākyaṃ kvāraṇaṃ, tvag uparaha iti.* For the full text and translation see Belvalkar, *Four Unpublished Upaniṣadic Texts.*

² H.I.P. 132.

³ There are several other points of connection between *Chāgaleya* and *Maitri*, e.g. the description of the *Ātman* as *pracodayitr* (impeller) and

(4) **Buddhist chariot-parables.** There are several interesting Buddhist chariot-parables, all however later than the *Kaṭha* parable and quite different in their teaching.

(a) **The Dhammapada parable.** The oldest of these Buddhist chariot-parables is that found in the opening verses of the Kharoṣṭhī *Dhammapada*,¹ which seem to be taken from the *Saṃyutta Nikāya* :

“Straight” is the name that road is called,
 “Fearless” the quarter it leads to ;
 The chariot is named “Silent-runner”,
 With wheels of ‘right-effort’ well-fitted.
 “Conscience” is its leaning-board,
 “Heedfulness” its canopy ;
 “Dharma” I say is its driver,
 “Right views” the horses that draw it.
 Whoso has such a chariot,
 Be it wanderer or householder,
 Be it a man or a woman,
 By that very same chariot,
 Is carried right to Nirvāṇa.

Here the chariot is the Buddhist teaching which, in its silent spiritual progress, takes one straight to fearlessness, straight toward *Nirvāṇa*, and the *Dharma* itself is said to be the charioteer. The metre is the same as that of the *Kaṭha* parable.

(b) **The Milinda-pāṇha parable.** The most famous of the Buddhist chariot-parables is that found in *The Questions of King Milinda*,² (c. 1st century B.C.). Milinda (Menander), King of the Graeco-Bactrian kingdom which in India had its centre in Taxila, asks the Buddhist missionary Nāgasena what is his name. “I am called Nāgasena, he replies, but that is a mere name, a convenient designation, for there is no Ego here to be found.” “Then”, replies the king, “there is no Nāgasena”. “Pray sire, how did you come here?” “In a chariot.” “What is a chariot? Is it the pole?” “No.” “The wheels?” “No”. “The chariot-body?” “No”. “Then

the mention of his whip or goad (*pratoda*) which in *Chāg.* is called *karman* (probably “acquired disposition” rather than “volition”) and in *Maitrī*, *prakṛti-maya*.

¹ See Barua and Mitra, *Prākṛit Dhammapada*, 98. The rendering is my own with acknowledgments to Dr. Barua and Mrs. Rhys Davids.

² See Warren, *Buddhism in Translations*, 129ff.

there is no chariot." Then the monk goes on to teach the king that just as the word "chariot" is a convenient name for the assemblage of pole, axle, wheels, and body, so the word "Nāgasena" is only a convenient name for body, sensations, perceptions, consciousness, etc. "In the absolute sense there is no Ātman or Ego here to be found." "So the priestess Vagirā said in the presence of the Blessed One,

"Even as the word 'chariot' means
That members join to frame a whole,
So, when the groups appear to view,
We use the term, 'A living soul'."

Here we note that the very same simile which in the *Kaṭha* and all Hindu chariot-parables is used to point out that there must be a Self or Soul as the sustainer of the body and the directive power behind all its activities, is used to teach the opposite Buddhist doctrine, i.e. that of *anattā*, the denial of any continuing Self.

Buddhaghōṣa in the *Visuddhi-magga*¹ (5th century A.D.) expounds the parable as follows, "Just as the word 'chariot' is but a mode of expression for axle, wheels, body, pole, and other constituent members, placed in a certain relation to each other, but when we come to examine the members one by one we discover that in the absolute sense there is no chariot,—in exactly the same way the words 'living entity' and 'Ego' are but a mode of expression for the presence of five attachment groups, but when we come to examine the elements of being one by one we discover that in the absolute sense there is no living entity there to form a basis for such figments as 'I am' or 'Ego'."

(5) **The Maitri parable.** In the *Maitri*, which is probably the latest of the classical Upaniṣads, we have a very detailed development of the *Kaṭha* chariot-parable (ii. 3 to iv. 4). Here there is no distinction made between intelligence or reason (*buddhi*) and mind (*manas*), and it is said, "The charioteer is the mind". The two classes of *indriyāṇi* are clearly distinguished and it is said that "the horses are the organs of action" (*karmendriyāṇi*) while the senses or organs of perception (*jñānendriyāṇi*) are likened to the reins. As in the *Chāgaleya*

¹ See Warren, B.T.

the soul or self is called the "impeller" or "stimulator" (*pracodayitr*) of the body. As to the nature of the soul two accounts are given. According to the second *prapāṭhaka* there is really only one Soul. "Verily that subtle, ungraspable, invisible one called the *Puruṣa* turns in here (in the body) with a part (of himself)... Now assuredly that part of Him is what the intelligence-mass in every person is—the spirit (*kṣetra-jña*) which has the marks of conception, determination, self-conceit (*abhimāna*).” This would suggest that individual souls are parts (*aṃsa*) of the one *Puruṣa*, and a picture is given of the *Puruṣa*, called *Prajāpati*, differentiating himself and entering in to the living beings he creates that he may enjoy objects. But this is only appearance. The *Atman* or *Puruṣa* seems to wander from body to body but He is only covering himself with a veil of qualities—while remaining fixed like a spectator and self-abiding. "Yea He remains fixed."

The third *prapāṭhaka* gives a different account. It distinguishes between the inner *Puruṣa*, the great, immortal *Ātman*, and what it calls the *bhūtātman*,—the elemental or individual soul. This is called *kartṛ*, the doer, while the other *Ātman* dwells apart, pure and unaffected, "like the drop of water on the lotus leaf", and yet it is called "the causer of action" (*kārayitr*). The individual soul, we are told "is overcome by the qualities (*guṇa*) of Nature (*prakṛti*) and goes on to confusedness. Now because of confusedness he sees not the blessed Lord, the causer of action, who stands within oneself (*ātma-stha*). Borne along by the stream of qualities, unsteady, wavering, bewildered, full of desire, distracted, one goes on to a state of self-conceit (*abhimānatva*). In thinking 'This is I' and 'That is mine', he binds himself with his self, as does a bird with a snare." Here we see certain Sāṃkhya ideas but by no means in a classical Sāṃkhya form, for we are told in the next verse (iii. 3) that the pure Self is not without responsibility for this evil state of the individual. "Assuredly the *bhūtātman* is overcome by the inner *Puruṣa* and beaten by qualities." This agrees with ii. 6.d. where the *Puruṣa* or *Ātman*, called the "Impeller", makes use of the whip or goad of *prakṛti* (*prakṛti-maya pratodana*) to drive the body. We may infer (though we are not directly told) that the over-Soul

goads the individual to rush round and round amid the fancied delights of material objects that it may be "fed up" with them (*etaiḥ paripūrṇa*, iii. 5) and also with its self-conceit, and driven to seek salvation. For this the first rule is, as in the *Gītā*, pursuit of one's regular duty. Nothing can make up for lack of this. Then "by knowledge, by discipline (*tapas*), and by meditation Brahman is apprehended". "So when this chariot-rider is liberated from those things wherewith he was filled full and overcome, then he attains complete union (*sāyujya*) with the Ātman" (iv. 4).

APPENDIX III.

The Practice of Yoga in the *Gītā* and *Śvetāśvatara*.

The *Kaṭha Upaniṣad* does not give any directions for the practice of Yoga. It is clear, however, that by Yoga it does not mean (as the later Yoga so often did) the production of a hypnotic trance or ecstasy in which knowledge is superseded, but rather a discipline akin to meditative prayer by which all the powers of our being are controlled and concentrated for the vision of the highest. The earliest account of the practice of such *dhyāna-yoga* is probably that given in *Gītā* vi. 10-15.

"Abiding in a secret place, alone, with mind and soul controlled, without craving and without possessions, a Yogin should constantly yoke his soul.

Setting for himself in a clean place a firm seat, neither too high or too low, with *kuśa* grass, a skin and a cloth spread thereon.

There, sitting on that couch, with thought and sense restrained, making his mind intent (*ekāgra*, 'one-pointed'), he should practise yoga for the cleansing of the soul.

Firm, holding body, head and neck erect and still, gazing at the tip of his nose and not looking around.

Tranquil, free from fear and steadfast in the vow of continence, (*brahmacāri-vrata*), with mind controlled thinking on Me, so should he sit, yoked, intent only on Me.

Thus ever yoking his soul, the Yogin with mind restrained, attains the peace which culminates in bliss and which abides with Me."

The *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad* (ii. 8, 9, 10) gives an almost contemporary and very similar account.

"Holding his body steady, the three (upper parts) erect,
Restraining the senses with the mind in the heart,

A wise man with the Brahma-boat should cross over
All the fear-producing streams.

Repressing his breathing here (in the body), with movements
controlled,

One should breathe through the nostrils with diminished breath ;
Like that chariot yoked with vicious horses,
A wise man, undistracted, should restrain his mind.

In a clean place, free from pebbles, fire, and gravel,

By the sound of water and other surroundings

Favourable to thought, not offensive to the eye,

In a hidden retreat, sheltered from the wind, he should practise
yoga."

In both these accounts it is clear that place and posture are not regarded as important for their own sake, but are only means to secure undistractedness of meditation. On this matter even the much later *Yoga-sūtras* of Patañjali are content to say, "The posture should be steady and easy" (*sthira-sukham āsanam*). Re breathing, the *Gītā* in the passage quoted says nothing, though in iv. 29, it refers to *prāṇāyāma* (restraint of breath) as a kind of sacrifice offered by some ascetics, and v. 27, advocates level, steady breathing during meditation. The later *Yoga*, on the other hand, attached exaggerated importance to *prāṇāyāma*, ascribing to it the acquisition of all kinds of super-normal powers, and we see the beginnings of this even in the *Śvetāśvatara* (see ii. 11, 12).

The point, however to which we desire to draw attention is that both in the *Gītā* and *Śvetāśvatara* the practice of yoga as quoted above is essentially of the nature of contemplative prayer. In commenting on the word *Vipaścīt* (ii. 18, p. 105) and also in our account of contemplative sacrifice in the Introduction, p. 23, we pointed out that the fountain-head of the idea of yoga seems to be found in the prayers to Savitṛ (whose stimulation or inspiration enables the worshipper to "yoke mind and thought"), which occupy a central place in the directions for the piling of the fire-altar both in the *Taittirīya* and the *Kāṭhaka Saṃhitās* of the Yajur Veda. In introducing its description of yoga, *Śvet.* (ii. 1-7) first quotes these verses :

Yoking first of all the mind
And thoughts for truth, Savitṛ,

Discerning the light of Agni,
Brought it down to earth.

With mind well-yoked are we,
By inspiration of god Savitṛ,
With strength for gaining heaven.

They yoke their minds and yoke their thoughts,
The sages of the great wise Sage.

With Savitṛ as inspirer,
One should joy in the ancient prayer,
If there thou makest thy source,
The past besmears thee not.

Whether the *brah̄ma pūrvyam* of the last verse be rendered "ancient prayer" or "ancient Brahman" the reference to prayer as the inspiring power for ordered thought and life is very clear. It is tempting to see in "ancient prayer" a reference to the *Gāyatrī*, but, whether this is so or not, the use of the term *pracodayitṛ* ("stimulator") of the *Ātman* in both the *Chāṅgaleya* and *Maitri* chariot parables is plainly derived from the *Gāyatrī*. The *Maitri* indeed directly quotes,

"Let us meditate upon the adorable splendour
of that divine Vivifier (Savitṛ):
May He inspire our thoughts."
(*dhiyo yo naḥ pracodayāt*),—

and interprets of the *adhyātman* saying, "Assuredly the Soul of one's soul is called the Immortal Leader" (vi. 7).

In the *Gītā* the matter is plainer still. "Unswerving devotion to Me through undivided yoga, resort to a solitary place and distaste for the concourse of men", in words like these the nature of yoga in its highest aspect as the prayer of communion is made manifest. In the *Kaṭha* it is true this intensely personal yoga of *bhakti* is not attained, yet it seems clear that by yoga the *Kaṭha*, like the *Gītā*, means not only the discipline of control but the prayer of communion which inspires it. (Where the *Kaṭha* definitely falls short of the *Gītā*, however, is that it does not have anything to say about *karma-yoga*,— the right running of the chariot along the highway of social life.)

Epilogue.

We have insisted, perhaps ad nauseam, on the religious nature of yoga in the *Kātha* just because, as we have said, yoga has so often meant something quite different in spirit, though making use of somewhat the same outward practices—a negative yoga of suppression rather than a positive yoga of ordered control, a yoga which spite of its formal recognition of Īśvara is often essentially atheistic, a yoga which seeks not the illumination of a higher knowledge in communion with God but hypnotic trance or ecstasy in which all things fall away and the self is left isolated, in *kaivalya*, void of all conscious content. Even in its higher expression, e.g. in the *Yoga-sūtras* of Patañjali, this negative yoga, to which so much of India's highest effort has been devoted, has been a sadly sterile aberration. Just because India so greatly needs the positive yoga of control and self-realisation through communion, the essential diversity of the negative yoga of suppression and the extinction of personality must be so strongly insisted on.

In conclusion, one might perhaps profitably inquire wherein has lain the great attraction of this negative yoga for the Indian mind. One clue is given in the words of Professor Manilal Dvivedi in his Introduction to *The Yoga-sūtra of Patañjali* (p. ii), "The rule is clear that extinction of personality is the only way to real progress and peace. When one consciously suppresses individuality...he becomes part and parcel of the immutable course of nature, and never suffers." This attitude of mind and the negative yoga to which it leads is a relic of Buddhist pessimism. The Buddha, whether consciously or unconsciously, confused the metaphysical and the ethical meanings of *ahaṃkāra*. He rightly saw that *ahaṃkāra*, egoism or selfish individualism, is the root-cause of the sin and misery that set the world aflame and he went on to teach that the only way to cure it is to eradicate the notion of *ahaṃkāra* in the sense of self-conscious individuality or personality. This confusion, excusable perhaps in a teaching which had lost God and therefore could not find salvation in recalling man to the divine basis of his being, was inherited by Hindu teachings which professed to condemn Buddhism as atheistic,—by the

Yoga of Patañjali and also in a different form by the Vedāntism of Śaṅkara. It has even in part infected such theistic doctrines as Śaivism and Vaiṣṇavism.

There was a further inheritance also. Buddha, like the early Upaniṣad teachers, believed in the saving power of knowledge applied in a life of discipline. Some of his later followers, despairing of knowledge, sought for a short cut and they seemed to find it in the disappearance of the consciousness both of the outer world and of their own individuality in a state of trance. Hindu negative yoga also took the same fatal short cut.

So to-day the same message comes to India's youth as came to Naciketas, "Arise, awake! Obtain your boons and understand!"—the boon of the knowledge of God, promised to those who truly seek, no philosophic abstraction but Soul of our soul, our Creator, Redeemer, and Sustainer; the boon of the knowledge of ourselves, utterly weak and unworthy if we live in selfish isolation, yet sons of God, of infinite worth and unmeasured potency if yoked in communion with Divine wisdom and power; and the boon of service, of the privilege of using all the powers of our being, raised to their highest through communion with Him, in His service through the service of our fellow-men.

APPENDIX IV.

'Faith essential in Yōga.'

Additional Note on the interpretation of Kaṭha vi. 12, 13.

*Asti ity bruvato 'nyatra
katham tad upalabhyate ?*

We have taken *bruvataḥ* as ablative after *anyatra*, and render, "Otherwise than (by one) saying, 'He is', how is that one apprehended?" Or, more freely, "Except by one who says, 'He is', how can He be experienced?"

Professor F. W. Thomas has suggested that it would be better to render, "Otherwise than *from* one who says, 'He is'," i.e. from a true *guru*. I note that Geldner also (V.B. 168) adopts the same rendering. "Wie könnte es anders erfasst werden als von einem (Lehrer), der sagt, er ist?" "How could He otherwise be apprehended than from one (i.e. a Teacher) who says, 'He is'?" Charpentier also who follows him says that he gives the only possible meaning. Among Indian commentators Madhva interprets in the same way.

With all deference to such authorities I still venture to think that the rendering I have adopted is grammatically quite as admissible and, on the whole, preferable. In any case the assertion of the need of faith remains, even though it is in the first place the teacher's faith which is communicated to his pupil.

I note that Whitney, Arabinda Ghose, Sitarama Sastri, and Tattva-bhusan render substantially as I have done. The gist of Śaṅkara's comment is, *Staddadhānād anyatra....katham tad brahma tattvataḥ upalabhyate ?* "Except by a man who has faith, how can Brahman be truly apprehended?"

Verse 13. Carrying on the idea of teacher and pupil, Professors Thomas, Geldner, and Charpentier all interpret *ubhayoḥ* as meaning "for both (teacher and scholar)". So Geldner renders, "Nur mit dem Wort 'er ist' wird er fassbar als das wahre Wesen für beide. 'Er ist', wer ihn so auffasst, dem wird sein wahres Wesen klar". "Only with the statement, 'He is' does He become apprehensible as the true Essence, for both (teacher and scholar). 'He is',—who so apprehends Him, to him His true essence (substance or nature) becomes clear". Thomas renders, "Only by the statement, 'He is', is He to be known in His true nature, by both parties".

Geldner however apparently has certain doubts, for he gives the alternative, "as the true essence of both: i.e. of both the personal and the highest Ātman". He also adds, "according to Rāghavendra, however, of the Prakṛti and Puruṣa of the Sāmkhya philosophy".

APPENDIX V.

Notes on the Dīrghatamas Hymn.

- 1* (1) *Asya vāmasya palitasya hotus
tasya bhrātā madhyamo asty aśnaḥ,
Tṛtīyo bhrātā ghytarṣṭho asya
atra apasāyam viśpatiḥ sapta-putram.*

Ancient of days: Geldner, *altersgrauen*,—hoary with age. The word *palita* which originally appears to mean grey or pale (*cf.* Gk. *πελιτός*, *πολιός*, L. *pallidus*, E. pale), seems at first inapplicable to the sun, but through the meaning grey-haired, hoary with age, it comes, like *πολιός* to mean ancient, venerable. *Cf.* Daniel's description of the Ancient of days (vii. 9) and *Revelation* i. 13-16. Also Francis Thompson's *Orient Ode*.

Vāma: *cf.* the *Upakosala-vidyā*, *Ch.* iv. 15. 2.

Aśna is taken by Sāyana to mean *sarvatra vyāpta* (all-pervading) and is interpreted as referring to Air (Vāyu). Sāyana apparently derives from 1√*aś*—to reach, attain, but most modern philologists from 2√*aś* (*aśnāti*)—to eat (so B.R., Uhlenbeck), so that it means the voracious (B.R.) or hungry one (Geldner, *der Hungrige*). B.R. apply to Lightning, but Geldner denies both this and Sāyana's interpretation, taking the three brothers as the three sacrificial fires,—the Āhavanīya, the Dakṣiṇa and the Gārhapatya, the Dakṣiṇa being called "hungry" because the sacrifices come preferably to the Āhavanīya. This is not convincing. There is a certain truth, since the Āhavanīya represents the celestial Agni, the Dakṣiṇa is connected with the *antarikṣa* and the Gārhapatya with the household. But, as Keith remarks, the three forms of Agni explain the three altar fires and not vice versa (R.P.V. 157). *Aśna* then is probably the lightning fire and may perhaps be regarded as a variant of the more common name *aśani*. Now *aśani* appears in various passages, e.g. V.S. xxxix. 8, and Ś.B. vi. 1. 3. 7 as cognate with Rudra or Mahādeva, the destroyer, and they are said to be forms of Agni.

Atra (Here) may mean in the first brother (the Sun) or the third brother (so Geldner who says that the Gārhapatya fire is *Stammherrn* (*Viśpati*—Lord of the race or family). Or again it may refer to all three brothers: so Sāyana says *atra=atreṣu bhrātṛeṣu madhye*,—taking *Viśpati* as *Paramēvara*, the supreme Lord, manifest in three forms.

- 2* (2) *Sapta yuñjanti ratham ekacakram,
eko aśvo vahati saptanāmā ;
Triṇābhi cakram ajaram anarvaṃ
yatra imā viśvā bhuvanā 'dhi tasthuh.*

- 3* (4) *Ko dadarśa prathamam jāyamānam,
asthanvaṃtam yad anasthā bīharti ;
Bhūmyā asur asṛg atmā kva svit,
ko vidvāṃsam upa gāt praṣṭum etat.*

Geldner renders line c, "Where is the life-spirit, blood, and soul of the earth". So, in effect, Griffith, Regnaud, and Whitney. Geldner interprets of the first living being and mother earth. Sāyana of the *avyakta* or *avyākṛta* (the *prakṛti* of the Sāṃkhya or *Iśvarāyatta* or "God-dependent" *māyā* of the Vedantins) and the created or manifest world.

- 4* (6) *Acikītvāñ cikītuśaś cid atra
kavīn pṛcāmi vidmane na vidvān,
Vī yas tastambha ṣal imā rajāṃsy
ajasya rūpe kim api svid ekam.*

- 5* (20) *Dva suparṇā sayujā sakhāyā
samānam vṛkṣam pari śasvajāte,
Tayor anyah pippalam svādv atty
anaśnann anyo abhi cākaśīti.*

Geldner interprets the tree as the tree of knowledge, and the birds as two kinds of seekers after knowledge,—those who seek the higher wisdom and the non-speculative.

6* So Sāyana. Regnaud considers Agni is the speaker.

- (33) *Dyaur me pitā janitā nābhīr atra
bandhur me mātā pṛthivī mahīyam.*

Nābhīr atra—'Here's the navel' or connecting link. Sāyana says *atra* = *asmīn antarikṣe*—'this mid-world'. Cf. x. 90. 14, and note that x. 90. 16, is identical with I. 164. 50. Or *nābhī* may refer to the Sun, the seat of Vivasvat, father of Yama, the first man. (Keith, R.P.V. 113.)

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
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ADDENDA AND CORRIGENDA

- Page xviii. Square brackets in the transliterated text denote that the words enclosed should be omitted as hypermetrical.
- P. 9, note 1, read S.K. for S.P.
- „ 21, line 11, „ Kavaṣa for Kavasa; also pages 218-9.
- „ 45, „ 8, „ lokās „ lokas.
- „ 74, „ 16, „ *svijñeyam*: so A and majority of MSS.: B.C. have *svijñeyam*.
- „ „ „ 3, „ *svijñeyam* in Nāgarī text also.
- „ 98, „ 16, „ *kṛta-akṛtāt* for *kṛta-akṛtāt*.
- „ 110, „ 11, „ *mada-amadaṃ* „ *mada-amadaṃ*.
- „ 114, „ 27, „ *ātma-kāmasya* „ *ātmā-kāmasya*.
- „ 122, „ 19, „ *ātmā* or *ātma*? *ātmā* (= *ātmānam*) may, like *bhoktā*, be taken as predicative acc. with nom. form, (see Macdonell, V.G.S. 196 β.). But Śaṅkara reads *ātma* in the sense of *śarīra* and takes it as member of the compound *ātma-indriya-manoyuktaṃ* which is adj. qualifying *ātmānam* understood, (“the soul, joined with body, senses, and mind, etc.”).
- „ 126, note 3, delete 4 before Loeb.
add It is interesting to note that the car of Jagannāth at Serampore (Mahesh) has two horses, one white and one black, but I have not been able to obtain any traditional explanation of the symbolism.
- „ 129, line 3, read [*niyacchet*].





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